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'SOVIET RUSSIA
AND
THE FAR EAST

BY
DAVID J. DALLIN

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1949

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Preface

In Soviet Russia's international relations Europe has always occupied a more important place than has the Far East; for a comprehension of Soviet policies, however, the Far East is at least as important as Europe. In east Asia, Soviet policy could set itself its most ambitious goals, develop new political methods, and test new techniques long before they could be applied in Europe. (As early as the 'twenties the Far East had emerged as an important workshop of new devices and strategies in Soviet international activities. A China ripe for the great upheaval; Japan as a buffer against the Anglo-Saxon world; a Manchurian railway worth fighting for; Outer Mongolia as the first Soviet satellite state; Tannu Tuva, the first area to complete the full course from "sovereignty" and "integrity" to the position of a third-rate province of the Soviet Union—these were the major elements of a peculiar policy conducted from Moscow: a policy often successful, sometimes miscalculated, but always a policy *sui generis*, bold, and dynamic, peaceful in relations with a superior power, aggressive toward inferior force.) In this scheme of things, the Soviet Far East itself became an advanced military base, a stronghold in the Pacific constantly being fortified for further action; an outpost of Soviet might, and a base for expansion. Many a misconception and many an error in evaluation of Soviet policy in general could have been avoided had the Far Eastern pattern been better known and understood. \

Strictly speaking, "the Far East" is an inexact designation for this book. Embracing, as it must, relations between the Soviet Union on the one hand and China, Japan, and Korea on the other, the subject matter of this volume could not be limited to that sector of land in eastern Asia and the adjacent islands that are usually called the Far East. Russian relations with China have extended deep into central Asia; Chinese Turkestan and Mongolia have been important objects of Sino-Soviet contests. This book must therefore also be concerned with the peripheral areas of

China. Furthermore, no work dealing with Soviet foreign policy in the Far East would be complete if it did not consider the activities of the Communist parties in the countries of the Orient. Sometimes these parties proclaimed proudly and publicly the ties that bound them to Moscow; at other times they preferred to parade as "independent" and "nationalist" forces. Actually, they at no time ceased to function as an arm of Soviet international activities.

Chronologically this volume begins with the crucial year 1931 and covers the period down to the present time. This book constitutes a part of my work on Russian policy in the Far East which will embrace a period of about 90 years, from the date of the Russian acquisition of the key area in the Pacific to our days. The history of the period from 1860 to 1930 is the subject of a companion volume to be published in the spring of 1949.

The author wishes to express his gratitude to Eugene Davidson, of the Yale University Press, at whose suggestion this work on the Far East was undertaken; to Professor M. Pavlovsky, of Shanghai, for valuable assistance in placing at my disposal important data and source material; to Professor Robert T. Oliver for his expert advice on Korean problems; to Professor Harry R. Rudin for comments and suggestions concerning this manuscript; to Alexander Dallin for research and assistance in the literary shaping of the book; and to Mrs. Tilly Klorman for valuable aid in editing the manuscript.

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Part I. Japan in the 'Thirties

I

Militant Japan

September, 1931, marked a turning point in the history of the Far East. With the Japanese invasion of Manchuria a distinct period had ended—the nine years of circumspect Japanese policy after Japan's setbacks at the Washington Conference of 1922. The new era that now began was destined to last 14 years—down to the signing of the armistice aboard the *Missouri* on September 2, 1945.

Japan was conscious of her new and strong position. From the events in the late 'twenties she had arrived at the conclusion that the time was propitious for a new advance onto the mainland of Asia and the islands of the Pacific. She had drawn all the consequences from the happenings that surrounded the brief but illuminating Sino-Soviet war of 1929 when China made an attempt to regain control of northern Manchuria by seizing the Chinese Eastern Railway. Japan's policy aimed at the maintenance of the status quo; Tokyo gave the green light to the Red Army's operations against China, while Moscow rejected all efforts of the United States to mediate the conflict.

The armed conflict of 1929 had revealed to the world the actual relationship between the powers in the Far East, the weakness of some and the strength of others. It had again revealed the utter impotence of China and her inability to resist foreign pressure; the Soviets' violent opposition to any interference of the Western Powers in Far Eastern affairs, and their inclination to cooperate with Japan; the reluctance of Britain and the United States to resort to force in the face of joint Japanese-Soviet opposition. Only now did it become clear how swiftly Japan's power had grown since her misfortunes of 1922-23. The Soviet Union had been the victor in the struggle with China, but the fruits of Soviet victory were reaped by Japan.

A direct line leads from the Sino-Soviet conflict of 1929 to Japan's invasion of Manchuria in 1931, to the dislodging of Russia

from the Northeastern Provinces of China, to the outbreak of war with China in 1937, to Pearl Harbor in 1941. It is not too much to say that the experiences of 1929 encouraged Japan to risk an attempt at grand-scale conquest on the Chinese mainland and in the western Pacific. These invasions and wars, detrimental to both Russia and the United States in the Far East, could have been averted in the initial phases of the process. Effective resistance to Japan was possible only through cooperation of Russia and the United States in Manchuria.

"American intervention" in 1929 was more than once rejected by the Soviet Government, which clearly foresaw that the simple "mediation and conciliation" which the Western Powers advocated would have led to far-reaching changes if accepted. The Soviet Government expected that a settlement reached with the aid of the United States might lead to eventual internationalization of the Chinese Eastern Railway and probably of a great number of other Manchurian enterprises as well. In general penetration by other powers into Manchuria would not be limited to economic activities, but would deprive Russia (and Japan) either partially or completely of control and supremacy over the Chinese province.

The creation of some form of international supervision in Manchuria was probably the only alternative to Japan's conquests, China's defeats, and the retreat and humiliation of Russia during the 1930's. Russian interest demanded cooperation with Japan's antagonists, but such a policy, for a number of reasons, ran counter to Stalin's general outlook. In Communist ideology and emotions, the United States and Great Britain always appeared as the purest embodiment of capitalism and imperialism, and cooperation with the United States would be considered only as a last resort in any difficult situation. Moscow's animosity toward the American and British Governments had led more than once to a Soviet rapprochement with Germany and Japan—even with Nazi Germany and saber-rattling Japan—in opposition to London and Washington. Out of these ideological and emotional barriers to cooperation with America there emerged political misconceptions and predictions, concepts that were not only erroneous but sometimes fatal. Stalin still anticipated that the antagonism between Britain and the United States would lead to a war between them, that Japan would

team up with England, and that the struggle would relieve the position of the Soviet Union in the Far East. With this prospect in view, Stalin's policy was aimed at maintenance of good-neighbor relations with Japan and the avoidance at all cost of conflict with her.)

Out of this miscalculation there developed, during the early 'thirties, a policy which was sometimes interpreted abroad as a Russo-Japanese alliance against China as well as against the Western Powers. An actual tight alliance never, of course, existed, although Moscow and Tokyo remained on the most friendly terms when Japan invaded Manchuria, and Moscow then rendered Japan valuable services. But when Japan turned against the Soviet Union, Russia found herself isolated both from the West and from Japan and was obliged to retreat. As a result, between 1933 and 1935 the Soviet Union withdrew from Manchuria. Then began the diplomatic as well as military rearguard actions for Mongolia and the Maritime Provinces of the Soviet Union.

By September, 1931, Soviet relations with China had once again reached the freezing point. There was not even mutual diplomatic recognition of the two governments, although the Great Powers had recognized the government of Nanking in 1928-29.

During these years—1930-31—Soviet relations with Japan were at their best. Whatever disputes arose from time to time concerned purely economic matters which were always settled amicably and which did not becloud the Far Eastern sky. With great satisfaction Molotov reported to the Fifth Congress of Soviets in May, 1929, that "not a single political conflict is recorded between the Soviet Union and Japan during the years which elapsed since the signing of the treaty [of 1925]." ¹ He declared that all pending controversies had been settled and that he hoped that any future controversies would also be settled amicably. Similar statements were made by Japanese leaders.

On September 18, 1931, the Japanese Army started its invasion of Manchuria. The events that followed created an immense sensa-

1. Later Litvinov recalled more than once the period of friendship between the Soviet Union and Japan. "From the time of the Peking agreement [of 1925]," he told the Central Executive Committee, for example, in December, 1933, "to the end of 1931, the best good-neighborly relations existed between us and Japan." *Izvestiya*, December 30, 1933.

tion. They caused considerable anxiety throughout the world, and not least in the Narkomindel, the Soviet Foreign Office. The Japanese Ambassador to Moscow, Koki Hirota, conferred with Litvinov and his aide Lev Karakhan every few days. To dispel Soviet fears Hirota made a categorical statement that Japan would limit her military activities to the south of Manchuria; that she would not penetrate into the sphere of the Chinese Eastern Railroad. Thus a sort of partition of Manchuria was suggested by Hirota and, in fact, accepted by Litvinov.²

Armed with this declaration, the Soviet Government decided to pursue a policy of "strict neutrality" in the struggle between Japan and China. The Soviet press did not attack Japan for the invasion; and when it did react to the historical events it hinted that powers other than Japan were the real culprits. *Izvestiya* wrote on September 21, 1931: "The impression has been created that the Japanese action was well prepared in the sense of coordination with other imperialist powers." The official publication of the Comintern stressed the fact that "behind the Far Eastern crisis lies hidden the antagonism between England and America,"³ and the Communist International officially declared in a manifesto of its Executive Committee: "The imperialists of France have given their blessings to the Japanese occupation of Manchuria . . . The League of Nations organizes the partition of China. American capitalism insistently seeks its share of the booty . . ." ⁴

There was no basis for such an accusation, but it was in line with the Soviet policy of continuing to oppose the Western Powers and soften relations with Japan.

Japan was satisfied with Soviet neutrality. "From the very beginning of the Chinese incident," the Japanese Ambassador to Moscow told the Narkomindel on October 28, 1931, "there have occurred no events between us which would reflect on our relations, and this must be considered a great good fortune."

2. The exact wording of this important declaration has never been made public, because the Japanese promptly broke the pledge, and because it implied some agreement between Moscow and Tokyo in regard to the partition of Manchuria. Litvinov, however, often referred to this Japanese statement: in December, 1933, for example, he told the Central Executive Committee that "Japan gave us official assurances that her troops would not go further than Manchuria proper." The term "Manchuria proper" as used by Litvinov was hardly the same as used by Japan.

3. *Kommunistichesky International* (1932), No. 11.

4. *Pravda*, November 6, 1931.

Meeting with no serious resistance, the Japanese Army within the course of a few months occupied all of Manchuria. On February 18, 1932, "the independence of the Northeastern Provinces"—the official term for Manchuria—was proclaimed. Two weeks later the establishment of the new state of Manchukuo was announced to the world, and Henry Pu Yi, a descendant of the ancient Manchu dynasty of China, was made its chief executive; a year later he was elevated to the imperial throne. In September, 1932, one year after the invasion, a protocol of alliance was concluded between Japan and Manchukuo, making the defense of Manchukuo the concern of Japan.

THE APPEASEMENT OF JAPAN

To maintain neutrality between the legitimate government and the invader was not an easy task, especially in view of the peculiar Soviet position in Manchuria; it was often impossible to be impartial. On the Chinese Eastern Railroad Soviet agents had to work with their Chinese colleagues appointed by the defeated but legal Manchurian Government; Manchurian generals fighting the Japanese claimed the right to use the railroad since technically 50 per cent of it belonged to China; Manchurian consuls were stationed in the Soviet Far East. As the course of events forced Russia to take sides, Moscow decided to favor Japan.

The Japanese occupation spread at a rapid pace. By the end of October southern Manchuria was firmly in the invaders' hands and the Japanese Army was approaching the zone of the Chinese Eastern Railroad. Japan had no serious intention of sticking to her promise, given Litvinov at the beginning of the campaign, to stay out of the Soviet sphere. On the other hand, there was some apprehension in Tokyo that in case of a Japanese advance into the north, the Red Army might cross the Manchurian border. Tokyo sent a note to Moscow presenting utterly unfounded accusations against the Soviet Union. It alleged that Russian authorities were giving assistance to the Chinese general Ma Chan-san, who was resisting the Japanese forces in the north. The note concluded with a sharply worded threat to the effect that in the event of a movement of Soviet troops into the territory of the Chinese Eastern, Japan "would be compelled to defend her citizens and guard the Taonan-Tsitsihar Railroad." The very next day a reassuring reply

came from Moscow. Karakhan informed the Japanese Ambassador that Russia not only was not helping General Ma but, in general, had no intention of interfering in the Manchurian conflict. Soon afterward Litvinov himself made a statement to the Japanese envoy concerning Soviet nonintervention, complaining that "certain circles" in Japan were trying to complicate Soviet-Japanese relations by dishonest accusations. Similar exchanges took place concerning the disposition of another Manchurian army, that of the anti-Japanese Gen. Su Ping-wen; General Su's army had fled across the Soviet border and was disarmed and interned by the Soviet authorities. The Japanese demanded its extradition. When Karakhan refused Tokyo insisted on a Soviet promise that interned Chinese would not be returned to China. "If they are sent to China," the Japanese stated on December 8, 1932, "they will conduct agitation harmful to Japan and Manchukuo and be surrounded with sympathy by the Chinese and will probably become heroes." But the Soviet Government would not comply with this request either.

The fate of these Chinese troops was nothing short of sensational. They were later transferred to central Asia, rearmed, and used in the invasion of the Chinese Province of Sinkiang which was aimed at detaching the area from Chiang Kai-shek's control and establishing it as a semidependency of the Soviet Union.⁵

Late in the year Japanese troops entered the terrain of the Chinese Eastern. As they were approaching Tsitsihar, on November 19, the Soviet Ambassador in Tokyo was informed that the operation would take only four or five days and that the troops would leave after completing a certain maneuver. They did not; instead, they continued their advance and within two months occupied all of northern Manchuria. On February 5, 1932, they entered Harbin, the Russian capital of northern Manchuria. By that time the occupation had been completed and Japan could proceed with the consolidation of her newly won empire of Manchukuo.

If the true intentions of Japan were concealed at the beginning of the invasion, and if the promises of her government were given credence at the outset, by December, 1931, there was no longer

5. Cf. Chap. VI.

any doubt. There was, however, no change in Soviet policy. Repeated demonstrations were given of a firm Soviet adherence to its "peace policy"—meaning nonopposition to Japan's drive. Thus, in December the secretary of the Czech legation at Moscow, Karel Vanek, allegedly attempted to kill the Japanese envoy. He was denounced by an obscure employee of the People's Commissariat for Communication, Goditsky, and accused of having plotted the assassination in order to "complicate Soviet-Japanese relations and provoke war." Vanek was obliged to leave the USSR. The political charges were concocted but the incident was used as a basis for accusing third persons and powers of wishing to provoke a Soviet-Japanese conflict.

On December 31 Litvinov proposed to Japan the conclusion of a nonaggression pact. Coming at the height of the Japanese campaign, this offer produced a profound impression. It was obvious that along with the plain promise of nonaggression, Moscow was ready and willing to make certain concessions to Japan. The world press interpreted this move as the beginning of an actual alliance between the Soviet Union and Japan, and the denials of the official Tass agency did not dispel this impression. Japan did not reply to the Soviet offer for about a year, and when the answer came, in December, 1932, it was in the form of a rejection. Before such a pact could be signed, Japan contended, the numerous unsolved problems dividing the Soviet Union and Japan must be settled. In subsequent years the Soviet press and Foreign Office repeatedly returned to this offer, but always with the same result. It was not until ten years later, in April, 1941, when Japan was already preparing to strike in the Pacific, that she felt ready to sign the non-aggression pact with Russia.

In her demands on Russia, Japan resorted to the cynical argument that a short time earlier Russia had won her war against China because of the benevolent noninterference of Japan; now Japan expected the same neutral treatment from Russia. One Japanese note, demanding the cessation of Chinese troop transports on the Chinese Eastern, frankly began: "During the Soviet-Chinese conflict of 1929, the Imperial Government maintained a policy of strict neutrality." This line of reasoning was embarrassing to Litvinov. In his reply he denied any similarity between the Russian drive of 1929 and the Japanese invasion of 1931; however, he did accede

to the Japanese demands, promising that "in no case will the Soviet Government agree to the transport of troops of either side to the front."

But soon Japan raised further demands. In January-February, 1932, the Tokyo government asked for permission to transport Japanese troops on the Russo-Chinese line to Harbin. This involved a question of principle. If permission was granted the next step, obviously, would be the use of the railroad by Japan to transport troops to the Soviet border. But Moscow could not reject the Japanese request. Its reply stated that the decision would be left to Russia's Chinese colleagues on the board of the railroad; if they consented, Moscow would likewise give its approval.

The Japanese took the hint. The Chinese president of the line, Mo Teh-hui, appointed by the former Manchurian regime, was dismissed along with some other Chinese officials, and new people, willing collaborators of the Japanese, were appointed in their place; their role of puppets was plain. Li Shao-king became the nominal president of the railroad. With Soviet consent, the new flag of Manchukuo was hoisted over the building of the Chinese Eastern Railroad in Harbin on March 21, 1932, and permission for the use of the line for Japanese troop transports was granted. More than anything else, this last move served to reinforce the world-wide impression of a secret alliance between Japan and the Soviet Union.

Soon the Soviet Government made another friendly move toward Japan. In April it asked for the recall of the Manchurian consul in Blagoveshchensk appointed by the former Manchurian Government. Moscow contended that he had cooperated with the anti-Japanese General Ma. Later it proceeded to forbid all activities of the former Manchurian consuls. This Soviet policy of consistent and considered appeasement of Japan became obvious also in the Soviet stand on the League of Nations inquiry.

When the League of Nations, after prolonged deliberation, decided to dispatch an investigating commission—the so-called Lytton Commission—to Manchuria, on April 20, 1932, Sir Eric Drummond, Secretary-General of the League of Nations, invited the United States and Soviet Russia to take part in the work of the commission, despite strong protests from Tokyo. The United States consented to take part and appointed Gen. Frank R. McCoy to the commission. The Soviet Union, obviously in deference to

Japan, refused to participate. Litvinov's reasoning was hardly convincing. In his note of March 7 he said:

The Soviet Government, desirous from the very beginning of the Sino-Japanese conflict of preventing the further extension of armed conflict and the possibility of its becoming the source of a new world conflagration, adopted a course of strict neutrality.

The Soviet press continued to lambaste the League. When the commission finally concluded its work it presented its findings to a number of interested governments. In its report it said to the Soviet Union:

It is clear that any solution of the problem of Manchuria which ignored the important interests of the USSR would risk a future breach of the peace and would not be permanent . . . If the Government of the USSR desired to participate in the nonaggression and mutual assistance section of such a treaty, the appropriate clauses could be embodied in a separate tripartite agreement.

Writing in *Izvestiya* ⁶ Karl Radek ridiculed the commission and its report; as to the above proposal to Russia, he termed it "an attempt to bribe the USSR and to induce it to join a possible anti-Japanese front."

In February, 1933, Mr. Drummond again appealed to the Soviet Union to join the permanent League Commission on Manchurian Affairs. Litvinov again refused, offering various reasons for his government's stand. Summarizing the Soviet position, he stated, "The Soviet Government has adopted a course of strict neutrality."

RELATIONS DETERIORATE

Soviet-Japanese relations during this period were also influenced by the continuing struggle between the aggressive military and the conservative civilian factions in Japan. Acts of terrorism, assassinations of ministers, and unauthorized operations by the army became characteristic traits of Japanese public life in the 'thirties. The so-called Kwantung Army, after its spectacular victories in Manchuria, became the backbone of the expansionist elements. It repeatedly acted without prior consent from Tokyo, and fre-

6. October 12, 1932

quently confronted the government with a *fait accompli*. More than once it aggravated Russo-Japanese relations, leaving it up to the Tokyo Foreign Office to bear the consequences and to rationalize the daring and dangerous actions in diplomatic language. A program of immediate invasion of the Russian Far East was voiced after the beginning of 1932, not only in secret documents but now also in public addresses. Influential individuals and groups in Japan advocated war with Russia.

In February, 1932, a trainload of Japanese soldiers was blown up near Harbin; 40 officials of the Chinese Eastern were arrested by the Japanese. A general strike of railway workers ensued. The Soviet side accused Russian "Whites" of responsibility for blowing up the trains; this was not correct, since the politically active "Whites" were supporting the Japanese. It was actually an act committed by Manchurian guerrillas. Japan sent a punitive expedition to "pacify" the province. For some time all train movement was interrupted.

On March 4, 1932, *Izvestiya* published an article which was reprinted throughout the Soviet press. For the first time it spoke of "Japanese provocations"; it quoted Japanese documents demanding war against Russia and the occupation by Japan of all of Siberia east of Lake Baikal.

"Since the first days of the Far Eastern conflict, the Soviet Union has occupied a position of strict neutrality . . . Foreign Minister Yoshizawa has confirmed in the parliament that the Soviet Union is maintaining strict nonintervention." But certain Japanese circles—the article continued—openly advocate immediate war on the Soviet Union. It went on to quote Stalin's dictum that "We don't want a single spot of foreign soil; nor will we give up to anyone a single inch of our own territory." The article concluded by stressing the urgent necessity for Russia to fortify the Far East and increase its military forces in the Maritime Provinces. A secret Provisional Government for the Far East was set up and held in reserve; it was to start activities in case Japan severed connections between the Russian Far East and Moscow.

This was the beginning of a gradual deterioration of Russo-Japanese relations and of a more rapid process of militarization and industrialization of the Soviet Far East. The policy of appeasement, however, was not immediately abandoned. It took considerable

time to reverse the "general line." An agreement was signed in September, 1932, concerning the delivery of considerable quantities of Russian gasoline over a period of five years. In August, 1932, a new fisheries agreement with Japan was made, which included certain new concessions to the wishes of Japanese industry. When Chang Hsueh-liang, the deposed Manchurian dictator, applied for a visa to go to the Soviet Union, the visa was refused.

On the other hand, on December 12, 1932, the Soviet and Nanking Governments announced mutual recognition after five years of official friction. Since it was realized that this act, clearly precipitated by Japanese operations on the Asiatic continent, would provoke resentment in Tokyo, Litvinov hastened to assure the Japanese that "the improvement of relations with one country is not a means of rendering relations worse with another." He stated that no secret agreements with China had been concluded. What took place was indeed a mere exchange of diplomatic representatives. Nevertheless, the Japanese Government officially stated that in its view "the elements most disturbing to the peace of the world have now joined hands and Japan stands squarely against these forces."

From 1932 on Japan was the offensive power, while Soviet Russia was on the defensive. The strained relations between them lasted until 1939-40.

In the course of these seven years conflict followed on conflict, and the diplomatic activity of the two governments became intensive. Disputes flared up, often approaching military action. Then the tension would subside, but only for a short time, and before long relations would again take a turn for the worse, invariably reaching a precarious phase. Beginning in 1933, hundreds of so-called "border incidents" occurred which at times developed into full-fledged battles involving tanks, planes, and hundreds of casualties. The clashes were isolated rather than part of an integrated plan of military strategy; they did not amount to real war. Yet the possibility that these outbreaks would merge and become the start of an over-all war between the two nations was considered great. A new Russo-Japanese war seemed likely; at times it appeared inevitable.

When in October, 1933, the United States was about to recognize the Soviet Union, Japan anticipated far-reaching collabora-

tion among the powers of the Pacific and promptly announced that it would take up arms against such a contingency. Saburo Kurusu, the Japanese negotiator in Washington at the time of Pearl Harbor, who in 1933 worked in the Tokyo Foreign Office, told the American embassy on October 24, 1933: "If American recognition of the Soviets were to lead to a belief on the part of the Russians that the United States would support them in their discussions with the Japanese, or if the Chinese were to believe that the United States would support Russia in the Far East, the Foreign Office felt that it might have its work with the Military to do all over again." 7

The operations along the borders of Russia and Mongolia were part of Japan's ambitious design to carve out for herself a great Far Eastern empire. The easy victories won in Manchuria and later in Inner Mongolia and northern China served to convince the expansionist elements in Japan of Japanese superiority over all the nations, great and small, in her prospective sphere; the weakness of Chinese resistance left no doubt in the minds of the Japanese that the incorporation of China into the new "structure" could be achieved without great losses; and the passivity of the Great Powers in the face of the Japanese drive strengthened the conviction that her projects could indeed be realized. All these factors combined to create in certain circles a state of political intoxication, of exaggeration of her own power and the minimizing of the potential of the world beyond her shores. Manchuria was firmly in Japan's grip after only a few months of warfare. The drive into Inner Mongolia started in 1933; the campaign into northern China began in 1935; and then, in 1937, the "incident" at the Marco Polo Bridge brought all-out warfare with China. "No power on earth," the future foreign minister, Yosuke Matsuoka, exclaimed on March 27, 1935, "can check our advance. The sooner we realize it and the World Powers recognize it, the better it will be for the welfare of the world."

From the very inception of the policy of conquest and expansion there was no doubt in Tokyo that sooner or later Japan would have to fight Russia. To round out her new possessions, Vladivostok and Kamchatka were necessary, if only to eliminate foreign influence there and bar them as bases of any future enemy. The occupation

7. Cordell Hull, *Memoirs* (Macmillan Company, 1948), I, 276.

of all eastern Siberia, between the Pacific and Lake Baikal, was widely considered as both necessary and feasible. There was but one question for Japan—the sequence of her future campaigns of conquest. On this point there was considerable divergence of opinion.

The powerful army wanted a “continental orientation” for the first stage of Japan’s operations, meaning that China and Russia were the prospective victims. Within the army the Kwantung group, in control of Manchuria, looked forward to an early solution of the Russian problem by means of armed force. The navy, on the other hand, favored a “southern orientation” of Japan’s drive—toward Indonesia, the Philippines, and British possessions to the south. The struggle between the rival groups and personalities rendered the situation uncertain, and this is why the Soviet Government had to reckon on the possibility that war might erupt at any moment on its Far Eastern borders. Such a war would have been a relatively easy one for Japan to fight in 1931 or 1932, but from 1933 on the strengthening of Soviet defenses in the Far East proceeded at a rapid tempo, and by 1935 it was obvious that a Japanese attack on Russia would mean a major war.

Japan’s forces were of course superior to those of Russia. To win the war, however, Japan would have to transfer considerable reinforcements and huge amounts of supplies from the home country to the Asiatic continent. The Soviet fleet was no match for the Japanese Navy, but the submarines and destroyers operating out of Russian bases in the Far East would have been able to inflict serious losses on Japan’s cruisers and transports. The Russian Air Forces located near by could well bomb Japan and wreak fire and destruction on her inflammable cities. Moreover, guerrilla activity in the rear of the Japanese forces, especially in Manchuria, supplied and organized by Russia with the assistance of Chinese Communists, would have resulted in the blowing up of bridges and troop transports, thus rendering Manchuria insecure as Japan’s main base of operations. An attack on Russia might have developed into a protracted campaign. It could not be waged simultaneously with the offensive in China; it might even have required the withdrawal of Japanese forces from certain regions previously occupied.

These were the reasons why Japan hesitated. Her government

repeatedly restrained the most adventurous elements of the army and directed their activity into different channels. Victories in the struggle against Russia had to be won at first not by open warfare but by diplomatic and semimilitary means. The course of events demonstrated that these means could yield the desired results, at least in the early stages.

RESISTANCE OR PEACE?

Two slogans were stressed in the statements of Soviet leaders, in editorials of the Russian press, and in the Communist response to Japan's policies: peace and resistance.

The Communist International called for "resistance to Japanese aggression"; it sharply condemned the Nanking government for the truces concluded with Japan, for its inclination sometimes to compromise when unable to resist; it attacked the Western Powers for their appeasement of Japan and for their failure to stem the tide of Japan's conquest. Moscow ridiculed the impotence of the League of Nations, and appealed to all the peoples of the world to take part in the struggle against Japan.

As far as the Soviet Union itself was concerned, another slogan, just as lofty as "resistance to brute force," was being propagated: "Peace." A local war in the Far East could easily be transformed into a world war, and the Soviet Government wanted to save the world from a great catastrophe—such was Moscow's contention. The simultaneity of the two ideas, resistance and peace, only appeared to be a contradiction. Actually, the two were part of the same policy: resistance by the other nations in order to weaken Japan wherever possible and to prevent her from attacking Russia, and Soviet concessions to Japan in order to safeguard peace. Both means served the same end: to prevent a defeat of the Soviet Union at the hands of Japan.

In 1934-35 the main forces of China's Communists were transferred from the south, where they had won footholds thousands of miles away from the Soviet border, to northern China, where they would be able to help Russia in case of war. Later, Russian supplies began to reach Chiang Kai-shek, and a few Russian fliers—"volunteers"—even took part in operations against Japan on the Chinese front—always with the same end in mind: to enmesh Japan

more deeply in her net of conflicts outside of Russia and thus alleviate the danger of war for the Soviet Union.

In these years Russia's isolation in the world was becoming a source of danger both in Europe and in Asia. The Soviet Government signed nonaggression pacts with the Baltic States and Poland; later with France and Czechoslovakia. For a time it seemed as if the accession of Franklin D. Roosevelt to the presidency of the United States would make effective cooperation between Russia and America possible.⁸ A "definition of aggression" was accepted by the League of Nations; Litvinov in his advocacy of peace throughout the world scored a personal triumph. A nonaggression pact was signed with China. When the Brussels Conference of the signatories of the Washington naval treaty convened, Litvinov was invited and proved to be among the most insistent proponents of "resistance to aggression." Litvinov stated in every capital that Russia's aims were defensive and peaceful; that Russia had become a contented nation; that it did not seek foreign territory; that it was prepared to live in peace with any capitalist nation; and that Stalin's concept of "socialism in one country" meant the renunciation of world-wide expansion of Communism. A slight rapprochement even with Britain took place in the same year when the naval pact, setting a ceiling on Soviet naval construction, explicitly excluded the Far East from its application.⁹

Other Soviet leaders, on the other hand, left no doubt that in case of war the Soviet Union, as a member of a victorious coalition, would try to expand the area under its control both in Europe and Asia. As late as 1934 Stalin prophesied at the congress of the Communist party that a new war would mean social revolutions. His lieutenant, Mekhlis, said later: "If the second Imperialist War should turn its point against the first socialist state in the world, . . . we must fulfill our international obligations and increase the number of Soviet republics."¹⁰ And the Soviet expert on the Far East, V. I. Lan, wrote that "During the war of 1914-18 the victori-

8. There were rumors in 1933 that Russia was preparing to sell Northern Sakhalin to the United States and that the American Navy would visit Vladivostok. Cf. Karl Haushofer in the *Berliner Börsenzeitung*, March 31, 1933. President Roosevelt, however, limited his Russian policy to diplomatic recognition of the Soviet regime.

9. The reason for this clause was Japan's refusal to subscribe to the international limitation of naval power.

10. Eighteenth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party, *Stenographic Report* (in Russian), p. 273.

ous November Revolution raised the banner of labor over one sixth of the globe. The second World War will spread the workers' rule to one third, to a half, maybe even to a greater part of our planet." ¹¹

In accordance with the general Communist philosophy the next war was depicted as another step toward a greater USSR. If so, was a hard-and-fast coalition with Russia really desirable? Such were the doubts that paralyzed attempts at closer ties between the Soviet Union and the Western anti-Axis states. Russia remained isolated in the Far East.

The arming of the Russian Far East was a second facet of the same policy, and it was this aspect of Soviet action, rather than Moscow's peace propaganda, that was responsible for Japan's hesitancy to start a war against Russia. The separate Far Eastern Army, activated in 1929, increased both in numbers and equipment. By 1935-36 a redoubtable air force had been based not far from Manchuria's borders. The Second Five-Year Plan, begun in 1933, provided tremendous amounts of money and material for strengthening the Far East. New coal mines were to be opened in the Bureya region, metallurgical plants were to be built on the Amur River in the north, power stations were to be established throughout the area. A second track was laid on the Trans-Siberian Railroad, and construction was begun on the Baikal-Amur Railroad—the so-called BAM—far to the north of the Manchurian border, where it would be relatively secure in case of war. While 1932 and 1933 were among the worst years economically in the history of the Soviet Union, investments in the Far East and the supplying of the army were being given every possible priority. The poverty-stricken nation was committed to further sacrifices in order to send abundant goods and man power to the Amur and to the Pacific. "Russia was wasted with misery," Walter Duranty wrote, "but the Red Army had restored its food reserves and its reserves of gasoline, and cloth and leather for uniforms and boots. And Japan did not attack." ¹²

11. V. Lan, *Angliya i Amerika*, p. 62.

12. Walter Duranty, *USSR* (J. B. Lippincott Company, 1944), p. 193. Duranty also reports that "Orders were given in March [1932], at the beginning of the spring sowing period in the Ukraine and North Caucasus and Lower Volga, that two million tons of grain *must* be collected within thirty days because the Army had to have it. It *had to be collected*, without argument, on pain of death." The orders about gasoline were hardly less peremptory. Here I don't know the figures, but so many thousand

The whole of the Russian Far East had a population of less than 2,500,000, as against 20 millions in Korea and about 30 millions in Manchuria. In order to make the Russian Far East as independent of Europe as possible in case of war (this was the principal purpose behind the Five-Year Plan for the Far East), man power was a primary requirement. Colonization therefore became the order of the day. To encourage the migration of peasants and workers from Europe the Soviet Government eased the obligatory delivery of produce to the state by peasants of the Far East and raised the pay of workers and employees. The decree of December 11, 1933 ("Privileges of the Population of the Far Eastern Region"), provided for exemption from obligatory deliveries of grain and rice for ten years for kolkhozes and five years for individual peasants. As far as other products were concerned, obligatory deliveries to the state were reduced by 50 per cent. The price of fish sold by kolkhozes and their members was raised; all wages were increased by about 20 per cent; army pay was raised 20 per cent for officers, 50 per cent for enlisted men. A second decree, signed on February 5, 1934, introduced similar privileges in a number of other districts of eastern Siberia. After the completion of their military service Red Army men were "encouraged" by the strongest means to settle in the Far East as peasants or workers. Beginning in 1933 convict labor was used in the Far East in extensive proportions.

RETREAT FROM MANCHURIA

The Japanese occupation of Manchuria was completed by 1932, but in northern Manchuria the Chinese Eastern remained an alien body in this new Japanese domain. The Soviet-controlled Chinese Eastern was not merely a railroad; it was the life line of a great area, the center of gravity of the area's economy, and an institution in which thousands of Soviet employees were active under the protection of Moscow. The final expulsion of Russia from Manchuria now became the immediate goal of Japan.

Since early in 1933 it had been rumored all over Manchuria and in Japan that steps would be taken to liquidate the Russian possession. The forcible seizure of the Chinese Eastern, along the same

tons of gasoline *must be given* to the Army. At a time when the collective farms were relying upon tractors to plough their fields." *Ibid.*, p. 192.

lines as China's attempt four years earlier, was advocated by some; others preferred a commercial transaction in the form of a purchase of the vital line. Anticipating complications, the Soviet authorities proceeded to send the rolling stock of the Chinese Eastern across the border to Russia. In April, 1933, Japan stopped train traffic between Manchuria and Siberia. In May she closed the eastern outlet of the railroad. This led to an exchange of notes in Harbin between the Soviet manager of the railway and Japan's Consul General. If Soviet forces enter Manchuria, the consul declared, "Japan will defend it."

In the meantime, Moscow had decided not to accept the challenge but to propose to Japan to sell the railway. Since such an offer could be interpreted as a sign of weakness, Marshal Blücher delivered a highly bellicose speech to a May Day demonstration in Khabarovsk. "The Red Army is ready," he said, "to fight for the world proletarian revolution and at any time to rise in defense of the achievements of October."¹³ The very next day Maxim Litvinov made the following offer to the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow: first, Japan or Manchuria to acquire the Soviet 50 per cent of the Chinese Eastern; second, payment to be made in installments; third, the Soviet Union to give de facto recognition to the state of Manchukuo. After four weeks, Japan accepted the Soviet proposal in the following form: negotiations were to be conducted between the governments of the Soviet Union and Manchukuo; Japan would participate in them as Manchukuo's friend and ally. Conversations opened a month later, on June 26, in Tokyo.

It took another 19 months to complete the negotiations successfully. The period was high-lighted by exciting interruptions, violent measures by Japan in Manchuria, arrests and pressure. At first the stumbling block was the price of Russia's share of the railway. The first Soviet demand was 250 million gold rubles, which at that time equaled 650 million yen.¹⁴ A counter offer of 50 million

13. A reference to the Soviet Revolution of 1917.

14. The gold yen is nearly equal to the gold ruble; but the yen had been depreciated to about 40 per cent of the gold yen's value.

Besedovsky (*Na putyakh k Termidoru*, I, 137-139) reports that as early as 1927 he talked with Stalin about the possibility of selling the Chinese Eastern. Stalin said that he considered it possible that some day the railway would have to be sold, but added that the sale must be arranged in such a way as "to sharpen the antagonisms in the Far East." At that time Chicherin's notion of a fair price for the railway was \$300,000,000 (600 million gold rubles).

yon was made by the other side. While the Russian price was obviously inflated for bargaining purposes, Japan believed in her ability to compel the Russian negotiators to give in by means of forceful action in Manchuria.

Five futile sessions of the Tokyo Conference were held. It was then decided to hold smaller ad interim *pourparlers*. Moscow lowered her demand to 200 million gold rubles, but there was still no agreement in sight. Then the Japanese arrested six Soviet employees of the railroad accused of transferring rolling stock to Russia and of "Red propaganda." On September 9 the Soviet Government published the text of four letters written by the Japanese envoy and consul in Manchuria to Tokyo in September, 1933, containing a detailed plan for the arrest of Soviet officials and other measures of pressure, and the cynical explanation that these measures appeared desirable "in view of the lag in the negotiations in Tokyo." Japan denied the authenticity of the documents.

Meanwhile the situation on the railroad was becoming serious. Movement of trains had decreased markedly; losses accumulated. Most serious was the fact that Manchurian armed bands were damaging and endangering railroad traffic. Hundreds of thousands of men—partly members of the dissolved Chinese armies, partly Chinese peasants—formed bands which roamed and plundered the countryside.¹⁵

The Japanese-Manchukuo police made an interesting estimate of the number of these bands and bandits. These statistics show a gradual decline in bandit activity from 1932 to 1937: the peak, with 210,000 bandits reported, was reached in September, 1932; thereafter, the figures were 105,000 in May, 1933; 45,000 in September, 1934; 20,000 in April, 1936; and about 10,000 in 1937-38.¹⁶

Moscow accused Japan of ineffectively guarding the railroad in order to further depreciate its value for the benefit of the Manchukuoan negotiators. Later the Japanese press reported that bandits had been discovered wearing the insignie "Friends of the Soviet

15. In April, 1934, official Soviet sources reported that in 1933 there had occurred on the Chinese Eastern 11 intentional train wrecks, 39 attempts at wrecking, 38 raids on trains, 19 cases of arson, 60 murders of employees, 197 cases of robbery and assault; 400 people were kidnaped.

16. Communist guerrillas in Manchuria (as well as in China proper) were also referred to as *kungfi*—"bandits."

Union." Tass countered that the bandits were armed with Japanese rifles.

After an interruption of four months Moscow proposed a resumption of negotiations. It had drawn the inescapable conclusion from the situation and lowered its price for the railroad. On February 26, 1934, Yurenev, the Soviet envoy, named the sum of 200 million yen as acceptable to his government, on the condition that Manchukuo assume the payment of retirement allowances to the company's personnel, amounting to 30 million yen. In April Manchukuo raised its offer to 100 million yen, including the allowances. Finally, on September 21 a price of 140 million yen, with an additional 30 million for retirement allowances, was agreed upon. However, the Soviet delegates' demand that Japan underwrite Manchukuo's obligations gave rise to prolonged disputes and new interruptions.

In the meanwhile new arrests had been made on the paralyzed Chinese Eastern. A number of Soviet officials were confined for ("connection with bandit attacks.") Moscow launched violent protests against these arrests and against the torture of the arrested; Tokyo replied that these acts concerned Manchukuo and not Japan, adding that those arrested had given instructions to the bandits. The War Minister in Tokyo asserted that "the orders to organize wrecks and attack trains on the railroad were given by the Special Red Army of the Far East." In a note of October, 1934, Moscow placed the number of Soviet employees arrested at 167.

Finally, in March, 1935, a full agreement concerning the railroad was reached. It consisted of five documents, and provided that the price of the Russian share in the railroad was to be 140 million yen, plus the employees' retirement allowances, which Manchukuo promised to pay. Of the price, one third was payable in cash in installments over a period of three years; the balance was to be paid in goods. Should the yen's rate of exchange vary by more than 8 per cent of its value at the time of the agreement, the Swiss franc was to be made the basis of settlement. The Soviet employees of the railroad were to be given three months' notice of dismissal and were to leave jobs and country within two months after the notice period. Through traffic from Siberia to Vladivostok was to be re-established. Finally, Japan guaranteed the payments assumed by Manchukuo.

The agreements were signed on March 23, 1935, and a check for 23,500,000 yen was handed over to the Soviet delegation. The Russian general manager, Rudy, then turned over the railroad to his Japanese-appointed successor, Ting Chien-hsui. The state of Manchukuo, thus far not recognized by the other powers, was actually accorded *de facto* recognition by the Soviet Union.¹⁷

The goods ordered by Russia in payment for the railroad were delivered. The cash payments were not made promptly and were the cause of some diplomatic exchanges. Payments were not completed until 1940. The Chinese Eastern, renamed the North Manchuria Railway, disappeared from the political news columns for ten years.

With the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railroad, an important leaf in the history of the Far East was turned. Russia had first been forced out of Manchuria in 1918 but had returned in 1924. For the next 11 years the Chinese Eastern again represented the steel backbone of the Soviet sphere in Manchuria. In 1935 Russia was again expelled for a period of ten years. She returned to Harbin, under utterly different circumstances, in August, 1945.

17. A few months earlier a river navigation treaty between the Soviet Union and Manchukuo had been negotiated. In Japan it was considered the first official recognition of Manchukuo. Moscow, however, denied this implication, pointing out that the agreement was signed not with the state of Manchukuo but with the Harbin Navigation Department.

The Semiwar (1935-1939)

The continental frontier between Russia and Japan was a short line, only a few miles long, where the Japanese colony, Korea, bordered on the Vladivostok region. With every new success of Japan's campaigns in northern China, the border line grew and within a few years it stretched over thousands of miles. Now the Manchurian-Russian frontier became Japan's concern and responsibility. Inner Mongolia's frontier with Soviet-dominated Outer Mongolia then became, in fact, a Russo-Japanese border line. After 1935 the line, which began at the Japanese Sea, went deep into central Asia.

The border line between Manchuria and Siberia had long been the subject of Russo-Chinese agreements. A long stretch of this border followed the course of rivers, and here, it might seem, no dispute whatever was possible. The rest of the frontier also was defined on maps; and border signs had been posted at certain specified intervals. As time went on, however, the demarcation signs disappeared; maps did not always agree; and the beds of streams moved in the course of time.

Strategically, the border line with Russia had been drawn in a manner unfavorable to China-Manchuria. To a great extent it had been established under Russian pressure on China; the stronger of the two governments was in a position to mark the line in a manner that suited its needs and military convenience. With Japan's arrival on the Manchurian scene, counterpressure began as soon as the Japanese Army realized the precarious strategic position.

The Japanese Army considered the Russian border fortifications a serious hazard, and the Tokyo government conducted a "peace campaign" against Russia. As a prerequisite, in order to settle outstanding questions, it proposed the "demilitarization" of both the Russian and Manchurian sides of the border. Repeatedly it pointed to Russian military preparations as jeopardizing Japan's position

and as proof of the aggressive designs harbored by the Soviet. "We hope," Minister Hirota said in the Japanese Diet in January, 1935, when the Chinese Eastern Railway issue was nearly settled, "that now the Soviet Government will pay particular attention to the question of military installations in the Far East."

In his answer Litvinov tried to shift the discussion from "military installations" to "military forces" in the Far East; he was prepared to withdraw only a part of the army from the border if Japan acted likewise:

"It would be entirely normal," he declared on March 14, 1935, "if, to the extent that the tension, accumulated as a result of events in the Far East in the past four years, eases, the parties concerned proceeded to the study and calm discussion of the problem of bilateral withdrawal to a certain distance of certain units of the armed forces of both sides, including aviation units."

But the controversy led to no agreement, and Hirota's successor, Arita, became more threatening when he announced, in May, 1936, that in the face of continued Soviet military preparations "Japan cannot remain indifferent." Japan desired a certain belt along the border to be neutralized. This demand proved unacceptable to Moscow. At certain points the Amur Railway—the only Russian connecting link between Vladivostok and Russia proper—runs less than 30 miles from the Amur River; if, in a surprise attack, Japan succeeded in cutting the railway, the whole Maritime Province might be isolated. In a leading article, probably written by Litvinov, *Izvestiya* answered:

"Behind our line of defense there runs a railroad, which in many places is less than 50 kilometers from the border . . . The Japanese military suggest to us the annihilation of our line of defense. Why don't the Japanese generals demand, as proof of our sincerity, that we build for them a route of approach to our trunk line?"¹

Litvinov consistently rejected the transparent "peace move" of Japan. Against Japan's slogan of "demilitarization" he again advanced his old offer of a nonaggression pact. But to this the Japanese Government, and particularly the army heads, would not consent. Every pact means limitation of freedom of action.

After the middle 'thirties the Soviet power position in the Far East had improved considerably, and the accumulation of military

1. *Izvestiya*, June 18, 1936.

strength was certainly one of the reasons why Japan did not transform her "border incidents" into real war. The Far Eastern Red Army in 1936-38 grew to number more than 300,000 men, according to Japanese as well as other sources. Soviet General Lushkov, who escaped from Russia to Japan in June, 1938, said, in Tokyo, that the Far Eastern Army consisted of 400,000 infantrymen and that it had 2,000 planes at its disposal in the Far East.² Japanese intelligence estimates placed the Soviet Far Eastern forces at 300,000, namely, 5 cavalry and 15 infantry divisions, 4 mechanized corps, and 9 air squadrons.³

After 1935 both sides were agreed, "in principle," that one or several border commissions should be organized to settle the costly disputes. Moscow proposed that the task of these commissions be the "redemarcation" of the border (following strictly the old treaties and official maps); Japan insisted on plain "demarcation," which would give more leeway to her representatives and more likelihood of rearranging the frontier line in Manchukuo's favor. Japan's proposal was not acceptable to Moscow. Therefore the border commissions did not come into existence until 1940.

Still further reasons or pretexts for disputes existed at the Manchuria-Mongolia and Inner Mongolia frontiers. Both Manchuria and Mongolia had been parts of one empire; deserts within Mongolia were not of sufficient importance to make an exact demarcation of the border worth while. Nomads and their herds wandered over the barren land, unconcerned as to their allegiance to one side or the other.

The total number of Soviet-Japanese conflicts of a warlike nature was reported by the Japanese to have reached over 250 between 1932 and March, 1936.⁴ By 1938 the number had reached 539, of which "border violations" and capture of inhabitants accounted for

2. *New York Times*, July 3, 4, 7, 11, 14, 1938.

3. N. Hidaka, *Manchoukuo-Soviet Border Issues* (Hsinking, 1938), p. 260.

It seems that the least well informed was United States Ambassador Davies. In his "journal" he wrote, on June 4, 1938, that "approximately 450,000 to 600,000 Soviet armed troops are in the eastern area. . . . The Japanese believe that for every Japanese soldier in Manchukuo the Soviets maintained, in Manchuria, three Soviet soldiers." In his report to Secretary of State Hull Mr. Davies wrote at the same time (June 6) that the Far Eastern Army was "variously estimated at from 350,000 to 450,000 men. . . . Two Soviet soldiers for every one Japanese soldier in Manchukuo." He reported that there were 40 Soviet submarines in Pacific waters, and that the Russian air force consisted of 1,500 planes. *Mission to Moscow* (Simon & Schuster, 1941), pp. 335, 414.

4. Hidaka, *op. cit.*, pp. 6, 227.

48 and "aerial invasions" for 77. In addition there were 23 cases of "interference with water transport" and 16 cases of removal or destruction of border signs. Of these 500 and more conflicts, only 6 were settled by mutual negotiation.

Most of the brushes were skirmishes, but a few were more serious and sometimes became full-scale battles.

Between 1933 and 1935 Japan had occupied certain areas of Inner Mongolia, and early in 1935 a major military offensive into northern China began. Outer Mongolia (the Mongolian People's Republic) now lay on the road. From January, 1934, on, "border incidents" flared up intermittently along the Mongolian-Manchurian frontier. The "incident" at Buir-Nor in January, 1935, was one of serious proportions.

Outer Mongolia had actually been a Soviet satellite since 1921. Formally, however, it had remained a part of China, and China's sovereignty had been officially recognized by the Soviet Union. If it was really an autonomous province of the Chinese Republic, it was an easy prey for the new Japanese Empire, just as were Mongolia's eastern and southern neighbors. To what extent was Moscow interested in the fate of Outer Mongolia? Would it risk a military conflict over it? Those were the paramount questions that Tokyo had to answer. "Japan does not wish to acquiesce," General Araki, the former Japanese war minister, proclaimed, "in the existence of such an ambiguous territory as Mongolia, bordering immediately on the sphere of influence of Japan." "Japan is knocking at the door of Mongolia," said Kanki, a spokesman of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs,⁵ "just as Commodore Perry knocked at the doors of Japan 80 years earlier."

Manchukuo was now claiming a border region that had been considered Mongolian soil for a number of generations. When the "border incidents" began to multiply, Japan contended that her troops were operating on Manchurian territory, whereas Russia considered these movements an invasion of Mongolian soil.

Following the first border clashes, the Premier of the Mongolian People's Republic was called to Moscow, in November, 1934, to discuss the defense of Mongolia. No details of the decisions arrived at were made public; since Mongolia was under Chinese suze-

5. Quoted in *Tikhii Okean* (1935), No. 4, p. 114.

rainy, China would immediately have raised objections to any Soviet pledge to defend Mongolia. But a "gentlemen's agreement" was concluded by which Soviet Russia undertook to assist Mongolia in the defense of her territory. This naturally meant that, nine years after the Red Army had withdrawn, Soviet Army contingents and military supplies were to be shipped to Mongolia.

The troops of Manchukuo, even with Japanese help, did not succeed in penetrating deep into Mongolia; this failure was obviously due to the fact that Russia stood behind Mongolia, just as Japan stood behind Manchukuo. After the Buir-Nor fighting it was decided to convene a conference in Manchouli to settle the disputes between Manchukuo and Outer Mongolia. Russia was not a party to this meeting. The conference began work on June 3, 1935, and was in session for almost five months. The Manchurian delegation, strongly supported by the Japanese Kwantung Army, demanded the "opening" of Mongolia and the establishment of three commissions for the settlement of border incidents, with one commission officiating in Ulan Bator, capital of the Mongolian People's Republic. The latter demand was, of course, the more important. It would have given Japan the opportunity to observe the working of the regime in Mongolia and to organize a network of intelligence agents there. With Russian approval, the Mongolian People's Republic rejected this demand. On November 25, 1935, the conference closed in disagreement.⁶ The Manchukuo press, however, continued to insist:

("Manchukuo does not consider Mongolia an ordinary normal state, and therefore Manchukuo now proclaims that, viewing Outer Mongolia as an incomprehensible and dangerous country, it intends to regulate all issues and settle all disputes by force of arms as it sees fit."⁷)

Beginning in December, new clashes occurred in the regions of Halhin-Sumeh, Bulun-Duresu, Aldyk-Dolon, and Tamsok-Bulan. In each case the Japanese press reported that Mongolian troops had invaded Manchukuo, while Moscow accused Japan and her satellite of aggression against Mongolia. The Manchukuo Government threatened Mongolia with "dreadful consequences" if she persisted in her policy. By the end of January clashes were occur-

6. *Pravda*, December 9, 1935.

7. Quoted in *Tikki Okean* (1936), No. 3, p. 77.

ring almost daily. Now Japan inquired in Moscow what interests the Soviet had in Outer Mongolia. The answer went through diplomatic as well as public channels: the Soviet Union will have to defend the borders of Outer Mongolia against any invader. In February, 1936, Stalin gave an interview to Roy Howard, the American newspaperman, in which he said; "In case Japan should attack the Mongolian People's Republic and endanger her independence, we will have to help the Mongolian People's Republic."⁸ In the meantime, the Prime Minister of Mongolia declared in an interview that "the Soviet Union, we expect, will support us, should we become the victim of an attack."⁹

The "protocol of mutual assistance," signed by the USSR and the Mongolian People's Republic in Ulan Bator on March 12, 1936, was the prototype of the mutual assistance pacts concluded between Russia and the Baltic States in the later thirties. It embodied the unpublished agreement of 1934. By the terms of the treaty, the two governments promised "mutual assistance by all possible means" to avert and divert the menace of aggression. Article 2 stipulated that "the Governments of the USSR and the Mongolian People's Republic undertake, in the event of military aggression against one of the contracting parties, to give each other every assistance, including military assistance." Article 3 provided for the stationing of troops of one party on the territory of the other.

The significance of this agreement was not to be found in its specific clauses; it was obvious that a document signed in 1936 between Russia and her impotent satellite was no bilateral agreement. The real import was to give warning to Japan of the presence of Soviet troops in Mongolia and the far-reaching consequences of any Japanese attack on Mongolia under these circumstances.

The purpose of the agreement was indeed fulfilled. Incidents along the Mongolian border soon began to diminish both in violence and number, and beginning in the summer of 1936 they ceased for a few years.

Along with dozens of small clashes, one "border incident" occurred each summer in the three years from 1937 to 1939 which threatened the peace between Russia and Japan. The diplomatic

8. *Izvestiya*, February 20, 1936.

9. *Ibid.*, January 31, 1936⁹

tug-of-war, fierce at all times, on these occasions reached the breaking point. International attention, usually focused on central Europe, suddenly veered to the Far East. Within a few weeks, however, the tension relaxed, and Soviet-Japanese relations resumed their unhealthy yet nonwarring course. Of the three clashes, the first ended in favor of Japan, while those of 1938 and 1939 resulted in Russian victories. The shift in the power ratio was due in part to the growing strength of the Red Army but also to the fact that the first of the three incidents took place before the start of the full-scale Japanese offensive against China, while the latter two occurred after it.

The first erupted late in June, 1937, over the question of the islands in the Amur River, whose political allegiance was not clearly defined. Soviet forces occupied two of the islands (Bolshoi and Sennufa). The Japanese lodged a demand—virtually an ultimatum—with Moscow for the evacuation of the islands. Extended negotiations between Litvinov and the Japanese Ambassador, Mamoru Shigemitsu, ensued; in the meantime new armed clashes took place between patrols and gunboats in the disputed area. In Tokyo the situation was viewed with great alarm. Finally Litvinov consented to withdraw the Russian forces. As soon as the Red Army left Japanese and Manchukuo troops landed on the islands. The Soviet protest that followed was of no avail.¹⁰

The second of the conflicts occurred during the summer months of 1938, and the third during the period from May to September, 1939. Their course and consequences were quite different from the outcome of the Amur incidents of 1937. But between the first and second of these clashes a sequence of important events took place—Japan's full-scale invasion of China and the founding of the Anti-Comintern.

THE FIRST ANTI-COMINTERN

In the tense atmosphere of border clashes and sharp diplomatic exchanges, Japan and Germany took decisive steps toward cooperation in world affairs. On the German side it was not the Foreign

10. Joseph E. Davies, United States Ambassador to Russia, saw Litvinov as well as Shigemitsu, and expressed the hope that a peaceful settlement would be possible. He did this, as he said, on his own initiative; it does not seem that his intervention had any influence on the negotiations. *Mission to Moscow*, pp. 165-166.

for another year, while the auction was put off for one day in order to give the Japanese an opportunity to attend.

In the midst of the small-scale war being waged between Russia and Japan, official diplomatic relations continued. But in the course of a few years many things changed. Gone were the glorious days when the receptions at the Soviet embassy attracted a brilliant crowd and represented a social event high on the official calendar of Tokyo. Now the Soviet representatives lived in constant fear of an attack on their buildings as well as their lives. Their offices were under constant watch by the Japanese police, and only rarely did an outsider dare enter the building. Both the Soviet envoy in Tokyo and the Japanese Ambassador to Moscow, along with all the consuls, were—surely with good reason—suspected of systematic espionage activities while the opposing armies were often engaged in operations against each other.

The Russian embassy in Tokyo was

a low long building, austere in its boxlike simplicity, resembling a military barrack. A large iron gate, locked except when the embassy is entertaining, bars the way from the street. A guardian opens the gate to announced visitors, and there is a horseshoe driveway to the front door. . . .

A servant unlocks the door and locks it again behind the visitor. The minister of a certain country who had called on Soviet Ambassador Smetanin discovered himself locked in when the servant could not be found to open the door. Another envoy who called at the embassy relates that to his astonishment iron doors were lowered, momentarily shutting off the room in which he was sitting with the ambassador, but to his intense relief were quickly raised again in what was apparently an ill-timed test.

For four years after Ambassador Yurenev left Tokyo [in May, 1937], the Russian Embassy passed virtually into oblivion. Callers were carefully scrutinized by Japanese secret-service men who lounged in taxicabs drawn up at the curb in front of the gates of the embassy and checked everyone coming and going. Japanese visitors were "marked" and later cross-questioned by the police as to their business, so that few dared have any contact with the embassy or members of the staff. There were periods when interpreters and Japanese employees of the Soviet Embassy were arrested.¹⁷

17. W. Fleisher, *Volcanic Isle* (Doubleday, Doran & Co., 1941), pp. 240-241.

During the purges the embassy staff dwindled from about 50 in Yurenev's days to a mere handful.

In 1936 the Tokyo police arrested the teachers and translators employed by the Soviet embassy on charges of espionage. Hajime Suwitate, president of the Kokumciso ("Statist") Society,

walked into the office of the Soviet trade representative in the heart of Tokyo's business and banking district. Brandishing a sword, he scared the Japanese clerks, then began to smash windows and furniture. Having done all the damage he could, he re-entered his waiting taxicab and drove to the office of his society. He surrendered to the police when they arrived . . .

Sato, a patriotic thug who shot and nearly killed the Soviet trade representative, was not punished. He appealed the District Court's sentence of three years. The Appeal Court reduced it to eighteen months and granted a long stay of execution. He served none of his sentence.¹⁸

In 1937 the Soviet Government proceeded to close down all but three of its consulates in Manchuria, while insisting that a corresponding number of Manchurian consulates in the USSR be eliminated. In September, 1937, Moscow closed two of its consular offices in Japan and demanded that Japan close two of its consulates in Russia. In November the Japanese Government asked the Soviet envoy in Tokyo to make easier the life of the Japanese consul in Vladivostok, who was unable even to obtain medical supplies. 1

At the session of the Supreme Soviet on January 17, 1938, Andrei Zhdanov demanded a more forceful policy toward Japan. In his speech, which had undoubtedly received the previous approval of the Foreign Office, Zhdanov said:

In Leningrad almost every foreign power has its consul. I must add at this point that some of these consuls clearly exceed the framework of their authority and duties and conduct themselves in an impermissible manner, engaging in disruptive activities against the people and the country to which they are accredited.

It is also known that the USSR does not have an equal number of consuls in those countries. There arises the question in my mind: why is that so? Why does the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs tolerate a situation in which the number of consuls representing foreign powers in the USSR is not equal to but greater than the num-

18. H. Byas, *Government by Assassination* (Alfred A. Knopf, 1942), pp. 246-247.

ber of consuls representing the USSR in foreign states? Does there not flow from the strength and might of our great socialist power the equality of consular representation—ours as well as foreign?

I pass to the second question on which I would like to get some elucidation. I think the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs should be more determined with regard to the insolent hooligan provocative acts of Japanese agents and the so-called puppet Manchukuo.

An unending string of incidents developed on all possible issues. Soviet steamers were detained in Japan, and Japanese steamers were held in Soviet ports. Fishing vessels belonging to Japanese and Korean firms were stopped near the Soviet border in September, 1937, and the old dispute over the extent of territorial waters flared up once more. On Northern Sakhalin a number of Japanese were arrested. In November, 1937, the Tokyo government protested, in a note, against the forcible deportation of Koreans from the Maritime Province into remote areas of Siberia. Moscow replied that they were Soviet citizens under the Soviet's exclusive jurisdiction.

RUSSIA AND JAPAN'S WAR WITH CHINA

On July 7, 1937, the Japanese Army began the invasion of China. The operation was expected to last a few months but actually developed into one of the longest of Japan's wars and did not end until her surrender in 1945. In the course of this war Japan met with greater Chinese resistance than she had expected; China's losses, although tremendous, never led to the complete cessation of resistance; and the retreat of China's armies to the west meant an increase of difficulties for the Japanese armies because of the long distance that supplies had to travel.

For Moscow, Japan's drive was an enormous relief. It was an indication that, despite the attitude of the Kwantung Army, the real leaders of Japan had decided to avoid the fatal clash with Russia and had chosen China instead as their next objective. For the moment the lightning rod proved to have worked effectively: to divert the storm and turn the enemy's guns in another direction had been the main goal of Moscow's policy in the Far East since 1935, as it was in 1939 in Europe. It was hardly probable that Japan would seek a military conflict with Russia before the conclusion

of the war in China. The major preoccupation of Moscow therefore became the prolongation, without active Soviet intervention, of the Sino-Japanese war. ". . . any aggression against the Soviet Union on the part of Japan," Maxim Litvinov said, "is now out of the question, on account of the trouble which China is causing Japan by its (China's) unexpected military success."¹⁹

In fact, the Japanese Army during the first year of the war numbered about 1,200,000 men and had 2,000 planes, 1,800 tanks, and 4,500 heavy guns.²⁰ About one million of these men and a great part of the equipment were needed in China.

The easing of Russia's position was reflected in the new self-assurance of Soviet actions and statements. The tone of the government's pronouncements became more independent and bolder than ever. "The Soviet Union will know," Premier Molotov declared in a public address in January, 1938, "how to end Japan's hooliganism on the Far Eastern front." A few days later Moscow severed postal communication with Japan. In May the People's Commissar of the Navy, Smirnov, used highly undiplomatic language in a statement made in the Far East. "The Japanese imperialists, like bloodthirsty mad dogs," he said, "tear to pieces the living body of China." When Tokyo officially protested against this speech, Moscow rejected the protest because "a campaign of slander and propaganda against the USSR has been systematically carried out in Japan."

On August 21, 1937, six weeks after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war, the Soviet-Chinese nonaggression pact was signed in Nanking. The pact was a cautious affair—in fact, it was inadequate and not representative of the true state of things. On its face it was almost absurd. It was limited to a reciprocal pledge of Russia and China not to invade the territory of the other signatory and not to participate in any coalition (i. e., with Japan) aimed against the other partner. What both countries really needed was a different type of treaty and policy—a pact of mutual assistance.

However, Moscow did not wish to arouse more protest in Tokyo than was absolutely necessary. Even the modest nonaggression pact, when made public, was interpreted by Japan to be a pact of

19. Confidential report of Ambassador Davies to Secretary Hull, March 29, 1938, in *Mission to Moscow*, p. 299.

20. *Pravda*, February 13, 1938.

military alliance; it was assumed that it contained secret obligations; the Japanese press asserted that China was surrendering her independence to Russia. United States Ambassador Grew reported to the State Department concerning his conversation with the Japanese Premier: ". . . I understood that the Sino-Soviet Agreement was merely a pact of non-aggression. Mr. Hirota replied that he thought it went much farther than that. I said: 'Do you mean that it contains secret clauses.' Mr. Hirota nodded an affirmative."²¹ And the United States military attaché in Tokyo reported, on September 29, 1937, that the "possibility that Soviet Russia may ally itself openly with China is considered serious . . . There is a strong feeling among the younger [Japanese] army officers that, as Russia will have to be fought sometime, the war might just as well come soon."²² The spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo added that the Sino-Soviet pact "confirms the Japanese belief that the Nanking government is being made a tool for the bolshevization of eastern Asia."²³

Seeking to avoid a new clash with Japan, Moscow kept secret its first loan to China, granted soon after the conclusion of the non-aggression protocol. It also tried to keep secret the shipment of military equipment to China. In this it did not succeed very well, and the facts soon became known in Japan.

FIGHTING CONTINUES

The Amur River incidents, as we have seen, were settled in the summer of 1937. But a multitude of other issues divided Tokyo and Moscow, and no rapprochement was in sight. Under these circumstances, every minor problem grew into a source of heated and bitter diplomatic exchanges.

In April, 1938, Soviet Ambassador Slavutsky suggested to Japan the settlement of ten outstanding issues; he did not include such affairs of paramount interest to Japan as a long-range fishing convention and the continued operation of those Japanese consulates which were slated for liquidation by Moscow. The Japanese Gov-

21. October 15, 1937. United States, Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. Japan: 1931-1941* (U. S. Government Printing Office, 1943), I, 403.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 377.

23. *New York Times*, August 30, 1937.

ernment responded in vague terms and showed little inclination to accept the proposal.

At the same time, however, the Japanese Ambassador to Moscow, Shigemitsu, visited Litvinov and lodged a protest against the participation of Soviet forces on China's side in the war against Japan. The Japanese had captured a Russian aviator flying a Soviet military plane in China. Litvinov argued that the sale of war material to China was not contrary to Soviet neutrality and that if Russian fliers were present in China, they were merely volunteers.

On Northern Sakhalin a few Japanese were arrested. The building of fortifications in Southern Sakhalin was declared by Moscow to be contrary to existing agreements. The Soviet Government accused coal and oil concessionaires in Northern Sakhalin of violating fire and safety regulations; and charged that the ratio of Japanese to Russian employees and workers there, which was not to exceed 1:3, was actually above 40 per cent. The Japanese projected a pipe line from the oil fields without the preliminary approval of Russia; the installment due on the Chinese Eastern Railroad sale was not paid. On the other hand, the Soviet chargé d'affaires in Tokyo protested against the bombing of the civilian population of Canton by Japanese aircraft.

It was in this tense atmosphere of diplomatic warfare that the military clashes at Changkufeng created the impression of a looming war. The hill of Changkufeng, near Posiet Bay, lies in a territory that was then virtually a no-man's-land. If Japan were to gain possession of the hill, her forces would be able to keep the bay as well as the near-by area under observation and, if it were deemed necessary, under artillery fire. In 1938 the Soviet Government began the construction of a submarine and air base at Posiet Bay. The Japanese Army responded by attempting to occupy the strategic hill. Fighting and negotiations lasted from July 18 to August 10, 1938. Artillery and aviation were thrown into action. For a short time it looked as if full-scale warfare could not be avoided. Soviet newspapers devoted a good deal of space to the conflict; factory meetings were called, resolutions sent to Moscow and published in the press demanded "the punishment of Japan" and asserted "readiness to fight." Litvinov told the Japanese Ambassador: "The Japanese Government must compel the Kwantung and the Korean Armies to respect the existing border line. It is time to put

an end to 'incidents' and border conflicts." ²⁴ The Red Army in the Far East (the so-called Special Red Banner Army of the Far East), having grown considerably, was divided into two armies.

An agreement was reached. It provided for the withdrawal of military forces and the recognition of a border line proposed by Moscow. The casualties in the battles for Changkufeng were considerable. Japan admitted 158 killed and 723 wounded; Soviet losses, according to official sources, were 236 killed and 611 wounded. Each side claimed to have won the engagements.

Once again the truce was short lived. Old conflicts continued; new conflicts appeared. In April, 1939, Japan submitted a detailed memorandum to Moscow concerning the situation in Northern Sakhalin; in fact, the multitude of disagreements made normal economic operations there difficult. On July 16 Japan presented a new note concerning Sakhalin, demanding a reply by the 18th. The Narkomindel returned the note to the Japanese envoy because, it said, the time limit imposed was tantamount to an ultimatum. A week later the Moscow Foreign Commissariat made a detailed reply to the Japanese note, accusing the Japanese Government and the concessionaires on various counts.


Fighting had begun again on the Mongolian-Manchurian border in the Khalkingol (Nomonhan) area.

The battles around Khalkingol were the bloodiest in the long period since the Russo-Japanese war of 1905; they reached their peak in the last days of August. Japanese losses were stated in Tokyo to have exceeded 18,000. The Russian losses are not known; they were probably less than the Japanese.

Speaking before the Supreme Soviet during the fighting, Molotov in a belligerent tone declared on May 31, 1939:

I give warning that the borders of the Mongolian People's Republic, by virtue of the mutual assistance treaty concluded between us, will be defended by the USSR just as vigorously as we shall defend our own borders . . . It is high time that it be understood that there is a limit to our patience. It is by far better to cease right now the constantly recurring provocative violation of the borders of the USSR and Mongolia by the Japanese-Manchurian military units. We have also

24. *Pravda*, August 8, 1938.



MANCHURIA during the
SINO-JAPANESE
WAR
1935 - 1939.

— Railways.
A. Principal
Cities.
--- Japanese
Border.
--- Incident Area.

given a similar warning to Tokyo through the Japanese envoy in Moscow.

In the meantime negotiations were being carried on between Berlin, Rome, and Tokyo concerning the transformation of their relationship into an actual military alliance. While Italy was prepared to sign such a treaty (with the stipulation, however, that she was not obliged to go to war in the near future), Japan hesitated. Her government had already come to appreciate the worth of Hitler's unilateral policy, his disregard for the interests of his allies, and his habit of confronting them with accomplished facts. While Japanese ambassadors in Berlin and Rome urged Tokyo to compromise and enter the great Axis alliance, Tokyo postponed ultimate decision. In May, 1939, the Japanese Premier, Hironuma, announced that Japan was "neither a totalitarian nor a democratic" nation and therefore she would not participate in either of the European blocs. On May 20 the Japanese Cabinet decided not to enter into a military alliance with Germany.²⁵ While some important army commanders were continually demanding Japan's adherence to the Axis, Premier Shigemitsu reiterated in August that Japan would not become a party to the new alliance signed by Germany and Italy earlier that year. At the time cooperation with Germany and Italy was for Japan primarily an anti-Russian and not an anti-British device.

Meantime the Japanese issue had assumed importance in the complicated negotiations being conducted in Moscow simultaneously with Britain and France on the one hand and Germany on the other. These conversations lasted from April to August, 1939, and resulted in the conclusion of the Soviet-German pact on August 23.

In the negotiations with Britain and France, Molotov tried to extend the contemplated agreement to the Far East. London was not, however, prepared to go so far. At the time serious irritations were developing between Japan and Britain, and Neville Chamberlain hoped to have them assuaged independently. The Foreign Minister in Tokyo announced that "Japan cannot treat lightly an

25. Notes of Cordell Hull, May 18, about his conversations with the Japanese and British Ambassadors to the United States. United States, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States. Japan: 1931-1941*, II, 27.

entente of Britain and Russia.²⁶ In the end London turned down, Molotov's proposal.

At the same time Moscow tried to establish contacts with Berlin. At the end of June Count Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister, indicated to the Soviet chargé d'affaires that "Germany would not be disinclined to exercise influence on Japan for the purpose of an improvement in her relations with the Soviet Union and the elimination of the boundary disputes." Soon direct negotiations between the German and Soviet Governments were under way, and Ribbentrop made ample use of his ostensible influence over Japan to win over the Soviet leaders. On August 3 he negotiated with the Soviet chargé in Berlin and, while discussing Poland and various other matters, "described German-Japanese relations as good and friendly; this relationship was a lasting one. As to Russian-Japanese relations, however, I had my own ideas (by which I meant a long-range *modus vivendi* between the two countries)." ²⁶ Ribbentrop repeatedly stressed his ability to bring the armed clashes between Russia and Japan to an end and establish normal relations in the Far East. Count von der Schulenburg, the German Ambassador, conferred with Molotov on August 14 to lay the ground for Ribbentrop's visit to the Soviet capital and made a comprehensive declaration concerning Germany's foreign policy. He again stated that "Germany is ready to exercise influence for an improvement and consolidation of Russian-Japanese relations." ²⁷

At midnight on August 22 Hiroshi Oshima, the Japanese Ambassador, rushed to the Foreign Office to see Baron von Weizsäcker, the German state secretary. Oshima had just heard from Ribbentrop about his impending departure for Moscow in order to sign a pact with Stalin, and was uneasy; his nervousness increased in the course of the conversation. Now he expected that Russia would "strengthen her East Asiatic front and put new life into the Chinese war." He also questioned the legality of a German-Soviet pact and its consistency with earlier German-Japanese agreements. Von Weizsäcker told him that for Japan, just as for Germany, not Russia but England must now become Enemy Number One, and that "a period of quiet in Japanese-Russian relations"

26. United States, Department of State, *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941*, edited by R. J. Sontag and J. S. Beddie (Washington, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1948), pp. 38, 54.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 58.

must be inaugurated. On August 26, three days after its signing, Ōshima revisited the *Auswärtiges Amt* to lodge an official "earnest protest" on behalf of his government, stating that the pact was in conflict with existing German-Japanese agreements. Weizsäcker, however, persuaded Ōshima, who in his heart was sometimes more pro-German than pro-Japanese, to withdraw the protest and to think it over. Ōshima followed this advice, yet reported to his government that the protest had been transmitted. Not until September 18 did he return to the German Foreign Office to present another note, which contained no reference to the "earnest protest"; it was still strongly worded, however: "The Japanese Government regards the nonaggression and consultative pact recently concluded between the German Government and the Government of the USSR as in contradiction to the secret annex against the Communist International." ²⁸

Upon his arrival in Moscow Ribbentrop started his conversations with Stalin and Molotov with the Japanese issue. He was prepared, he declared, "to make an effective contribution to an adjustment of the differences between the Soviet Union and Japan." Stalin wanted caution and shrewdness; he was afraid lest Japan gain an impression of Soviet weakness if he insisted on active German mediation. "Herr Stalin," Ribbentrop reported, "considered the assistance of Germany in bringing about an improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations as useful, but he did not want the Japanese to get the impression that the initiative in this direction had been taken by the Soviet Union." ²⁹ To this Ribbentrop assented and intimated that he would negotiate with the Japanese about the Russian issue as if this were merely a continuation of his earlier steps.

The conclusion of the Berlin-Moscow pact on August 23, coming as it did at the height of Soviet-Japanese tension on the Manchurian-Mongolian borders, caused an outburst of indignation in Tokyo. The Japanese Cabinet was forced to resign and was replaced by the new Cabinet of Premier Abe, who saw himself compelled to effect a reversal of Japanese policy toward Russia.

On August 28 and 29 the great battle of Nomonhan took place; after that the negotiations which had been going on all through the

28. United States, Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1946, II, 1038.

29. *Ibid.*, pp. 70-73.

summer rapidly gained tempo and led to an agreement. On September 15 Vyacheslav Molotov and the Japanese envoy to Moscow, Shigenori Togo, signed a truce ceasing all military operations the following day. This agreement was more far-reaching than any of the previous local and temporary truces concluded during the years of border clashes. It also provided for the establishment of a mixed border commission, so long and so fruitlessly discussed before. Actually the September agreement put an end to the unilateral operations of the Kwantung Army and to the period of "border incidents."

Relations between Russia and Japan began to improve. This clearing of the Far Eastern atmosphere coincided with the improvement in Soviet-German relations. That a détente between Moscow and Tokyo did take place was not, however, owing to the Germans, Ribbentrop's promises to Stalin notwithstanding. For the moment, German influence in Tokyo had all but vanished. Japan stood isolated in her world policies and was unable any longer to proceed on her course and intensify disagreements with Russia. As a matter of fact, the improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations was the result of a suddenly emerging antagonism between Germany and Japan. It took another year of spectacular German victories over France and against Britain to make a new rapprochement of Berlin and Tokyo possible.

In the meantime, the Soviet Government was also having a heyday in Europe—the annexation of eastern Poland and the drive into the Baltic States. With considerable satisfaction, Molotov could report to the Supreme Soviet on October 31, 1939, that "a certain improvement" was noticeable in the Far East. "The first step has been made toward an improvement of Soviet-Japanese relations," he declared, adding that not only would a border commission be established but negotiations concerning the promotion of trade—which had dropped almost to zero—would also get under way.

Communism in Japan and Korea

Communism never developed an influential party in prewar Japan; in this respect, an important difference existed between the two European partners of the Axis and their Far Eastern ally. In so far as Communist tendencies did develop in Japan, they exhibited peculiar traits distinguishing them from the other 40 to 50 components of the Comintern—despite all the efforts of the international leadership to bring into line with the rest of the Communist organizations both the program and tactics of Japanese Communism.

The emergence of the Communist party in Japan was achieved with considerable help from Russia. A few small Communist groups, consisting mostly of Japanese intellectuals, were formed in 1921, about the time when the Communist movement began to gain momentum all over the Far East. The most prominent figure in this early period was Sen Katayama, the former leader of the Japanese Socialists, well remembered for his spectacular handshake with the Russian Socialist, Georgi Plekhanov, before the International Socialist Congress in 1904 during the Russo-Japanese war. The Socialist tradition of antimilitarism and a certain degree of pro-Russianism were strengthened by the Russian Revolution. "We have to defend the Russian Revolution," Katayama told the Congress of the Comintern in Moscow in November, 1922. "Our movement is still weak; yet in Japan we have no Hendersons and no Gompers'."¹ Katayama became the permanent spokesman for Japan at Communist conferences; he was a member of the Presidium of the International until his death in 1933. He died in Moscow and was buried with all honors near Lenin's tomb on Red Square.

1. Arthur Henderson, the leader of the moderate British Labor party, and Samuel Gompers, president of the American Federation of Labor, were among the non-Communist labor leaders most detested in Moscow.

The other outstanding figure in the Japanese Communist movement of those years was Kyuichi Tokuda, who visited Russia and displayed remarkable initiative and energy. Under his guidance, the Communist groups merged into one party. The life of this party was, however, rather brief: in 1924 internal differences, intensified after the earthquake, brought about the decision of the party's leadership to dissolve it, in spite of the strenuous efforts that had gone into its organization and the considerable aid that had been received from Moscow. Moscow protested. The few Communist leaders who were willing to continue their work were invited to Shanghai, then the headquarters of the Far Eastern Section of the Communist International headed by the Russian delegate, Voitinsky. The Japanese were told that the Comintern refused to ratify the dissolution of their party and that new efforts were to be made to revive it.²

Not until December, 1926, however, was the party re-created, Moscow giving the Japanese considerable assistance. A sum of \$120,000 a year was granted to Japanese Communists. In the Soviet embassy in Tokyo, Yanson, officially the trade representative, was also the representative of the Comintern in Japan. Yanson was behind the splitting up of a few "militant" trade-unions and the creation of a "Red Center" for the labor movement. He was not careful enough in his dealings; perhaps it was impossible to conceal the nature of his work. When he handed over the sum of \$10,000 to the Hyōgikai (left-wing trade-unions) for the financing of a strike and his activities were revealed in the Japanese press, he was recalled to Moscow. No other representative of the Communist International was appointed to reside in Japan. Instead, Voitinsky's jurisdiction was extended from Shanghai to cover Japan.³

The two years following were the best in the history of Japanese Communism. Considerable interest in the new movement developed among professors and students. The Ronoto party, controlled by the Communists, took part in the parliamentary elections in February, 1928, and polled 180,000 votes. The Comintern in Mos-

2. These details were confirmed by Itakawa, member of the Central Committee of the Communist party of Japan during his trial in the summer of 1931. *Tikhii Okean* (1934), No. 1.

3. Besedovsky, *Na putyakh k Termidoru*, II, 36 ff.

cow noted the growing strength of its Japanese section and reiterated that, in its view, a united front of the three Far Eastern movements—Japanese, Korean, and Chinese—was destined to solve the problems of the Far East.

No sooner had the Communist party grown out of its embryo stage and become a political organism than characteristic Japanese tendencies again began to tear it asunder. Two interesting "deviations" became the subject of prolonged discussions in Tokyo as well as Moscow. One was the Yamakawa faction, the other was that of Fukumoto. While the official leadership of the Communist party, in accordance with the universal pattern of Communist movements, was republican, the Yamakawa group was inclined to compromise with the monarchy in order not to be obliged to fight the imperial tradition of Japan. This concept combined the fight against capitalism, imperialism, and financial and industrial magnates with at least toleration of the monarchy. A faction which called itself the "Labor Group of the Communist Party" advanced the slogan, "Dictatorship of the proletariat with the Emperor at the head."⁴

The other, a rather Trotskyite faction, laid stress on underground activity and was accused by the official leadership of inclinations toward a "sectarian movement" instead of toward a mass party.

In addition to these differences, increased persecutions on the part of the police soon reduced the party to impotence. In 1928 an amendment to the "Peace Preservation Law" was adopted authorizing severe penalties, including capital punishment, for Communist activities. After 1928 arrests among the membership of the Communist party of Japan became increasingly frequent. In the six years from 1928 to 1933 about 30,000 Communists were arrested.⁵

4. *Kommunistisches International* (1934), No. 4, p. 44.

Otto Kuusinen rebuked the Japanese Communists in his speech before the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Communist International in March, 1932, for its "underevaluation of the fight against the monarchy."

5. In 1928 there were 1,850 arrests; in 1929, 3,567; in 1930, 3,737; in 1931, 6,903; in 1932, 9,212; and in 1933, about 9,000. *Nihon*, November 30, 1933, quoted in *Bolshevik* (1934), No. 5, p. 78. The Communist press in Japan and Russia reported cases of maltreatment, torture, and death in prison. Kuusinen stated in 1932 that 50 Communists died in Japanese prisons, and asserted that "in cruelty these persecutions exceed all the horrors of European fascism." Executive Committee of the Communist International, Thirteenth Session.

Here another peculiarity of the Communist movement in Japan became obvious: the enormous role of agents-provocateurs within the Communist party. The number and importance of these provocateurs exceeded anything known in old and new Russia or in Germany. Several members of the Central Committee were proved to have been employed as secret agents of the police; other agents were scattered all through the local organizations; the party from top to bottom was infested with informers. The *Communist International* reported that

in Japan, more than 90 per cent—and if we consider the most important mass arrests, almost 100 per cent—of all political prisoners have been arrested thanks to police espionage and provocations . . .

The mass arrests carried out simultaneously all over the country were the result of the "work" of such provocateurs as Akiwa, Kato, and others, in 1928.

Maniwe was one of those responsible for the mass arrests in 1929. After sizable mass arrests in July, 1930, the provocateurs responsible for them were likewise found out [Kase and others].

Finally, the inspirers of the arrests in October [1932] were the group of provocateurs headed by Momose.⁶

Of the 30,000 arrested but not indicted between March, 1928, and March, 1933, the authorities decided to release unconditionally as many as 27,500. However, a good many of the remaining 2,500 declared their abandonment of Communism; among them were well-known Communist leaders like Gaku Sato and Sadachika Nabeyama.⁷ Since there were stool pigeons at the very top level of the party, all the secrets of the movement and particularly its secret ties with Moscow and the financial assistance received from there became well known to the Japanese Government.⁸

The fight against the informers became a major problem for the slim remnants of the Japanese Communist party. In the eyes of the membership everyone was suspect. The Central Committee of the party was treated with distrust despite the fact that it had been approved by Moscow. In 1934 a new Communist group established itself as an "organizational committee for the purpose of taking the

6. (Russian ed. 1933), No. 24, pp. 56-57.

7. *Contemporary Japan* (December, 1933), p. 448.

8. This was probably the reason why resolutions concerning the Japanese party were sometimes, surprisingly enough, signed not by the Presidium of the Communist International but by an obscure "Western European Bureau of the Executive Committee."

- Central Committee back into its hands and purging it of provocateurs." Meanwhile those members and chiefs who had been found guilty of treason by the party were summarily done away with. Murders of secret police agents thus were numerous. The press indignantly spoke of "Red lynchings," and hundreds of men guilty or suspected of participation were arrested in 1933-34.

Whatever remained of the Communist party in Japan was officially backed and supported by the Comintern. "The defense of the Soviet Union," proclaimed by the Fourth Congress of the Communist International in 1928 as the primary duty of all Communist parties, was interpreted literally in Japan. At the Twelfth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern in 1932, Okano, the Japanese delegate, said: "The Communist party of Japan knows how great are the tasks confronting it, in the face of danger against *our* Socialist fatherland." And at the Thirteenth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International in 1933 Okano loyally pleaded: "We must propagandize the peaceful policy of the Soviet Union, the grandiose achievements of socialist construction in the Soviet Union, as well as in favor of Soviet China." In 1932, upon the initiative of the Communists a new Union of Friends of the Soviet Union was created in Tokyo.

During the negotiations concerning the purchase of the Chinese Eastern, when at times Japan seemed to prefer direct seizure of the line, the Communist party arranged demonstrations under the slogan, unusual for a labor movement, "Let's buy the Chinese Eastern!" In 1932-33, Russia's worst years in two decades as far as living conditions were concerned, *Sekki* (the clandestine publication of the Communist party of Japan) as well as leaflets among the workers in factories pictured the workers' life in Russia in the rosiest hues and asked "How can we achieve the living conditions of the workers and peasants of Russia?"⁹

Following the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, and especially when Soviet-Japanese relations had become dangerously tense, the Japanese Communists tried to extend their field of activity to the army and navy. For a short time *The Soldier's Friend*, which was illegally distributed among the troops, advised them to refuse to go to the front and fight. *The High Mast* was published at the naval base of Kure for the benefit of sailors. Its slogans were "Defend the

9. *Yaponiya* (Moscow, 1934), p. 385.

Soviet Union—the fatherland of the international proletariat!”¹⁰ “Liberation of Korea and Formosa!” and “Independence for China!”

“Don’t ship a single soldier!” the Japanese Communists exhorted the navy. “The reaction is turning against the toiling peoples of China and Japan and also against the toilers of the Soviet Union. Demand the immediate withdrawal of the armies from Mukden and all occupied areas!”¹⁰

Yet the positive results of the propaganda campaign, costly in men and money, were meager indeed. With sorrow Okano wrote, in the Moscow *Bolshevik*, that antiwar propaganda was still inadequate: “Not once have the Communists as yet succeeded in preventing a train or ship transporting troops and armaments to China and to the Soviet borders from leaving.”¹¹

The Seventh Congress of the Communist International in 1935 completed the formulation of the new tactics mandatory for all Communist parties, namely, a favorable attitude toward so-called popular fronts. In view of the growing menace of war against the Soviet Union arising from the policies of Germany and Japan, the “anti-fascist” slogans, involving a degree of cooperation with non-Communist leftist parties, were to constitute the new line of propaganda and policy. Everywhere conferences, congresses, and coalitions with non-Communists (but of course under Communist guidance) were scheduled. The two Japanese delegates at the Communist International, Tanaka and Nisikawa, told the gathering that they were in full accord with the new line of the International and would do everything within their power in Japan to prevent a war against the Soviet Union. “The Communist party must propose a united front to the Sakai Taisuto [the moderate labor party of Japan].” The Japanese trade-unions, likewise divided between a “Red” and a moderate leadership, must unite, Tanaka declared. Nisikawa was even more explicit: “If Japanese imperialism starts a war against the Soviet Union, that fatherland of the toilers of all countries and all mankind’s hope for a better future, we Japanese Communists shall do everything to answer it by a revolt of the workers and peasants in the rear of Japanese imperialism.”¹²

10. Quoted in *Kommunistichesky Internatsional pered sedmym kongresom* (Moscow, 1935), p. 430.

11. *Bolshevik* (1934), No. 5, p. 86.

12. *Revolutsionnyi vostok*, (1935), No. 6, 64, 79.

In subsequent years many attempts were made in Japan to follow this policy. Kato Kantsu, a member of the Japanese Diet and leader of the left-wing Japanese trade-union federation, formed a new association (Rono Musan Kyogikai), whose main aim was a "struggle against fascism."¹³ In February, 1937, it held its first conference and announced the formation of a new party, "Japan's Proletarian party" (Nihon Musantō). A "Society for Action," consisting of Communists, some socialists, anti-fascist democrats, and liberals issued a manifesto declaring that its aim was to "fight Fascism."¹⁴ The Musantō was active along the same lines as were the Japanese Communists. It also engaged in propaganda in the army and navy. Leaflets printed by Musantō in 1937 and addressed to "soldiers of the Japanese Army" said, for example:

"We do not want to be misguided by the deceitful phrases of the military and financial magnates . . . Stop the war immediately!"

"War . . . War! . . . Who profits by it? . . . Death to the capitalists and landlords!"¹⁵

The new party never gained wide support, nor was the new policy much more successful than the previous line of "class struggle." In December, 1936, about 1,300 Communists were arrested; in December, 1937, 400 were arrested. The government dissolved the Musantō; the leftist trade-union federation was likewise suppressed.¹⁶ In 1938 Okano, one of the leaders of Japanese Communism, frankly admitted that the policy of the "united front" in Japan had proved to be a failure and that moderate labor leaders were inclined toward "fascism," which meant that they were opposed to common action with the Communists.¹⁷

The Communist party of Korea, although its membership was more numerous than that of the Japanese party, was not very important either. Founded in 1925 it was growing, despite its illegal status, largely through help from the numerous Korean Communists residing in the Maritime Provinces of the Soviet Far East, as well as from Moscow.

The Soviet Consul General in Seoul, Sharmanov, until his recall

13. *Tikbi Okean* (1937), No. 2.

14. *International Press Correspondence* (1937), No. 43.

15. *Kommunistichesky Internatsional* (1938), No. 11, p. 91.

16. *Tikbi Okean* (1938), No. 1, p. 60.

17. *Kommunistichesky Internatsional* (1938), No. 10.

in the summer of 1927, had the task of assisting the Korean Communists. Of the \$120,000 appropriated by the Communist International annually for work in the Japanese Empire, Korea claimed 50 per cent, since the number of Communist cells there was greater than in Japan and Formosa combined. A multitude of factions developed inside the Communist movement, and this internal strife paralyzed its activity to such an extent that, in December, 1928, the Comintern disbanded the Korean party. Later, of course, it was resurrected. Persecutions by the Japanese-Korean police were severe; not less than 6,000 party members were arrested between 1928 and 1934.¹⁸ In accordance with the new "united front" policy, the "League for a National Front of Korea" was created in December, 1937. Three groups signed its first statement, in which they stressed the fact that because of Korea's special position as a colony of Japan, they proposed "not a class front, not even a people's front," but a "national front." The political purpose of this slogan was to rally all Koreans—not only leftists—for a fight against Japan. "Freedom and equality for the Korean nation," was the goal and motto of the new party. Later, in 1939, the Communist press reported the existence of a united anti-Japanese front in Korea and even the creation of a "national-revolutionary army" in the mountains and forests of the country. It was certainly an exaggeration to call the few guerrillas an army. While anti-Japanese sentiments in Korea were strong, overt action along Communist lines was modest in extent.

The Korean Communist party never came into its own before the second World War. In 1937 the official *Great Soviet Encyclopedia* noted that "the Communist party of Korea is not a mass party as yet." It did not begin to flourish until late in 1945.

18. *Kommunistichesky Internatsional pered sedmym kongresom*, and Besedovsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-20, 114-116.

"In Japan's Secret Service

The Japanese issue played a foremost role also in the great Russian purge of 1936-38, especially after the conclusion of the anti-Comintern pact. In the two great trials—of 17 men in January, 1937, and 22 in March, 1938—the defendants were accused of collaboration with Japan and Germany; a considerable number of Soviet diplomats were recalled and disappeared during these years; People's Commissars and other high-ranking officials were likewise indicted, found guilty, and liquidated for their help to these foreign powers; in addition, a number of nonpublic trials and executions were officially reported, on charges of service to Japan. The press reported the following convictions in the Far East and Siberia in 1937 alone: In May 43 death sentences against workers of the Trans-Siberian Railroad for alleged sabotage on orders from Japan; May 2, 43 men shot in Khabarovsk; June 14, 28 shot in Khabarovsk; June 27, 37 shot in Khabarovsk; July 6, 22 railroad workers convicted in the Far East; July 13, 61 men shot in the Far East; August 11, 72 railroad workers shot in Irkutsk; August 19, 34 railroad workers shot in Irkutsk; September 19, unknown number shot in Vladivostok; October 19, 54 men shot in Ulan Ude (Buryat-Mongolia). This list is far from complete; the provincial press carried other reports of similar purges, ties with Japan being the main charge preferred against the accused; the largest part of the liquidations was not publicized in the press.

It was this foreign-political aspect of the purge that provoked the greatest attention. Among the men who, according to the court's verdicts and official reports, had served Japan and Germany were the majority of those who had engineered the November Revolution of 1917 and who had been the leaders of the Communist movement in the days of Lenin. Among those found guilty and, with a few exceptions, executed for collaboration with Japan and Germany, were the President of the Communist International,

Nikolai Bukharin; Prime Minister Rykov; the Ambassador to Berlin, Krestinsky; the Ambassador to Paris, Rakovsky; the Ambassador to London, Sokolnikov; the leading Communist expert on international affairs, Karl Radek; People's Commissar Pyatakov. Some of the trials were public and were attended by foreign correspondents and foreign diplomats; in such cases, the Soviet press reported the proceedings at length.

The main motive for the staging of some public trials was to do away with all remnants of opposition and to make such opposition impossible in the future. Defendants were accused of planning the assassination of Stalin; others were charged with plotting to kill Molotov; mention was made of a plan to arrest the entire Seventeenth Communist Party Congress while it was in session. Communist leaders were arraigned together with obscure characters who not only confessed to wrecking activities and deliberate killing of workers but served as witnesses against their celebrated co-defendants. Nobody had ever heard of them. Agents of the pre-revolutionary secret police were brought before the court and introduced to the public; they were prepared to confirm everything the prosecutor desired them to confirm.

The trials, however, were not carefully enough prepared. In one case, for example, the defendants confessed to having met in a hotel in Copenhagen whose name was well known in Moscow; the hotel, however, at the time in question had already ceased to exist. In another case, a defendant was stated to have flown to Oslo for a meeting with Trotsky; the chief of the airport, when later questioned, declared that not a single plane had landed at his airport during the winter month in question. The multitude of impossible charges and false statements produced by the prosecutor, Andrei Vyshinsky, did, however, make an impression in Russia, since facts concerning charges disproved or denied abroad were not published in the Soviet press.

In order to produce this effect it was necessary to charge the defendants with crimes other than mere opposition to Stalin or even plots to overthrow the government; it was necessary to go beyond the issues of domestic conditions, which were widely considered to be unsatisfactory and the cause of discontent and protest. Treason to the nation had to be added to the indictment to justify

the severity of the purge. Vyshinsky proved to be well qualified to trump up charges of treason.

The injection of the issue of "service to the enemy" in addition to issues concerning internal squabbles had already become a tradition in the political trials preceding the great purge. After 1929 there had been public and nonpublic trials of the "Industrial party," the "Academics," and the Mensheviks, and in each case the prosecution (generally the People's Commissar of Justice, Nikolai Krylenko) had to establish the existence of ties between the defendants and the "intelligence services" of foreign powers; it used dubious witnesses, false documents, and "confessions" of defendants striving to save their lives.

Since the days of Lenin a peculiar logic had prevailed in the struggle against internal opposition. It was the logic of revolutionary passion rather than ordinary and legal reasoning. One syllogism was linked to another. All opposition weakens the position of the government abroad; hence opposition serves the purpose of foreign powers which oppose the Soviet Government. A man opposing the government of Moscow is therefore acting in the interests of foreign powers—"whatever his intentions," Lenin used to add in the early days. Ergo, an oppositionist acts as if he were the agent of a foreign power. A short logical jump—and every oppositionist is the agent of a foreign power. The next steps on the ladder of logic: an oppositionist is an informer of a foreign power; he is not only an informer but also a paid agent; an agent-informer of a foreign power is a spy. A spy is, of course, a traitor. The circle is closed: an oppositionist is a traitor.

This elimination of the individual's intent and motivation and the substitution of "objective consequences" were a part of the revolutionary excitement during the early days of Soviet Russia. Now this became a constant in the internal struggles, the ever-present point of indictment in political trials. The chain of logical syllogisms, the acceptance of which was obligatory only for faithful Communist believers, was, however, inadequate for the masses of the people; for their benefit the charges must be proved by other means—and this was precisely the task of the prosecutor and of the court. It was necessary to present the simplest possible connection between the defendants—political leaders of high standing—and the spy rings of the enemy.

In the trials of 1937 and 1938 the prosecutor tried to make use of the turn in Russia's foreign policy and position which had occurred since 1935. Previously, apprehension and concern over the prospects of war had been omnipresent. Had she chosen to attack Russia then, Japan would have been able to conquer and hold the Maritime and Amur Provinces. In 1933-34 Poland might have been able, especially after her pact with Hitler, to launch an attack from the west. In the highest circles of Moscow—in the Kremlin as well as in editorial offices and small gatherings of informed people—Russia's precarious position was a subject of concern. Everyone, including Stalin, was agreed that in case of war Russia stood to lose (for a certain time, at least) the Ukraine and Byelorussia in the west and sizable areas in the Far East. It was also felt that, since England was still unfriendly, certain parts of central Asia adjoining British possessions and spheres of influence would be lost, too. Lenin's peace with Germany in 1918, by which he ceded the Ukraine to the Kaiser in order to gain time ("he traded space for time") was widely alluded to. If there was any difference of opinion among the group surrounding Stalin and the opposition within the Communist party, it concerned only subsequent steps, the opposition anticipating that such setbacks and losses would lead in time to a reshuffling of forces within the party, with the opposition itself coming to power. There was, of course, nothing treasonable in such discussions and speculations.

After 1935 the Soviet position underwent a marked improvement and strengthening in the east as well as in Europe. Defeat was no longer considered a certainty. Effective resistance to an attack, at least from Japan, promised to be feasible. Thus in Stalin's fight with the opposition, Vyshinsky made use of certain statements made by Radek, Bukharin, Trotsky, and others in previous years, to prove their "defeatism" and their "hopes pinned on the enemies." Such statements were juxtaposed to Stalin's new policy aiming at successful resistance to any attack. The prosecution usually avoided giving specific dates of statements and documents. Policies harking back to a hoary past and once approved by Lenin and Stalin were now unearthed as proof of a defendant's treason.

The widely accepted notion that the principal defendants in the Moscow trials admitted to having been in the employ of foreign

governments is not borne out by the official record of the trials. When Vyshinsky, for example, pressed Bukharin to admit to spying activities, Bukharin answered: "I don't know anything about espionage activities."

Vyshinsky: "But the bloc [the opposition]—what did it engage in?"

Bukharin: "Two witnesses testified about espionage—both are agents-provocateurs."

Still more revealing was the exchange between the prosecutor and Karl Radek; the skillful distortion of a series of statements, so that what was intended to describe an expectation of a tragic outcome of events was made to appear as wanton defeatism, is clearly illustrated in the following testimony:

Vyshinsky: Were you in favor of defeat in 1934?

Radek: I considered defeat inevitable.

Vyshinsky: Were you in favor of defeat?

Radek: If I could avert defeat, I would be against defeat.

Vyshinsky: You consider that you could not avert it?

Radek: I considered it an inevitable fact.

Vyshinsky: You are answering my question incorrectly. Did you accept the whole of Trotsky's line given to you in 1934?

Radek: I accepted the whole of Trotsky's line in 1934.

Vyshinsky: Was defeat part of it?

Radek: Yes, it was a line of defeat.

Vyshinsky: Trotsky's line included defeat?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Did you accept it?

Radek: I did.

Vyshinsky: Since you accepted it, you were in favor of defeat?

Radek: From the standpoint . . .

Vyshinsky: You headed for defeat?

Radek: Yes, of course.

Vyshinsky: That is, you were in favor of defeat?

Radek: Of course, if I say yes, that means we headed for it.¹

At the trials there was quoted a letter allegedly written by Trotsky to Radek. (Trotsky, from abroad, emphatically denied

1. Pyatakov Trial, People's Commissariat of the USSR, *Report of Court Proceedings*, January 23-30, 1937, p. 127.

having corresponded with Radek during those years.) According to the letter Trotsky—pictured by the prosecution as the leader of the opposition—gave the following “instructions”:

“We shall inevitably have to make territorial concessions . . . We shall have to yield the Maritime Province and Amur region to Japan and the Ukraine to Germany . . . We shall have to yield the oil of Sakhalin to Japan and to guarantee to supply her with oil in case of war with America. We shall also have to permit her to exploit gold fields.”²

Indeed such a statement could very well have been made by Trotsky in the 'twenties, when the statement would have expressed the actual policy of the Soviet Government—at that time far-reaching economic concessions had been granted to Japan; in general Stalin, along with other leaders, was inclined to favor a war between Japan and the United States. “It was stated [in the letter alleged to have been written by Trotsky] that no obstacles must be raised to the conquest of China by Japanese imperialism.” Good relations with Japan were indeed the gist of Stalin's policy when Japan's drive into Manchuria began in 1931. At the time of the trials, however, the defendants were charged with treason in favor of Japan, while Stalin was presented as the only element prepared to fight for the Soviet Union.³

As far as collaboration with Japan was concerned, the most important of the defendants was Christian Rakovsky, an old Communist of high moral integrity. He was accused of having been in Britain's service since 1924 and of having served Japan since 1934. His “confession,” evidently prepared beforehand so that it would not contradict the prosecutor, stood out for its vagueness, for the absence of names, and, on the other hand, for some absurd remarks. He met—he said—a “well-known public leader” in Tokyo, and confessed to having promised to supply the Japanese intelligence service with certain information. In the terms used in the court pro-

2. *Ibid.*, p. 8.

3. The same applies to the Soviet attitude toward Germany. Krestinsky, the former Soviet Ambassador to Berlin, and others were charged with systematic transmission of military data to the German General Staff, on behalf of Trotsky, for a sum of 250,000 marks a year; Krestinsky “confessed” to these accusations. The accusations were based on facts—but the payments were a result of a decision of the Soviet Government, under Lenin, after the Rapallo treaty, when a period of close military-technical collaboration with Germany was inaugurated. The payments, of course, went through official channels into the Soviet treasury.

ceedings, the story produced the desired impression of a sinister plot.

In September, 1934 [Rakovsky testified], I was dispatched to Tokyo at the head of the Soviet Red Cross delegation to the international conference of Red Cross organizations. On the second day after my arrival in Tokyo, an important public figure of Japan met me in the corridor of the Japanese Red Cross building . . . At the second and third meeting with the man, who headed an important social organization in Japan, the character of the information, which I promised to transmit to the Japanese intelligence in Moscow, was established between us, as well as the technique of its transmission. While still in Tokyo I drew into this affair Doctor Naida, whose one-time underground counterrevolutionary terroristic affiliation was already known to me. It is he who played the role of liaison agent between me and the Japanese intelligence . . . I returned from Tokyo, with the mandate of a Japanese spy in my pocket . . . Before the trial of Kamenev and Zinoviev I transmitted five communications to the Japanese intelligence through Naida.⁴

In this ominous self-accusation, words and phrases had their specific meaning. The "counterrevolutionary terroristic affiliation" meant previous participation in some Trotskyite group; the "five communications to the Japanese intelligence" dealt with kolkhozes and similar economic matters, etc. In addition to Naida, several others were accused of having been aware of Rakovsky's "espionage" activities, including Ambassador Yurenev; Livshits, an Assistant People's Commissar; Knyazev, director of the North Caucasian Railway; and others.

Knyazev testified that S. Hiroshima, the railway expert at the Japanese embassy in Moscow (referred to at the trial as "agent of the Japanese intelligence service, Mr. H—"), had given him instructions to set fires in military stores; Hiroshima allegedly stressed "the necessity of using bacteriological means in time of war." Nobody dared to inquire at the trial why a Japanese railway expert had to give instructions for infecting trains with "highly virulent bacilli." Neither the Soviet nor the Japanese Governments considered the accusations too serious; Hiroshima remained at his post for another three months and was then transferred to Warsaw.

Most of the trials resulted in death verdicts. A few of the defend-

4. Bukharin Trial record (in Russian), pp. 147-149.

ants, among them Rakovsky and Radek, were sentenced to prison terms of 10 or 20 years; both Rakovsky and Radek died before the end of the second World War.

Japan followed the developments in Russia with the greatest attention. In Tokyo's view, the trials signaled a serious weakening of Russia's capacity to fight, and particularly in the Far East. The information being gathered by Japan was enriched when Gen. G. S. Lushkov, chief of the NKVD for the Far East and member of the Supreme Soviet, fearing for his life, crossed the Manchurian border in June, 1938, during the course of the purge. In July he was brought to Tokyo, where he freely revealed the state of Soviet military forces in the Far East; he also described the general depression among high Soviet officials and particularly in the army, as well as the multitude of arrests and interrogations by the NKVD, in which he himself had taken part.

This picture of a grave weakening of Russia as a result of the purges was part of a report by Gen. Masaharu Homma, who returned from Moscow to Tokyo and told Japan that he "shared the view of those who believed that the Red Army had been so weakened as a result of the trial and execution of Marshal Tukhaevsky and other officers of the Higher Command that it was threatened with disintegration. His visit to the Soviet Union had convinced him that Japan had no need to fear the Soviet Army."⁵

The consequences of the purges were indeed lasting. They made themselves felt, however, not so much in the Far East, where no fighting ensued until 1945, as in Europe, where the great defeats of 1941 were at least in part attributable to the liquidation of Russia's best military and other leaders in the preceding years.

⁵. Homma's interview with *Osaka Mainichi* of June 28, 1937; quoted in Arnold Toynbee's *Survey of International Affairs for 1937* (Oxford University Press, 1938), I, 150.

Part II. China Before the War

v

War and Peace with Chiang Kai-shek (1930-1941)

The great excitement in Moscow over the anticipated early success of the Chinese Revolution abated in the late 1920's, but Soviet interest in China remained intense. Special universities endowed with considerable funds, and with faculties consisting of prominent Soviet experts, schooled youths for work in China. A great number of books dealing with Chinese affairs appeared. Magazines devoted much space to description of the dramatic events occurring in China. After all, China since 1931 had been the only country outside of Russia where a Soviet government had managed to exist, maintain a Red Army, and control a sizable territory. From 1934 on the Communist party of China was recognized as second only to that of Russia in strength and importance. Apart from the Communist movement, Soviet influence was rapidly spreading in western China.

The basically antagonistic attitude of the Soviet Government toward Nationalist China under Chiang Kai-shek did not follow a straight line, however. It fluctuated with the ups and downs of Russia's relations with Japan. So long as relations with Japan appeared normal and peaceful, Russia's attitude toward Kuomintang China was negative and hostile. Beginning with the spring of 1927, when the break between Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Communists occurred, Chiang became Russia's Enemy Number One in the Far East. He was termed the "butcher of China," "the hangman," "agent of extreme reaction," a warlord in the pay of bankers and big business. Ideologically, Moscow was tied up with the bellicose Chinese Communists; Moscow's material help went far beyond ideas and advice. The war of Chinese Communism was Moscow's war. The cause of Chinese Communism was the cause of a Greater Soviet Union.

With each sign of deterioration in Russia's relations with Japan,¹ the chances of a corresponding improvement in Sino-Soviet relations rose. The danger from Japan was so formidable that the entire Chinese issue, including that of Communism, had to be subordinated to the defense of the Soviet Union. As Japan became aggressive, there was no choice: every means—even Chiang Kai-shek—had to be placed at the service of Soviet policy.

The 1930's opened under favorable auspices. Soviet relations with Japan seemed friendly and stable. There was no need for official relations between Moscow and Nanking—there was no diplomatic recognition and there were no envoys. In 1930 thousands of Chinese prisoners, taken by Russia during the brief Manchurian war in 1929, returned to their homeland. The Khabarovsk protocol had just been signed. But the end of the war did not mean the re-establishment of normal relations between Russia and China.

Nor did the Japanese invasion of Manchuria produce a marked change in Sino-Soviet relations. The Soviet Government at first failed to realize how far Japan intended to push and how critically Soviet-Japanese relations would be affected by Tokyo's new policy. Japan sought to allay Soviet suspicions and agreed to stay out of all territories belonging to the Soviet sphere. We have already seen how, for a certain time, Moscow strove to maintain good relations with Japan despite the occupation of Manchuria. Moreover, Moscow at first acted toward China in a manner reminiscent of Japanese methods. Six weeks after the Japanese blow at Mukden in September, 1931, Moscow signed a treaty with the Governor of Sinkiang, Chin Shu-jen, under which Russia obtained valuable economic and political privileges in Sinkiang in return for furnishing certain supplies—in part, military equipment. This agreement in effect signified the beginning of a separation of that vast province from the body politic of China. The accord was kept secret from the Chiang Kai-shek government precisely because of its long-range implications.¹ For almost a year after the Japanese attack, Moscow remained hostile to Nanking despite the Japanese invasion of Manchuria; this was the first year of Chiang's "expeditions" against the Soviet regions of China.

1. See Chap. VI.

• The atmosphere began to improve in the late summer of 1932. In June the Chinese Government had taken the initiative and suggested to Moscow the conclusion of a treaty of nonaggression simultaneously with the re-establishment of diplomatic relations, which had been severed five years earlier. However, the negotiations which began in Moscow at the end of June lead to no agreement. It was finally resolved to limit the rapprochement to the resumption of diplomatic relations.² At a meeting of the Disarmament Commission of the League of Nations in Geneva, Litvinov notified the Chinese of Russia's acceptance of the offer, and diplomatic recognition was again extended on December 12, 1932.

Litvinov never indicated the reasons for which the Chinese offer of a nonaggression pact was turned down. They may have had to do with Soviet penetration into Sinkiang or with Outer Mongolia. The following year Litvinov made a countermove and proposed to China his own text of such a pact; but his conditions, in turn, were unacceptable to the Chinese. Despite Litvinov's public prodding (in a speech in December, 1933) no agreement was reached, and the pact was not concluded until 1937.³

In May, 1933, the Soviet Government decided to withdraw from Manchuria and sell the Chinese Eastern Railway to Manchukuo-Japan. As soon as this plan became known in Nanking General Chiang protested vigorously to Moscow. From a strictly legal point of view, China's protest was well founded. By the treaty of 1924 the Soviet Government had obligated itself to make no arrangements affecting the railway without China's consent.

It needs scarcely to be emphasised [wrote the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs to Moscow] that all matters pertaining to the Chinese Eastern Railway should continue to be governed by the Agreements concluded between China and the Soviet Union in 1924 and should be exclusively determined by the Governments of these two countries.

2. *China Weekly Review*, June 18 and July 9, 1932; *China Year Book*, 1933, pp. 656-657.

3. In several books on Communist China Mr. Edgar Snow contends that Moscow offered a nonaggression pact to China in 1933 but that the Central Government rejected the offer. See his *Battle for Asia* (Random House, 1941), p. 296. He alludes to Jap-anophile policies as the reason for the rejection, but overlooks the Chinese offer of 1932; he does not indicate either on what terms the proposed pact was to be concluded. Without a knowledge of the terms proposed it is difficult to condemn a government for its refusal to sign a pact. *

Any new arrangement concerning this important means of communication made without China's consent would constitute a violation of the Agreement of 1924 . . .⁴

Litvinov replied that, as matters stood, the Chinese Government was itself in no position to enforce its rights in Manchuria. But Nanking, clinging to the letter of the Sino-Soviet treaty, lodged another protest:

. . . the views expressed by the Soviet authorities . . . show a total disregard of treaty obligations as well as an inclination to conclude an unlawful transaction with an unlawful regime on the part of the Soviet Government.

. . . paragraph 5 of the same Article [9] most explicitly stipulates that the future of the Chinese Eastern Railway shall be determined by the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the exclusion of any third party or parties.

. . . the Chinese Government is constrained to protest most emphatically against the proposed sale by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of its interests in the Chinese Eastern Railway and expresses the earnest hope that it would reconsider its attitude in regard to this question in the light of the Agreements of 1924.⁵

Moscow's negotiations with Japan, of course, continued. Nearly two years later an agreement was signed for the sale of the railway. On March 11, 1935, Chiang's government again protested to Moscow, stating that "The Chinese Government, which is joint owner of the railway, regards the transaction as illegal and without binding force, and that as such the sale cannot affect Chinese rights and interests in whatever manner."⁶ At the same time the Nationalist Government sent a memorandum to the powers in which it repeated:

" . . . This action by the Soviet Government . . . is clearly and completely ultra vires and therefore must be considered by the Chinese Government as absolutely illegal and invalid."⁷

The idea behind these protests on the part of the Chinese Government was that if Russia were compelled to withdraw from Man-

4. Chinese note of May 9, 1933, in *China Year Book, 1934*, pp. 732-733.

5. Note of May 13, 1933, *ibid.*

6. *Ibid.*, 1935, p. 138.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 139.

Churia she should do so without entering into a formal accord with Japan. If Japan's acts of violence were forcing Russia to relinquish the Chinese Eastern, Nanking suggested by implication, Moscow should leave under protest, maintaining its legitimate rights and claims in Manchuria. Chiang Kai-shek would have preferred such a demonstration of Russian solidarity with China to a commercial and political transaction between Moscow and Tokyo. Moscow, on the other hand, wished to avoid all conflicts with and demonstrations against Japan. The sum paid by Japan for the railway was small, but the agreements arrived at represented a peaceful solution, and Litvinov preferred "peace" to "resistance" so far as the Soviet Union itself was concerned. On March 13, 1935, he declared to the press that "the agreement for the transfer of the Chinese Eastern Railway to 'Manchukuo' must be considered a solution of one of the most complicated Far Eastern problems and the greatest positive event in the development of relations between Soviet Russia and Japan."

Once again, in 1936, the divergence between China's extensive formal rights and privileges and her actual impotence were at the root of a controversy—this time over Outer Mongolia.

In March, 1936, Moscow made known the conclusion of a treaty of mutual assistance with the Mongolian People's Republic. The treaty, discussed elsewhere,⁸ was the sounding of a warning to Japan that Moscow was prepared to defend the integrity of Outer Mongolia in the face of the Manchukuoan-Japanese advance. China obviously would have been incapable of defending Outer Mongolia even if Russia had permitted her to do it. Legally, however, the Soviet-Mongolian agreement was unquestionably a violation of previous treaties between the Soviet Union and China. It had been agreed in 1924 that Mongolia "constitutes an integral part of the Republic of China." True, China's sovereignty remained on paper; but Russia's intention to ally herself with Mongolia, without asking China's consent, was clearly in conflict with the treaty. In its note of April 7, 1936, the Chinese Government told Moscow:

Outer Mongolia being an integral part of the Republic of China, no foreign state has the right to conclude with it any treaty or agreement. The action on the part of the Government of the Soviet Union in con-

8. Cf. page 27.

cluding with Outer Mongolia the aforesaid Protocol, in breach of its pledge to the Chinese Government, constitutes, without doubt, an infringement of the Sovereignty of China . . .

In his reply the following day Litvinov stressed that the fact of the signing of the protocol and its separate articles did not violate in the slightest degree the sovereignty of China, nor did they contain any territorial pretensions whatever on the part of the USSR in relation to China or the Mongolian People's Republic. "The Soviet Government confirms, once more, that the above-mentioned Agreement, as far as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is concerned, remains in force in future."⁹

Pravda insisted that the Chinese protest was made "under pressure from Tokyo," and that there was no serious intent behind it.¹⁰ To allay the impression *Pravda* sought to create, Chiang Kai-shek repeated his protest in strong terms. The second note of the Chinese Foreign Minister declared:

I am . . . obliged to consider as without ground, the explanations given by the Soviet Government in regard to the signing of the Protocol by the U.S.S.R. with Outer Mongolia. . . .

Inasmuch as the present Protocol signed by the Government of the U.S.S.R. with Outer Mongolia constitutes an infringement of China's sovereignty and is in complete contradiction with the Sino-Soviet Agreement of 1924, the Chinese Government has to renew its protest in respect of the Protocol and to reiterate its stand in that regard as enunciated in its last Note of Protest . . .¹¹

Maxim Litvinov could, of course, have avoided this controversy with China, coming as it did at a most inappropriate moment, merely by asking for Chiang Kai-shek's consent to the Soviet-Mongolian treaty. However, China might conceivably have refused altogether or attached strings inconvenient in the eyes of the Narkomindel. As usual, unilateral action was the easiest way out.

By this time Sino-Soviet relations had actually begun to improve; a certain rapprochement had taken place even before the outbreak of war between Japan and China.

9. *China Year Book, 1936*, pp. 21-22.

10. *Pravda*, April 9, 1936. "It is clear," the article stated, "that the absolutely unfounded protest of the Chinese Government was made under direct pressure from Japan, which is posing in an utterly inappropriate fashion as the 'protector' of China's interests."

11. *China Year Book, 1936*, p. 23.

The expectations and hopes cherished in Moscow that the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railroad and the settlement of the Manchurian issue would insure peaceful relations between Russia and Japan proved to be a serious miscalculation. No sooner was the agreement concerning the sale of the railway signed than the sporadic and minor border clashes became a series of warlike conflicts. Japan's aggressiveness was increasing, and bitterness on both sides led the world to expect an early outbreak of full-scale war. As relations with Japan worsened, Moscow's attitude toward Chiang Kai-shek became more friendly.

§The policy of "united fronts" and "national fronts," proclaimed in August, 1935, at the Congress of the Communist International, represented Russia's reaction to the growing danger in Europe as well as in the Far East. The new policy had two facets: first, rapprochement between the Soviet Government and those governments that opposed Germany and Japan—and this included Nationalist China; and second, Communist support of their "anti-fascist" governments—in China implying a rapprochement between the Communists, with their own local governments, and the Kuomintang. §

The Soviet attitude toward Chiang Kai-shek now underwent a revision. In those days many a member of the Kuomintang in the Japanese-occupied territories of China began to cooperate with the conquerors. Well-known figures—including some from the left wing of the Kuomintang—changed color and aligned themselves with Japan. Now such left-wing leaders found themselves in the Japanese camp, while Chiang remained stubborn and opposed to capitulation. He was manifestly becoming the leader of a China prepared to continue resistance to the Japanese.

MOSCOW AND THE SIAN INCIDENT

In autumn, 1936, new negotiations between Moscow and Nanking got under way. Conducted in great secrecy, they dealt with a new nonaggression pact of momentous importance. Among its clauses were Soviet military supplies to China, establishment of airlines, opening of new consulates, and "no assistance" to the Chinese Communists. The talks had already taken a favorable turn when the Sian incident[†] occurred in December, 1936.

Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, the former dictator of Manchuria and a loyal member of the Kuomintang, was in charge of troops guarding the Shensi front against the Chinese Red Army near the city of Sian, on the borders of the Chinese-Soviet area. A movement had been gaining ground among Chinese leaders in Shensi, whose domestic program was a coalition of Kuomintang and Communists, with political freedom for the parties and groups of the left, and who, in foreign affairs, would obviously lead a resistance to Japan in cooperation with Russia. Contacts were established between the headquarters in Sian, whose main task was the "suppression of Communism," and the Communist Government just established in northern Shensi.

When Chiang Kai-shek arrived in Sian for a conference with the local generals, he was arrested and presented with a set of eight demands on behalf of a group of 19, who were in command of a sizable Chinese army. Among the demands were the establishment of a government to include all parties willing to "save the nation"; cessation of all civil war; amnesty for political offenders; freedom of assembly.

Of the eight points, seven simply repeated the program put forth by the Communist party a fortnight earlier. And the impression arose abroad that the Chinese Communists as well as Moscow were behind the military insurrection and that an alliance between Moscow and the future Chinese government, to be headed by one of the rebel generals, was in the offing.

There was a tremendous sensation. Chiang under arrest! Any hour the world expected to receive news of his execution. Dispatches from Nanking and Tokyo reported not only troop movements but also false news about serious battles between the armies loyal to Nanking and those of the rebellious generals. The day after Chiang's arrest a plane was sent from Sian to fetch representatives from Soviet China. The leaders of the Communist party hurriedly convened, and, having no time to consult Moscow, decided to support the action of the Sian insurrectionists. The plane returned to Sian bearing three delegates, including Chou En-lai. Meanwhile, a new government was established in Sian under the name of the Anti-Japanese Military Council; its military forces were to consist of about 100,000 Red Army men and about 150,000 Manchurian and other troops. The Red Army's first move was to approach

hearer to Sian and occupy a new area, including Yen-an, the capital-to-be of Communist China. Everyone looked to the Communists for political leadership: they were the only party with a clear-cut program and policy and they were able to get in touch with Moscow.

Moscow, however, valued a pact with Chiang more highly than one with the irregular forces of the insurrectionists; it adopted an unequivocally hostile attitude toward the Sian rebellion despite its "leftist" character. As a matter of fact, the very day that the first news reached Moscow *Izvestiya* sharply attacked Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang:

Under whatever slogans and program the Sian insurrection be conducted, this move . . . represents a danger not only to the Nanking government but to all of China. It is clear that despite Chang Hsueh-liang's anti-Japanese banner, his move can benefit only Japanese imperialism. So long as the Nanking government conducts a policy of resistance to the Japanese aggressors, the united popular front against Japan is understood by all its participants to mean not a front against Nanking but a front together with Nanking.¹²

To counter the Japanese charges of Russian inspiration in the rebellion, Moscow insisted that "Japanese agents" were pushing Chang toward civil war (which was untrue). *Pravda*, on the same day, declared in its leading article:

The Japanese military clique correctly figures that the process of China's unification around the government of Chiang Kai-shek, a process already well advanced, constitutes a mortal danger to their plans of transforming China into a colony. That is why they persist in egging on the Chinese generals to come out against the Nanking government, not disdaining the use of anti-Japanese slogans whenever necessary.

The position assumed by Moscow necessitated a rapid reorientation for the Chinese Communists. Their new brothers-in-arms were taken by surprise when the Communists refused to back the Sian regime's anti-Chiang policy and to overthrow the Nanking government, and instead advocated the peaceful settlement of an incident which they themselves had helped kindle. On December 19 the Chinese Communist party sent a telegram to the leaders of all

12. *Izvestiya*, December 14, 1936.

political factions proposing to convene a "National Peace Conference" to determine the fate of Chiang Kai-shek and to map armed resistance to Japan.¹³ When the Soviet attitude became known, "a wave of cynical resentment against the Soviet Union swept through Sian." Soon rebel officers were saying: "We have been betrayed! The Red Army induced the Young Marshal to release Chiang."¹⁴

There is no doubt that the position taken in Moscow had a decisive influence on the course of events in Sian and perhaps did save Chiang's life. Indeed, on December 27 Chiang Kai-shek was released and flown back to Nanking.

A few years earlier, the Russian and Chinese Communists would have been only too happy to lay their hands on Chiang, stage a spectacular trial and sentence to death "the butcher of China." Now the Communists claimed credit for having saved Chiang Kai-shek's life and averted a civil war. To the extent to which there is truth in this claim, the credit was on the side of Moscow, not of Yenan. In the last analysis Chiang owed his rescue to Japan's vigorous offensive on the Asiatic continent and to the reality of the Japanese menace to both Russia and China.

As negotiations between Moscow and Nanking progressed during 1937, the climate of internal Chinese politics improved. A rapprochement actually did take place on both levels—between the Soviet and the Chinese Governments and between the Kuomintang and the Communist party of China. Soviet Ambassador Bogomolov mentioned the forthcoming agreement "in confidence" to the correspondent of the *New York Times* in April, 1937. As if he were the leader of the Chinese Communists, he added: "There will be no more civil wars in China."¹⁵

The *Times'* correspondent had received his initial information about the Soviet-Chinese negotiations from Japanese sources. Tokyo was well aware of the talks; the prospect of a "united front" of Russia and China provided an additional incentive for an all-out Japanese war on China. The drive into China was to begin under all circumstances, but now the military party in Tokyo emerged

13. *China's March Toward Unity* (Workers' Library Publishers, 1937), p. 121. The *Communist International* passed over this faux pas of the Chinese comrades in silence and praised them for "favoring a peaceful settlement of the conflict."

14. A. Smedley, *Battle Hymn of China* (Alfred A. Knopf, 1943), pp. 148-149.

15. Hallett Abend, *My Life in China* (Harcourt, Brace, 1943), pp. 237-239.

stronger than before. War broke out before the Sino-Soviet pact was signed.

RAPPROCHEMENT WITH CHINA

On July 7, 1937, Japan struck at the Marco Polo Bridge, and the war was on. For Russia this was the signal for the far-reaching rapprochement with China. Sun Fo, the son of Sun Yat-sen and then a left-wing Kuomintang leader, went to Moscow to negotiate a political treaty and to obtain material help from Russia. Russian assistance was all the more important to China because Britain's attitude was wavering and inconsistent. On August 21, six weeks after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war, a treaty of nonaggression between China and Russia was signed—a treaty which had been delayed for about five years. In the customary manner, it stated:

In the event that either of the high contracting parties should be subjected to aggression on the part of one or more third powers, the other high contracting party obligates itself not to render assistance of any kind, either directly or indirectly, to such third power or powers at any time during the entire conflict, and also to refrain from taking any action or entering into any agreement which may be used by the aggressor or aggressors to the disadvantage of the party subjected to aggression.

The next article was indicative of the real relationship between the two signatories: China expressly promised to relinquish all grievances and revoke all protests [concerning, for instance, Russia's separate treaties with Mongolia and Sinkiang and the sale of the Chinese Eastern]. The pact provided:

The provisions of the present treaty shall not be so interpreted as to affect or modify the rights and obligations arising, in respect to the high contracting parties, out of bilateral or multilateral treaties or agreements of which both high contracting parties are signatories and which were concluded prior to the entering into force of the present treaty.

The treaty went into force immediately, without the usual waiting for exchange of ratifications. In its attempts to explain the significance of the new treaty to the Russian reader, the Soviet press

tried to make it appear that Chiang's government had been forced into an agreement with the Soviet Union not so much by its own will as by the pressure of the masses of the people.

"Not an unimportant role," *Izvestiya* wrote on August 30, 1937, "was played in this by the wide growth of sympathy for the Soviet Union among the masses of Chinese people. The Chinese people have always seen in the Soviet Government a friend, and these feelings have been clearly reflected in the days of trial that have now overtaken the Chinese Republic."

Nothing has been officially published concerning the extent of Russian military assistance to China. By Chinese standards, it was unquestionably considerable; its nature and quantity had, in turn, important repercussions on the political relationship of the two governments. China, at war with an enemy strong in bomber and fighter planes, had practically no air force of her own. Soon from 400 to 500 Russian planes were delivered to the Chinese Army; since there were too few Chinese pilots, Russian aviation instructors and fliers went along.¹⁶ Aviation schools with Soviet instructors were set up in Urumchi (Sinkiang) and Chengtu (Szechwan). A Russian air base was established near Lanchow, in Kansu. In Chinese officer training schools Soviet instructors gave technical and tactical advice. More important still were the Russian officers attached to most Chinese armies for strategic and technical purposes.¹⁷ A shuttle service between Russia and China, employing 200 trucks, was established. Finally, the construction of a road into central China through Sinkiang was begun. High-ranking military advisers with political functions were assigned to the Chinese Government. In Hankow, then the temporary capital, the Soviet military mission under General Cherepanov¹⁸ was located in the Japanese concession, next to the German military mission under General Falkenhausen.

Credit agreements between Russia and China were concluded between 1938 and 1940: in October, 1938, for \$50,000,000 (U. S.); in February, 1939, for the same amount; in August, 1939, for \$150,000,000; and in December, 1940, for \$50,000,000. Only about half of the negotiated loans had been used up by the middle

16. Davies, *Mission to Moscow*, p. 248.

17. Some time later—but still before Pearl Harbor—an aviation school in the south employed Americans as instructors.

18. B. Nicolaevsky in *Novyi zhurnal* (New York), XVIII, 225.

of 1941, when deliveries ceased due to the German invasion of Russia.¹⁹

By the biggest of the loans, that of August, 1939, Russia was to furnish China airplanes, trucks, tanks, arms, and ammunition in exchange for Chinese deliveries of tungsten, antimony, tin, tea, and other goods. The last series of agreements, concluded in December, 1940, consisted of three protocols. By the first China promised to furnish Russia with 100 million Chinese dollars' worth of tea; by the second Russia was given Chinese wool; the third provided for the delivery of Chinese minerals worth \$100,000,000 (U. S.) to Russia—all in return for Soviet military supplies.

The total of \$300,000,000 of credit, although not adequate for China's needs, was considerable in view of China's lack of war materiel.

It was only natural that Soviet aid should be directed to the Central Government and not to the Government of the Chinese Communists. It would have been highly unrealistic for Moscow to arm the small Communist guerrilla forces, leaving the main armies of China to be crushed by Japan. In a swift volte-face, characteristic of the dynamic policy of Stalin, Chiang Kai-shek and his government were now made the bearers of the torch of China's freedom, and the Communists were advised to cooperate with Chiang, Russia leaving it up to them to claim their part of the material aid from the Central Government.

A comprehensive trade treaty was signed on June 16, 1939. It regulated the exchange of goods and the rights of Soviet trade representatives in China. It was reported that in a separate and unpublished document signed simultaneously with the treaty, considerable amounts of war supplies and credits were promised to China.

From 1937 on, China's rapprochement with Russia was viewed with considerable anxiety not only in Tokyo but in Berlin as well. This was the time when the German propaganda campaign against Communism and Russia was at its peak; the anti-Comintern pact was about to be expanded to include Italy. As far as China was concerned, Germany entertained strong hopes that Chiang Kai-shek, who had fought the Communists for many years, would join the

19. *Pacific Affairs* (1942), pp. 329 ff. The above figures are approximate and are based on the exchange parity of five rubles to the United States dollar.

anti-Comintern. German relations with China were generally satisfactory: German military advisers were busy instructing Chinese troops; trade with China was being encouraged. In this, as in many other respects, there was a certain amount of disagreement between the two allies-to-be, Germany and Japan.

When Japan struck at the Marco Polo Bridge and threw China into Russia's lap, Hitler's government viewed the attack unfavorably. After a few months, when it had become obvious that Japanese hopes for a rapid victory were not materializing, the German Government advised Japan to seek a truce with China. Berlin viewed the dilemma as either collaboration between Japan and China within the framework of the anti-Comintern, or collaboration of China with Russia on the other side of the fence.

Hitler's envoy to China, Trautmann, approached the Chinese Government, at the end of November, 1937—five months after the outbreak of war—and, on behalf of Japan, offered an agreement to end military operations. The conditions, consisting of seven points, seemed not unduly severe, and it appears Chiang Kai-shek was inclined to discuss them seriously. It was significant of the new position of China with respect to Russia that before replying to the German envoy Chiang wired Stalin, giving him the proposed terms and asking for his opinion. The very fact that Chiang did not reject the terms but consulted with Moscow concerning them was an indication that he was considering an acceptance.

A certain danger to Russia was of course implicit in a possible cessation of war in China. The great armies which Japan had shipped to the Asiatic mainland could easily join the Kwantung Army in Manchuria and threaten the Russian Far East. In his reply to Chiang's inquiry, on December 3, 1937, Stalin could raise no objection to the terms proposed, but he advised Chiang to demand from Japan the immediate evacuation of Japanese forces and the restoration of the status quo.²⁰

The Chinese Defense Council, on which the Communists were represented, decided, following Stalin's reply, to open negotiations

20. The wording of Stalin's reply has not yet been made public. Commenting on these exchanges between Chiang and Stalin, Wang Ching-wei says that "the reply was worded in such a way as to show that Stalin was really opposed to peace and that if General Chiang would openly persist in the peace efforts, he would lose the support of Soviet Russia and the Communist party of China." *People's Tribune*, August-October, 1939, p. 43. At the time Wang wrote this he was collaborating with the Japanese, and his comment may not be considered as entirely objective.

with Japan and demand more details and exact stipulations. In Tokyo, however, the peace move was not popular among the war party, and Japan's reply, after a three weeks' delay, was again couched in vague terms. China rejected the offer in January, 1938.

The new pattern of Sino-Soviet relations remained unchanged. Dependence on Russian aid dictated Chiang Kai-shek's cautious policy toward the Chinese Communists. Other governments, such as Turkey, Germany, or Italy, could afford to combine good relations with Russia with severe persecution of Communists at home, but this was out of the question for weak China, hard pressed by Japanese armies and without real support from any side. The policy of the United States was inconsistent; its financial aid to China was insufficient. Britain was too much preoccupied in Europe to oppose Japan actively. Russia, on the other hand, involved in incessant clashes with Japan at various points along the border, was willing and prepared to send war supplies to China.

Sino-Soviet relations took a new turn after the conclusion of the German-Soviet pact, which was followed by a certain improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations. The new situation was characterized by an almost complete break with Britain and France and a deterioration in Soviet-American relations. After a period of about five years, Moscow discarded "united fronts," "collective security," and collaboration with the democracies. Chiang's government, though tied to Russia by political and economic bonds, was considered to be leaning toward the Anglo-American bloc. Hence Soviet-Chinese relations began to worsen.

The amelioration in Soviet-Japanese relations, however, proceeded slowly and uncertainly. Setbacks in the negotiations occurred time and again. Since the Japanese menace was by no means eliminated, Moscow continued to give some aid to China, and all kinds of supplies continued to be shipped east through central Asia. Now a new road from Russia to China, which had taken the Soviets three years to build, was completed. This highway, leading from Ulan Ude on the Trans-Siberian Railway to Ulan Bator, in Outer Mongolia, and thence by camel track to Ningsia and Lanchow, was of considerable strategic value. By the end of 1940 several thousand trucks were plying the road. Russian missions and commissions, officers, instructors, engineers were now stationed at

Lanchow. The détente with Japan notwithstanding, Moscow more than once in this period reaffirmed its adherence to its treaties with China. When Japan concluded a "treaty" with the puppet government of Wang Ching-wei, the Soviet Ambassador to Japan, Smetanin, declared to the Tokyo Foreign Office on December 4, 1940: "The Soviet Government deems it necessary to state that the Soviet Union's relations with China remain unchanged."²¹

Yet, in spite of these declarations and the continuing economic contact, relations between Moscow and Chungking were gradually cooling. After June, 1941, when the war with Germany began to absorb all of Russia's attention and energy, aid to China ceased altogether.

21. *Pravda*, December 5, 1940.

The Soviet Sphere of Influence in the Thirties

At the moment when Japan began its drive onto the Asiatic mainland in September, 1931, the Soviet Union's sphere of influence in China consisted of northern Manchuria, Outer Mongolia, and Tannu Tuva. During the following decade Japan's advance dislodged Russia from the eastern part of her sphere; but to some extent her losses were compensated by the acquisition of a new sphere in western China. Japan's activity resulted in the withdrawal of Soviet Russia from Manchuria; in the strengthening of her control over Outer Mongolia; and in a new and systematic drive into Chinese Sinkiang.

THE MONGOLIAN COLONY

Outer Mongolia, a Chinese province before the Revolution, became a Russian protectorate in 1912-13; its ties with Russia were severed in 1917-18, when Russia plunged into civil war and Lenin's government renounced all rights and claims to alien territories. After the defeat of the White Armies, some parts of which withdrew into Outer Mongolia, the Red Army was stationed there for a period of four years. It withdrew in 1924-25—but not until the vast province was transformed into a Soviet dependency, with Soviet "advisers" in every government agency, a Mongolian Army actually under Soviet command, and the Mongolian economy gradually being integrated into the Soviet economic blood stream. Renamed the Mongolian People's Republic, Outer Mongolia was the first component whose area and people became a part of the Soviet "zone" or "sphere."

The internal development of the Mongolian People's Republic was a reflection of developments within Russia. All the familiar traits of revolutionary transformations, of Soviet constitutions, of ideology were mirrored in the evolution of Outer Mongolia.

During the entire period from 1921 on the [communist] People's Revolutionary party remained the only political party in the country. It wielded exclusive power; in fact, the greater part of the party's membership was composed of state and other employees. "The Mongolian People's Revolutionary party," Moscow confirmed, "is the state's party and the only party in the country. All the wise instructions of the Communist International must be observed."¹

The Mongolian People's Revolutionary party went through all the transmutations and metamorphoses of the Communist party in the Soviet Union: a rapid rise in membership; periodic purges; "rightist" and "leftist" deviations; execution of leaders; and, finally, a great (but unsuccessful) experiment in the speedy realization of Communism during 1929-32. The membership of the party, which numbered 160 at its birth in 1921, rose to 6,300 in 1924. Then came a purge, so that by April, 1925, only 3,000 remained in the party. The process of growth resumed, and by 1929 the party counted 12,000 members; by 1932, 42,000. Then came another severe crisis and purge, and by December of that year the membership was down to 12,000. By 1934 only 7,500 party members remained. The bloodiest of the purges took place, as in Russia, during 1936-39, when members of the government were liquidated and other leaders "committed suicide." A Youth League, analogous to the Soviet Komsomol, followed the zigzags of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary party. It had 7,000 followers in 1929, 22,000 in 1931; after one of its purges, in 1934,² only 5,000 were left.

So long as the NEP was in force in Russia—until 1929—the traditional economic system of Mongolia was subjected to few modifications, the impact of the upheaval being mostly political and cultural. Russian and Chinese tradesmen disappeared from the scene, however, and while large "cooperative" enterprises were being encouraged, foreign trade was already veering toward Russia.

The turning point came with the Seventh Congress of the ruling party in 1929. It coincided with the Soviet drive toward collective farming, industrialization, and the five-year plans. The congress in Ulan Bator resolved that in Mongolia, too, the immediate goal was

1. *Revolyutsionnyi vostok* (1936), No. 1, p. 183; and *Khozyaistvo Mongolii* (1930), Nos. 3-4.

2. All the foregoing in *Sibirskaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya*, Vol. III, and *Revolyutsionnyi vostok* (1931), Nos. 11-12.

"the creation of a socialist economy." During the following three years the wealth of Mongolian princes, well-to-do lamas, and, in particular, the monasteries, was expropriated. This wealth consisted mostly of cattle—virtually the only form of "capital" in that country. Before 1929 the princes and lamas had owned over 20 per cent of the herds; by 1932 their property had sunk to 1 per cent. A violent antireligious campaign accompanied the economic transformation. The number of lamas declined considerably. A five-year plan for the development of Mongolian economy was adopted and integrated with the Soviet plan. In 1930 the state was given a monopoly over foreign trade. The most sweeping of all reforms, however, was the abortive kolkhoz experiment. After 600 "feudals" (princes and monasteries) had been deprived of their herds, their entire wealth was given to the newly founded collectives. By the summer of 1931, 740 kolkhozes, with a total of 174,988 members and dependents, had been created. This upheaval involved a considerable proportion of the population of a nation whose total was below the million mark. The Moscow press immediately reported enormous strides and successes.

Very soon, however, the real facts came to light. Collective cattle breeding cannot be anything but a failure in an area where the members of the collectives cannot even read or write and are incapable of maintaining any sort of accounting system. All the prerequisites for a highly organized economy are conspicuously absent in these parts of Asia. The Mongols were, and still are, a nomad people engaged in animal husbandry; illiteracy has been estimated at 97 per cent.³ Not a mile of railroads existed. Even after the "industrialization," the entire Mongolian industry employed only some 3,000 people. Under such conditions the socialization program was bound to result in serious calamity. The resentment of the thousands of shepherds was intense. Unable to resist brute force, they retaliated by killing their livestock or driving it across the border into China or Manchuria in typical nomad fashion. Mongol "émigrés" appeared in neighboring Chinese provinces. A great catastrophe was in the offing.

After two years of experimenting the government was obliged

3. Even within the People's Revolutionary party, consisting to a large measure of government employees, literacy did not exceed 40 per cent, and even this figure was featured in the Soviet press as a considerable achievement.

to give in. In the time-honored manner, overzealous "leftists" were made responsible for a policy dictated by Moscow, and purged. The People's Revolutionary party held a "plenum" of its Central Committee in June, 1932, to condemn its own policy as a "left-wing deviation." Now it was admitted—with Moscow's consent—that Mongolia was not ripe for socialism. Mongolia was proclaimed to have entered the road of "noncapitalist, anti-Imperialist" development, which would "in time" make possible her transition to a socialist economy. The kolkhoz experiment was abandoned; the right of *arats* (herdsmen and peasants) to hold private property was again recognized, but trade—in particular, the important cattle trade—was concentrated in the hands of a "cooperative" enterprise, which was in fact an agency of the state. This politico-economic notion of a noncapitalist and not-yet socialist economy in Mongolia has prevailed from 1932 to this day.

Out of these internal struggles there emerged the Mongolian leader who outlasted all purges and all his colleagues, the present Marshal Choibalsan. Belonging at first to the "left" wing of the movement, he had been active in Mongolia since after the Russian Revolution. When the party chairman, Danzan, was executed, he climbed to power, and after the purge of 1932 was in charge of the crucial Ministry for Internal Affairs. Somewhat later the two former premiers, Amor and Gendon, and the War Minister, Demid, were accused of plotting with Japan and were purged. Now Choibalsan rose to the highest position in the state. He was the most reliable instrument of Moscow's policy in Mongolia. He has remained at his post to this day.

The first constitution of the Mongolian People's Republic promulgated in 1924 was faithfully patterned after the Soviet model. The Great Hural was a copy of the Congress of Soviets; between its sessions a Little Hural was in operation; the Little Hural elected a "Presidium" and the Cabinet. As in Russia, no effective power was ever conferred on the quasi-parliamentary bodies. A GPU has existed, under the name of "Department for Public Safety." A Mongolian Army was created in the 'twenties and expanded considerably during the late 'thirties, when the Japanese menace became acute; it has been similar to the Soviet Army in every respect. Soviet officers have played a controlling role in its train-

ing. Just as in Soviet Russia, a "Bureau of Political Education" has existed in the army. Military supplies have come from Russia. In 1930 the former Revolutionary Army of Mongolia was renamed the Red Army; its publication bears the same name as that of its Moscow counterpart—*Red Star*. In 1937 Japan estimated the Mongolian armed forces at 25,000 men.⁴ The Eighth Congress of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary party told the people that the Mongolian Red Army "must strengthen its close bonds with the Red Army of the Soviet Union, which is the defender of the world's proletariat."

In 1940 a new constitution of the Mongolian People's Republic was promulgated, reflecting all the recent history and experience, or rather the ideological evolution, of the Soviet Union. In 1924 it had still seemed impossible, even ridiculous, to expect the nomadic tribes to evolve promptly into a socialist society; the first constitution had proclaimed as its aim "the abolition of all vestiges of a feudal-theocratic system." By 1940 these inhibitions had disappeared, and the new constitution announced that the future of Mongolia lay "along noncapitalist lines and a subsequent development into Socialism." In 1924 only "the soil, the natural resources, forests, and waters" had been made national property; whereas now, in addition, "industry, mines, railways, banks, [and] means of transportation by car, water, and air" became the exclusive property of the state. The article on religion was literally taken over from the Soviet constitution, providing for "freedom of worship and freedom of anti-religious propaganda." The hierarchy of hural was maintained: the Great Hural, the Small Hural, and its Presidium. Local hural were equivalent to the Russian soviets. The new constitution directed that "all voting in the hural must be public [i.e., not secret]."

Four years later the franchise was extended to former members of the "exploiting classes"—just as it had been in the last constitution of the Soviet Union.⁵

The international position of the Mongolian People's Republic, established in 1921, when the Red Army entered Urga, and confirmed by the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1924, remained unchanged

4. Misshima, Y., and Goto, T., *A Japanese View of Outer Mongolia* (1942), p. 58.

5. *Sovetskoye gosudarstvo i pravo* (1947), No. 8.

until 1945. Technically an autonomous unit under Chinese sovereignty, Mongolia was actually under complete Soviet control in domestic as well as international affairs. No other nations, with the exception of Tannu Tuva, itself not recognized anywhere,⁶ recognized the Mongolian Republic. The unsettled affairs in China, Chinese entanglement with Russia, and the insignificance of Mongolia in the world's commerce and politics, removed the new republic from international attention, making it almost a forgotten land. This process was fostered by the Soviet Government itself, which did not seek international recognition for Mongolia and did not want foreign envoys and staffs residing in Ulan Bator. Even China, the recognized "sovereign" of Mongolia, never had a representative in the capital of its "autonomous province" after 1921. ✓

In the first years of Mongolia's "independence" a few attempts were made by the people themselves to establish international ties with other governments besides Russia. Bogdo-Khan, the religious leader and semimonarch (until his death in 1924), tried to enter into direct negotiations with the United States and Japan. Danzan, the Vice-Premier, wanted an agreement with China. These and similar attempts were frustrated by Moscow, and among the accusations which eventually led to Danzan's execution his connections with China were uppermost. A group of Mongolian Communists sought to unify all Mongols in one state—those on the Soviet side of the border (in the Buryat-Mongol Soviet Republic) as well as those beyond it (in Outer and Inner Mongolia and in tiny Tannu Tuva). They naïvely translated the lofty precepts of national self-determination into practical policy. But the blueprint provided for the cession of a part of the Soviet Union to a technically independent state. The authors of the plan were duly rebuked.⁷ The Soviet Government did not consider any cession of its own territories, not even to a satellite state; rather it hoped that one day it would be able to absorb the Mongolian provinces in a Greater Soviet Union.

An attempt was also made by Mongolia to establish direct connections with Germany. In the middle 'twenties, at the height of Soviet-German friendship, a Mongolian delegation, headed by Sampilov, the future Minister of Economic Affairs, proceeded to

6. Cf. p. 87 below.

7. *Revolutsionnyi vostok* (1927), Nos. 2, 3.

Berlin. The delegation hired Germans for geological research in Mongolia, bought tractors, cars, machines. For four years (1925-29) commercial relations with Germany were maintained. Moreover, 45 Mongolian children were sent to school in Germany. Cultural ties were established with several other countries too.

The German Foreign Office was interested in expanding these connections, and Herr Trautmann, of the Far Eastern Department, proposed de jure recognition of the Mongolian Republic, normal diplomatic relations, and trade. The delegates from Ulan Bator never gave any reply, however. Moscow clearly did not wish to see German political and trade representatives settle in Ulan Bator. All direct and lasting connections between Mongolia and the non-Soviet world were severed in 1929.⁸ Since then there have been virtually no foreigners at work in Outer Mongolia.⁹ Mongolian commerce has been channeled to Russia.

In 1935 Japan, acting through the new State of Manchukuo, insisted on recognizing Outer Mongolia and sending a mission to Ulan Bator. The request was emphatically rejected by Mongolia. Then Japan made an attempt to penetrate Mongolia; her drive into the northern provinces of China had made her the master of the adjoining territories of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. As soon as the Kwantung and Manchukuo Armies began to "knock at the doors" of Mongolia, Moscow concluded first a "gentlemen's agreement" and then a pact of mutual assistance with Mongolia, by force of which the Soviet Government undertook to defend the territorial integrity of Mongolia.¹⁰ Bloody "border incidents" were frequent; conferences were held to settle them, with Japan insisting on a mixed commission to meet in Ulan Bator, capital of Outer Mongolia. This demand was rejected and negotiations broke down. All Japanese attempts from 1934 to 1939, whether through military or diplomatic means, proved unsuccessful in effecting a change in Mongolia's status.

This status remained unchanged until the end of the Far Eastern war in 1945.

8. Serge Wolf in Royal Central Asian Society, *Journal*, July-October, 1945, pp. 289 ff.

9. G. Friters, *The International Position of Outer Mongolia* (Dijon, 1939), p. 39.

10. Cf. Chap. V.

THE COLONY OF TANNU TUVA

No other territory under Soviet control or influence has constituted as clear-cut a type of colony as Tuva.¹¹ A country almost as large as Great Britain, it has a population equal to that of a few cross-town streets in New York City. In 1941 it was estimated at 95,000.

The political problem of Tuva is determined by its geographic location. The country borders on Mongolia and Russia. Hence it belonged to China for only so long as Mongolia was under Chinese rule. With the separation of Mongolia and, after the civil war, the establishment of the Mongolian People's Republic, Tuva became inaccessible to the Chinese Army and administration; it could be annexed by Mongolia or by Russia, or could be established as a separate state.

Just as the Mongols often looked upon the Chinese as a people advanced in culture, economy, and politics, to the people of Tuva Mongolia has in turn been a model great nation in comparison with which the Tuvinsians felt themselves helpless and backward. Nomads and hunters on a backward fringe of civilization, they did not even have their own written language¹² until, early in the 1930's, Soviet linguists proceeded to invent a Tuvinsian alphabet. At that time less than 1,000 men were literate, and these were the few officials and lamas. The monasteries, where the lamas resided, were centers of both economic and cultural activity; as in Mongolia, the monasteries, possessing herds of cattle and horses, were the only rich institutions of Tuva. There were about 2,000 shamans in the country. The mineral riches of the land, which were bound to become a pillar of support for Soviet economy by supplying industrial raw materials, remained unknown and unused by the population.

Tuva was a Russian protectorate from 1912 to 1917. Consistently differentiating between Outer Mongolia and Tuva, the old

11. The name of the area has been repeatedly changed. Before 1921 it was known as Uryankhai; in 1921, under Soviet influence, it was renamed Tannu Tuva; somewhat later its official title became Tuvinsian People's Republic. Since 1944 it has been a part of the Soviet Union. The territory is here referred to as Tuva.

12. "The Uriankhis [Tuvinsians]," wrote a Chinese general in the eighteenth century, "recently subdued, resemble the animals in the mountains and the fish in the rivers;

Russian governments strove to achieve "independence" and "autonomy" for Mongolia, whereas Tuva was to be subjected to direct control by Russia. The Revolution in 1917 for a time put an end to these tendencies.

From 1918 on Tuva shared Mongolia's fate. The Russian authorities departed, Russian troops dispersed. Soon Chinese officials took their place, and Tuva and Mongolia were again under Chinese control. In 1921 White Russian troops, retreating from Siberia, overran Mongolia and Tuva, and when they were driven out the Red Army was in control of the two areas. Thus, in 1921 the Soviet period in Tuva's history began.

The Soviet Government began its activities with a friendly gesture toward the people of Tuva. It abolished the Russian protectorate "forever" and proclaimed Tuva's independence. A congress of Tuvian *khoshuns* (provinces) was held in August, 1921, at which delegates from Soviet Siberia and from the reconstructed Mongolian People's Republic appeared. The congress proclaimed Tuva an "independent state," and stated that it had resolved "to shake off the shackles of slavery" forever. Accepting the resolutions of the gathering, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of Soviet Russia, Georgi Chicherin, on September 23, 1921, dispatched a solemn message to the Tuvian people:

At the present time, when the workers and peasant masses of Russia have overthrown the officials of the despotic tsarist government and have got entirely rid of the tsarist bureaucrats in the government, the Workers-Peasant Government of Russia, expressing the will of the toiling masses, solemnly proclaims that it in no way considers Tannu Tuva—the Uryankhai region—as its territory and has no aspirations to it whatsoever . . .

The Russian Government derives no privileges for itself from the fact that there are numerous Russian settlers on the soil of Tannu Tuva; nevertheless, it considers it imperative to arrive at an agreement with the people of Tannu Tuva, with its administrative organs, concerning the protection of the interests of these colonists, the Russian peasants and workers residing in Tannu Tuva; in no case sanctioning the forcible seizure of Tannu-Tuvian lands.

For a long time developments in Tuva closely paralleled those in Mongolia. The similarity is so striking and the parallel so precise it is better to abandon them to their own fate and not to seek to tame them by laws." Levine, *La Mongolie* (Paris, 1937), p. 185.

that one can see the guiding hand of a third power at every step. The constitution of Tuva was copied in detail from the Mongolian basic law which, in turn, was derived from the Soviet pattern. The Great Huruldan (the Tuvian counterpart of the Congress of Soviets) elected a Little Huruldan (the Central Executive Committee); the Little Huruldan appointed the Cabinet. The lamas residing in monasteries were disfranchised; private economy was left almost untouched until the end of the 'twenties. A GPU was, of course, established; its chief was a Soviet Mongol, A. Shoizhelov, who, under the pen name of Natsov, published a series of articles and an informative book on Tuva. The new state was now called the Tuvian People's Republic.

The GPU was kept busy; in 1924 Soviet cavalry had to be called in to assist it in quelling popular uprisings. Later a Tuvian Army was created which grew to 1,600 men by 1929.

A People's Revolutionary party—the only party permitted in Tuva—was formed in 1921. It passed through all the stages of evolution of Russian Communism and of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary movement. In 1923–24 the first purges took place; in 1928–29 an assault was launched against the "rightist deviation." The Tuvian party was admitted to the Communist International with an "advisory" vote. Its membership remained rather small: in 1927 there were 1,071 members, and the Youth League had a membership of 1,647. During the 'thirties the membership quadrupled.

At the time when collective farms were being created in Russia and strenuous campaigns were under way against the "rightist opposition," a senseless campaign was begun in Tuva to evolve a system of collective cattle breeding among the illiterate and uncivilized nomads. A purge was instituted to serve as the starting point. Five students of the Communist University of Toilers of the East in Moscow were hurriedly sent to Tuva. They purged the Tuvian People's Revolutionary party of two thirds of its members. Then began the confiscation of cattle belonging to the monasteries—"the feudal-theocratic element of the population."¹³ By the middle of 1931, 166 collective economics were in existence which embraced 22 per cent of the people. The ever-optimistic reports to

13. O. Mänchen-Helfen, *Reise ins Asiatische Tuwa*, p. 7.

Moscow spoke of an "urge of the Tuvinians" to join the kolkhozes and of their "extremely rapid growth."¹⁴

At the same time, foreign trade was monopolized and, in effect, concentrated in the hands of the Sibtorg—the Soviet Siberian Trading agency. All of Tuva's foreign trade went via Minusinsk to Soviet Russia.

The kolkhoz experiment was soon discarded, just as it had been in Mongolia. Private rural economy on a small scale was again permitted. By and large, the so-called cooperatives, under foreign guidance, replaced the former Russian and Chinese tradesmen. The colonial character of the trade, however, did not diminish despite the substitution of Soviet cooperatives for private merchants. The Soviet monopoly of the Tuvinian market enabled the trading agencies arbitrarily to fix prices for imported Soviet goods as well as for goods bought in Tuva for export to Russia. Considerable dissatisfaction developed as a result of the practices of this agency, but the Tuvinians could do nothing about it.

The urge to unite with Mongolia, however, was not dead in Tuva. In 1925–26 treaties of friendship were concluded by Russia with Tuva and with Mongolia. The treaty with Tuva, signed on July 22, 1925, again contained a confirmation of the Russian renunciation of its protectorate over Tuva. Moscow and Mongolia were the only countries which recognized Tuva, and Tuva did not seek recognition by any other country.

Despite all the official pronouncements inspired from abroad, the tiny and poor Tuvinian nation did not have the material and financial means necessary for the upkeep of its own government machinery; nor did it possess a sufficient number of qualified men to run their own country. If independent existence was impossible, then the Tuvinians wanted to orient themselves toward Mongolia rather than Russia. Moscow was strongly opposed to such a merger: an independent Tuva as a virtual dependency of Siberia was easier to handle than was immense Mongolia. Therefore, every Tuvinian leader who advocated his state's incorporation into Mongolia was declared to be "pro-Chinese" and a "traitor."

Donduk, a Tuvinian pro-Soviet leader, later accused of rightist

14. *Revolutsionnyi vostok* (1931), Nos. 11–12.

deviations, wrote a petition in 1925: "Our Tannu-Tuvianian people is small in numbers, poor in riches and backward in culture—it is dark. It is therefore necessary for us to join with Mongolia in order to realize our rights and our freedom." And another Tuvianian leader, the head of the khoshun of Tessingol, wrote a few weeks later: "Our Tuvianian people, being small in numbers and economically poor and uncultured, clearly will be unable to lead an independent existence as a state and is not strong enough to safeguard its rights and liberties. As a result, we express our desire to join with Mongolia." Three Tuvianian khoshuns likewise submitted a petition to the Central Committee of the Tuvianian People's Revolutionary Party in which they complained:

. . . one is obliged to extort taxes from the people. The wealth of our impotent people can be reduced to utter annihilation. And, after all, it is clear that our people will die out . . . The expenses involved in the maintenance of an independent state are clearly tremendous; however much we may rely on revenue from custom duties and leases, it will never suffice . . . We therefore make known our desire to become a part of the Mongolian state, whose peoples have the same creed as we do.¹⁶

The incorporationist movement and opposition to Soviet rule were so strong that spontaneous uprisings in favor of Mongolia and against Russian influence occurred. Red cavalry had to be sent in from Siberia to quell the revolts.¹⁶ But all the talk about Tuva's incorporation into Mongolia was of no avail. By 1929-30 Tuva was already firmly under Russian control. The real dictators of Tuva were Starkov, the Soviet envoy, and Bogdanov, agent of the Comintern for Tuva.¹⁷

In the 1930's a new factor began to play a role in Tuva's destiny. The Kuznetsk basin in western Siberia was being developed into a mighty industrial center; the ambitious project was to be extended further with each new five-year plan. Now Tuva lay in the hinterland of the Kuznetsk region and must obviously become connected

15. A. Shoizhelov-Natsov, "Tuvinskaya Narodnaya Respublika," in *Issledovaniya Assotsiatsii po Izucheniyu Natsional'nykh i kolonial'nykh Problem*, VII (1930), 87-88.

16. Mánchen-Helfen, *op. cit.*, pp. 162 ff.

17. *Ibid.* The specific role of the Communist International in the countries of the Far East, and especially in Inner Asia, is not yet adequately appreciated in the West. Unlike its function in western Europe and America, the Comintern in Asia served as an instrument of colonial rule of Soviet Russia.

with it. The considerable mineral wealth of Tuva had to be placed at the disposal of the Kuznetsk industry. The independence of Tuva from Mongolia, i.e., its direct subordination to Moscow, now had an economic basis also. The Russian "protectorate" was stronger than in 1914. Only an appropriate moment was needed for declaring Tuva's formal incorporation into the Soviet Union. It came with the end of the second World War.

Wartime developments in Tuva are known only as they have been revealed in fragmentary newspaper reports and speeches before the Supreme Soviet. According to S. Toka, the leader of the People's Revolutionary party, the Great Huruldan was convened on June 22, 1941—the day Germany invaded Russia. It adopted a solemn declaration stating: "the people of Tuva are ready to participate in the struggle of the Soviet people against fascist aggression till final victory, with all the forces and means at their disposal, not sparing their lives."¹⁸

Thus Tuva entered the war simultaneously with the Soviet Union and took part in it, furnishing man power and natural resources.

On August 17, 1944, a special session of the Little Hural of Tuva signed a petition addressed to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, asking for Tuva's incorporation into the Soviet Union. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet agreed, and on October 13, 1944, the Tuvian People's Republic became an organic part of the Soviet state, technically an Autonomous Region of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic.¹⁹

Tuva, along with all the other parts of the Soviet Union, could now participate in the first postwar elections to the Supreme Soviet and give proof of a thorough preparation: 100 per cent of the voters

18. *Pravda*, June 26, 1947. One wonders how all the members of the Huruldan were able to gather in Kyzyl the very day the war began. Tuva had neither railroads nor airplanes.

19. *Ibid.*, August 17, 1946. These events were not reported by the press until August 17, 1946. Such tardiness appears strange. There were other mysterious items in the *Pravda* reports. First, according to the Tuva Constitution, only the Great Huruldan (a quasi-parliament) was empowered to make the fateful decision concerning affiliation with Russia—not the Little Huruldan. Second, an incorporation into the Soviet Union must be sanctioned by the full Supreme Soviet, not the Presidium. Yet the Presidium did not even bother to submit its decision to the next session of the Soviet, as required by the Soviet Constitution. It is impossible at this stage to explain these unnecessary violations of constitutional provisions. Surmises could be advanced, but there are no facts to support any of them.

cast ballots, and all of them voted for the government candidate.

The People's Revolutionary party of Tuva was renamed the Communist party and became an integral part of the Communist party of the Soviet Union. Its membership reached 4,480 in 1946; the Youth League, now officially a part of the Komsomol, had 5,470 members. S. Toka, Communist leader of Tuva, now secretary of the region's Communist party, who had been the head of the Tuvianian Republic for several years after the annexation was announced, retained his post. He was awarded the Order of Lenin in August, 1946.

Hailing the incorporation of Tuva, Toka made a statement in *Pravda* significant of the new trend of Soviet policy both during and after the recent war. Surveying the history of Tuva before the Revolution, he mentioned the Russian domination in 1912-17:

The most farsighted of the political leaders of the Uryankhai region, reflecting the attitude of the arats [shepherds], turned to Russia with the request to accept Tuva under her protectorate. In 1914 Tuva was placed under Russian protection. This was the most favorable solution of the problem . . . The Tuvianian people . . . has acquired in the Russian people a mighty ally and defender.²⁰

Not many reforms were needed to transform the previously "independent" Tuvianian Republic into a part of the Soviet Union. Actually, all through the 'thirties Tuva had been a part of Russia, both politically and economically. All that remained to be done was rename the governmental agencies and recall the Soviet "diplomatic envoy" to Moscow. In his place a set of secretaries of Communist organizations subordinated to the Central Committee in Moscow were now in control of Tuvianian affairs.

The differentiation made between Mongolia and Tuva ever since the time of the Imperial Government, and Russia's consistent opposition to their unification, had borne fruit. Tuva went the full

20. *Ibid.* How great a departure this concept represents from the traditional Communist view is seen by comparison with another official statement on Tuva, made in 1931: "The Tuvianian people tried with every means to resist the aggressive policy of Russian imperialism. However, despite the protestations of the Tuvianian people and even attempted uprisings, Russian imperialism stubbornly proceeded to continue the policy of forcible colonization of the country . . . Tsarist Russia took advantage of the protectorate over Tuva by an unscrupulous exploitation and all kinds of violations of the small and helpless people, with the aim of forcible acquisition of the soil and all its resources . . . The overthrow of tsarism in Russia gave the Tuvianian people the hope of an early national liberation." *Kommunistischesky Internatsional* (1931), No. 24.

circle—from Chinese province to autonomy, from autonomy to Soviet protectorate, from a People's Republic, finally, to a province of the Soviet Union.

THE DRIVE INTO SINKIANG

In 1926 the Soviet Government decided to build a railroad which, it appeared, was bound to revolutionize conditions in all of central Asia, just as a quarter of a century earlier the Trans-Siberian Railroad had revolutionized the Far East. The railway from Siberia to Turkestan—the Turksib—was to run from Semipalatinsk, on a branch of the Trans-Siberian, southward, almost parallel to the border of China, to Frunze. Construction was begun in 1927; the line was completed in 1930. The purpose of the railroad was partly economic—to develop the industries of the contiguous republics—but it also had a highly political aim: “resistance to British penetration” into Sinkiang. The Turksib, commented Artemi Khalatov, a leading official in the railway commissariat,²¹ will have to “prevent the penetration of western European capitalism into Sinkiang.” “The construction of the line from Turkestan to Siberia,” said a highly official commentary, “simultaneously solves the problem of transportation from this lost country [Sinkiang], which will be increasingly attracted to the Soviet Union economically, particularly if, in addition to this great line, other lines are opened and if [other] roads are improved . . .”²²

It was planned to begin construction of a railroad connecting Sergiopol (on the Turksib) with Chuguchak (on the Sinkiang border), which was to be extended later to Urumchi, capital of Sinkiang. These projects did not materialize, but several good highways were built which connected the Turkestan-Siberian Railroad with the Ili district in the northwest and with Kashgar in the south. Soon the drive into Sinkiang got under way.

In a way this was the projection of Russian policy of the last 50 years of the old Empire, of the occupation of Ili in the 1870's, of the rivalry with Britain over this part of central Asia, of the continual attempts of the Russian Government to incorporate Chinese Sinkiang into the great Russian sphere of Asia.

21. A. Khalatov, *O Turkestano-Sibirskoi Zbeleznoi Doroge* (1927), pp. 29-31.

22. *Turkestano-Sibirskaya magistrāl*, p. 235.

Soviet Moscow proved to be more successful than had Imperial St. Petersburg.

Sinkiang, the "New Frontier" of China bordering on Russia along a line over a thousand miles long, is one of the least known provinces of central Asia. Like Mongolia and Tibet, Sinkiang only rarely makes political news; when its name does appear in the press, it soon vanishes again into oblivion. Sparsely populated, without railroads or industry, Sinkiang remains the domain of explorers, courageous travelers, missionaries. With a territory twice as large as that of Texas, Sinkiang has a population smaller than New York City: it has been variously estimated at from four to six millions. Enormous deserts and steppes and huge mountain ranges cover about 80 per cent of the country; at the peripheries, in the Altai Mountains in the north and in the Ili region in the west as well as in the south, there is fertile soil or forest. It is of the utmost significance that these economically superior areas border directly on Russia. Apparently Sinkiang possesses considerable mineral riches; what has been discovered so far consists largely of gold, coal, oil, copper, iron, and lead.

The capital, Urumchi (in Chinese, Tihwa), is situated more than 1,200 miles from the nearest Chinese railroad. Until trucks came into use camel caravans were the only medium of transportation and trade. Recent travelers to Sinkiang from China proper have often preferred to go over Russian soil, by way of Vladivostok and the Trans-Siberian and Turksib Railroads.

Sinkiang became a Chinese dependency in the middle of the eighteenth century, but the ties connecting Peking with Sinkiang were loose and local governors enjoyed a large measure of autonomy. The Chinese, a small minority among the various nationalities of Sinkiang, were the administrators and merchants; compared with the Turkis and Mongols who inhabited Sinkiang, they were members of an advanced civilization. Time and again the native population revolted against Chinese rule. Unorganized, divided among themselves, and lacking weapons, they were unable to succeed in their rebellions.

As for the history of Sinkiang during the last century, it is of the greatest significance that its people are ethnically akin to those of Russian Turkestan. The border between Russia and China often

appears as an arbitrary line cutting through national areas. As in Russian central Asia, the religious factor plays a great role in Sinkiang, a much greater role, indeed, than anywhere in Europe or America. Wars and uprisings of the natives have often had a religious tinge, and Islamism in central Asia, as in India, is but one of the latest of the militant religions which have animated millions of men in war.

The Moslems of Sinkiang are of Uzbek, Kirghiz, and Kazakh nationality; a few are Tadjiks.²³ Besides these four groups, which comprise about three fourths of Sinkiang's population, there is a numerically small but politically highly important group of Chinese Moslems, the so-called Tungans. A Chinese-speaking group, they inhabit the eastern part of Sinkiang as well as the neighboring Chinese province of Kansu. Finally, there are a number of Buddhists (often referred to as Kalmyks) belonging to the Mongol race, which has spread north as far as Outer Mongolia and south as far as Tibet. The total number of pure Chinese in Sinkiang is estimated at only one to two hundred thousand.

Shortly before the new Russian railway was completed, the Chinese Governor of Sinkiang, Yen Tseng-hsin, was killed by one of his aides after 17 years of undisputed rule. When Chin Shujen succeeded him, the quiescent period in Sinkiang's history was over. In 1930 civil war broke out, which lasted for four years and led to essential changes in the province's internal organization as well as in its international position.

The war started as a result of a purely local affair. There had remained, within the vast territory of Sinkiang, several tiny autonomous principalities, with their own administration independent of the Governor of Sinkiang. In the 1920's the governor, in need of revenue, had proceeded to abolish their autonomous status. The last remaining autonomous principality was that of Hami, in eastern Sinkiang. When Chinese refugees fleeing famine and destruction at home came to this part of Sinkiang, the governor decided to allocate to them plots of land in Hami. The local population rebelled at this violation of their little state's independence, and a struggle ensued between the natives and the Chinese immigrants which soon assumed all the earmarks of a Moslem uprising against

23. According to Joseph Castagné (*Revue des études islamiques* [1933], Vol. II), there were in Sinkiang 3,000,000 Uzbeks, 300,000 Kirghizs, and 260,000 Kalmyks.

suppression by the alien and infidel Chinese. The rebels appealed for help to Gen. Ma Chung-yin, leader of the Tungans in neighboring Kansu Province, and he appeared with his men to lead the fight for Sinkiang.

Ma Chung-yin was a remarkable personality indeed. From the age of 17 he had been not only a general but an outstanding military leader. (There were several other Generals Ma operating in China, but the young Ma Chung-yin was distinguished as "the Big Horse," since the word Ma, which means "Mohammedan" among the Moslems, means "horse" in Chinese.) When called to assist the movement in Hami, the "baby general" was only 23 but he had already won remarkable fame. His campaigns were well mapped out and planned. His successes were already legendary. Even by Asiatic standards, his cruelty was extraordinary. Wherever he went he left behind him thousands of corpses. The population of entire villages through which his forces passed was annihilated. He instilled terror among the entire population, but inspired the utmost devotion of his men. Under favorable circumstances, a born leader of this type rises to become a conqueror, a dictator, or else succumbs during one of his adventurous exploits. As we shall see, Ma Chung-yin managed to avoid both these extremes.

Fearing the Tungans of the Big Horse, Governor Chin turned for help in the only direction open to him—toward the Soviet Union. For Moscow, a decision in this situation was not simple. The uprising in Sinkiang was a wide popular movement, and it would seem that Moscow should align itself with the rebels against the government. Actually Moscow showed itself favorable to Chin's request for aid, and for more than one reason. In its opposition to Chiang Kai-shek it wished to help the Chinese minority in Sinkiang against both the local Moslem movement and the Central Government. This was the easiest and cheapest way of gaining control over the huge area of the "New Province." There was also another reason why the Soviet Government did not choose to support the Big Horse and his Tungans: General Ma, like the majority of Moslems of central Asia, was strongly opposed to Soviet Russia and Soviet policy in general, for national as well as religious reasons.²⁴ Among Ma's closest advisers were two Turks from

24. These antagonisms became known only years later; in Moscow the germs of future conflicts had been obvious since the 'twenties. In the 'thirties Japan en-

China, intelligent, politically minded, and of the most militant anti-Communist species. The "baby general" contemplated, if the movement succeeded, the creation of an all-Moslem empire encompassing all of central Asia and engulfing Soviet territories up to the Urals.

Moscow backed Ma's opponents from the very beginning.

A secret agreement was concluded between Governor Chin and Soviet Russia on October 31, 1931. In return for Soviet goods and military supplies, Chin granted the Soviet agencies far-reaching trade concessions and privileges in Sinkiang. The Soviet Government also promised to send experts to Sinkiang, including instructors in electricity, communications, rural economy and animal husbandry.²⁵ Implied in the Soviet promise to Sinkiang was military support of the Urumchi regime.²⁶

In accordance with the provisions of this agreement, all Sinkiang-Soviet trade was concentrated in the hands of Soviet representatives. The activity of other nationals was discouraged and actually made impossible. The Sino-German Eurasian Air Company, for example, started operating an airline from Urumchi to Shanghai. After successful trial flights in 1932 it had to suspend operation. A Chinese Motor Transportation Company planned to connect Sinkiang with Inner Mongolia, but had to limit the line to Hami, on the eastern fringes of Sinkiang. Russia dominated the whole commercial field.

couraged the Moslem movement in the areas bordering on Russia. In 1933-35 conferences were held under Japanese sponsorship at which groups of Turks united in opposition to Russia. In May, 1934, a preliminary conference of these groups—from China, Korea, Manchuria, and Japan—met in Kobe, and in February, 1935, a "congress" convened in Mukden which was attended by 40 delegates claiming to represent 15,000 to 20,000 Turki nationals. The followers of Ma Chung-yin played a prominent role at this congress. The aim of the movement was stated to be the creation of a huge Central Asian Moslem Empire, including Russian central Asia up to the Urals, the Chinese Provinces of Kansu and Sinkiang, and Afghanistan. *Welt des Islams*, February, 1936, p. 94. The congress established a "Central Executive Committee of Idel [Volga]-Ural-Tatar Religious-National Societies of the Far East," whose seat was in Mukden, Manchuria. It was to act in cooperation with Japan. *Osteuropa*, XII, 543. Ma Chung-yin was to become a part of this anti-Soviet movement in Sinkiang and Kansu.

The Soviet reaction to these developments was expressed at the Thirteenth Session of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, where the Chinese delegate, Wang Ming, declared: "British and Japanese imperialists are at present intensively organizing revolts and 'disorders' in Sinkiang Province in order to divide that huge territory between themselves." *Strategiya i taktika Komintern*, p. 339.

25. Martin R. Norins, *Gateway to Asia: Sinkiang* (John Day, 1944), p. 68.

26. F. Kazak, *Ost-Turkestan, zwischen den Grossmächten*, "Osteuropäische Forschungen," XXIII, 76.

And yet the civil war had taken an adverse turn for Chin Shu-jen. He had no trained army and was unable to resist the forces of young Ma. He turned now to the White Russian émigrés—the only group in Sinkiang who had had military education and experience and knew the meaning of discipline. Under the low standards of Sinkiang, a military force of a few thousand men could tip the balance. Chin created a White Russian contingent as a pretorian army under the White Russian general, Pappengut, disregarding all protests of the Soviet representative in Sinkiang. The émigré army proved efficient; yet it, too, was unable to defeat the Tung-ans.

Early in 1933 the Soviet Government sent a new force into Sinkiang. These were the Chinese armies who had fought in Manchuria under Gen. Ma Chan-san, then retreated into Soviet territory and were interned there.²⁷ The Japanese had asked Russia not to send the Chinese home, fearing that they would soon be back in action against them. The Soviet Government found a way of sending them back to China but not in the interests of the Kuomintang. The troops were transported through Siberia, entered Sinkiang, and were put at the disposal of Governor Chin. These troops, comprising about 10,000 men, had been trained and equipped when they arrived. Twenty of the Chinese officers had been shot for "conspiracy."²⁸ Six thousand of the troops went to the capital, Urumchi, while 3,000 proceeded to Ining in the Ili district. They proved a considerable asset to the anti-Moslem forces, but they were unable to defeat the enemy. In the meantime the White Russian Army had perpetrated a coup d'état against Governor Chin and, for a time, it appeared as if a new Russian government (anti-Soviet as well as anti-Moslem) would be established in a Chinese province. Governor Chin fled to Nanking, where he was put on trial for his secret treaty with Russia, found guilty, and sentenced to three and a half years in prison.

The coup of the Whites failed, however, and the military commander of Sinkiang, Sheng Shih-tsai, assumed full control and became the dictator of Sinkiang. He ruled for twelve years.

Sheng wanted at first to be cautious as far as cooperation with the Soviet Union was concerned. Like his predecessor, however, he

27. See Chap. I.

28. Sven Hedin, *The Silk Road* (E. P. Dutton, 1938), p. 152.

was forced by circumstances to accept aid from Russia and to pay for it heavily, since no essential assistance was forthcoming from Nanking and Britain was far away and inactive. Sheng's first proclamation as Border Defense Commissioner—the so-called Eight Points—was the routine statement of a Chinese ruler. He promised peace, religious liberty, security, better living conditions, and so forth. This was not satisfactory, however, to the Soviet faction, and soon Sheng was obliged to announce another program, the so-called Six Great Policies. Among these, the first two were anti-imperialism and "kinship to Sovietism." Not himself a Communist, he soon had to engage as Foreign Minister Chen Te-li, who was not only known for his pro-Soviet views but generally described as in more than one way dependent on Moscow.²⁹

During the first eight months of Sheng's rule the civil war in Sinkiang proceeded unfavorably. The Big Horse won a number of victories, and at times it appeared that he would succeed in crushing the military forces of his adversaries. It was known that the Nationalist regime in Nanking was prepared to recognize his control of Sinkiang, after the previous governors had been proved to have collaborated with Moscow to a degree which, in Nationalist eyes, was tantamount to a betrayal of China.

Pressed by the Tungans of General Ma, Sheng Shih-tsai needed more help, despite the support he had from the White Russian troops and the so-called Manchurian forces. He turned to Russia for material assistance. In December, 1933, he reached an understanding with the Soviet representative, Pogodin. The secret agreement was most comprehensive. Sheng obtained Russian military help and paid for it with Sinkiang's independence.

On the other hand, Sinkiang promised Russia mining, oil, and gold concessions and the right to build a railroad from Chuguchak to Urumchi. The Soviet side agreed that the White Russian Army was not to be dissolved but merely purged and put under the command of officers approved by Soviet representatives. The White Russian general, Pappengut—denounced by his aide, Bykhteyev—and several of his officers were shot,³⁰ and the White forces were placed under what amounted to Soviet command. At the same time

29. Norins, *op. cit.*, p. 46; *Osteuropa*, October, 1935, p. 88.

30. I. Serebrennikov, *Veliki atkhod* (Harbin, 1930), p. 262, and *Osteuropa*, October, 1936, pp. 88 ff.

from 40 to 50 higher officials of Sinkiang were removed from office.

Russian military assistance was now forthcoming, and it was sufficient to inflict a series of defeats on the enemy. "The Politburo ordered two brigades of G.P.U. troops . . . to clear the roads and liquidate the rebellion." Alexander Barmine, who was in charge of the supply of Soviet arms to Sinkiang, reports.

Meanwhile, on the order of the Politburo, we shipped a number of planes and bombs to the borders of Sinkiang. There they were stuck for some time, as the road to Urumchi, capital of Sinkiang, was blocked by the rebels. Finally the command of the Red Army Air Force operating there took charge of this shipment. They "delivered" our cargoes, consigned to the governor, by dropping the bombs on the rebel forces gathered round the capital, and by landing the planes right on the airfield of the besieged fortress. I was instructed to send the bill for the bombs, as well as the other goods, to the governor.³¹

Now the successes of Sheng Shih-tsai demoralized his adversaries and neutralized the Turki elements in the Moslem camp.

Fighting ended in June, 1934. Then came the great sensation. The Big Horse, Ma Chung-yin, famous military commander and hater of Communism, fled to Russia with a small group of bodyguards, accompanied by the secretary of the Soviet consulate. It was obvious that negotiations had been going on for some time and that an agreement between Ma and the Russians had been reached. The Soviet Government recognized Ma's ability and considered him a potential asset in Russian activities in the Moslem world; it was anxious to keep him in reserve for future developments. Ma was well received in Russia and was soon made an officer in the Red Army. His letters from Russia were often read to the local troops in Sinkiang.

The agreement of 1933 was the turning point in Sinkiang's civil war as well as in its international position. The terms of the secret accord were carried out on both sides. The administration, the army, and the former White Russians were purged according to the promises given to Moscow, and a considerable number of suspects were arrested, some of them executed. A GPU began to operate in Sinkiang under Pogodin's command.

When the details of the agreement became known in Japan,

31. A. Barmine, *One Who Survived* (G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1945), p. 231.

Minister Hirota informed the Diet of "reports of the sovietization of Sinkiang."³² To counter this charge the Sinkiang Government (certainly prompted by Moscow) sent a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek, categorically "denying that Sinkiang is dominated by foreign advisers." Chiang's reply was a protest against the Soviet activities in Sinkiang; he said that "as provided by laws recently promulgated by the Central Government, the employment of foreign advisers and the contracting of foreign loans should be approved by the Central authorities." As to the proposed loan agreement with Russia, the reply pointed out that not a single report had been submitted to the Central Government for consideration and approval.³³ The Soviet drive into Sinkiang had resulted in further irritating Sino-Soviet relations.

Now almost all of Sinkiang was in the hands of the Soviet-dominated government at Urumchi. Only in the south, the last troops of the Tungans, under another General Ma (Ma Ho-san, a relative of the Big Horse), continued to rule over Khotan and the adjacent areas for several years, remaining virtually independent of Sinkiang. In June, 1937, new fighting broke out when Gen. Ma Ho-san moved on Kashgar. Soviet aviation bombed a number of towns in southwestern Sinkiang, especially Khotan and Yarkand. Ma Ho-san, the last of the rebels, was defeated with Soviet help.³⁴

The Sinkiang Government, reformed and purged in accordance with Soviet demands, made only a few concessions to the nationalist spirit of the Turkis. They were given a few representative positions, but the Chinese kept control of the executive posts. Actual control rested, of course, with the Soviet representatives. In the years following the civil war a stabilization took place in Sinkiang under strict Soviet guidance. Soviet advisers were active in the government and in the economy. Soviet trade representatives controlled foreign commerce. When Sven Hedin passed through Urumchi in 1935 he spoke, at the request of the Soviet envoy, before 250 Russian officials and officers at a Russian club. A Russian flying school was opened in Urumchi, and day after day its planes executed maneuvers over the capital. The Ban An-dü—counter-

32. January 21, 1935.

33. *China Weekly Review*, February 2, 1935, p. 326.

34. United Press dispatches, June 3 and October 21, 1937; and International News Service dispatch, October 21, 1937.

part of the NKVD—continued to operate under the same General Pogodin.

Chinese and Korean Communists took a large part in the councils of Sinkiang. The brother of the Communist chief, Mao Tse-tung, was a high official in the Government of Sinkiang—until he was strangled in 1942. The Chinese Communists were reported favoring the outright incorporation of Sinkiang into the Soviet Union.³⁵

"There was . . . only one man in Urumchi," Sven Hedin reported, "who was more powerful than Sheng Tupan [Sheng Shih-tsai]—M. Apresoff," the Soviet consul general.³⁶ Sheng is "a puppet of the U.S.S.R.," Peter Fleming reported in 1936.³⁷

In Sinkiang's schools Russian, not English, was now taught as the foreign language. Hundreds of boys were sent for military study to Tashkent, in Russian central Asia; a number of girls went along to Russia. In the streets of Sinkiang women now walked without veils. In 1936-37 a vigorous atheistic campaign was conducted. Resistance to it was particularly strong among the Moslems, and many clashes resulted. At the same time a purge of Sinkiang officials was conducted, involving about 200 men.³⁸

As a consequence of the new accord, a number of factories, mills, hospitals, and highways were built by Russia in Sinkiang during the following years. A Reconstruction Committee was instructed to draw up a three-year plan. Physicians, pharmacists, instructors for the military academy and aviation schools arrived from Russia. A loan of 5,000,000 rubles was granted to Sinkiang.³⁹

"Sinkiang was to become a sphere of exclusive Russian influence," Barmine states,

and to serve as a bulwark of our power in the East. We had to equip 10,000 Sinkiang troops completely, from boots to Kuomintang insignia. Soviet advisers, who actually exercised the authority of ministers, were placed at the governor's elbow. A commission headed by Stalin's brother-in-law, Svanidze, was sent to Sinkiang to draw up a plan of reconstruction for the province. My trust was instructed to send

35. G. Vassel, *Flammen der Wüste*, p. 246; and T. White and A. Jacoby, *Thunder Out of China* (William Sloane Associates, 1946), pp. 240, 251-252.

36. Hedin, *op. cit.*, p. 166.

37. *News from Tartary* (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936), p. 250.

38. Royal Central Asian Society, *Journal*, January, 1938; London *Times*, February 10, 1937; S. Hedin, *op. cit.*, p. 300; Aitchon K. Wu, *Turkistan Tumult* (Methuen, 1940), p. 260.

39. *China Weekly Review*, June 4, 1938.

engineers to build roads, airdromes, and hangars all over Sinkiang.

Sinkiang was soon a Soviet colony in all but name. The Soviet Government had guaranteed her currency with a huge loan of silver, dominated her trade, and was directing her politics. Although nominally a part of China, Sinkiang sent her own consuls to Russia, and the Chinese ambassador, understanding the situation, raised no questions. At this same time, 1935, Chiang Kai-shek addressed a request to us through his air ministry for a delivery of airplanes. I was instructed to refuse. Stalin did not want to strengthen Chiang Kai-shek's government.⁴⁰

In the fall of 1935 Britain dispatched Eric Teichman, a consular agent at the British legation in Peking, to Urumchi for trade negotiations. He was received with all honors, but was given mere promises. The result of his trip was almost nil. In March, 1939, foreigners, i.e., British and Indian merchants, were requested to leave Sinkiang. The British consul protested but "the Consulate was boycotted and the Chinese servants . . . were assaulted in the bazaars."⁴¹

Meanwhile the ties with Russia were strengthened by a third agreement, signed on January 1, 1936, which established the closest political bonds between Sinkiang and Russia—bonds much closer than provided for in prior agreements. It contemplated even the possibility of establishing a formally independent Sinkiang. The pact, aimed against both Britain and Japan, was reported to include the following clauses:

. . . 2. The Governments of the USSR and of Sinkiang undertake to maintain order and security of the province, taking care that no foreign influence should penetrate into it . . .

5. In case of some external attack upon the province, the USSR is bound to assist it politically, economically, and by armed force . . .

7. In case the province decides upon the declaration of independence or the formation of a separate state, the USSR is bound to assist it.⁴²

40. *Op. cit.*, pp. 231-232. "I had a slight squabble with the G.P.U.," Barmine adds, "over some artillery sent to Sinkiang. The governor informed us that the artillery was secondhand, although it was listed as new. An investigation disclosed that the G.P.U. troops, on returning to Russia after helping to put down the rebellion, had decided to exchange their old cannon for the new ones we had sent. They had made the exchange without bothering to inform Moscow. I brought my complaint to Rosengolz. 'Don't start anything with the G.P.U. men,' he said. 'Give Sinkiang a discount and forget it.'"

41. Aitchen K. Wu, *op. cit.*, p. 270.

42. *Moslem World* (1936), p. 415.

The full meaning of this new agreement was soon revealed when Soviet transports began to move across Sinkiang. A regiment of Russian troops in Chinese uniforms was stationed at Hami; a loan of five million gold rubles was extended to the Sinkiang Government. Even traffic shifted from the left to the right side of the road. An oil refinery was built, and oil wells drilled.⁴³

Sinkiang's trade went again in a western direction—to Russia. A special agency was created by the Soviet Government for trade with Sinkiang—the Sovesintorg (Soviet-Sinkiang Trade); it established offices in all the principal cities of Sinkiang. Transport facilities were likewise in the hands of this agency. Export to Russia, consisting largely of cattle and animal products, was part of a barter process: Russia furnished textiles and metal goods in exchange.

The main difference between the state of affairs in Sinkiang and that in other newly acquired areas of the Soviet Union, such as Mongolia or Tannu Tuva, lay in the fact that no Communist party was created in Sinkiang and no political parties at all existed. A party, a popular movement, even strictly controlled, would have demanded propaganda on behalf of the native population, Turk-Moslem, against the Chinese; in Sinkiang, however, the local Chinese minority was the Soviet instrument for ruling the province. Therefore only "anti-imperialist" movements were engineered, and only an "Anti-Imperialist League" was founded, whose propaganda was directed against two powers—Britain and Japan—in line with the general Soviet policy in Asia during that period. The difference between a political party and an anti-imperialist league lay in the fact that a party would have had to formulate a comprehensive program of home policy, whereas the league could concentrate on specific international affairs. International events, of course, were always presented in strict conformity with the trends prevailing in Moscow.

"Tremendous anti-imperialist demonstrations" took place on New Year's Eve of 1937. In October, 1938, an "All-Sinkiang Congress" of the Anti-Imperialist League was held in Urumchi. It pledged ten planes for the Chinese Air Forces to oppose "Japanese imperialism," and to keep the overland route to China open.⁴⁴ The

43. Theodore White in *Time*, October 25, 1943.

44. Norins, *op. cit.*, p. 58; Royal Central Asian Society, *Journal*, January, 1938, pp. 11 ff.

shift in Soviet policy in August-September, 1939, when the Soviet-German pact was concluded and Soviet-Japanese relations began to improve, was mirrored in Sinkiang, where the *Sinkiang Daily News* pictured the non-Soviet world as divided between two imperialist axes, putting the "Anglo-Americans" on the same level as Germany, Italy, and Japan. For Sinkiang, the newspaper stressed, the clash of the two imperialist camps meant peace.⁴⁵ This was in general agreement with the line of the Comintern everywhere.

The Soviet policy in Sinkiang was handicapped during the 'thirties by the over-all international situation. The time was not opportune for detaching Sinkiang from China and declaring its autonomy, despite the fact that Chinese sovereignty there was in reality a fiction. The technique of separating Chinese provinces and making them "independent" was being abundantly demonstrated by Japan in precisely the same period in Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, and elsewhere. In its vigorous opposition to Japan from 1934-35 on, and in its attempts to find a basis for cooperation with the Western Powers, Moscow had to act in a "diplomatic" manner. It also needed China's cooperation, just as China needed the support of Russia.

In 1937, when China was in dire need of Russian supplies, and the nonaggression pact with Russia was signed, China was in no position to make demands on Moscow. It tacitly acquiesced in the state of affairs in Sinkiang, while Moscow agreed to build a highway across Sinkiang in order to bring Russian supplies to the Chinese front. It was decided to construct a motor road from Soviet soil to Urumchi to Hami to Lanchow and Szechwan; in the course of the next few years hundreds of trucks carried war supplies and equipment to China over this longest of overland military supply routes. Soviet "volunteers" came and went through Sinkiang.

Germany's attack on Russia led to a radical change in Sinkiang's international status. After ten years of Soviet domination it reverted to Chinese rule—but only for a period of a few years.

45. Norins, *op. cit.*, pp. 58, 74.

The Chinese Soviets

In 1931, after a severe crisis that had lasted for over three years, Chinese Communism was again on the upgrade. That year saw the First Congress of Chinese Soviets, while the leadership of the Communist movement in China was entrusted by the Comintern to Mao Tse-tung, in whose hands it has remained ever since. A strong and outstanding individual, with all the traits of a genuine leader, Mao would not have been able to attain his high position had he not been brought to the fore by the leading men in the Comintern. A student first in Hunan, then in Peking, Mao Tse-tung was a member of the Chinese party's Central Committee from its very first Congress in 1921. In 1925 he joined the Central Committee of the Kuomintang along with the other delegates of the Communist party, when the short-lived coalition was effected with Moscow's consent. Mao thus formulated his views on revolution: "Revolution cannot be carried out without crushing all kinds of pretty decorations; it cannot be carried out softly, gradually, carefully, considerately, respectfully, and appeasingly."¹

In 1927, when everything seemed to have fallen apart, Mao and a few stalwart Communist units retreated to the rural areas and created the first Chinese soviet. He opposed the moderate policy of the founder of the Communist party Chen Tu-hsiu, called for a peasant uprising, and in the territories under his "soviet" personally walked the fields of the expropriated landlords, dividing the land among the peasants. He was the natural choice for Moscow when a man had to be found to take over the Chinese Communist party; he opposed both "rightist opportunism" and the "semi-Trotskyism" of his predecessor Li Li-san; above all, he was always loyal and obedient to his superiors in the Comintern.

The other leader of the Chinese Communists was Chu Teh. He had studied military science in Yunnan and, because of his ability,

1. *Kommunistisches Internationales* (1935), No. 33, p. 83.

had advanced rapidly in the Chinese Army, despite his addiction to opium. Early in the 'twenties he left for Europe, studied in Germany, Paris, and Moscow, and broke his opium habit. When he returned to China from Moscow, in 1926, he was already a member of the Communist party; since 1927 he has been a constant companion and aide of Mao Tse-tung.

During the early 'thirties, all over the world, a new set of men took over the leadership of most of the various Communist parties of their countries—men who, happily for the Comintern, were lacking in those qualities which had been so essential in the earlier period. These men—Thorez, Togliatti, Pieck, Browder—were better disciplined than their spiritual predecessors; they were obedient and lacked the predilection for theoretical as well as political discussions, and for organizing circles of close adherents. They were satisfied with the ideological crumbs that were thrown them from above. The new Communist leadership in China belonged to this category. It never rebelled against Moscow and it caused the International no trouble by dissension or disloyalty. After a few years of Mao Tse-tung's activity at the head of the Chinese party, it was stated in the Comintern: "From the time of the twelfth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International to this day, there have been and there are no serious political deviations and antiparty factions and groups in the Chinese Communist party."²

Shanku

For the Chinese Communists the years 1931 to 1934 were ones of relentless struggle and growth. The Central and local governments sent troops against the Soviet regions and often succeeded in reoccupying territories, suppressing the Communist party there, and arresting a number of its followers. The bulk of the party membership managed to escape to other areas and to occupy new regions and establish "soviet republics" in the new locations. It has always been a matter of pride among Chinese Communists that they were able to withstand the "six campaigns" of Chiang Kai-shek against their forces. This paradox in China's history—the existence of independent Communist states within the Kuomintang's state—was partly due to the political and emotional cohesion among the small group of Communist rebels; but it was due mainly to the weakness of the Central Government and the vast size of rural China.

2. *Ibid.* (1933), No. 34, pp. 10-12.

Moscow's guiding hand was obvious at every crucial turn in the internal affairs of Chinese Communism; at that time no serious attempt was made to conceal the role of the Communist International in Chinese affairs.

The Conference of the Chinese Communist Party held in August, 1927, at which the "rightist" Chen Tu-hsiu was removed from his position, was called upon the request of the Comintern's Executive Committee. Early in 1928, upon Stalin's initiative, a special session of the Executive Committee assembled to discuss China.³ The Sixth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in July of that year took place in Moscow—in order to avoid the danger of arrest of members in China. When, some time later, a "leftist trend" took hold of the Chinese movement, it was again the Executive Committee in Moscow that not only put a stop to the deviations but even appointed a new set of leaders for the Chinese party. In 1931 the Politburo of the Chinese Communist party was reorganized; its new members were consistent followers of the Comintern's policy. When the Chinese Communists again began to wage a successful fight against the government, it was proudly announced that "the Communist party [of China] owes its successes to the immediate and constant guidance and help which have been forthcoming from the Leninist Executive Committee [of the Comintern in Moscow] to the Chinese Communist party."⁴

Far Eastern affairs were handled by a special department of the Communist International, the so-called Eastern Secretariat. Korea, Japan, China, India, Indonesia, and several other countries were under the jurisdiction of this office, at whose head, in the early 'thirties, stood Pavel Mif. A separate Far Eastern Office, the Dalburo, was established by the Comintern; for a number of years its headquarters were at Shanghai, from where it kept in touch both with Japan and with the remoter regions of China, where the retreating Communist units were trying to establish a permanent foothold.⁵ The chiefs of the Dalburo changed in rapid succession. The more prominent were Voitinsky, James, Yanson. The Noulens, an Austrian couple, for a time acted as chief agents of the Comintern. They were arrested in 1932 and remained in jail until

3. *Ibid.* (1934), No. 20, pp. 59-60.

4. *Ibid.*, No. 20, pp. 62-63.

5. The Central Committee of the Communist Party remained in Hankow and Shanghai until 1931, then moved to the Soviet areas.

1937.⁶ A prominent German Communist, working under the assumed Chinese name of Li Teh, was military adviser with the Communist armies from 1933 on.

And yet it would be wrong to consider Chinese Communism, even at that time, as a pure and simple product of Russian propaganda or of Comintern subsidies. There is no doubt that from its very beginning the Communist movement in China was a product of Chinese conditions. It was a popular movement, that is, not a movement of the Chinese people or even of a majority of the Chinese people, but one of several political and social trends that emerged in China in the course of the last 50 tormented years. To this revolutionary movement, still in its infancy, still fighting its first battles, Russian Communism lent ideas, theories, organization, and discipline. Even without this influence, a revolutionary movement would certainly have developed then, but it would probably have run into quicksand, easily to be smothered by other forces. In no other country was the prestige of Russian Communism as high as it was in China. The more difficult the political problems facing Chinese Communism the more urgently was it in need of authoritative solutions. This was precisely the reason why the Soviet Government was able to make of the Chinese movement a conveniently devoted and conscious instrument of Russia's Far Eastern policies.

Certain writers on China have attempted to picture the Chinese Communist movement as independent of Moscow. This reasoning has often been in line with Moscow's political moves. Such independence, however, has never existed. The Chinese Communists would reject it no less emphatically than would the Soviet leaders. Those who have not demonstrated unswerving loyalty to Moscow have been termed "Trotskyites" and have been promptly ejected from the body of the Chinese Communist party.

A SOVIET GOVERNMENT IN CHINA

By the end of 1927 the sensational news reached Moscow that soviets were being created in China. At that time—20 years ago—

6. When released, writes Freda Utley, who saw them after their release, "they were warned to see no one. They were obviously terrified. . . . They feared to be liquidated if they returned to Russia. They knew too much.

"Poor devils. I left full of pity for these two white-faced derelicts of an age in Comintern history long past. They had left one prison only to fear incarceration in

the very word "soviets" was electric; the world remembered the recent experiments with soviets in Hungary, Bavaria, and Berlin. There was something almost mystical about a soviet. More often than not, people did not know exactly what a soviet was, but nevertheless—or rather, precisely because they did not—"sovietization" appeared to many as a universal nostrum. Because of this veneration for the term and because the creation of soviets had been prohibited by Moscow during the revolutionary years in China, the Communist guerrilla formations fleeing now from the police into the mountains and distant areas called their new communities "soviets." When the Communist-inspired peasant uprisings were quelled and the Canton revolt was suppressed, by the end of 1927, the first "soviets" were organized.

People in China and abroad failed to see the difference between the Russian and the new Chinese soviets. In Russia soviets had been created in 1905 and again in 1917 in the big cities; they were the result of spontaneous revolutionary movements mainly of industrial workers; the soviets included the representatives of various political parties competing on a democratic basis. In China, on the other hand, soviets emerged as a product of a defeated revolution; they were located not in the politically important cities but in distant rural regions. No political discussions could take place in the Chinese soviets, nor could there be dissension. The Chinese soviets were actually Communist party groups and guerrilla units that had selected for themselves a name which to them was sanctified. The men who stood at the helm of the first Chinese soviets in Kiangsi and Kwantung Provinces were not yet prominent but were destined to play a guiding part in Chinese Communism of the next two decades—Mao Tse-tung in Kiangsi and Chu Teh in Kwantung. Their guerrilla groups were officially renamed Red Army (another term borrowed from the Russian Communist arsenal). Chu Teh was "Commander in Chief" of the guerrilla forces, while Mao assumed a position similarly derived from Russian practice—he became "political commissar" of the army. Even Communist sources do not put the strength of this armed force above 10,000.

These first "soviets" were to last but a few months. They had not

another. Rejected by everyone, they were too broken in spirit to save themselves and start a new life." F. Utley, *Last Chance in China* (Bobbs-Merrill, 1947), p. 26.

strength enough to resist the mopping-up operations of the local and Central governments. They disappeared in 1928, to be resurrected in 1930.

In February, 1930, a new "Provisional Soviet Government of Western Kiangsi" was proclaimed. Its task was announced to be the redistribution of land among the peasants. Soon a conference of representatives from various Communist regions took place in Shanghai to forge a link between them. The "Red Army" in the Soviet districts was already estimated at 62,000. Finally, in August, 1931, the Executive Committee of the Communist International advised the Chinese party to create a full-fledged Soviet government with a program on the Bolshevik model: "In the shortest possible period, a central Soviet government must be formed in the most secure region . . . The Soviet government must carry out a Bolshevik national policy with regard to the various minorities on the basis of their full equality and right of self-determination." ⁷ As a result, the First Congress of Chinese Soviets took place in Juichin, Kiangsi, in November, 1931. It closely followed the Russian pattern. A Constitution was promulgated, largely resembling that of Russia; supreme power was vested in the "Congress of Workers', Peasants', and Red Army Deputies." The program included confiscation of landlords' properties, nationalization of industries belonging to foreigners, a minimum wage, assistance to co-operatives, and the right of secession for each of China's national groups. The congress elected a permanent "Central Executive Committee" which, in turn, appointed the Cabinet—the Soviet of People's Commissars—which included all the loyal leaders of Chinese Communism—Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh, Chang Ho-tao, and Chou En-lai. The Cabinet was empowered to rule by decrees which had the force of law. The Soviet of People's Commissars consisted of ten departments, including a department officially referred to as the "GPU" by the Chinese Communists themselves; Teng Fa was put at its head.

Moscow and its Dalburo took an immediate part in determining the political line, program, and tactics of Chinese Communism. In Russia the years 1929-33 were marked by a decisive turn of the government to the left. Private peasant economy was abolished; all intra-Communist opposition was suppressed. This trend "to the

7. *Strategiya i taktika Komintern*, pp. 306-307.

left" was of course mandatory for all other Communist parties, including that of China. The Chinese party was ready to follow the line laid down by the Comintern.

In September, 1932, the Communist party of China reported to the Comintern "great victories" of the Soviets and a Red Army consisting of 26 corps and 15 local divisions. "We also have now a well-armed GPU detachment," the report added. The creation of the GPU units was a source of particular pride since here the imitation of Russia was most complete. At first local "committees to combat counterrevolution" had been created; soon they were renamed "departments of political defense." Finally, the "Administration of Political Defense" was created to control and direct the activity of all the local GPU's.

The first GPU's emerged in the Provinces of Hupeh, Hunan, and Anhwei; soon they expanded into the Soviet areas of Kiangsi and Fukien. A report from western Fukien read:

In our Soviet region, as in all the other Soviet regions, work to combat counterrevolution was intensified after the discovery of counterrevolutionary plans in the Soviet regions of Kiangsi and Fukien. The experience and lessons of fighting counterrevolution in these two regions were absorbed by our Cheka, whose aim it is to fight counterrevolution, and facilitated its task of liquidating the counterrevolutionary nucleus in our region. All in all, up to 1,500 arrests were carried out.⁸

With the creation of the GPU the whole mentality and practice of its Russian model were taken over: fantastic accusations, trials and confessions, and indiscriminate "liquidations."

A report from Kwantung stated that

the doctors turned out to be members of counterrevolutionary organizations. At first they sought to poison all our responsible workers but later on changed their tactics and began to give them medicine that affected their brains. At present very many of our responsible workers, especially among the party committees, suffer from disorders of the brain.⁹

And a GPU official of the Central Soviet region wrote in September, 1931:

We pay very great attention to confessions made by counterrevolutionaries, to their voluntary repenting. The Kiangsi provincial government

8. *Ibid.*, pp. 415-416.

9. *Kolonial'nyye problemy*, III-IV (1935), 93.

has issued regulations about admissions of guilt, with sincere confession and a truthful description of the organization and its plans being recognized as mitigating circumstance.¹⁰

In 1933 the Chinese delegate Wang Ming reported, on a note of triumph: "In the past year and a half the enemy has not been able once to penetrate into this main stronghold of the Chinese Soviet Republic . . . As a result, the territory of the Chinese Soviet Republic is now greater than that of any large capitalist country of western Europe." The total Soviet territory ("the stable Soviet regions plus the region of Red guerrilla activity"), he stated, occupied one fourth of China proper; the "stable" regions alone, with a total population of 50 to 60 millions, he added, occupied one sixth of the total territory; the area under Soviet rule was 1,348,180 square kilometers; the area of the stable regions, 681,255 square kilometers. According to Wang, the regular formations of the Red Army numbered 350,000 men, the irregular forces 600,000.¹¹ The membership of the Communist party rose to 250,000, almost all members being recruited in the Soviet areas.

The Communist party was the government of Soviet China; actually it was also the Red Army. The three elements were in reality but one. The government, to exist, had to fight. It was really a great guerrilla force, controlling the area, commanding the peasants, confiscating property, fighting the Kuomintang, teaching, learning, and adopting resolutions.

The Second Congress of Chinese Soviets took place in January, 1934, again in Juichin, and was attended by some 800 delegates. Mao Tse-tung was in a position to report important progress made by his movement, the conquest of new areas, the establishment of a considerable number of newspapers and other publications in Soviet China, and, finally, growth of the Communist party and the Red Army. "Above all, we must gather all our forces for the victorious war against the imperialist dogs—the Kuomintangists," Mao Tse-tung proclaimed.¹²

The Second Congress was enthusiastically hailed in Moscow. At the Seventeenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet

10. *Sovety v Kitaye*, pp. 270-271.

11. Executive Committee of the Communist International, Thirteenth Plenary Session, December, 1933.

12. Report to the Second Congress, January 22, 1934, quoted in *Kommunistichesky Internatsional* (1934), No. 20, p. 24.

Union, Dmitri Manuilsky, reporting on the progress made in China, thus summed up his findings: "The young Communist party of China is becoming one of the best sections of the Communist International, also because both they and the Red Army have passed through the years-long school of civil war."

Soon another vigorous attack by the government forces made it necessary for the Communists to abandon the provinces where the Soviet movement had won a foothold. To save the party, the army, and the very lives of its members, the whole body of Chinese Communists began the "Long March" which resulted in the creation of a new Soviet-Communist state at the other end of the Chinese Republic.

THE LONG MARCH

Every great revolutionary movement has had its heroic age, to which new generations turn for inspiration, legends, and example. The Long March belongs to the heroic age of Chinese Communism.

Beginning in October, 1934, it lasted for a whole year and took the weary columns a distance of more than 5,000 miles. These 12 months were marked by hundreds of skirmishes and several large-scale battles with the armed forces of the Central and local governments. High mountain ranges had to be climbed, rivers crossed, food and pack animals obtained, and forced marches made in the heat of summer and the cold of winter. The casualties were tremendous. Out of the approximately 100,000 men who left the former Soviet area, less than half reached the final destination; the rest were killed or left behind. On the other hand, thousands of dispersed Communists joined the moving horde, thus adding to its strength.

The Long March was unquestionably a feat of remarkable courage, discipline, and devotion. It combined faith with heroism; in it, the potential political force of Chinese Communist became manifest.

In addition to Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh, the two men who led the movement, Chang Ho-tao, who headed a Soviet area in Szechwan, also played an interesting role. Chang had been a Chinese student in Moscow and one of the first leaders of the party during the preceding decade. He had often been a delegate to conferences

with the Comintern and had led strikes of industrial workers. He had the title of Vice-Premier of the Soviet Government in China.

Having taken by surprise the blockading armies of Chiang Kai-shek and having broken through their lines, the Communists at first moved westward. From Kiangsi they entered Hunan and northern Kwantung, then veered further to the west, into Kweichow and northern Yunnan. In May, 1935, they were in Szechwan.

Now the Communist columns turned to the north and, on May 30, 1935, crossed the Tatu River. It appears that the preliminary plan was to settle permanently in these provinces of western China and to create a Soviet republic there, far from the guns of Nanking. In Moscow the new area of Soviet China had already been announced and a map published on which it was shown occupying a large region in western China, covering parts of Kweichow, Szechwan, Kansu, Yunnan, and Sikang.¹³

It proved impossible, however, for the Chinese Communists to gain a foothold in these provinces, and the tired and depleted columns had to trek on. A serious divergence of views then developed among the leaders of the March. Mao Tse-tung wanted to continue northward, while Chang Ho-tao proposed to move to the west, nearer to Sinkiang, a province which only a short time before had become a de facto Soviet Russian protectorate. The majority of the Communist leaders, supported by the Chinese GPU,¹⁴ approved Mao's plan, and began their march into Kansu and Shensi.

Chang Ho-tao remained behind and, it seems, asked for Soviet permission to enter Sinkiang. His request was denied.¹⁵ In Sinkiang the Chinese Communists would have been of little use to Russia. They would have been reduced to the status of political refugees, of whom there were already enough. Moscow needed the Communists in China proper as a force capable of opposing Chiang Kai-shek and, if necessary, the Japanese as well. Chang Ho-tao was obliged to submit and rejoin the other wing of the marchers into Shensi. His insubordination was not forgotten, however. He was later arrested. The rift between him and the rest of the Communist leadership widened and, in April, 1938, Chang was finally expelled from the party.¹⁶

13. *Kommunistisches International* (1935), No. 25, p. 35.

14. E. Snow, *Red Star over China* (Modern Library ed.), p. 213.

15. O. Brière, in *Aurore, Bulletin de l'Université* (Shanghai), 1946.

16. Cf. pp. 140-141.



Now a new Soviet area was rapidly organized in north Shensi, where a tiny Soviet region had been in existence for a number of years. It was destined to exist much longer than any of the earlier Soviet areas in other parts of China and to play an important role in the politics of the entire Far East. Thus Communist China carried out the advice given eight years earlier by its former "rightist" head, Chen Tu-hsiu, that it settle closer to the borders of Soviet Russia. Mao Tse-tung, who had always considered Chen Tu-hsiu as a cause of Communist defeats in the 'twenties, who had hated him and contributed much to his downfall, now saw himself compelled to adopt the ideas of his adversary and to constitute the Soviet area of China as a potential territorial extension of the Soviet sphere in central Asia.

With a Communist state established in the north in a historically significant setting, bordering on Inner Mongolia, on the road of the Japanese expansion and as close as possible to the borders of Soviet Russia, the Communists were well set to play their pivotal role during and after the new World War. At the base of the new structure lay thousands of lives of young and devoted Communists who had died during the Long March. It was a tragic irony of fate that no sooner had the Communists settled in their new homes than a rapprochement between the Communists and the Kuomintang began to take effect and the first steps toward the so-called united front were made. Had this change of policy occurred one year earlier, untold suffering, sacrifice, and privation would have been avoided. But it is futile to seek logic and reason in the course of history.

THE ESSENCE OF CHINESE COMMUNISM

During the course of the Long March the essence of Chinese Communism revealed itself more clearly than in any of its previous manifestations. The Long March is a tale of roving soviets, moving on from province to province, from one end of China in the south to the distant border regions of the north.

From 1931 to 1936, wherever the Communist forces arrived a new government with all appropriate departments was set up. Soviets were established, property redistributed, and a new state brought to life. A few million peasants were the human material of

this mobile governmental experiment, while the well-disciplined and militarily organized Communists provided the leadership. When after a few weeks or months of activity in a new region the Communists, hard pressed and threatened, were forced to leave, the local population immediately returned to its old way of life and shifted its allegiance back to the old authorities. The Communists, meanwhile, would have reached another area, bringing with them the tested pattern of a soviet state; they would immediately unfold the ready-made blueprint, like a tent, cover the new area with a network of governmental agencies, and again claim the unanimous support of the population—only to depart again and leave the population to repudiate the Communists.

In its theoretical conception, Communism is a working-class movement, and no Communist party in the world considers itself as anything but the vanguard of labor. The fact that Communists often represent but a fraction of the workers in no way detracts from this premise. Communism views itself as the most farsighted and courageous of political movements, one which in time will win the support of the entire working class. This is why the label of Communist party was permissible only in countries where at least a certain amount of industry existed. In backward nations, where there was neither industry nor a working class, the Communists could not call their party "Communist," no matter how closely their groups followed the instructions and discipline of the Communist International; in those countries their organizations were called "People's Revolutionary parties." The fact, however, that Communism gained supporters among such backward peoples was a paradox never satisfactorily explained away by Communist theoreticians.

China, of course, has been considered a country where a full-fledged Communist party could thrive. In eastern China, along the coasts, in the ports, in the cities, along the railways, millions of Chinese have belonged to the working class. It is significant, however, that the Soviets have always been strongest in the rural areas of China, far from the large cities; only a few towns have been under Soviet control. Chinese Communism has rarely had a sizable following among labor. It was all very well for the Communists to consider themselves the vanguard minority, but the response of the reluctant and overwhelming majority was more than disappointing.

In an almost unending series of letters, resolutions, instructions, and speeches the Communist International in Moscow drew the attention of its Chinese section to these shortcomings. In 1931, for example, the Comintern noted with regret that only 5 to 10 per cent of the Chinese Red Army (at the time almost identical with the party) were workers, and pointed out that "the percentage of *industrial* workers was even considerably lower."¹⁷ It was virtually nil. In another instance it pointed out that at the most only 4,000 industrial workers in all of China belonged to the party. Among the participants in the Long March there were few if any workers. In 1937 Wang Ming wrote with regret: "The Chinese Communists are well aware of the fact that work among workers and their trade-unions in the previous period has been very poor."¹⁸ Later, when the Communists expanded their guerrilla activity over large areas of Japanese-occupied China, Mao Tse-tung reported to the Central Committee: "The enemy occupies big cities and lines of communication—we occupy hamlets."¹⁹

For decades the activity of Chinese Communism has been directed primarily to rural China, and it was under Communist guidance that revolutionary movements developed and profound revolutionary changes were wrought in the relations of peasants and landlords and, more generally, between rich and poor in the Soviet-dominated areas. This fact, along with the known weakness of Communist influence on industrial labor, has led some observers and writers to conclude that Communism in China is an agrarian movement, different and distinguishable from the well-known models of Communism in Russia and other countries. No interpretation would be more mistaken than this view of Chinese Communism.

The Chinese Communists have never regarded themselves as an agrarian movement; they have always remained aloof from the "petty-bourgeois" tendencies of a class which possesses "private means of production"; they repeated Lenin's warnings against certain pro-capitalist and counterrevolutionary tendencies among the peasants. A large number of purely peasant organizations have existed in China for many years; some of them date back to the

17. *Kommunistichesky Internatsional* (1931), No. 21.

18. *Kitaiski narod pobedit* (1937), p. 34.

19. Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Sixth Plenary Session, November, 1938.

eighteenth century. Struggling against burdensome taxation and oppressive landlords, they joined sometimes with this, sometimes with that party in civil war. Pure peasant organizations, they lacked political and military leadership. Less known to the world than the Chinese Communists, these peasant unions, often imbued with a revolutionary spirit and designated by fanciful names (the Long-hairs, the Heavenly Gates, Yellow Sand, Red Lances, Yellow Lances, etc.), have been rebuffed by the Communists. The Comintern warned against the incorporation of such "dubious" groups in the Communist movement; more than that, "agreements with the Red Lances and similar unions are strictly prohibited."²⁰

In the writings and teachings of the Chinese Communists one phrase constantly recurs which is at first rather surprising; it is that the social basis of Communism in China is formed of "workers, peasants, and the youth." The "youth" referred to along with two great social classes were neither the young industrial workers nor the peasant youth. The term referred to university students and the youth in the high schools of the big cities who play a peculiarly important part in China's political mutations. It also embraces sizable groups of young professional men. Numerically insignificant compared with the hundreds of millions of Chinese peasants and the millions of workers, for the past 40 years these young people have been exerting a tremendous impact on the political development of their country.

This Chinese "youth" group lives in an environment of inflamed passions and heated debates over political problems. A sincere idealism and devotion to lofty principles, combined with the oriental readiness for mass self-sacrifice, are its characteristics. The revolutionary movement that developed at the time of the downfall of the monarchy drew its inspiration from among the rebellious groups of university students. The great popular movements—nationalism, anti-imperialism, the successful drives of the Kuomintang, the unification of China and, finally, the Communist movement—all were closely tied up with the trends among the academic youth. Student demonstrations and university strikes sometimes upset the political balance of power.

20. *Kommunistischesky Internatsional* (1931), No. 21, p. 29. Later, when the war with Japan was under way, and the time of the "united front" arrived, the strict prohibition was lifted and in certain cases collaboration with these unions permitted—but never to the point of a solid coalition or merger.

During the last decade Yen-an, the new capital of Communist China, has been the mecca for hundreds of boys and girls from all the provinces, especially northern and central China. At great risk to their lives and under conditions of severe privation, these young people have made their way to the Communist capital to attend the university where Mao Tse-tung himself taught Marxism-Leninism, in order to be able later to contribute actively to the cause which in their eyes was the greatest in the world. It is these men and women and not the workers and peasants who have made up the real reserves of sincere and devoted Communists.

The outstanding position of universities and other institutions of higher learning in China is, in a sense, a phenomenon common to the entire East, including India and Russia. In any country where the great majority of the population is too poor, too little educated, to participate systematically and actively in political life, "student movements" acquire an importance out of all proportion to their numerical strength. It was therefore easier for Russia to understand the real nature and the mechanics of Chinese Communism than it was for those countries where the stratum interested and participating in public life is considerably wider and where schools and academies consequently do not occupy so pre-eminent a place.

The majority of Chinese "youth" do not come from workers' families, and only a few are of peasant origin. For the greater part they are of "bourgeois" background, representing all strata of the urban population. In this respect, too, China parallels the Russian experience: at the beginning there were almost no workers among the guiding lights of Lenin's party; young members of the bourgeoisie and the Russian gentry were the nucleus of the groups around Lenin as well as of the local committees of his movement. Moreover, Lenin's formula for a Communist party recognized the paradoxically strong position of the enthusiastic nonlabor intelligentsia which was within the "labor party" yet occupied a position distinct from the general labor movement. "An elementary labor movement," Lenin wrote, "can create, and inevitably creates, only trade-unionism; a trade-union policy of the working class is a bourgeois policy." Communist ideals and policy "can be brought only from the outside" of the laboring class. *The Party and the Masses. The Leaders and the Followers.* The party is the hard core of revolutionists who, in time of political ferment, attract the masses of

workers and peasants. When the revolutionary fever subsides, the small, the real party remains and prepares the next move. How this concept differs from the British Labor party, for example, which for nearly half a century has been constituted as a political federation of trade-unions!

What was true of the Russian Communist party has been equally true of its Chinese counterpart. There have been no workers among the supreme leaders of Chinese Communists. The only one who was a labor leader was Li Li-san, the former head of the miners' union—but Li was soon discarded, and Trotsky took pride in announcing that the only Chinese labor leader in the Communist party had been denounced as a semi-Trotskyite.

It is therefore wrong to classify Chinese Communism as a workers' movement or as a peasant movement; nor is it, of course, a political movement embracing the whole intelligentsia. It cannot be identified with any distinct social class. It resembles rather other broad movements of our times which have their roots in several classes and can, if they wish, claim to cross the demarcation lines of any particular class.

As in Russia, the inner core of China's Communism consists of a few thousand central and local leaders—administrators, generals, teachers. Communists to the bitter end, they are 100 per cent pro-Russian so long as Russia is Communist. They are revolutionists in the Communist sense, and ruthless politicians, but also eternal dreamers hoping for a great Soviet China as a future component of a Greater Soviet Union.

IMITATING RUSSIA

In no other Communist party did veneration and imitation of Russia reach the proportions they did in the Chinese party. A multitude of terms and phrases of the peculiar Russian vocabulary found their way into Communist China. A *Politburo* headed the party; the armed forces were a *Red Army*; the territories ruled by the party were *soviet* regions; the secret police of the Communist regions were commonly referred to as the *GPU*; the names of newspapers and magazines in the Soviet regions were derived from the Russian: *The Red Star*, *Truth*, *The Struggle*, *Soviet China*, etc.²¹

21. Mao Tse-tung's report to the Second Congress of Chinese Soviets.

"Saturday brigades," imitating Russian practice, worked in fields and offices.

The Red Army was patterned so closely after the Russian model that the hand of the Russian organizer was unmistakable. Military commissars were appointed to all army units; political departments were established in regiments and higher echelons, politruks [political instructors] in every company; a central agency for political propaganda and police in the Red Army was patterned after the Russian Political Administration of the Red Army; 30 per cent of the training time of young recruits was, in the Russian manner, devoted to "political schooling"; the term "soldier," was, as in Russia, replaced by the word "fighter"; a Revolutionary War Council, precisely as in Russia, stood at the helm of every army; Communist party cells and Communist Youth cells were organized. The soldier's cap was adorned with the five-cornered Soviet star insignia; a "Lenin's Corner" was organized in every military training school, and portraits of Lenin, Stalin, Voroshilov, Mao Tse-tung, and Chu Teh adorned the walls.²² A soldiers' song went like this:

To overthrow the Kuomintang and the imperialists' yoke
We must create a Union of Soviet countries.

From 1932 on the Chinese Communist party kept what amounted to an ambassador in Moscow. He was Chen Shao-yui, who operated in Moscow under the name of Wang Ming. Having won Moscow's favor by his firm opposition to Li Li-san, Chen Shao-yui became a member of the Presidium of the Communist International and for about five years played an important role as chief liaison agent between the Comintern and the Chinese party. Returning to China in 1937 with the halo of Moscow's blessing, he immediately assumed a prominent place; his name was sometimes listed even above that of Mao Tse-tung, the "Chinese Stalin."

On every important occasion the Chinese Communist party expressed its admiration of the personality of Stalin and the achievements of his party. Every turn and zigzag in Soviet policy was enthusiastically applauded by the Chinese Politburo. When Russia embarked on a sweeping program of collectivization, the Chinese pupils warmly approved; when, some time later, Stalin made a

22. *Kommunistisches Internatsional* (1935), No. 33.

partial retreat in the collectivization program, they were again with him heart and soul. When the Fourteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union convened at the end of 1933, amidst a severe economic crisis, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communists sent greetings to "the glorious pilot of the world-wide October [Revolution], Comrade Stalin." It read:

We are happy and proud of the victories to which thou hast brought the great country of socialism—thou, the best disciple of Lenin, our teacher in combat, our ardent friend, our commander and leader . . . The revolutionary proletariat and peasantry of China, engaged in a bloody struggle against the imperialists, the national bourgeoisie, and the landlords, have created their own Soviet republic on one fourth of the gigantic territory of China, with a population of 80 millions. We now have our own armed force for the defense of the achievements of the revolution from our class enemies . . .

Let the entire capitalist world shudder at our successes and accomplishments. Let the international bourgeoisie, torn asunder by contradictions, grit their teeth at the sight of a constant increase of our might. The end approaches and with it our final victory. Only the Soviets can save China from final disintegration and impoverishment.

Lead us on, O our pilot, from victory to victory!²³

At the same time the Chinese delegate, Wang Ming, told the Executive Committee of the Comintern how much Chinese Communism owes to Russian leadership: "One of the fundamental reasons for our successes," he declared, "was the victorious conclusion of the First Five-Year Plan within four years and the publication of its results in the report of Comrade Stalin."²⁴

Two years later Wang Ming addressed the Seventh Congress of the International in these words:

The ideological, political, and organizational growth of the Communist party of China is due to the fact that it has been under the guidance of the Communist International, that it can use the experience of other sections, in particular the experience of the leaders of the All-Union Communist party . . . Our party has remained faithful to the teachings of Stalin.²⁵

23. Seventeenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. *Stenographic Report* (in Russian), p. 1323.

24. Speech at the Thirteenth Plenary Session of the Executive Committee, December, 1933.

25. *Kommunistichesky International* (1935), No. 25.

The Russian example was closely imitated by the Chinese GPU, and it seems probable that there too instructors from Moscow gave at least initial advice. Writing in *Toucbujen* (The Struggle), a high official of the party reported on the efficiency of the GPU's operations in Hunan Province and told how it "destroys counterrevolutionary elements" and rounds up "conspirators," and so forth. Wang Ming himself reported to the Thirteenth Plenary Session of the Comintern's Executive Committee in Moscow that

the organization and the operation of our GPU was improved and strengthened to such an extent that, despite all kinds of attempts by the Kuomintang to organize counterrevolutionary uprisings in our rear, there was not a single serious counterrevolutionary revolt, as there used to be previously, in the Soviet areas in the past year. Our GPU has been capable of uncovering and smashing numerous counterrevolutionary intrigues and conspiracies of the Kuomintang and the imperialists in our Soviet China.²⁶

When, soon after, the suppression and liquidation of Trotskyites began, the Chinese GPU learned to "establish" ties between the Trotskyites and Japanese authorities and to portray them as paid agents of the enemy. Neither in methods nor in ruthlessness has the Chinese GPU wished to lag behind its elder brother in Moscow.

26. Quoted in *Strategiya i taktika Kominterna*, pp. 332-333.

Moscow and Yenan (1935-1941)

The coordination of Russian and Chinese Communist foreign policies has been complete both in general outline and in detail. On the whole it offers a picture of remarkable cooperation and synchronization at every step.

Until the middle 'thirties the one decisive factor in the internal as well as the foreign policy of the Chinese Communists was opposition to the Kuomintang. The overthrow of Chiang Kai-shek's government was the aim to which all other activities and policies had to be subordinated. Foreign policies were made dependent upon domestic policy. This was both emotionally understandable and in line with the traditions of Russian Communism and the teachings of Lenin. Revolution, bringing destruction of the government and its machinery, was the key to all other issues. It was only natural that in 1929, when the Sino-Soviet conflict over the Chinese Eastern Railway arose, the Chinese Communists should have sided with Russia, accusing their government of provoking the war. They actually preferred to see the Chinese Eastern in Soviet hands than to have Chiang Kai-shek or Chang Hsueh-liang keep it. While all the labor unions of Shanghai issued appeals in favor of the Nationalist Government,¹ the Chinese Communists supported the Soviet policy.

This attitude was not seriously affected by the Japanese attack on China. For a period of about five years the Communists continued to advocate an uprising and the overthrow of Chiang's government as the only means of saving China from Japan and "the other imperialist powers." This political line was made possible by the apparently uncertain attitude of the Kuomintang in the face of the Japanese campaign.²

1. Chen Tu-hsiu's letter to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. *Kommunistichesky Internatsional* (1929), No. 49.

2. When the Chinese Soviet Government "declared war" on Japan, in February, 1932, this was merely a political gesture without practical implications. The soviet regions

In connection with the Japanese attack the Nationalist Government faced the same crucial problem which later confronted every second-rate power threatened with aggression by one of the members of the Axis: resistance or surrender. China's forces were obviously inadequate to repel the armed might of Japan. Resistance meant tremendous losses and defeat. Submission, on the other hand, meant sacrifice of independence and of national liberty and acquiescence in the transformation of China into a colony of Japan. Resistance would be heroic but suicidal. Submission would mean bitter humiliation. It was a tragic dilemma, and there was no answer to the question, How can the weak defeat the strong?

Later the world became aware of this problem when the Czech President, Hacha, was summoned to the *Reichskanzlei* in Berlin and presented with a choice: either Czechoslovakia surrenders or the German Army attacks tomorrow morning. Hacha surrendered. A few months later Poland, facing the same dilemma, tried to resist but surrendered within three weeks. During the war the underground movements of Europe were divided over this very dilemma: caution or resistance.

The Chinese armies in Manchuria in 1931 offered practically no resistance to the invading Japanese. They retreated into northern China, while the Japanese were rounding out their conquests and organizing the state of Manchukuo. In Shanghai, which was invaded by Japan in January, 1932, there was resistance, but its success was obviously the result of international and not Chinese pressure. Soon Japan renewed her campaign. Ineffective Chinese resistance alternated with truces and armistices. The liberation of China from Japanese occupation could be achieved only by the victory of some other great power over Japan.

Meanwhile the Japanese war was undermining Chiang Kai-shek's government. It did this both by military means and by lowering the government's prestige. Chiang's inability to resist effectively was among the causes for the new growth of Communism and the establishment of soviet territories. The Chinese Communist party made capital out of this weakness. Two days after the Japanese struck in Manchuria the Chinese and émigré Japanese Communists issued a joint manifesto demanding the overthrow of the Kuomin-

were then located far from the theaters of war, and no actual fighting between Communists and Japanese took place for a number of years.

tang. Chiang Kai-shek appealed to his nation for unity against Japan; the Communists responded with the manifesto of September 30, 1931, in which they stated:

People of China! The Kuomintang has of late begun to spread ridiculous, absurd, and lying inventions that ostensibly the Communists and leaders of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army in Kiangsi, Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung, are prepared to fight for a "united front against the external enemy" and go over to the side of the Kuomintang. The Communist party of China is and remains the irreconcilable enemy of the imperialists and the Kuomintang . . .

The manifesto concluded with the slogans, "Overthrow the Kuomintang, which capitulates before the imperialists!" and "Defend the Red Soviets and the Red Army!"³ In an open letter to the party the Central Committee declared in December, 1931:

The Kuomintang, having remained faithful to its capitulating policy of "tolerance," has made of Manchuria a gift to the Japanese capitalists . . .

We shall crush the rotten regime of counterrevolution with an iron hammer and win decisive victories for the cause of the Chinese revolution in the most important provinces: Hunan, Hupeh, Kiangsi, Anhwei! This goal is no longer merely the prospect of a future revolutionary blossom. This is the task of the present day, it stands in the order of the day and awaits immediate fulfillment! Our entire work must be concentrated on the solution of this problem.⁴

In Moscow the Executive Committee of the International adopted a resolution in September, 1932, the gist of which was that "the Communist party of China must fight for the overthrow of the Kuomintang, that agent of imperialism."

We have seen in a previous chapter how Russian policy toward Japan developed in the first half of the 'thirties. For a long time the Soviet Government tried to appease Japan and make the "imperialists" (to the Communist world this term connoted primarily Britain and the United States) responsible for the Far Eastern crisis; it continued its hostile policy toward Chiang Kai-shek until 1936. In accordance with this political line of Moscow the Chinese

3. Signed by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Quoted in Mif et al., *Okkupatsiya Manchzhurii*, p. 153.

4. Quoted in Mif et al., *ibid.*, p. 154.

Communists, too, placed the chief blame for the conflict on Chiang Kai-shek and "his allies, the imperialists."

In October, 1933, the Chinese Communists issued a proclamation, signed by Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh, and others, addressed to the "Workers, Peasants, and Intellectuals" of the world. It was directed against Chiang Kai-shek and against the United States and Britain. As far as Japan's offensive was concerned, the Chinese Communists declared that they were ready to join in an agreement with "any armed force" to fight Japanese aggression. This was simply an offer to the members of the Chinese Army to shift their allegiance from Chiang Kai-shek to the Red Army.⁵

Overthrow of the Kuomintang regime, maintenance of Communist armies as the only force capable of stopping the Japanese, and uncompromising opposition to Britain and the United States in China continued to be the general line of the Chinese Communists as well as of the Comintern and the Soviet Government in Moscow.

RESISTANCE OR RETREAT?

This policy began to change when Russia, threatened in both east and west, gradually shifted toward a rapprochement with France, joined the League of Nations, and began to display a firmer policy of resistance to Japan on the Manchurian and Mongolian frontier. The year-long sequence of "border incidents"—a semi-war between Japan and Russia—developed. An adjustment of Chinese Communist policy to the exigencies of the new political line of the Comintern and the Soviet Government was due.

The dilemma which haunted Chiang for five years—resistance or submission—was one that international Communism also pondered.

Writing in the (non-Communist) Chinese newspaper, *Ta Kung Pao*, in July, 1935, Dr. Ting Wen-chien recalled the policies of Lenin toward Germany in 1918: A few months after the November Revolution of 1917, he pointed out, Lenin and his party were faced with the same problem that China faced almost 20 years later. By that time Russia had been reduced to a second-rate power, having in effect lost almost her entire army. Effective resistance to General Hoffmann's attacks was impossible. Germany proposed

5. *Kommunistisches Internationales* (1933), No. 18, and *Bor'ba za yedinyi front v Kitaye* (Moscow, 1937), pp. 103 ff.

a humiliating separate peace, and heated disputes arose in the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party as to whether the offer should or should not be accepted. Trotsky and Bukharin refused to submit to the German conditions but Lenin was in favor of the separate peace. He won out by a small margin. Both trends were intrinsic in Communist party policies, as they were in the policies of any other party. The Chinese Communists, the article implied, had no means of defeating Japan, and if they were to gain control of the government, they would be just as helpless as was Chiang Kai-shek. Retreating in the face of Japanese attacks, Chiang Kai-shek would have been able to invoke the precedent and example of Lenin. The aim in both instances was "to trade space for time"—to give the other Great Powers time to defeat the major enemy. In the case of Lenin the Great Powers were the Western nations at war with Germany in 1918; in the case of China the expectation was of a conflict between Britain and the United States on the one hand and Japan on the other.

Theoretically, either line of reasoning—cautious retreat or forceful resistance—might appeal to a Communist movement. In the history and practice of the Communist International both had been considered legitimate. In the case of China, however, the Kuomintang was at first trying to avoid battle with Japan, while Russia needed China's continued resistance to the Japanese. Chinese Communism, violently opposed to the Kuomintang, was inclined to vote for resistance—and did so, with Moscow's approbation.

The tide began slowly to turn during the second half of 1935.

The Seventh Congress of the Communist International assembled in Moscow in August of that year, at a time when the depleted but still lengthy columns of Chinese Communists were continuing their trek toward northern Shensi. The congress proclaimed a general change of Communist tactics everywhere toward "united fronts," cooperation with the democracies, and collective action against Germany, Japan, and Italy, and made it obligatory for all its member-parties to seek coalitions with political groups and governments which were willing to "fight fascism." The Comintern had always been proud of its ability to combine the "defense of the Soviet Union"—seemingly a Russian national problem—with the

interests and activities of Communist parties throughout the world. The new tactics were unanimously accepted.

The Congress of the Comintern concluded with the election of members to the highest bodies of the International. Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai, Chang Ho-tao, and Wang Ming were elected to the Executive Committee. Wang Ming was also made a member of the powerful Presidium and its secretariat. All these Chinese Communists (with the exception of Chang Ho-tao) continued as members of the highest echelons of the Comintern for a period of eight years until its dissolution in 1943.

At this congress Wang Ming was one of the delegates representing the thousands of Chinese Communists. He immediately absorbed the spirit of the new policy. The Chinese Communists, he said, would propose to their people an "anti-imperialist united people's front" against Japan. He was cautious, however, about the Kuomintang. He still adhered to the principle of a coalition of military units, small parties, and the Communist party of China—but without Chiang Kai-shek. The members of such a coalition, Wang Ming proclaimed, would have "to organize along with us a Chinese People's Government of National Defense."

In China the implications of a "united front" were far more painful than anywhere else. In other countries the new policy meant cooperation with political opponents; in China it meant, if put into effect, reconciliation with the "bloody head of counterrevolution" responsible for the deaths of thousands of Communists. Therefore the Chinese Communist manifesto, released immediately after the conclusion of the Moscow congress, was still negative in its attitude toward Chiang Kai-shek, restricting its offer of a united front to elements outside the Kuomintang.⁶

RUSSIA AND THE "UNITED FRONT" IN CHINA

A few months later the Long March came to an end and a new soviet region began to take shape in the northern part of Shensi Province. The area originally occupied had a population of

6. In a book (*Bor'ba za yedinyi front v Kitaye*) published in 1937, at a time when the united front with the Nationalist regime had been effected, Wang Ming attempted to show how the Communists had consistently striven for national unity. In a reprint of a set of documents going back to 1933, he included the appeal of August, 1935, referred to above. Wang, however, omits documents showing the opposite trend as well as words and sentences in which Chiang Kai-shek was assailed.

1,500,000. The following year the area was extended to the south and its population rose to two million. The little town of Yen-an, which became the capital of the region, was repeatedly bombed and most of its buildings were destroyed; private dwellings as well as government offices were partly located in caves carved out of the rock. Yen-an, headquarters of the Communist party of China, which counted 250,000 to 300,000 members in 1936 and became the strongest non-Russian party in the Communist International, was located in one of the poorest areas in China, where there was no industry, no railway connecting it with the world outside, and no working class. A Red Army Academy, a university, and a party school began to function in Yen-an.

Putting to use the considerable experience acquired in southern and western China, the Communists speedily organized their new state; administrative units were set up, laws were proclaimed, a government established, and—last but not least—a new Red Army organized in which the Communist veterans constituted the nucleus and occupied commanding positions, while the local peasant population provided the rank-and-file soldiers. Remnants of former armies arrived; from the east enthusiastic Communists began a pilgrimage to the new soviet area, Yen-an soon becoming the capital of political, military, intellectual, and educational affairs. Mao Tse-tung was again at the head of the movement, and Chu Teh continued in command of the Red Army.

Compared with the earlier Chinese Soviet areas, the new communist state in Shensi, bordering on Inner Mongolia, was nearer to Soviet-controlled Sinkiang and the Mongolian People's Republic. In the east the new Communist state faced Japan and claimed for itself the distinction of being an outpost against the fascist onslaught; in the south it faced Kuomintang China. Chinese Communism, however, now had its back not far from the sturdy wall of Soviet Russia. Contacts with Moscow were destined to exert a powerful influence on ensuing events. Chiang Kai-shek wasted little time in dispatching armies to seal the borders of the Soviet territory and stem the Communist expansion by force.

Now the policy of the Chinese Communists toward the Kuomintang underwent a change—a change in fact and not merely in words. Three factors were decisive in this connection.

First, the new Communist area was in the path of Japan's ex-

pansion; the menace of imperialist Japan—a menace that had seemed little more than academic so long as the soviet regions were located mainly in the southeast—was now a grave reality. The defense of the Chinese Soviet state was now as imperative as was the defense of the Russian fatherland, and implied all the consequences of a policy of all-out national defense. For all intents and purposes Nationalist China was a neighboring state with which a military alliance could usefully be concluded—so long as that neighbor was prepared to fight the common enemy. Generalissimo Chiang was, of course, a great evil; but if he turned against Japan, a temporary coalition should not be impossible. Had not Soviet Russia found it possible to ally herself with France against a common enemy—Germany?

Second, there were the instructions and directives from Moscow, urging the need for cooperation among all anti-Japanese forces.

Third, the truce between the Kuomintang and Japan had obviously outlived its purpose. Disappointment throughout China was widespread; the futility of compromises with Japan had been sadly demonstrated; further retreats in the face of Japanese attacks were psychologically impossible. The cautious Chiang Kai-shek could not help speaking in the sharpest and most uncompromising terms of Tokyo's policy when he addressed the Kuomintang's Central Committee in July, 1936. Other elements, among them military commanders, were often inclined to try an experiment of cooperation with Russia—which automatically implied a rapprochement with the Chinese Communists.

In August, 1936, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist party dispatched to the leaders of the Kuomintang a letter signed "with national-revolutionary greetings." Commenting upon the new political attitude of Chiang Kai-shek, it for the first time clearly formulated the Chinese dilemma, as the Communists saw it: either a rapprochement of the Kuomintang with Japan or a united front between the Kuomintang and Soviet China. At the same time Mao Tse-tung advanced the new motto: "All parties and classes unite to fight the Japanese and the traitors . . . The opposition to the Kuomintang and various governments does not correspond to the present situation. We are against civil war."⁷ Wang Ming, unofficial ambassador of Soviet China to Moscow, wrote in the *Com-*

7. Reprinted in *Tikbi Okean*' (1937), No. 1, pp. 203 ff.

munist International: "One cannot put the Kuomintang-Chiang Kai-shek on the same level as the Japanese aggressors; the main enemies of the Chinese people are the Japanese-fascist militarists."⁸ From that time on, in innumerable letters, speeches, and political demonstrations, the Communists stressed their readiness to cooperate with Chiang Kai-shek, his army, and his party.

The Kuomintang did not immediately react to the Communist offer, and the first test of the new Communist line did not come until the Sian incident in December of that year, described elsewhere.⁹ Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang's forces, previously dispatched to guard the borders of the soviet area, became a part of the rising "united front" movement against Japan. When Chiang Kai-shek was arrested by Chang Hsueh-liang and presented with a political ultimatum, the Nanking government began preparations for war, for which the anticipated and feared execution of Chiang Kai-shek might have been the signal. The Communist party meant to participate in a new revolutionary government. The Sian rebels were immediately rebuked by Moscow; the Communists promptly reversed their policy to advocate a peaceful termination of the conflict. Chiang Kai-shek was freed and the civil war averted; the Communist party took credit for the peaceful resolution of the crisis and, as appears from a multitude of subsequent statements, considered the dramatic events of December, 1936, as the turning point in its relations with the Kuomintang. "The whole country rejoices," the Central Committee of the Communist party wrote in a message of greeting to the Kuomintang in February, 1937, "in the peaceful solution of the Sian conflict."

The Kuomintang Conference, however, rejected the offer of a united front and called for a complete eradication of the Communist state. It adopted a resolution which advanced four conditions for cooperation with the Communists, including disbanding of the Red Army and the abolition of the Chinese Soviet Government.¹⁰

These two points of the Communist program—a separate government and its own army in a specific area of China—were becoming the stumbling blocks in the negotiations between the two parties. While advocating the cessation of civil warfare, the Com-

8. *Kommunistichesky Internatsional* (1936), No. 14.

9. See pp. 67-70.

10. *China Year Book*, 1938, p. 532.

munists never volunteered to submit to the jurisdiction of the Central Government. The maintenance of their nucleus of Soviet China was so important to them that even the Japanese menace was not adequate justification for the abolition of what they believed to be the greatest achievement in the history of China. In this position they were upheld and prompted by the Comintern in Moscow. George Dimitrov, the head of the Comintern, wrote approvingly: "The Communist party of China does not intend to follow the road either of blind confidence in its allies [the Kuomintang] or of capitulation."¹¹

In the Communist pattern of agreement with the Kuomintang, a proposal was included that appeared to represent a substantial concession on the part of the Communists but which in fact was of only secondary importance: the Communist party agreed to dispense with the name "Soviet China," which had inspired exultation among all Communists, and to replace it with the term "Special" or Border Region of China, with its own "Government of the Special Region." Similarly, the proud name of the Red Army was to be changed to "National-Revolutionary Army"; Communist universities and academies were to be called "anti-Japanese." Apart from these verbal changes, however, the Communist party was not prepared to sacrifice any sector of independence in its separate state in Shensi.

In May, 1937, a Communist conference convened in Yenán. In his report to the conference delegates Mao Tse-tung again proposed suspension of hostilities; renaming the Soviet Government of China the "Administration of the Special Region of the Chinese Republic"; changing the name of the Red Army to "National-Revolutionary Army"; subordination of the army to the central army command; cessation of confiscation of landlords' estates; and establishment of a "democratic" form of government in Soviet China, which implied the abolition of soviets in name. On the other hand, Mao Tse-tung emphasized: "There are limits to our concessions . . . We must maintain Communist control in the Soviet region and in the Red Army."¹²

According to these proposals the Red Army was to remain intact; although a part of China's armies, and armed and supplied by

11. *Bor'ba za yedinyi front*, p. 135.

12. *Kommunistichesky Internatsional* (1937), No. 9.

the Central Government, the Red Army was to enjoy wide autonomy. Since an autonomous army in time of war is impossible, this proposal was the source of future serious clashes. The abolition of soviets and the institution of democratic forms of government were not intended to be fundamental changes in the political structure of Communist China. No opportunity for non-Communist political activity was ever granted or intended. In order to abide by the requisites of "formal democracy," the new electoral law for Soviet China of May 18, 1937, returned the franchise to capitalists, landlords, kulaks, and monks. Leasing of land was again permitted, and a few landlords returned. When, however, elections were held they strongly resembled the Russian procedure: 80 to 90 per cent of the population participated; even the sick showed up at the polls; in some villages a full 100 per cent of the authorized voters cast ballots, although only 2 per cent were literate. All government candidates were elected without opposition.¹³

At a later stage, the Communist organizations were instructed to seek no more than one third of the seats in the representative bodies; another third of the deputies was to consist of Kuomintang men; the remaining seats were to go to nonparty people. But the Kuomintang in the Communist regions was a sham party, consisting of an artificial amalgam of elements who at some prior time had been in contact with Chiang Kai-shek's following but who were now willing to submit to instructions from the Soviet authorities; the same was usually true of the nonparty deputies. The Communist leadership remained the government in the "Border Regions."

What the Communists were really after was a coalition of two powers against Japan—Communist China and Nationalist China being equal allies, each with its separate army and government. A military alliance of two nations was, of course, neither novel nor impossible, but in this case many obstacles stood in the way of such an alliance. The first was the fact that the Nationalist Government was not prepared to acquiesce in the permanent division of the country and implicit recognition of the Communist state. Secondly, the activity of the Communist party was not restricted to the Soviet region; departing from the blueprint of a businesslike alliance of two distinct nations, the Communists sought and gained adherents all over China who continued their activities on behalf of the "for-

13. *Ibid.* (1939), No. 10, pp. 79 ff.

cign power"—Soviet China. Finally, when the war against Japan got under way, in the summer of 1937, and Japan overran a sizable part of China, a new source of trouble arose: both the Kuomintang and the Communists displayed considerable activity in enemy-occupied China; the Communists especially, with the aim of laying the basis for the realization of their postwar ambitions, tried to induce allegiance to the Communist Government of Mao Tse-tung, particularly in the rural areas occupied by Japan.

All in all, the concessions offered by the Communists were half-hearted and often insincere. A coalition built on this basis could not be enduring.

ONCE AGAIN THE TROTSKYITES

Conditions within the Communist party, in turn, made it impossible for the party to engage in full-fledged collaboration with the Nationalist Government. The civil war, with all its hardships and atrocities, was still fresh in everyone's memory—was, in fact, still going on. The enthusiasm and the great expectations that had followed the successful establishment of the new Soviet China in the north were a political factor too. Cooperation with Chiang Kai-shek appeared to many a Communist as a betrayal of faith and principles. As a result, a "leftist" movement emerged within the Communist party which represented a serious challenge—greater than that of the "rightist deviation"—to the Communist leadership.

From the very beginning the Communist leaders were constrained to combat individuals and organizations accused of Trotskyism. It appears that there were no genuine devotees of Trotsky active in China at the time, at least no considerable number of them. The utterances and writings of "Trotskyites" which have been brought to light do not sound like the products of Trotsky and his followers, and Trotsky himself in all those years never published reports on Trotskyite activity in China in his *Bulletin*—which he undoubtedly would have been glad to do had there been anything to report. Obviously the infamous Trotskyites of China were members of the Communist party who were dismayed by the new trend of cooperation with their mortal enemy "for the benefit of Russia."

The great trials of the Trotskyites were then under way in Russia, and the Chinese Communists, always eager to follow the

Moscow star, opened a campaign of bloody persecution against their native Trotskyites. Faithfully following the Moscow prototype, the accusations charged the persons involved with being in the service of Japan, receiving instructions as well as money from Japanese sources; even exact amounts were indicated by the defendants, who often "confessed" their crimes in good Soviet fashion.

The witch hunt gained momentum. The GPU of Soviet China displayed frantic activity. Executions followed at frequent intervals. "In the Eighth Army [part of the Red Army] the Trotskyites conduct a propaganda campaign, making use of the existing material difficulties," the *Communist International* reported. It stated that they were receiving \$100,000 a month from their Japanese bosses. In Tientsin, it claimed, a Society of Eastern and Western Culture was in reality a tool of the Trotskyites, Chang and Hsui. In Honan Province the Trotskyite Tsian Lu-yin was organizing "bandits" against the Fourth Army.¹⁴

The publication of the Chinese Communist Youth League reported on a Trotskyite leader, Chang Muo-tao, naming a number of his aides and purportedly showing their ties with Japan; enumerating their organizations, such as the "Union for the Liberation of the Fatherland" and the "Fraternal Union for the Emancipation of Toilers." Chang was accused of spreading rumors to the effect that the liberation of Chiang Kai-shek during the Sian incident had been made possible "not by insistence of the Communist leaders but by a bribe of \$1,500,000 to Gen. Wang Yi-cheh" to release Chiang.¹⁵

Chang Muo-tao and his comrades were put on trial in the summer of 1937. The court was satisfied from the evidence presented that they had received money from Japan, and convicted them. The fantastic accusations leveled against the "culprits" were reminiscent of their Soviet counterparts. "Chang Muo-tao," the Communist Lin Fu alleged, "was preparing a bandit conspiracy in China's rear. He is a vile traitor and spy."¹⁶ He further pictured the American writer Frank Glass in Shanghai as an agent dispatched by Leon Trotsky to do political work in the Far East and

14. *Ibid.* (1938), No. 36, pp. 122 ff.

15. *Ibid.*, No. 8, p. 113.

16. *Ibid.*, No. 6, pp. 122-123.

as "the liaison man between the Trotskyites and the Japanese consulate and intelligence service." Upon his instructions, it was claimed, a Chinese Trotskyite, Cheng Sun-hsing, conducted sabotage against the Communist armies until his apprehension.

In Kwangsi Province twelve Trotskyites were executed. The leader of the Trotskyites in Fukien Province, Tung Hsiao-kuei, was also executed. A certain Trotskyite, Li, when put on trial, "confessed that the Japanese intelligence was paying the Trotskyites of Hopeh Province the sum of \$10,000 a month." In Peking, he allegedly revealed, a conference of Trotskyite delegates from various regions of China met regularly once a month in a Japanese office. In the same city, he was reported to have confessed, the Trotskyites were giving lectures on how to combat the Communist movement. Utterly intolerable was the behavior of Trotskyites in the county of Nianghwei: "In the library of a teachers' college they display various Trotskyite pamphlets, including the biography of that super-bandit, Trotsky."¹⁷

The ideas of this seemingly impressive quasi-Trotskyite movement are not devoid of interest. Their power consisted in their adherence to the slogans and ideals of orthodox Communism during the civil war. Their main slogan was "Down with *all* the imperialists!" "The war of the Japanese aggressors is a war of the fascist bourgeoisie of Japan against the Chinese bourgeois Kuomintang." For the Communists to participate in such a war meant selling out the interests of the proletariat to the bourgeoisie. "No united front with the Kuomintang is possible," the Trotskyites insisted. Their propaganda was the more dangerous to the Communists in that it appealed to emotions and a state of mind deeply embedded in each Communist. Teaching Communism at the University of Yen-an, Mao Tse-tung and others often defended theories from which the Trotskyites could readily draw justification for their own position. The united front—even as a maneuver, a temporary zigzag—was in conflict with the basic attitudes of many Chinese Communists.

UNITED FRONT IN ACTION

There was no concrete agreement between the Kuomintang and the Communists until the Japanese attack at the Marco Polo Bridge,

17. *Ibid.*, No. 10, pp. 119-120.

which ushered in the great war. But even after the "Double Seven" (7/7 1937) the agreement between the two factions was neither complete nor perfect. To a great extent relations between the two Chinese parties reflected the state of Sino-Soviet relations. As the negotiations with Russia proceeded successfully, Chiang Kai-shek's attitude toward his Communists began to change. In August the agreement with Russia was signed; soon Russian war supplies began to reach Chiang's armies.¹⁸ Insufficient as these supplies were, for a time they were the only military help Chiang could get from abroad. He obviously had to behave in such a manner as not to arouse Moscow's antagonism.

The Communists, in turn, followed their blueprint of wartime activities strictly: stressing "anti-Japanism," adhering to the Kuomintang-Communist coalition, suppressing "traitors and Trotskyites," while maintaining strict independence from Nationalist China and Chiang's armies, in preparation for the rise of a possible tide in their favor. The Communist attitude toward Britain and the United States shifted to reflect the new orientation of Russian policy. Lo Fu, writing in 1937, stated:

We desire that a collective treaty of security in the Pacific Ocean area be concluded on the basis of the principle of equality and mutual assistance by England, America, France, the USSR, and other states. With respect to the League of Nations we must assume a position of support . . . As regards questions of terminating extraterritorial rights and concessions of other countries, the revision of unequal treaties, the regulation of questions pertaining to foreign loans, the raising of tariff duties, etc., the proper solution of these problems can be attained by means of peaceful negotiations with the interested governments.¹⁹

This was a rather important departure from the time-honored standards of Communist policy.

One week after the signing of the Soviet-Chinese treaty, and even before any agreement with the Kuomintang was reached, the Chinese Communist party decreed that the name of the Red Army be changed to "The People's Revolutionary Army."²⁰ Three

18. Cf. pp. 72-73.

19. *Kommunistischesky Internatsional* (1937), No. 9, p. 76.

20. When the Red Army was renamed and "the old warriors took the red star from their caps, as part of the united front agreement, they did not discard it. Many of them pinned it to their tunics, just inside their left breast pockets." Edgar Snow, *Battle for Asia*, p. 335.

weeks later the "united front" of the two movements was officially declared to be in effect. After exactly ten years of underground existence the Communist party became legal. Communist publications were permitted. In the following years May Day was legally celebrated. A "democratic republic" had replaced the Soviets. Confiscation of lands ceased. "Comrades of the Kuomintang!" Mao Tse-tung wrote in *Liberation* in September, 1937, "Together we are carrying out the duty of saving the country . . . Let the Kuomintang and the Communist party close ranks!"

After the German Ambassador had proposed peace between Japan and China, volunteering his services for mediation,²¹ and Chiang Kai-shek had responded in accordance with Stalin's advice, the Central Committee of the Communists issued a manifesto stressing the firmness of its alliance with the Kuomintang. They were so elated over Chiang's following Stalin's instructions that they even promised cooperation with the Kuomintang after the war: "The Communist party of China is prepared to build a new China after the war together with the Kuomintang."²²

This was in line with the numerous statements made by Chiang Kai-shek himself. The Generalissimo had stated more than once that the civil war was a thing of the past and would never occur again. "The cry, 'Suppress the Communists!'" he told the People's Political Council at a later date, "belongs to history . . . At no future time could there conceivably be another campaign for the suppression of Communists."²³

Whether these were illusions of both parties or merely diplomatic verbiage, the outward solidarity of the three elements of the coalition—Moscow-Yenan-Chungking—seemed to have been attained.

Wang Ming, the Communist representative who for five years had been in Moscow as a member of the Comintern's Presidium, was sent back to China in 1937, well informed as to the ideas and attitudes of the Soviet Government. After his arrival he continued, in classical Comintern fashion, the struggle "against rightists and leftists." The Trotskyites in particular aroused his wrath since "they want to have a civil war and war against Japan at the same time and refuse to accede to a coalition with the Kuomintang."²⁴

21. See Chap. V.

22. *Kommunistisches Internationales* (1938), No. 4, pp. 109-110.

23. Speech of March 6, 1941.

24. *Kitaiski narod pobedit*, pp. 10, 14, 32.

Together with his colleague Chou En-lai, Wang Ming was received by Chiang Kai-shek, who stated that the government had freed the political (Communist) prisoners and had extended the freedom of the press and assembly.

In the conciliatory mood of 1937, Russian and Chinese Communists did not even raise the issue of a coalition government in China. It was obvious that such a demand would have complicated the realization of the anti-Japanese united front.

"The Communists do not demand their inclusion in the government," Wang Ming declared.²⁵ Mao Tse-tung himself confirmed that the Communist party "is not yet advancing demands for participation in the national government," but it demanded measures against those members of the Kuomintang who still denied the legality of any party except their own.²⁶

The government set up a new People's Defense Council in which three Communists—Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh, and Chou En-lai—participated. The council was later enlarged to include seven Communists and was renamed the National Political Council. Early in 1938 Chou En-lai was appointed vice-chairman of the Political Training Section; he also became a member of the Supreme War Council.

In October, 1938, a plenary session of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party took place in Yen-an. Reiterating the principle of cooperation with the Kuomintang, this important gathering resolved that "at this stage in China, a Soviet Socialist system cannot be realized." The Trotskyites were again condemned; so was the "rightist menace," because it wanted "the abolition of the organizational independence of the Communist party" (i.e., a merger of the Red Army with the Nationalist armies). Chang Ho-tao, the outstanding Communist leader, was accused of rightist deviationism, declared a traitor, and expelled from the party. Since he had been elected by the Congress of the International to the Executive Committee, Moscow had to take sides—it promptly confirmed the ouster of Chang.²⁷ Reviewing

25. *Hsin-bua Jih Pao*, December 25, 1937, quoted in *Kommunistichesky International* (1939), No. 5.

26. *Hsin-chun Hua Pao*, February 10, 1938, quoted in *Kommunistichesky International* (1938), No. 4, pp. 86 ff.

27. *Kommunistichesky International* (1938), No. 7, p. 125.

Chinese affairs, the Presidium of the Comintern expressed "its complete solidarity with the political line adopted by the Communist party of China . . . The Presidium confirms the expulsion from the Chinese Communist party of the member of the Central Committee, Chang Ho-tao, who has betrayed the cause of Communism and the united anti-Japanese front and who has gone over to the enemies of the people."²⁸

China's reverses in the war with Japan coincided with a stiffening and strengthening of Russia's attitude toward Tokyo. Russia had not been beaten in the "border incidents" and since 1938 she had, on the contrary, given ample proof of strength. Russian prestige was rising high in the eyes of the Chinese Communists. Criticism of Moscow was suppressed with a strong hand. When the war with Japan broke out in July, 1937, it was first rumored in China that "Moscow promised to join in the war within three months." Later the time was extended to six months. Finally the Chinese became aware of the real state of affairs: Moscow would avoid fighting Japan by all means, and China's struggle was necessary to the Soviet Union precisely in order to prevent such a military conflict. But even the realization of this "egoistic" policy of Stalin failed to discourage or disappoint his ardent followers in China. "The land of Socialism" had to be saved and defended at all costs, and it had the right to remain aloof from military entanglements.

When the Eighteenth Communist Congress of the Soviet Union convened in March, 1939, Mao Tse-tung sent greetings from Communist China in these glowing terms:

The Central Committee of the Communist party of China sends a flaming Bolshevik greeting to the eighteenth Congress of the CPSU and to Comrade Stalin, leader of progressive humanity of the whole world . . .

The people of China, who wage a holy liberating war against the Japanese barbarians, nourish the most sincere and most friendly feeling for the peoples of the USSR. The Chinese people follow your ex-

28. A striking example of misconceptions common in the United States was provided, for instance, by the allegation that after their arrival in Yen-an the Chinese Communists "had become an independent organization; their ties with Moscow were nominal." T. H. White and A. Jacoby, *Thunder Out of China*, p. 45. This is but one of a number of widespread errors in this country with regard to the Chinese Communists and their relation to Moscow.

ample, learn from your experience . . . We are certain that our nation will achieve victory just as you achieved a victory unprecedented in history . . .

Long live Comrade Stalin . . .

The best period of the Chinese united front lasted about two years—from August, 1937, to September, 1939. The Red Army, with a strength of 45,000 men, was officially incorporated into the Chinese armed forces; an additional Communist Army, 15,000 men strong, was agreed upon. The government undertook to pay the troops a monthly sum of 600,000 Chinese dollars and to supply the armies, which nevertheless were accorded a good deal of independence. The first friction and controversies arose late in 1938, but until the fall of the following year these were local and sporadic in character, having no deep political repercussions.

The sources of friction were manifold. First among them was the undetermined frontier between the areas of operation of the Communist and Nationalist armed forces. In the course of their activities the Communists often moved to other provinces, outside of Communist China, and clashes with the Nationalist forces frequently resulted. Not until 1940 was a line drawn by Chiang Kai-shek delineating the region assigned to the Communist armies.

Second, the Red forces were no match for the Japanese and were not able to come out in open battle against the Japanese armies. It was rather guerrilla warfare that the Communists engaged in, organizing sabotage and operating in the rear of the enemy's lines. The Red command often mentioned hundreds of "actions" in which the Communists had engaged against "the Japanese and pro-Japanese elements." Operations against the Japanese themselves were on a modest scale, however; the main blow of the Communists was dealt against those Chinese in the Japanese-occupied territories who were collaborating with the occupation. Such activity—in effect another civil war—was more in line with the emotions and background of the Communist armies, and it was, of course, conducted with an expectation of postwar developments. In Nationalist circles the Communist armies were generally accused of merely "roaming over the countryside," of preferring political to military activity, and of hostility to their "ally," the Kuomintang. Strong anti-Communist feelings began again to take root in the Kuomintang.

Reports of these clashes coming from Communist and Kuomintang sources were almost stereotyped. The government reported that its troops were surrounded by Communist detachments, disarmed and brutally mistreated; often atrocities were attributed to the attackers. The Communists, on the other hand, described the movements of their forces as always to the front "to fight the Japanese," or returning "from a battle with the Japanese," only to become the victims of an unprovoked assault by the Nationalist armies.

These clashes did not yet affect, however, the principle and practice of the over-all Kuomintang-Communist united front.

FIGHTING RESUMED

Relations began to deteriorate seriously from September, 1939, on.

The Soviet-German pact was signed in August, 1939, and three weeks later the Soviet-Japanese truce put an end to the border fighting and ushered in a gradual improvement in Russo-Japanese relations. The effect of these improved relations on China soon became clear.

The agreement between the Soviet and German Governments was promptly hailed by the Chinese Communists. Mao Tse-tung himself, in a series of lectures, articles, and interviews, took pains to convey to his followers the new interpretation of the world situation. Mao developed the orthodox philosophy concerning imperialism, social revolutions, and Communism in complete unison with the interpretations of Moscow. Britain and France were again pictured, as they had been before 1935, as the great warmongers. On September 26, 1939, Mao stated in an interview that "the center of world reaction now lies in England. Chamberlain is public enemy number one." The interviewer, Edgar Snow, asked Mao Tse-tung whether he considered a German attack on Russia likely after victory in the West. Mao replied, "No, Hitler is in Stalin's pocket."²⁹

No distinction was made between the imperialism of the Axis Powers and that of their opponents. Soviet neutrality would coincide with revolutions within the war-waging countries, Mao pre-

29. *China Weekly Review*, January 13-20, 1920.

dicted in particular that revolution in Japan would help China's cause and he said:

Whether it be Germany, Italy, Japan, England, the United States, France, or any other state either directly or indirectly participating in this war—their aim is always a counterrevolutionary and imperialist aim: to plunder the peoples of the world . . . Are there other aims? No. Not one . . . The German-Soviet pact has strengthened the position of the Soviet Union.³⁰

Chou En-lai, another outstanding Communist, said that while the Soviet Union wanted peace, England, France, and the United States were guilty of attempting to spread the war further.³¹

The Central Committee of the Communist Party adopted a resolution in October, 1939, hailing the Soviet Union for its pact with Germany and for its "peace policy." It was ready to follow in Moscow's footsteps: if Soviet Russia had found a way of cooperating with the "fascist governments," why should not a Communist Government in China be able to do likewise? Mao Tse-tung insisted on the fulfillment of only one condition before undertaking a rapprochement with Germany and Italy: "Should Germany and Italy cease aiding the enemy, we might reconsider our position and improve our relations with them to weaken Japan."³²

The improvement in Russia's relations with Japan was automatically reflected in her attitude toward Nationalist China. Chiang Kai-shek's usefulness to Russia decreased in proportion to the increase in prospects of peaceful Russo-Japanese relations: help to China, which continued to be given, was no longer of such vital importance to Russia as it had been during the fighting around Changkufeng and Nomonhan. Japan's drive into China was slowing up. During the first year of the war the Japanese Army had advanced about 1,800 miles into China; the following year (July, 1938–July, 1939) the advance was slowed to 300 miles; Japan was obviously not able to bring about a final defeat of China and was not taking the risk of being bogged down further in the vast interior of the country. The result was a virtual standstill on wide sectors of the front. Furthermore, no continuous "front" existed in the sense

30. New China Information Committee, *Bulletin*, No. 9.

31. *Communist International* (American ed., 1940), No. 4.

32. Mao Tse-tung's interview in the *Sao Tang Pao*, September 11, 1939. Reprinted in New China Information Committee, *Bulletin*, No. 9.

that it did in Europe. The Japanese Army was in no position to control effectively what was considered Japanese-occupied China—an area with a population of 150 to 200 millions. The Japanese occupied towns, guarded railways, controlled strategic outposts; but the great rural spaces of China, far from the railroad tracks, were in effect unoccupied and governed by local officials, ostensibly loyal to the Japanese command. While a great number of Kuomintang members went over to collaborate with the occupation, other groups in that party remained opposed to the invader and sponsored anti-Japanese movements. The Communists continued to be fairly active in the Japanese rear.

Communist opposition to the Nationalist Government became more outspoken and violent. The stabilization of the Sino-Japanese fronts meant the renewal of civil war in China. This also seemed to be in line with the new relationship between Moscow, Tokyo, and Chungking.

Departing from its previous position, the Communist party now decided to demand the immediate creation of a coalition government in China. In October, 1939, the Central Committee stated that "one-party rule must be brought to an end"—a demand which in the preceding two years the Communists had repeatedly declined to make.³³ From then on the inclusion of Communists in the Chinese Government became an important point in the Communist program; approved and supported by Moscow, the notion of a joint Kuomintang-Communist government acquired international significance; it was to play an important role during the war and postwar years, during part of which time the United States was to become an advocate of such a step. In December, 1939, the Communist general, Peng Te-huai, stated in an interview with the Yenai press: "We will undertake the defense of the Border Region against all attacks . . . station a strong garrison for the defense of the Border Region against reactionaries."³⁴ This was a return to the days before the united front: the former Soviet area—now the Border Region—was to be guarded by a Communist Army—now the National-Revolutionary Army—and surrounded by Nationalist troops diverted from the Japanese fronts.

Clashes between the Communist and Nationalist Armies

33. New China Information Committee, *Bulletin*, No. 12.

34. *Ibid.*, No. 14.

multiplied at a menacing rate. In April, 1940, Nationalist headquarters in Kansu reported to the High Command that the Red Army in Shensi had expanded beyond the area assigned to it; that the Communists had used for various other purposes money appropriated for the army; that Communists were arresting and executing Kuomintang officials, attacking, torturing, killing, and kidnaping civilians. A multitude of new taxes, the memorandum said, had been imposed. The Communists were frequently executing people upon the charge of being "traitors," "Trotskyites," "agents of the Wang Ching-wei clique." The Communists, it was further reported, were trying to annihilate the armed forces of the Central Government on the ground of "rumors that a certain unit was organized by traitors and Trotskyites." "The Communists are much more bitterly antagonistic toward friendly armies than toward the enemy."³⁵

And yet Chiang Kai-shek could not formally and finally break with the Communists. He needed Russia, and therefore the alliance with Chinese Communism had to be kept up. With the Burma Road temporarily closed by the British, the only supply route into China that remained open was one that led from Russia through China's northwest. In July, 1940, Chiang Kai-shek, in a new agreement with the Communists, assigned specific "fighting areas" to the Communist armies both along the fronts and in the rear of the Japanese troops, and the Communists were promised a certain quantity of new arms.

This arrangement improved the situation for only a short time. In its appeal to the people of China on the third anniversary of the outbreak of war, the Communist Central Committee spoke of "the imminent danger of the reappearance of internal strife or war." "We demand," it said, "that the Kuomintang forsake its destructive policy against the Communist party." France had fallen, the Communists added, because Premier Daladier had persecuted the Communists.³⁶

The most serious clash occurred in January, 1941, in the Province of Anhwei. The Communist New Fourth Army had crossed the artificial barrier laid down in the July agreement, and bitter fighting ensued. In November, 1940, the High Command ordered

35. *China Weekly Review*, May 4 and 11, 1940. v

36. New China Information Committee, *Bulletin*, No. 11.

the Fourth Army to withdraw to the confines of its zones, but the Communists did not comply; instead its generals sent a protest to Chiang Kai-shek. The Communist Commander in Chief, Chuh Teh, joined in the protest and accused Chiang Kai-shek of "impairing" the united front. Between January 6 and 13 a fierce battle took place between the New Fourth and Nationalist Armies. The number of killed was reported to be nearly 2,000, and of wounded, between 3,000 and 4,000. Yeh Tung, the Communist general, was arrested and brought to court-martial, and his Army was officially disbanded by the government.

The Communists reacted in a bellicose manner, re-creating and reorganizing the disbanded formations and reactivating the Military Revolutionary Committee, which was subordinated exclusively to the Communist government. They submitted 12 demands to Chiang Kai-shek, including "apology by the government," compensation for the victims, cessation of attacks on Communist forces, among others. Chiang Kai-shek rejected the demands, and the government ceased to make its monthly payments to the Red units. The Communists were now busy printing considerable amounts of their own currency, thus further widening the abyss between the two Chinas.

Officially the Central Government still pictured the growing conflict as a local affair. To keep Russia's support, the Kuomintang went even further than it had before and made known its willingness, in principle, to reconstruct the government on a two-party basis. Russian pressure in this connection continued to mount to the extent to which Russia's relations with Japan improved.

The new outburst of civil warfare was a sufficient guarantee for Tokyo that no effective action would be undertaken against the occupation forces. As far as Russia was concerned, the April agreement between Matsuoka and Stalin gave Japan the assurance that she would not be attacked from the rear should war break out in the Pacific. Japan felt so safe on the Asiatic continent that she could now shift all her energies against the United States and Britain. When Germany finally invaded Russia, the situation seemed more propitious than ever for an attack on Pearl Harbor.

Part III. The Years of the World War

IX

Peace with Japan (1939-1941)

The Soviet-German pact of August, 1939, had its Far Eastern aspects, the repercussions of which were a source of considerable satisfaction to both Moscow and Berlin. They signified the isolation of Japan at a moment when fighting was in progress along the Manchurian border and the Tokyo government was hoping for German assistance.

From the very outset of their collaboration relations between the two Axis partners—Germany and Japan—had been vacillating and uneven. Each power needed the other for the accomplishment of its great designs against the West and against Russia. The necessity of close collaboration between the two was accepted as a matter of fact; yet at every turn in world events during the fateful years from 1937 to 1945 differences arose which often burst into the open with extreme vigor and hatred. The two governments pledged mutual friendship and devotion to a common cause, only to separate again in profound discord. They parted ways and for a time each tried to go in its own direction; but the iron logic of aggressive policy and dire necessity drew them together again in opposition to the other powers. Theirs was a seesaw line of relations, resembling a quadrille, in which the two partners meet momentarily, separate immediately, and meet again for another quick rejoining of hands.

The reason for this fatal inability systematically and consistently to carry out a common policy lay in the very nature of the political systems of the partners. In Berlin as well as Tokyo the leading groups were not only imbued with nationalist feeling but were hysterical, impetuous, uncompromising, and utterly indifferent to the fate of any ally. Unlike other nationalist movements, which reckoned in generations for the achievement of their goals, the Germany and Japan of those days reckoned in years and months. No obstacle must be permitted to obstruct their road, not even the

interests of an ally. Under these circumstances not coordination but domination was called for. The German-Italian alliance worked because Benito Mussolini was aware of Italy's inferiority and was prepared to accept the consequences of such status. Japan was in a different class.

One reason why the German-Japanese alliance operated with such inefficiency was China. Japan considered China a part of her "sphere." Hitler, however, was not prepared to sacrifice Germany's extensive interests in east Asia to Japan, and after each and every public agreement with Tokyo he hastened to make a friendly gesture in the direction of China. By 1935 Germany had replaced Britain as the third largest nation in Chinese foreign trade. As soon as the first anti-Comintern pact was signed, in 1936, Germany concluded a barter agreement with China. Even military supplies were still going to China from Germany while Japanese armies were massing in the north for the march on Nanking. In the summer of 1937 Dr. H. H. Kung, en route from China to Berlin, stated that "China considers Germany her best friend." China's finances were to be reorganized by a German, Herr Klein. The able German envoy, Oskar Trautmann, vainly tried to induce Japan and China to conclude a peace at the end of 1937. It was not until the summer of 1938 that German military advisers were recalled from China, and even as late as March, 1939, at the height of Soviet-Chinese collaboration, a small-scale trade agreement was concluded between Nanking and Berlin. The "incident" between Japan and China was in progress, yet the German envoy remained in Chungking until November, 1940.

When fighting between Japanese and Soviet troops broke out in the region of Changkufeng in the summer of 1938, Tokyo expected Germany to come to its aid. But Hitler was deeply involved in the Sudeten problem and was not disposed to enter immediately into hostilities with Russia. This German reluctance provoked a good deal of bitterness in Tokyo. In return, Japan refused to join the German-Italian military alliance in 1939 despite Berlin's repeated strenuous efforts of persuasion. To Hitler, the Japanese rejection was one more justification for Germany's rapprochement with Moscow, and the pact with Stalin a means of punishing Japan. His indignation against the Japanese was extreme. In a remarkable oratorical appeal to his generals on August 22, 1939 (the speech was

not made public until the Nuremberg trials in 1946), Hitler dwelt, among other things, on Germany's relations with Japan. His remarks were caustic, even contemptuous. Stressing the Teutonic superiority over the "half-monkeys of Asia," he declared:

Since autumn, 1938, and since, I have found out that Japan does not go with us without conditions . . . I have decided to go with Stalin. On the whole, there are only three great statesmen in the world: Stalin, myself, and Mussolini. . . .

I have left to Japan a whole year's time to decide. The Emperor is the companion piece of the later Czars. Weak, cowardly, irresolute, he may fall before a revolution. My association with Japan was never popular. We will furthermore cause unrest in the Far East and Arabia. Let us think of ourselves as masters and consider these people at best as lacquered half-monkeys, who need to feel the knot."¹

In Japan the disorientation produced by the Soviet-German pact was considerable. Was the anti-Comintern dead? Could relations with Russia be improved? The tough war in China was now in its third year, and there were no prospects of breaking the deadlock. In the Pacific tension between Japan and the United States was mounting and relations with Britain were at their worst.

Fighting on the Russian borders ceased; negotiations with Russia were initiated,² but there was no serious hope that ways and means of collaboration would be found. The decisive question demanding an answer was what course Japan's dynamic policy was to pursue under the new circumstances. Was it to be a drive on the Asiatic mainland—meaning Siberia—even though there was no longer any hope of European assistance? Or would it be wiser to turn against the sea powers to reap the fruits of the expected German successes in a war against the Dutch and French Empires in the Far East, and prepare for a conflict with the Anglo-Saxon Powers?

Slowly Japan veered in the latter direction, on which it had turned its back a few months before the outbreak of the European war. More and more the Tokyo government seemed inclined to subscribe to the new German thesis that the anti-Comintern pact was an instrument not only and not so much against Russia as against the "Western democracies." To Japan this meant the ces-

1. Office of United States Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*, VII, 753-754.

2. Cf. pp. 43-44.

sation of friction with Russia, the conclusion of appropriate agreements with her, and the search for a new rapprochement with Germany.

Hitler's wishes were of the same kind. He had hoped to intimidate England and France and to stage a new Munich which would consent to the partition of Poland. Now he was in the midst of war. Anticipating the defeat of France he needed, nonetheless, an ally on the high seas in order to neutralize Britain's naval power. Again the two partners, each for his own reasons, were looking for a rapprochement.

On December 30, 1939, the German Government began negotiations with Russia for the use of the Arctic sea lanes as the only safe route for German shipping to Japan in wartime. "No difficulties [on the part of Russia] anticipated," Admiral Raeder noted in his diary. The preliminaries were successfully concluded in the summer of 1940, and on August 12 Raeder noted: "Departure 'Ship 45' via Siberian sea lane with Russian assistance."³

Germany's victories in Europe against the Netherlands and France in May-June of 1940 paved the way for the easy Japanese acquisition of control over Indo-China and, in part, Indonesia. Now only England stood in the way of Japanese control of these European colonies. With Japan's attention turned decidedly southward, it was important that she secure her rear, i.e., find a *modus vivendi* with Russia.

The Soviet Government was likewise interested in an agreement with Japan. At that time—between September, 1939, and the summer of 1940—the German danger to Russia was being minimized in Moscow, yet all of Russia's energies and forces were needed in Europe, where one piece of territory after another was being annexed and had to be digested by the Soviet Union. Annexations alternated with armed conflicts, such as the war with Finland; under the circumstances it was important to keep the Far Eastern borders quiet and to maintain as normal relations as possible with Japan.

Thus, although no radical change in the diplomatic relations between Russia and Japan occurred until the middle of 1940, the two countries were now avoiding military clashes and even reached a number of agreements which put an end to some grievances of long standing. By a special agreement of October 28, 1939, each side

3. *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*, VI, 981, 986.

consented to release a number of the other's fishermen and fishing vessels which had been detained for several months. A Joint Commission for the delineation of frontiers was formed. Also on December 31, 1939, a compromise on the final Manchukuo payment for the Chinese Eastern Railway was reached. On the same day the fisheries convention was renewed for another year. These agreements were preceded by the return to Tokyo in November of Konstantin Smetanin, the Soviet Ambassador to Japan, after an absence of 16 months. Finally, in January, 1940, new negotiations for a trade agreement were started in Moscow.

At the same time, however, Premier Nobuyuki Abe of Japan made it clear that a nonaggression agreement with Russia "still belongs in the future." Even if the Soviets accept all the conditions that Japan might make, Abe said on December 28, 1939, "we still have to consider carefully whether Japan will gain or lose by such an agreement." Even more blunt and threatening was the statement of the Japanese Foreign Minister, Hachiro Arita, before the Diet on January 31, 1940: "Russia should cease interfering in the industrial concessions of North Sakhalin, modify her policy of supporting the anti-Japanese regime in China, and collaborate for the realization of general peace in eastern Asia."

Molotov, in turn, complained that relations with Japan were still far from satisfactory, in spite of the conclusion of various accords with her. He stated:

We cannot express great satisfaction in regard to our relations [with Japan] . . . For instance, the delimitation of the frontier [between Mongolia and Manchukuo] remains unsettled. The Japanese authorities continue to raise obstacles in the way of normal utilization of the last installment for the Chinese Eastern Railway, which Japan has paid.⁴

In fact, the conference on border questions broke down by the end of January; the Soviet press again began to attack Japan.

The real improvement in Russo-Japanese relations did not come until after the fall of France and the final reorientation of Japan in the Pacific.

4. Molotov's speech of March 29, 1940.

THE TRIPARTITE PACT

In the summer of 1940 Japan agreed to a new alliance with the European Axis partners. A war against Britain in the Pacific now seemed an alluring prospect; the neutrality of the United States still appeared as a possibility; and the neutrality of Russia—a prerequisite for any Japanese attack in the Pacific—could, so it seemed, be bought for the same price Hitler had paid for Russia's neutrality in Europe in 1939.

At the end of July a new cabinet came into office in Japan under the premiership of Prince Konoye; Hideki Tojo, the future wartime dictator, was War Minister, and Yosuke Matsuoka Minister of Foreign Affairs. The aggressive nature of the government and its inclination toward a military alliance with Germany were unmistakable—but so was its tendency to seek a rapprochement with Russia. Japan proposed to Moscow the conclusion of a neutrality pact. Businesslike negotiations started and on August 1 Molotov could report to the solemn session of the Supreme Soviet, which incorporated the Baltic States and Bessarabia into the Soviet Union, that “of late our relations with Japan have begun to assume a somewhat more normal character . . . In general there are certain indications of the desire on the part of Japan to improve relations with the Soviet Union.” The border demarcation commission—this barometer of Soviet-Japanese relations—had again started its sessions and even reached positive decisions.

Heinrich Stahmer, a special envoy of Hitler's, made two trips from Berlin to Japan in 1940 to prepare the tripartite pact between Germany, Italy, and Japan. Testing the earnestness of the German alliance, the Japanese Government immediately issued an ultimatum to French Indo-China, and Japanese troops were soon marching into that country. Germany had induced Vichy to agree. Then, on September 17, the Japanese Crown Council decided to approve the concluding of the triple alliance.

The first news about the impending conclusion of the treaties reached Moscow from its envoy in Tokyo; Ribbentrop, in spite of the pact of friendship and its consultation clause, did not inform the Soviet Government until the last moment. Relations between Moscow and Berlin were not as friendly as before, and Ribbentrop, seeking to comply with his obligations in a perfunctory manner,

actually forestalled consultation with the Soviet partner by resorting to a diplomatic device: before any important German move in the international field, he would instruct his Moscow envoy to make a relevant statement to the Narkomindel—but to do so at a prescribed date so that only a day or sometimes a few hours remained before the event took place, and Molotov was unable to present the Soviet views in time.

This method was again employed with regard to the tripartite pact. Its signing was scheduled for November 27, and on November 25 Berlin instructed Ambassador von der Schulenburg to call on Molotov not earlier than the 26th. The envoy called at the Foreign Office late in the evening and declared that the pact between Germany, Italy, and Japan, which was to be signed the next day, was aimed against the United States; that it in no way reflected on German-Soviet relations; and that, in order to safeguard Soviet interests, it would contain a special article to the effect that "the existing political relations between each of the three treaty powers and the Soviet Union shall not be affected by the treaty." Molotov was not satisfied with this statement. He demanded to see the treaty as well as any possible secret addenda. In his opinion, he was entitled to see the documents before the signatures were affixed.⁵

The next day the treaty was signed before any reply was given to Molotov. Not until October 4 did the Soviet Foreign Office receive the evasive reply in which Ribbentrop expressed the view that such pacts as the tripartite alliance did not fall under the "consultation clause" of the Soviet-German treaty of friendship; he emphasized, however, that no secret protocols or agreements had been concluded with Japan.

The meaning of the pact signed in Berlin on September 27 was dual. Its first purpose, as Minister Toyoda put it, was "to prevent American participation in the war."⁶ Secondly, it indicated the division of the future world into three spheres, whose extent, however, could not be revealed.

Under the terms of the pact, the signatories were obliged to take joint action against any state with which any one of them "might become involved in war." This was obviously a threat to the United States. As for Russia, Article 5 stipulated: "Germany, Italy, and

5. United States, Department of State, *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941*, pp. 195-199.

6. *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*, VI, 551.

Japan affirm that the aforesaid terms do not in any way affect the political status which exists at present as between each contracting party and Soviet Russia."

There was nothing in this paragraph which could really protect Russian interests. It meant exactly what it said—that the relations between the members of the Axis and Russia remained unaffected by the treaty. For example, a war against Russia on the part of one of the Axis members was still possible, but the pact would not compel similar action by its allies. Commenting on the pact *Pravda* stated that the Soviet Government had had advance knowledge of it; "in so far as it depends on us," *Pravda* added, "the policy of Soviet neutrality is and will remain unchanged."⁷

The conclusion of the three-power alliance gave new impetus to the idea of a great international coalition including not only the three Axis Powers but also the Soviet Union. Two weeks after the solemn conclusion of the September pact Ribbentrop dispatched a personal letter to Stalin in which he invited Molotov to Berlin; then he quoted from Hitler and referred to his own previous talks with Stalin. "You will remember," he wrote,

that at the time of my first visit to Moscow I discussed similar ideas with you quite frankly and that I offered our good offices for the adjustment of differences still existing at the time between the Soviet Russians and the Japanese. I have endeavored since then to work in this direction, and I would welcome it, if the trend toward reaching an understanding with the Soviet Union—which is becoming more and more clearly manifest in Japan, too—could lead to its logical goal.

And then, underlining every single word, Ribbentrop declared:

*In summing up, I should like to state that, in the opinion of the Führer, also, it appears to be the historical mission of the Four Powers—the Soviet Union, Italy, Japan, and Germany—to adopt a long-range policy and to direct the future development of their peoples into the right channels by delimitation of their interests on a world-wide scale.*⁸

To this letter Stalin replied on October 22 that Molotov would soon visit the German capital; as far as the four-power combination was concerned, he "is not opposed to it in principle." Upon receipt of this message Berlin began to lay the groundwork for the

7. *Pravda*, September 30, 1940.

8. *Nazi-Soviet Relations*, p. 213.

conclusion of a four-power pact; Japan's concurrence was not in question.

Japan's greatest problem was Russia's future neutrality. Tokyo's activity was predicated on Stalin's noninvolvement. The latter's promises and the statements in *Pravda* were obviously inadequate to protect Japan's rear if she became involved in a war in the Pacific. What Japan wanted was a comprehensive agreement with Russia which would give the best possible guarantee of Soviet neutrality. This was the task that was attacked immediately after the signing of the tripartite pact.

On October 2 the Foreign Office in Tokyo announced that "Japan would be open to a nonaggression pact with Russia." Two days later Moscow stated that "the Soviet Government is not excluding the possibility of rapprochement with Japan." Matsuoka, the Japanese Foreign Minister, then declared that "after the stormy period in Russo-Japanese relations, the time has come now for co-operation." While Japan desired a comprehensive nonaggression pact, Molotov preferred a more modest neutrality treaty.

As for Stalin, his willingness to enter into close relations with the Axis Powers was but another step along the road adopted in the summer of 1939—the policy of maintaining neutrality and intensifying the conflict between Germany and Japan on the one hand and the Anglo-Saxon Powers on the other. True, a great deal had changed since the pact with Hitler had been concluded in August, 1939, and some miscalculations on the part of Moscow had become apparent. Relations with Germany were no longer what they had seemed a year earlier. After the fall of France a German attack on Russia was a probability if not a foregone conclusion. The basic motif of Stalin's policy remained, however, his deep antagonism toward Britain. And so long as collaboration with Britain, i.e., war against Germany, was out of the question for the Soviet Government there was no choice: closer relations with the Axis were imperative.

Moreover, Britain was fighting Germany all alone. Britain's chances were uncertain. What if Britain lost the war, as Ribbentrop continually prophesied? If Britain were really defeated, Russia would have to adjust herself to the new situation and, whether she liked it or not, find a *modus vivendi* in the new world, between the huge power complexes of Germany and Japan. Why then not start

on the spot to settle all problems and enter into closer relations, especially since Germany and Japan were prepared to reward Russian assistance with extensive territorial acquisitions, at the cost of British possessions and spheres of influence in Asia?

When Molotov arrived in Berlin on November 12 Hitler and Ribbentrop developed their most ambitious vision of a great trans-continental bloc of Europe and Asia for their guest of honor. To augment the tremendous impact which the formation of such a bloc would exert on the enemy, the Germans proposed to call the founding conference in Moscow and to announce the conclusion of a pact in which the four powers "undertake to respect each other's natural spheres of influence. In so far as these spheres of influence come into contact with each other," the German draft treaty continued, "they will constantly consult each other in an amicable way with regard to the problems arising therefrom." By another article of this pact the four signatories would "undertake to join no combination of powers and to support no combination of powers which is directed against one of the Four Powers."⁹

This treaty was to be released to the public. In addition, a secret protocol was to fix the spheres of influence of each of the four powers. Germany's sphere was to "center in the territories of Central Africa"; that of Italy referred to North and Northeast Africa; to Japan was assigned "an area of Eastern Asia to the south of the Island Empire of Japan."

The sphere of the Soviet Union was described as follows: "The Soviet Union declares that its territorial aspirations center south of the national territory of the Soviet Union in the direction of the Indian Ocean."¹⁰

Such was the German scheme. It was hardly satisfactory to the Japanese because China was not mentioned as part of her prospective orbit: the "territories to the south" of Japan would not necessarily include the country in which Japan had been waging war for three years. In regard to China, Ribbentrop alluded to certain common interests of Germany and the Soviet Union. He was ready to compensate Japan by Indonesia. To Molotov Ribbentrop suggested forcing an agreement on China by which Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia would pass to the Soviet sphere; he knew that Japan

9. *Ibid.*, p. 249.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 257.

would be agreeable to such a settlement. The future borders between the Japanese and Soviet spheres in southeastern Asia were to run along to the 90th meridian—leaving India to Russia.¹¹

Molotov did not go into any detailed discussion of these problems. He reserved decision until after his return to Moscow; instead, he presented Hitler and Ribbentrop with a list of grievances about the presence of German troops in Finland, about Bulgaria and Turkey, and left no doubt that, should the Soviet Union join with the other three powers in a great coalition, other far-reaching concessions to his government would have to be made. His accusations against the Germans were well founded, yet Hitler was no longer inclined to make concessions to Soviet desires; when Molotov departed, Soviet-German relations were more strained than they had been when he arrived.

Seven years later, at the height of the "cold war" between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government published a lengthy statement intended to counteract the publication by the State Department of documents on Nazi-Soviet relations in 1939-41. This statement, entitled "Falsifiers of History," was, in part at least, unquestionably written by Stalin. The negotiations in Berlin concerning the four-power pact were here presented as a "sounding out of the German side, without any intention of concluding any agreement whatsoever." Consequently, "the Soviet Government did not return to discussions of these questions in spite of repeated reminders from Ribbentrop."¹²

This statement does not follow the facts. Shortly after his return to Moscow Molotov discussed the four-power pact with the German envoy and gave him the Soviet outline of a covenant between the four states. Soviet accession to the new coalition was made contingent on certain conditions; these were not insuperable obstacles, and if Adolf Hitler, in his *mania grandiosa*, had not decided to attack Russia, Molotov's ideas could have served as the basis for agreement.

The Soviet outline spoke of five secret protocols in addition to the public treaty. The Soviet sphere in Asia, which in Ribbentrop's

11. According to official German documents, the 90th meridian later constituted the "treaty line" delineating the contemplated Japanese sphere from the German-Italian. United States, Navy Department, *Fuehrer Conferences on Matters Dealing With the German Navy, 1942* (1947), p. 127.

12. *Pravda*, February 17, 1948.

plan was to lie "south of the Soviet Union in the direction of the *Indian Ocean*," according to Molotov was to be defined as located "to the south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the *Persian Gulf*"; thus the Soviet sphere would comprise not only India and Afghanistan but also Iran and probably Iraq. In another protocol Molotov wanted a military base at the Dardanelles, which would practically involve the inclusion of Turkey in the Soviet sphere. Bulgaria was likewise to be recognized as "inside the security zone of the Black Sea boundaries of the Soviet Union." The Soviet sphere of influence thus outlined would embrace not only the British possessions in south Asia but also most of the Near East and a great part of the Balkans; it would stretch from the Rumanian-Bulgarian border in Europe to the boundaries of India and Burma in Asia.

Finally Molotov demanded the withdrawal of German troops from Finland, which Berlin had recognized as part of the Soviet orbit as far back as August, 1939; and the cancellation of Japanese concessions on Northern Sakhalin.

Germany did not react to Molotov's proposal. In December, 1940, Hitler issued the first concrete orders for the preparation of Operation Barbarossa—the invasion of Russia—and Ribbentrop no longer cared to discuss the far-reaching desires of the Soviet Government.

On January 17, 1941, Molotov summoned the German Ambassador and told him that "the Soviet Government is surprised that it has not received any answer" to its proposals. The evasive German reply was that the Reich Government was engaged in conversations with the other members of the Axis.¹³ Thus the negotiations about the four-power pact ended. On April 20, 1941, *Pravda* published a report that proposals made to the Soviet Government concerning its adherence to the great coalition had been rejected by Moscow. This report was not correct.

In the meantime direct negotiations between Moscow and Tokyo continued through the winter of 1940-41. Japan was anxious to conclude a nonaggression treaty with Russia; she was eager to acquire Northern Sakhalin; she was prepared to pay for it not only in money but also by abolishing Japanese fishery rights in

13. *Nazi-Soviet Relations*, pp. 270-272.

Russian waters; the old Portsmouth treaty could be revised. To Stalin, however, the cession of Northern Sakhalin was entirely out of the question. "You are joking?" Molotov asked the Japanese envoy when he presented the proposal. The Soviet condition for any real agreement with Japan, was the cancellation of all Japanese concessions in the Soviet part of Sakhalin, and on this point Molotov remained adamant.

It was to break the deadlock and reach some sort of agreement with Russia that Yosuke Matsuoka, the Foreign Minister, went on his spectacular trip to Europe in March, 1941.

SOVIET-JAPANESE AGREEMENT

Matsuoka stopped over in Moscow for a short time. He brought valuable presents. Stalin received a thirteenth-century hand-embroidered screen depicting an ancient hunting scene. Molotov was presented with a lacquered box, the lid of which was decorated with a Japanese shrine in gold and silver. Both were rare specimens of Japanese art. In his first conference with Stalin the rather talkative Japanese diplomat asserted that the Japanese were really "moral Communists," although they did not believe in "political and economic Communism." Matsuoka proceeded to develop his conception of the affinity of Russian and Japanese policies; his idea was that Britain and the United States insisted on maintenance of the status quo in eastern Asia, while Japan and Russia, each for her own reasons, were aiming at considerable changes in that area. He represented the Anglo-Saxons as the common foe of Japan, Germany, and Soviet Russia.

Stalin promised to give him an answer after Matsuoka's return from Berlin. Then, after some reflection, Stalin stated that "the Soviet Union had never gotten along well with Great Britain and never would."¹⁴ In this case Stalin was, no doubt, entirely sincere.

Matsuoka then proceeded to Germany and Italy, where he was received with pomp and ceremony. Finally he returned to Moscow for prolonged conversations.

By this time Hitler's plans for a war against Russia had already been completed. Hitler's predilection for a blitzkrieg played a role in his diplomatic relations with his allies: he hoped to bring the war against Russia to a swift conclusion, using as his strongest

14. *Ibid.*, pp. 289-298, especially p. 297. .

weapons complete secrecy and the element of surprise. He deceived himself into believing that he would be able to win *blitzartig*—his favorite expression. He deceived Italy and Japan as to his intentions, and while all the diplomatic chancelleries were buzzing with rumors of the impending Russo-German war, he pretended to favor a plan ostensibly designed to break Britain's resistance first and fast.

As far as Japan was concerned, Hitler's desire was that Japan attack Britain in southeast Asia and above all at Singapore. Again he hoped for a blitzartig victory, since Britain's Navy was largely engaged in the Atlantic. Victory would come to Japan so quickly that the United States would have no time to enter the conflict. To prolong American neutrality until Britain was defeated was, therefore, one of the prime aims of Hitler's strategy.

Foreign Minister Ribbentrop told the Japanese Ambassador, Hiroshi Oshima, in February, 1941:

A surprising [sic] intervention by Japan is bound to keep America out of the war. America, which . . . is not armed as yet and would hesitate greatly to expose her Navy to any risks West of Hawaii, could do this even less so in such a case. If Japan would otherwise respect the American interests, there would not even be the possibility for Roosevelt to use the argument of lost prestige to make war plausible to the Americans. . . . If, however, contrary to all expectations, the Americans should be careless enough to send their Navy in spite of all, beyond Hawaii and to the Far East, this would represent the biggest chance for the countries of the Three-Power Pact to bring the war rapidly to an end.

"We believed . . .," Ribbentrop insisted, "that it should be possible to keep America out of the war by skillfully coordinated politics of the allied powers."¹⁵

Hitler's secret order of March 5, 1941, concerning collaboration with the Japanese, ran in the same vein: "The *common aim* of the conduct of war is to be stressed as forcing England to the ground quickly and thereby keeping the United States out of the war. . . .

The *seizure of Singapore* as the key British position in the Far East would mean a decisive success for the entire conduct of war of the Three Powers." As to Russia, the German High Command

15. *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, IV*, 471-473.

ordered in a top secret document: "The Japanese must not be given any intimation of the Barbarossa operation."¹⁰

These were the days when Matsuoka was expected in Berlin. The German Commander in Chief of the Navy, Admiral Raeder, urged Hitler in vain to disclose to Matsuoka the German designs on Russia.

When Matsuoka met with Ribbentrop and Hitler at the end of March, 1941, Russo-Japanese relations constituted the most difficult of the subjects under discussion. While Hitler did not wish to reveal to the Japanese his true intentions with regard to Russia he could not promise them lasting German friendship with Moscow either. To Matsuoka it was essential to learn whether Russia would be able to move against Japan in case the latter became active in the Pacific. Ribbentrop's reply was that

He did not know how the situation would develop. One thing, however, was certain, namely, that Germany would strike immediately, should Russia ever attack Japan. He was ready to give Matsuoka this positive assurance, so that Japan could push forward to the South on Singapore, without fear of possible complications with Russia. The largest part of the German army was anyway on the Eastern frontiers of the Reich, and fully prepared to open the attack at any time.¹¹

Hitler himself took the matter up with Matsuoka and proceeded to deceive his ally concerning his intentions toward Russia. He informed Matsuoka that "Russia will not be touched if she behaves in a friendly manner according to the treaty. Otherwise, he reserves action for himself."¹²

Hitler expressly advised Matsuoka to come to an agreement with the Soviet Government.¹⁰ He was certain that his military forces

16. "Basic Order No. 24 regarding collaboration with Japan," signed by Chief of Staff Keitel, *ibid.*, VI, 906-908.

17. Official German report of the Ribbentrop-Matsuoka conversation of March 29, 1941, in *ibid.*, IV, 520.

18. Entry for April 20, 1941, in the diary of the High Command of the German Navy, *ibid.*, VI, 997.

Admiral Raeder in his memoirs writes: "The communication to Matsuoka was designed entirely as a camouflage measure and to insure surprise. . . . [Hitler] told me so at the time at a party!" *Ibid.*, VI, 889.

Matsuoka was not deceived, however. In his memoirs Prince Konoye mentions Matsuoka's report to the Emperor upon the minister's return from Europe. He considered a German-Soviet clash likely. *New York Times*, December 22, 1945.

19. Somewhat later Hitler admitted to having "advised Matsuoka to bring about a

alone would suffice to crush the Red Army; more important still was his insistence on the maintenance of strictest secrecy with regard to his plans against Russia. By approving of improved Russo-Japanese relations he was certain to mislead the world. Ribbentrop told Matsuoka that the Reich would "consider it proper if that [the Japanese] army were prevented from attacking Russia. Japan would best help the common cause if she did not allow herself to be diverted by anything from the attack on Singapore."²⁰

The general strategy was again outlined as an attack on England and an attempt to keep the United States out of the armed conflict. With this Matsuoka agreed:

In case that country [Japan] should decide to attack Singapore, the Japanese navy, of course, had to be prepared for a fight with the United States, because in that case America probably would side with Great Britain. He (Matsuoka) personally believed, that the United States could be restrained by diplomatic exertions from entering the war at the side of Great Britain.²¹

Summing up the discussion Ribbentrop stated that

Whatever might happen, Germany would win the war. But it would hasten victory if Japan would enter the war. Such an entry into the war was undoubtedly more in the interest of Japan than in that of Germany, for it offered a unique opportunity which would hardly return, for the fulfillment of the national objectives of Japan . . .²²

Upon his return to Moscow early in April Matsuoka had six conferences, in one or two of which Stalin participated personally. Stalin wanted, in case of war with Germany, to have his rear secured, and Japan's neutrality was no less important to him than was Russia's neutrality to Matsuoka. Since the pacts with Japan could not be relied upon as an assurance, the prospect of Japan's starting a war in the Pacific was, in Stalin's eyes, the best guarantee against a Japanese attack on the Soviet Far East. The conclusion Stalin drew from the increasing menace of war was not the necessity of a rapprochement with the United States—which the Department of

lessening of tension with Russia" (speech, June 22, 1941). The *Bolshevik*, however, tried to assert the opposite: "The signing of the neutrality pact of April, 1941, hardly corresponded to the desires of Berlin" (1944, No. 7). The Soviet presentation of the Soviet-Japanese agreement as being contrary to Hitler's desires is incorrect.

20. *Nazi-Soviet Relations*, p. 309.

21. *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*, IV, 523.

22. *Ibid.*, IV, 527.

State expected—but the facilitation of the Japanese attack on the Anglo-Saxon Powers in the Pacific.

Matsuoka proposed a comprehensive nonaggression treaty; he could not, however, accept Stalin's demands; Stalin in turn suggested a plain neutrality agreement on a modest scale. His only condition was to be the cancellation of Japanese coal and oil "concessions" on Northern Sakhalin. From this demand he did not budge. But to Japan Sakhalin oil was an important source of fuel, and in addition the "concessions" provided an opportune means of gathering intelligence about the Soviet Far East.

A number of "concessions" in North Sakhalin had been granted to Japan in the 'twenties but most of them had been terminated soon after. There remained two coal and oil concessions, which were to expire in 1970. When relations between Russia and Japan deteriorated in the 1930's the repercussions were felt in the Japanese concessions, for many an obstacle was put in their way. One of the coal mining companies closed down in 1937, the second had reduced its output to a minimum. Only the oil concession was still active, although its output never again attained the 195,000 tons produced in 1933-34.

When he became convinced that no agreement was possible without the abolition of concessions, Matsuoka confirmed in a letter, which was to remain secret, his assurance that "he would do his best to bring about the elimination of the Japanese concession in North Sakhalin . . ." ²³ He subsequently confirmed that the decision would be made no later than six months after the signing of the Moscow treaty, i.e., October 13, 1941, at the latest.

Now the agreement between Moscow and Tokyo could be signed. Unlike the Russo-German treaty of 1939, it was one of neutrality, rather than friendship and nonaggression. It also lacked the clause of mutual consultation contained in the latter. Its main points were:

1. Both contracting parties undertake to maintain peaceful and friendly relations between them and mutually respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of the other contracting party.

2. Should one of the contracting parties become the object of hostilities on the part of one or several third powers, the other contracting party will observe neutrality throughout the duration of the conflict.

23. *Nazi-Soviet Relations*, pp. 323-324, and K. Eidus, *Yaponiya* (1946), p. 236.

3. The present pact comes into force from the day of its ratification by both contracting parties and remains valid for five years.

Attached to the pact was also a "Frontier Declaration" to the effect that "the USSR pledges itself to respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of Manchukuo, and Japan pledges herself to respect the territorial integrity of the Mongolian People's Republic."

The agreement between Matsuoka and Stalin was reached a few hours before Matsuoka's departure, after all previous negotiations had failed. A celebration was promptly arranged, with the highest Russian officials and Japanese diplomats attending. As a token of special benevolence Stalin saw Matsuoka off at the station and in an extraordinarily friendly manner wished the Japanese a pleasant journey. On the platform Stalin embraced Matsuoka three times and said, "We shall remain friends." Then he asked for Count Schulenburg, the German Ambassador, walked up to him and threw his arm around his shoulders: "We must remain friends and you must now do everything to that end!" Finally, making sure that he was talking to a German, Stalin turned to Colonel Krebs, the acting German military attaché, and reiterated: "We will remain friends with you—in any event!"

Stalin by this demonstrative greeting had emphasized its importance before the numerous persons who were present and to the outside world. The train carrying Mr. Matsuoka away left unobserved. The crowd recognizing Stalin gave him an ovation, while little Japanese Ambassador Tatekawa, standing on a bench, waved his handkerchief and cried in his strident voice: "Spasibo, spasibo! (Thank you, thank you!)"²⁴

The first reaction to the Russo-Japanese treaty came from China in the form of a strong protest against the published addendum concerning Manchuria and Mongolia. Foreign Minister Wang Chung-hui wrote on April 15:

" . . . It is an indisputable fact that the four northeastern provinces and Outer Mongolia are integral parts of the Republic of China and always will remain Chinese territory.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 324; G. Gafencu, *Prelude to the Russian Campaign* (London, Frederick Muller, 1945), pp. 157-158.

"The Chinese government and people cannot recognize any engagements entered into between third powers which are derogatory to Chinese territorial and administrative integrity . . ." ²⁵

In the Soviet view, however, the Russo-Japanese pact had no binding effect on China; China was free to claim and fight for Manchuria. Moscow once more stressed its view that the treaty with Japan did not prevent Russia from helping China.

Now current issues that had divided Russia and Japan were settled in rapid succession. Two trade agreements were concluded on June 11 providing for a trade turnover of 30,000,000 yen a year. The flow of goods from Japan over the Siberian railroad was of vital importance for the warring Reich; among the goods thus obtained were sizable amounts of Manchurian soybeans, needed in Germany not only as food but also for plastic and other industries. In return Germany provided Japan with industrial products. This transit reached such proportions that the freight charges on the Trans-Siberian due from Germany exceeded 100 million Reichsmark. In June, 1941, new agreements concerning this trade were concluded. Besides, seaborne traffic between Vladivostok and Japanese-controlled Shanghai was resumed; and on June 17 a final agreement concerning the demarcation of the Mongolian-Manchurian frontier was signed.

Two days before Germany's attack on Russia Matsuoka inquired in Berlin as to the rumors of impending war. Germany denied any warlike intentions on her part. ²⁶

RUSSIA AT WAR IN EUROPE

The news of the outbreak of war between Germany and Russia precipitated another crisis in German-Japanese relations. Following the German lead Japan had reoriented her entire policy, directing her efforts toward the south and east; it was at Hitler's behest that Matsuoka had signed the treaty in Moscow. It was the favorite German idea to concentrate all the forces of all the Axis allies on one target at one time and to annihilate the enemies one by one. An attack on Singapore, ushering in a war against the British Empire in the Far East, was to take place simultaneously with an attack on

25. *China Weekly Review*, April 19, 1941, p. 214.

26. Grew, *Ten Years in Japan* (Simon & Schuster, 1944), p. 413.

Britain in Europe. And now Germany had turned off in another direction, leaving Japan in a state of confusion and consternation.

This state of indecision lasted for several months, until the advent of the Tojo Cabinet in October. During this time Germany, reversing her stand, tried to induce Japan to reorient her policy and to strike at Russia in the east. Japan tried to counter, especially after the first serious defeats of the Red Army, with the advice to Germany to come to terms with Russia and embark upon an all-out drive against England. These two orientations within the framework of the Axis remained essentially unchanged in the course of the ensuing years and made the German-Japanese alliance weaker than it might otherwise have been.

Nine days after the attack, on July 1, Ribbentrop sent a message to Matsuoka inviting Japan to "get possession of Vladivostok and push as far as possible toward the west" with the prospect of "shaking hands at the half-way mark" before the onset of winter.²⁷ The next day the Crown Council convened in Tokyo. Animosity against Germany was strong, not only because Japan had been deceived by an ally but in general because a Japanese attack upon Russia might have led to a simultaneous war with England and possibly the United States. Britain was already Russia's ally; the United States had promised large-scale assistance and might be drawn into the war. In this way Japan, after having tried hard to neutralize Russia in order to be able to fight on other than Russian fronts, would soon be involved in global war. The Crown Council therefore decided to reject the German requests for intervention and to adopt instead a policy of watchful waiting.

After the session of the Crown Council Matsuoka invited the Soviet Ambassador to visit him and told him that although Japan's position was "awkward" she did not intend to change her policy.²⁸

Immediately Cordell Hull, the American Secretary of State, at the request of President Roosevelt, sent a message asking the Japanese for an explanation of their designs toward the Soviet Union. This message was obviously intended to stress American interest in the Soviet Union and to divert Japan from warlike designs against Russia. Japan's reply was satisfactory. It said that "the Japanese

27. United States, Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1946, I, 1041.

28. United States, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States. Japan: 1931-1941*, II, 503.

Government . . . have not so far considered the possibility of joining the hostilities against the Soviet Union." 29

However, Germany's insistence was determined. Almost immediately after the Crown Council's decision, made on July 2, Ribbentrop again instructed his ambassador, Eugen Ott, to make energetic representations at the Tokyo Foreign Office. In his interesting message Ribbentrop thanked Japan for the valuable service which the Japanese embassy in Moscow was performing for Germany at the time—the embassy, first in Moscow, then in Kuibyshev, was gathering intelligence information about Russia and reporting to its government concerning political trends and rumors in the Soviet Union; the Foreign Office in Tokyo in turn conveyed the information to the German embassy, thus enabling the Germans to obtain material of great importance during the war. Ribbentrop went on, however, to demand again a Japanese attack on the Russian Far East.

Since Russia, as reported by the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow, is in effect close to collapse, a report which coincides with our own observations, it is simply impossible that Japan does not solve the matter of Vladivostok and the Siberian area as soon as her military preparations are completed. . . .

. . . I ask you to employ all available means in further insisting upon Japan's entry into the war against Russia at the soonest possible date, as I have mentioned already in my note to Matsuoka. The sooner this entry is effected, the better it is. The natural objective still remains that we and Japan join hands on the Trans-Siberian railroad, before winter starts. After the collapse of Russia, however, the position of the Three Power Pact states in the world will be so gigantic, that the question of England's collapse or the total destruction of the English islands, respectively, will only be a matter of time.³⁰

Ambassador Ott replied from Tokyo that he believed "Japanese participation will soon take place."

Matsuoka's position in the Japanese Government became untenable. He was an overt exponent of a pro-German policy and wished to follow Ribbentrop's advice. Immediately after the start of the Russo-German war, on June 23, Matsuoka rushed to the Emperor without previous consultation with his colleagues or the

29. July 7, 1941. Grew, *op. cit.*, p. 400.

30. *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*, V, 564-565.

Premier and demanded that Japan attack Russia. In the Imperial Conference on July 2, he again advocated attacking Russia. Two weeks later he had to retire. The Chief of the Naval General Staff in Tokyo summoned up his view at a "liaison conference" in these words: "If the other party is the United States alone, we have some confidence in fighting it, but if the Soviet Union comes in and if we have to conduct operations both in the north and in the south, we have no confidence."³¹

On August 30 the German Ambassador in a discussion with the new Foreign Minister, Toyoda, put to him the blunt question: "Is there any possibility that Japan may participate in the Russo-German war?" Toyoda was evasive and gave no definite reply. Ott summoned all German businessmen and members of the German community in Tokyo and told them that their salaries would continue in spite of the inactivity of their businesses. "Their particular instructions were to start a whispering campaign among the Japanese directed both against the American-Japanese discussions and against Russia on the lines that now is Japan's best opportunity to attack her."³²

At the end of November Ribbentrop again insisted to Ambassador Oshima that "The war against the Soviet Union has now taken definite shape and the outcome can be unerringly foretold. . . . Next spring Germany will advance to and cross the Ural Mountains and chase Stalin deep into Siberia."

Oshima: "Approximately when do you expect that?"

Ribbentrop: "The campaign will be launched in about May of next year, according to present schedules."

Oshima: "According to what you say, Germany is apparently preparing to gamble quite a bit in her Russian campaign. We hope that air connections between Germany and Manchukuo can be established at an early time."

Ribbentrop: "That is an item that Germany has been considering for some time. By summer of next year, I do not believe that air connection from the Ural area to Manchukuo will be an impossibility."³³

31. Prince Fumimaro Konoye, *Memoirs* (Tokyo, 1946), pp. 3, 25. Translated from the *Asahi Shimbun*, December 20-30, 1945.

32. Grew, *op. cit.*, p. 464, entry of October 29, 1941.

33. Oshima's report to Tokyo, November 29, 1941, in *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*, VII, 160-161.

There was another way left for Germany to bring Japan into war with Russia, namely, by instigating trouble about American supply shipments to Vladivostok. These American goods were intended to assist Russia in her war against Germany—Japan's ally—and this in itself was reason enough for Ribbentrop to demand action by Japan against Russian shipping in the Pacific. Moreover, the American deliveries could be stock-piled in the Far East, eventually to serve Russia or the United States in fighting Japan. The sinking of ships carrying American supplies, if conducted systematically in accordance with German wishes, was apt to embroil Russia and Japan in a military conflict. While Germany desired such a development Japan was reluctant to go that far.

Five days after the German attack, on June 27, the Japanese Government, complying with German wishes, informed Russia that the transport of American war material across the Pacific "would be very dangerous and would put Japan in a very awkward and embarrassing position." Molotov in turn protested against this "unfriendly" act of Japan. The rejection of the Japanese protest was made all the easier since in 1940 American monitors were already decoding secret Japanese messages exchanged between Tokyo and Berlin, and Washington knew—and informed Moscow—that Japan's insistence would not be pushed and that Tokyo would stop before the prospect of immediate war.

On August 23, 1941, the Japanese Ambassador in Washington again talked with the Soviet envoy as well as with the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, demanding that deliveries of American oil to Vladivostok be stopped or "at least rerouted." The same day the Foreign Minister in Tokyo told the Soviet Ambassador that "the shipment of gasoline and oil from the United States to Vladivostok would create for Japan an extremely delicate and difficult position." Molotov instructed his envoy to reply that his government "does not see any ground for concern by Japan."

Cordell Hull likewise rejected Ambassador Nomura's protest on August 27. Two days later Japan insisted anew. On September 6 the United States definitely rejected Tokyo's request.³⁴ In October again the Japanese Foreign Office stated that "Japan will become

34. United States, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States. Japan: 1931-1941*, II, 567-569; *New York Times*, August 27, 1941.

concerned" about deliveries of raw materials to Russia from the Netherland East Indies.³⁵

All these demands were aimed primarily at appeasing Ribbentrop. Japan was not ready to go to war with Russia. ". . . we would like to avoid bringing about any situation," Tokyo informed its ambassador in Berlin, "likely to result in an armed clash with Soviet Russia until strategic circumstances permit it . . . Get the German Government to understand this position of ours . . ." ³⁶

On the eve of Pearl Harbor—December 6, 1941—when an agreement between Tokyo and Berlin concerning closer military coordination and the promise of not concluding a separate peace was under discussion, the Japanese Government went so far as to threaten a postponement of this essential agreement with Germany if Ribbentrop should insist on Japanese action against Russian shipments in the Pacific. ". . . get them to agree," Tokyo wired the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin,

to a procedure permitting the addition [to the pact of alliance] of a statement to the effect that so long as strategic reasons continue to make it necessary for us to keep Soviet Russia from fighting Japan (what I mean is that we cannot capture Soviet ships), we cannot carry this [stopping American supplies to Russia] out thoroughly.

"In case the German Government refuses to agree . . . and makes their approval of this question absolutely conditional upon our participation in the war [against Russia] and upon our concluding a treaty against making a separate peace, we have no way but to postpone the conclusion of such a treaty. This point is intended for you to bear in mind." ³⁷

This message from Tokyo was also intercepted by the United States and no doubt immediately made known to the Soviet Government. In this way the firm stand of Japan against this particular German demand made lend-lease shipments across the Pacific one of the best ways of supplying Russia in the following years.

While Germany insisted on Japan's entry into the war against Russia, the designs of the ruling circles in Japan turned more and more toward war in the Pacific. The German estimate that the war with Russia would be completed within six weeks or three months

35. *New York Herald Tribune*, October 3, 1941.

36. *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*, VI, 312.

37. *Ibid.*, VI, 312—313.

proved erroneous. Meantime the circumstances for an attack on Britain's Asiatic possessions were at their most favorable and might not last much longer.

In October Japan began to propose peace between Russia and Germany. This was obviously a countermove against German pressure in the opposite direction. The official Domei news agency bluntly declared on October 8: "The Axis Powers should terminate the war with Russia to conserve German resources for an assault on Great Britain"; otherwise "Japan will be left alone to face the hostility of Britain and perhaps of the United States."

The political editor of *Hochi*, Yoshitaro Shimizu, wrote that the war with Russia had lasted long enough, that Germany was wasting material and men needed for the war against England. He advised an immediate peace between Russia and Germany and urged the latter to concentrate all her forces for an attack upon Suez and the Near East:

It may be said [Shimizu continued] that, in a way, relations of non-aggression now exist between the two nations, and in an atmosphere in which, after crossing swords, they are expressing admiration for each other's valor and fighting power, a state of nonaggression is not wholly impossible of realization.

If such a state of nonaggression could be achieved the Siberian Railroad would again represent a most important link between Japan and Germany.

This campaign for a peace between Germany and Russia was accompanied by the last changes within the Japanese Cabinet before Pearl Harbor. War Minister Tojo became Premier on October 16, and his accession to power brought with it the political and military program of concentrating all forces against England and the United States. Shigenori Togo, known for his friendly attitude toward Russia, was appointed Foreign Minister, and Haruhiko Nishi, a man of similar reputation, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs. This composition of the Cabinet was the obvious sign that everything was set for a continuation of peaceful relations with Russia and a war against the Anglo-Saxon Powers.

Russia's setbacks in the six months between the German attack and Pearl Harbor gave rise in Japan to a demand for settlement of various issues in a manner favorable to Japan; not involving war with Russia, yet taking advantage of the latter's difficult military

situation. Prominent among such issues was that of Soviet support of Nationalist China. Although Russian supplies to China diminished noticeably after the German attack, Japan wanted to see China completely cut off from the Soviet Union and in this way isolated. The Burma Road, which had been closed for some time and then reopened, could be made inaccessible—or so it seemed in Tokyo—by direct action. The press, advocating such a policy toward Russia, did not know, however, that the Japanese Government had already made use of the advantageous situation to back out of the “undertaking” given by Matsuoka in Moscow to withdraw from North Sakhalin within six months. The secret agreement remained unfulfilled for several years longer.

On November 30—only a few days before Pearl Harbor—a wire from the Japanese Government, which was intercepted by the United States, instructed its Ambassador in Berlin to negotiate with Ribbentrop: “If . . . the Germans and Italians question you about our attitude toward the Soviet, say that . . . right now, it is to our advantage to stress the south and for the time being we would prefer to refrain from any direct moves in the north.”³⁸

On December 7, 1941 Japan attacked American bases in the Pacific, and the war was on. Neutrality, however, was observed by both Russia and Japan for another three and a half years—until August 8, 1945, when Russia declared war on Japan.

38. *Ibid.*, VI, 309.

Russia and the Pacific War

From Pearl Harbor until August 8, 1945, the Soviet Union was the only neutral power in the Pacific area. Yet the neutrality was a precarious one indeed. To Japan, Russia was the enemy of her ally and the ally of her enemies. The same thing, in reverse, was true of Russia. During this period negotiations between the two powers proceeded; concessions were made, new agreements were signed; at times their relations seemed quite friendly. Both parties were aware, however, of the conditional and temporary nature of their established relations. There were problems in the Far East which no agreement with Japan could solve in the sense desired by Moscow. As for Tokyo, there was even less doubt there that the end of the war would result in radical changes in Russo-Japanese relations. Neither of the two parties had renounced its long-range ambitions against the other: action had merely been postponed.

The press of both powers was more outspoken than the diplomats. In Japan every German victory was hailed and a complete defeat of Russia repeatedly forecast. The Soviet press, official throughout, could not go to the same lengths as its Japanese counterpart. It maintained more reserve, yet from the very outset of the war in the Pacific it predicted the ultimate defeat of Japan. Japan's successes in 1942 were interpreted as temporary, due merely to Japan's better state of preparedness and her advantage of initiative. On the whole, the attention of the Soviet press and, even more, of the Russian population, was absorbed by the struggle going on in Europe. The newspapers, reduced in size, could give only brief summaries of official communiqués on the Pacific struggle.

Nineteen forty-two, the first year of the war in the Pacific, was the most difficult year for both Russia and her allies. The Japanese Government was certain of victory, and statements of its representatives did not always display the customary diplomatic restraint.

In a committee meeting of the Japanese Diet, in February, 1942, the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that Japan, contrary to the Matsuoka agreement, would not give up her rights in Northern Sakhalin, and that "Russia's attitude will change with the international situation." The official *Diplomatic Review* stated in June that Japan "desires the complete success of German forces against Russia." The *Japan Times*, in January, 1942, printed the statement—which *Pravda* immediately quoted—that the future Japanese Empire must embrace all the lands and peoples within a radius of 4,000 miles of Formosa. Such an empire would clearly include eastern Siberia. "We know," *Pravda* retorted—pointing at the Foreign Office in Tokyo—"that strict censorship prevails in Japan."

Reacting to this line of anti-Russian propaganda, the Soviet newspapers, on Red Army Day in February, 1942, printed a telegram of greetings from Chiang Kai-shek, the sharp wording of which was directed against Japan: "Now that the strongest plunderers of two continents, Europe and Asia, are trying to carry out their dark conspiracies, our countries are rooting out brute force and are re-establishing peace throughout the world."¹

Along with these hostile utterances on both sides and the indifference of the Russian population to events in the Far East, there was continued diplomatic activity, of which almost nothing was known. Immediately after Pearl Harbor Japan received assurances, in response to inquiries made in Moscow, that the neutrality pact would remain in force. A few weeks later Japan began negotiations for the usual annual renewal of the fisheries agreement; on March 20 the agreement, with only insignificant alterations, was renewed for a year. After Molotov's visits to London and Washington in the summer of 1942 the Soviet Government informed Japan that "the concluded agreements contained no provisions regarding Japan."² On the other hand, the Soviet Government insisted on fulfillment of Matsuoka's promise to close down the Japanese concessions in Northern Sakhalin. Anticipating a favorable outcome of the war, Tokyo failed to carry out this promise, which was in fact an essential component of the Russo-Japanese neutrality pact. Japan was certain that, with German armies at the gates of the

1. *Pravda*, February 25, 1942.

2. *New York Times*, June 5, 1942.

Caucasus, Russia would be in no position to act upon this failure to comply, or even to declare the treaty null and void.

On the first anniversary of the signing of the pact *Pravda* devoted an article to Japanese affairs, concluding with a few mysterious sentences that made sense only to those few men in Moscow and Tokyo who knew about the secret clauses of the treaty:

In order for the pact to continue in existence, Japan must show the same attitude toward treaties as does the Soviet Union. It is essential to carry out signed treaties and agreements taken upon oneself most strictly and unwaveringly, *not leaving decided questions unsettled* . . . It is important that the Japanese military-fascist cliques, who are drunk with their military successes, should realize that all their prattle about a war of aggression in the north will harm Japan above all.³

As a result of the casualties in Europe the Soviet Army in the Far East during 1942 was depleted, and the Japanese Kwantung Army—almost a million men strong and well equipped—constituted a great danger to Russia in case of war; the Japanese Army was superior to the Soviet forces at that time. Had it struck, the result would have been not only occupation of the Russian Far East but severance of the supply route from America to Russia. This supply line was of tremendous importance since the Atlantic route to Murmansk was infested with German submarines and the route around Africa and through the Indian Ocean to Iran was long and time consuming. More than one third of United States lend-lease material to Russia went via Vladivostok.

GERMANY PRODDING JAPAN INTO WAR

It was precisely for this reason that Germany continued to insist upon a Japanese offensive against Russia. With the gradual deterioration of Germany's military position, this demand was to become increasingly urgent, while Japan's inclination to comply waned proportionately. At the height of his successes, in the summer of 1942, Hitler said that Japan should attack Russia only if Tokyo itself considered such a move profitable. Later, this polite condition disappeared from the German *démarches*.

German plans called for a Japanese attack on the British-American supply lines through the Arabian Sea to Iran; Japan was not

3. April 13, 1942. *Italics mine.*

averse to agreeing to this project, but not until a successful German advance to Suez and across the Caucasus had been effected. Hitler hoped that he would be able to reach these objectives during the summer of 1942. Berlin informed Tokyo that "strong attacks by the Japanese Navy and Naval Air Force against British supply lines in the western part of the Indian Ocean would give decisive support to the German operations intended for early summer of this year."⁴

In July, 1942, Ribbentrop told Hiroshi Oshima, the Japanese Ambassador to Berlin, that

If Japan felt itself sufficiently strong militarily, the moment for Japan to attack Russia was probably now. He thought it possible that, if Japan attacked Russia now, it would lead to her (Russia's) final moral collapse; at least it would hasten the collapse of her present system. In any case, never again would Japan have such an opportunity as existed at present, to eliminate once and for all the Russian colossus in Eastern Asia. He had discussed this question with the Fuehrer, and the Fuehrer was of the same opinion, but he wanted to emphasize one point right away: Japan should attack Russia only if she felt sufficiently strong for such an undertaking.⁵

Since the Government of Japan, completely absorbed in and elated by its operations in the Pacific, was impervious to the German *démarches*, relations between the two Axis partners again began to deteriorate, particularly after the German reverses at Stalingrad. The two allies, who had barely maintained their friendly relations in times of success, were now becoming mutually bitter. On March 6, 1943, Ribbentrop again conferred with Oshima, who transmitted this harsh message of his government: ". . . it is not possible for the Japanese government, considering the present war situation, to enter the war [against Russia]. . . . It is rather of the conviction that it would be in the common interest not to start the war against Russia now." Ribbentrop countered with an accusation of Japanese "passivity"; even Japan's Navy, he said, was becoming restive; her armies in Manchuria were utterly idle: ". . . the attack on Russia is primarily an army affair." He inquired if the necessary forces would not be ready for that.⁶ The further the war developed, the less reason Japan had to complicate her position by

4. April 13, 1942. English trans. United States, Navy Department, *Fuehrer Conferences, 1942*, pp. 65-66.

5. July 9, 1942, *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*, V, 580.

6. *Ibid.*, V, 658-659.

adding a conflict with Russia. Germany, however, persisted in her demands. As late as August, 1944, when virtually all hope of a German victory was gone, the German radio still tried, in Japanese, to persuade Japan to attack Russia, and accused Japan of "insufficient activity."⁷

JAPAN PRODDING FOR A NEW HITLER-STALIN PACT

While Germany was demanding from Japan an attack on Russia, Japan was countering with the often repeated advice to Berlin to bring the war with Russia to a speedy end and, in unison with Japan, to concentrate on the war against the naval powers. Here again the great difference between Japan and Germany became obvious. Hitler's two-front war heavily taxed not only Germany but Japan as well. Tokyo remembered the happy months before the German attack on Russia when the Trans-Siberian Railway and Russian airfields had served to connect the capitals of the Tripartite Powers. The Japanese General Staff realistically appraised Germany's military situation after Stalingrad, and concluded that only a separate peace, or an armistice between Russia and Germany, could salvage the situation for the Axis.

Japan's persistent efforts to bring Moscow and Berlin together started as early as March, 1942, and continued throughout the war. These endeavors were far more frequent and desperate than it was generally assumed at the time. The first such suggestion was made by the Japanese Navy in conversations with the German naval attaché in Tokyo. Anticipating an early victory, Hitler not only answered with a rejection but replied in tones of highest indignation. In June of the same year, the Japanese General Staff repeated the Navy's suggestion and offered its services as an intermediary. Again in August Tokyo made known a plan to send Premier Tojo, the chief of the Japanese General Staff, and other high officials to Europe. At first Ribbentrop tended to look with favor on this mission but on September 2, probably on instructions from Hitler, he declined to hold the conference; Germany was certain to win the war, he told the Japanese.

In March and April, 1943, the government in Tokyo received from its envoys in Europe information concerning secret negotia-

7. *Bolshevik* (1944), No. 7, p. 44.

tions being carried on between Germany and Russia in Bulgaria. Tokyo was naturally apprehensive lest a new agreement between Germany and Russia be concluded at the expense of Japan, as had already happened before. In April, 1943, Ribbentrop reproached Oshima for the continued Japanese assurances to Russia concerning Tokyo's neutrality; the consequence, Ribbentrop said, was that Russian troops were being moved from the Far East to Europe and American lend-lease goods were piling up in Vladivostok, where they might eventually be used against Japan. As far as the "Balkan rumors" were concerned, Ribbentrop of course denied they were true—what else could he say?—and made mysterious allegations implying that the Rumanian dictator, Ian Antonescu, was the only guilty one. Oshima, no doubt, already knew the worth of Ribbentrop's denials.⁸ A month later Ribbentrop again spoke of Japan's assurances of peace with Russia; he contemptuously referred to Sato, the Japanese Ambassador to Moscow, as a "pacifist."

The relationship between Japan and Germany was becoming more strained, and the discussions between the old friends Ribbentrop and Oshima were becoming increasingly irritated and venomous.

In May, 1943, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu in Tokyo told Heinrich Stahmer, the German envoy, that Germany "could desist from attacking Russia with all its possible force" in order to save its energy for the struggle against Britain and the United States. He hinted at Japan's readiness to act as an intermediary to re-establish relations between Germany and Russia. Shigemitsu then proposed a "perfect synchronization of military operations" against the naval powers. Germany, however, was not prepared to accept the suggestion. In Berlin Oshima again conversed with Ribbentrop and, with all proper reserve, urged a truce with Russia. "Should Germany at some time wish to make a sounding in that direction," Oshima told the German Foreign Minister, "Japan would be prepared for it."⁹

This was the time when in a conference with his chiefs of staff Hitler told of his intention to conclude a secret armistice with

8. United States, Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1946; II, 399; Kordt, *Wahn und Wirklichkeit*, pp. 327-331.

9. *Bulletin*, loc. cit., II, 483 ff.

Russia so as to deceive her allies; he sought "an unannounced armistice on the Eastern Front, to be kept secret from the Anglo-Saxons. Russia would continue to accept lend-lease materials. This political goal is worth every sacrifice." For the moment, Joseph Goebbels noted in his diary, "I confess I can't imagine what such [Japanese] mediation would look like. Some facts, nevertheless, seem to point in that direction. The Japanese have always tried hard to end the conflict between the Reich and the Soviet Union in one way or another. If this were possible in some way the war would assume a totally different aspect. Of course I don't believe that such a possibility will arise in the foreseeable future."¹⁰ To maintain his prestige Hitler would have to condition his armistice with Russia upon at least German economic control of the Ukraine, which was still occupied by the German Army; yet this was unacceptable to Stalin. "The Führer would prefer negotiations with Stalin," Goebbels noted, "but he does not believe they would be successful inasmuch as Stalin cannot cede what Hitler demands in the East."

On September 10, 1943, the Japanese Government again proposed to send "a high official" with assistants to Moscow and then to Berlin. Three days later Molotov rejected the offer and informed the United States Government of this step. This Soviet communication to Cordell Hull was not devoid of a certain implicit threat; coming as it did on the eve of the Moscow and Teheran Conferences, it hinted at the alternative which the Soviet Government had available in case of a rift with the Western Allies.¹¹

By the end of 1943 the Japanese General Staff had begun to suspect Germany's intentions. For some time it had discerned an "Italian policy of Germany," that is, a planned betrayal of her ally. By November the General Staff in Tokyo was certain that there would be a collapse of the German eastern front if an agreement with Russia were not concluded. The German Foreign Minister, aware of the viewpoint of the military in Tokyo, bitterly demanded to know whether "supplementary agreements" had been concluded between Japan and Russia which were unknown to Berlin (and which obviously had enabled Russia to withdraw a part of her

10. United States Navy Department, *Führer Conferences, 1943*, p. 95; Joseph P. Goebbels, *The Goebbels Diaries* (Doubleday & Co., 1948), p. 340.

11. Goebbels, *op. cit.*, p. 477; Donald B. Sanders in *American Mercury*, November, 1947, pp. 522-527; Hull, *op. cit.*, II, 1263, 1462.

troops from the Far East to the German front). The Japanese envoy refused to deny the existence of such agreements, thus giving further proof of the strange collaboration between the allies.

In April, 1944, Moscow informed the American Government of a new Japanese offer to mediate between Germany and Russia, and of a Soviet rejection of these proposals. This communication from Moscow came just as the Western Allies were completing preparations for the opening of a second front, but doubts continued to prevail in certain quarters whether the cross-channel invasion would actually be carried out. In September, 1944, Japan again suggested the dispatch of a peace mission to Moscow; again the proposal was rejected.

Down to the present time, more than three years after the war, these peace feelers and negotiations continue to represent the most secret aspect of wartime diplomacy. Despite their importance, both Moscow and Tokyo have preferred to keep silent about them; only a part of the relevant documents have been secured in Berlin; and the United States has likewise failed to reveal all it knows about these developments. It will take some time before a complete picture of this "peace diplomacy" and the attitude of the Soviet Government toward a separate peace can be obtained.

AMERICAN EXPECTATIONS AND ILLUSIONS

The issue—war or peace with Russia—which lay at the root of German-Japanese divergences during the war, played a prominent part in Russo-American relations of the same period. Germany's insistence on a Japanese attack on Russia coincided with the American agitation for Russia's entry into the war—or at least the granting by Russia of air bases to the United States in the Russian Far East. It was odd that the two enemies—Germany and the United States—should both have considered a Russo-Japanese war advantageous and should both have sought its realization. At least one of them must have been laboring under misapprehensions and miscalculations.

In the United States the expectation of an early Russian entry into the war against Japan was almost universal after Pearl Harbor. Short of that, the Americans demanded "at least bases." Russia's unwillingness to agree^e was a source of considerable irritation, at

least as far as the general public in the United States was concerned. Secretary of State Cordell Hull had urged Maxim Litvinov as early as December, 1941, to grant the United States air bases in the Russian Far East. This was essentially a narrow view of the situation; the American demand was based on a lack of adequate information and understanding.¹²

Russia could not even grant air bases without inviting war with Japan. The Manchurian Army, superior to the Soviet forces in Siberia, especially after the transfer of considerable Soviet reserves from the Far East to the West, was prepared to invade Russia at a moment's notice. Japan was making no secret of her preparedness, and there could be little doubt as to the outcome of such a fight. The erection of American airfields and bases in Siberia—an operation which would have required several months—would immediately have become known to the Japanese, who maintained consular agents and a network of informers in Russia. Before the first American bomber could have taken off from Soviet territory for Japan, the Maritime Province would have been overrun by the Kwantung Army, bridges on the Trans-Siberian would have been destroyed, communications between European Russia and the Far East would have been severed, the best American supply line to Russia would have been blocked—and all this without having served any good purpose, without any benefit whatever to the anti-Japanese coalition.

Under the circumstances, no Russian government involved in a life-and-death struggle in Europe could have consented to the unconsidered desire for "bases." Least of all could the Soviet Government—a government with its own and peculiar notions of war and peace and foreign policy—have agreed to them.

To Stalin and his followers a simple "defeat of Japan" was not a goal which made entry into the war worth while. Neither was "a speedy termination of the Pacific conflict," as the slogan went, a worth-while goal. Only tangible gains, territorial and otherwise, could, in the eyes of Moscow, justify plunging the Soviet state into a further ordeal. An elaborate diplomatic foundation had first to be laid. Assent to Soviet territorial aspirations had to be secured, and the opposition of the United States and China had to be destroyed.

For all these reasons the war against Japan—and the "granting of

12. Hull, *op. cit.*, II, 1111.

bases" to the United States—had to be postponed. From 1942 to 1944 Stalin pursued a dual policy. He would confirm his determination in principle eventually to participate in the Far Eastern war and, at the same time, manifest his reluctance to make any specific commitments and to initiate practical preparations. When pressed by his allies he, and especially his subordinates, would resort to excuses, sometimes even little tricks and delaying tactics. When, however, the Anglo-American envoys failed to report to him concerning Anglo-American negotiations regarding the Far East, he would be offended. Stalin said, ". . . if the United States and Great Britain preferred to bring Japan to her knees without Russian participation, he was ready to agree." But again, when the British and American diplomats proposed to put into writing at least those decisions in regard to future Soviet actions in the Far East concerning which there was agreement, Stalin refused.¹³

While the American public kept wondering about Russia's intentions toward Japan, it was known in the highest circles of the American Government that Stalin had emphasized his readiness to enter the war. As early as August, 1942, after United States Ambassador Harriman had explained the American strategy to him, Stalin informed the Ambassador that inasmuch as Japan was the "historic enemy" of Russia, her eventual defeat was essential to Russia's interests. Eventually, Stalin said, Russia would come in. At the Teheran Conference (November, 1943) Stalin stated to Roosevelt and Churchill that Russia would some day fight Japan, but not until Germany was defeated. "But then, by our *common* front, we shall win." As a matter of fact, the future Soviet collaboration against Japan was discussed in some detail between President Roosevelt and Stalin at Teheran. On November 29, 1943, Roosevelt handed Stalin a memorandum asking the Soviet Government for information on five points—among them was a question on Siberian ports and on air bases in the Maritime Province (to be used by the United States) capable of accommodating 1,000 heavy bombers. A month later Molotov handed a reply to the United States Ambassador—he was prepared to answer some of the questions soon; others could not be discussed "at the present time." Again this was a promise for the

13. John R. Deane, *The Strange Alliance* (The Viking Press, 1947), pp. 240, 248. Some of the subsequent details of Soviet-American negotiations regarding the Far East contained in this chapter are likewise taken from General Deane's book, chaps. xiii-xvi.

future, practical collaboration in the Far East could not yet be got under way.

In the meantime an American Military Mission, headed by Maj. Gen. John R. Deane, had been established in Moscow. One of its most important tasks was planning for and preparing the future alliance in the Far East. Relying on Stalin's declaration at Teheran, the Military Mission exerted much effort in preparing a number of plans and trying to negotiate with leading military men in Moscow about the contemplated offensive against Japan. The plans did not meet with the expected cooperation. At the end of December, 1943, General Deane submitted to the Soviet Chief of Staff a proposal under which the United States would be allowed to send aircraft, spare parts, weapons, ammunition, machinery and steel mats for runways to build up supply depots just east of Lake Baikal. "Antonov and Slavin," the Soviet military commanders, "were shocked by my proposal and literally turned white when I mentioned the word 'Japan,'" General Deane reported. Again, in February, 1944, Ambassador Harriman, during a visit to Stalin, was told that the Americans would be allowed to operate heavy bombers from Siberian bases, that facilities would be constructed, but that "time was needed" for Russian preparations. There again elapsed many months of futile negotiations. The United States liaison officers in Moscow, anxious to see some progress and irritated by Soviet excuses and delays, were evidencing nervousness and bitter disappointment.

On June 10 Harriman again approached Stalin on the subject of Far Eastern bases. The Soviet Generalissimo replied that 12 air-dromes suitable for heavy bombers would be constructed in the area of Vladivostok—Sovetskaya Gavan. Of the 12, 6 or 7 would be made available to the United States. In return Stalin asked that the Soviet Union be given several hundred heavy bombers for its own operations in the Far East. Stalin and Harriman also took up other details, such as the training of Soviet pilots for operation of American heavy bombers and naval strategy for keeping the Pacific supply lanes open.

For a considerable time longer nothing was done. Neither General Deane, the head of the American Military Mission, nor his British colleague realized how many obstacles the Soviet leaders would put in the way if American personnel started operating from

Russian bases. During the whole course of the war American aid in the form of supplies continued to be readily accepted by the Soviet Government. In only one case, however, did the Soviet Government consent, reluctantly, to the establishment on Russian soil (in the Ukraine) of American air bases manned by United States personnel. The highly exaggerated fear of espionage, the reluctance to open Russia up to hundreds of Americans, and a sense of prestige inflated to unreasonable proportions were some of the reasons which made the Soviet authorities more than reluctant to admit foreign troops, even in small numbers, to Soviet soil; even the dispatch of American specialists to weather stations in Siberia evoked protracted controversies, and only after difficult negotiations did the United States Mission succeed in obtaining consent. As a matter of fact, the Soviet intention clearly was to accumulate large stores of lend-lease supplies in the Far East, quietly build bases, and then operate them using only Russian personnel. All hopes and promises to the contrary were utterly unfounded; misleading statements were made in order to gain time.

Only two satisfactory developments in Soviet-American negotiations concerning the Far East were noted. Lend-lease supplies poured in in an uninterrupted stream. For the most part these supplies were utilized in Europe, but quantities not insignificant by Asiatic standards were being stock-piled in the Far East.

The second line of agreement concerned the fate of American fliers who had been obliged to make forced landings in the Russian Far East.

The first group of these fliers consisted of five men of the Doolittle crew who had bombed Tokyo and other Japanese cities on April 18, 1942. "In accordance with international law," Tass officially announced, in April, 1942, "Soviet authorities have interned the American plane as well as its crew." Later, larger numbers of American airmen joined the first group. When the American planes appeared over Soviet soil they were met by fire from anti-aircraft batteries and from Soviet fighters; however, no casualties occurred. The American fliers were disarmed, interrogated, and interned. The Flying Fortresses disappeared, obviously being made available to Soviet airplane constructors and engineers.

Eventually more than 250 men found themselves in Russia interned in a special camp near Tashkent, in central Asia. By the end

of 1943 the United States Military Mission in Moscow had conceived a plan for repatriating the fliers and found high Soviet officials willing to cooperate. It was necessary, however, to furnish an alibi for Russia, in case Japan should get wind of the contemplated transfer. The operation was entrusted to the NKVD, which carried it out successfully. The airmen were told that they were being transferred to another location. They entrained. As they approached Ashkhabad, near the Iranian frontier, the train—manned exclusively by NKVD personnel—"broke down." Trucks, likewise manned by NKVD troops, were on hand to transport the Americans, who were told by their commanding officer that he had bribed the drivers. The trucks, covered with tarpaulins, reached the Iranian border, some ten miles to the south. All went well: the trucks were inspected by the border guards—all NKVD men. From Iran the airmen were brought to Cairo and thence to the United States. The "escape" was repeated a few months later when another hundred Americans had accumulated. Another "escape" was scheduled for January, 1944, but this failed to go off because in the meanwhile the American press had carried reports of the first operation. A few months were allowed to elapse before the attempt was repeated; this time the "escape" went according to plan. The periodic transfer operations were continued until the end of the war.¹⁴

The promise to liquidate its concessions in Northern Sakhalin, although technically a separate secret agreement, was an organic part of Japan's neutrality treaty with Russia. So long as this neutrality was secured by German victories in Europe, Tokyo did not care to comply with its obligations, which were tantamount to a retreat at a moment when the Japanese Empire was in the process of potent expansion. By the end of 1943 the military prospects of the Axis had deteriorated to such an extent that the signed neutrality accord again acquired importance for Japan.

In October, 1943, the Japanese Cabinet opened negotiations with Moscow with the view to complying with its pledge. On March 30,

14. It would be naïve to suppose that the Japanese were unaware of these matters. At the height of the "escapes," in April, 1944, the Tokyo Board of Information said that "wicked people are spreading rumors about an American flier, formerly interned in Russia and now taking part in aerial operations in Europe . . . This is "nothing but the usual brand of enemy propaganda," the Board of Information slyly added, intended to "create distrust between Japan and the Soviet Union." *New York Times*, April 29, 1944.

1944, several protocols were exchanged. In the preceding two weeks Japan had already closed down her concessions on Northern Sakhalin and handed them over to the Soviet authorities. According to the agreement, Russia was to pay Japan five million rubles "as a consideration for the cancellation of the concessions." On the other hand, the Soviet Government undertook to deliver to Japan during a period of five years 50,000 tons of oil a year from Northern Sakhalin on ordinary commercial terms. At the same time the Japanese consulates in Alexandrovsk and Okha on Northern Sakhalin were closed. As a reciprocal gesture Soviet consulates on Hokkaido and Tsuruoka were likewise abolished. The same day a fisheries agreement was signed for a period of five years; its conclusion had similarly been delayed by Moscow because of Japan's failure to carry out the "Matsuoka understanding." The fisheries convention stipulated that until the end of the war the fishing areas off the eastern coast of Kamchatka and in the Olyntorsky district would not be exploited by the Japanese.

These agreements came four months after the Teheran Conference. Stalin's intention to enter the war against Japan was now firm, and the five-year term of the new concessions was not without its ironical aspects.

PREPARING FOR WAR

On July 18, 1944, Hideki Tojo relinquished the premiership of Japan. His retirement, after three years of wartime leadership, was indicative of the turn of events. Viewed from Moscow, the Far Eastern situation had greatly improved, and now the initiative in Russo-Japanese relations had passed from Tokyo to Moscow. The extreme caution exercised by the Narkomindel during the preceding years could now give way to a more vigorous policy. Preparations for the eventual clash with Japan could now be begun.

In his wartime speeches and reports Stalin had never referred to Japan. Now for the first time, on November 7, 1944, he spoke of the Eastern neighbor—and in very unfriendly terms. He mentioned her attack on Pearl Harbor and bluntly called her the "aggressor" in the Pacific. His few words provoked widespread comment and marked concern in Japan. The official Domei news agency commented, on November 9: "Premier Stalin's speech on

the anniversary of the revolution has become the central topic of discussion of all Japan . . . Japan must also adopt a realistic policy that will conform with any new situation created by the Russians. . . .”

Military preparations for the anticipated war in the Far East had actually been begun four months before the Yalta Conference, at the time of Winston Churchill's visit to Moscow in October, 1944. The Far East question stood high on the agenda of the conference, in which the United States Ambassador and the chief of the American Military Mission participated. Three questions were put to Stalin on behalf of the American Government. They concerned the date of Russia's entry into the Pacific war (“how long after the defeat of Germany . . .”), the building up of Soviet reserves for a Far Eastern attack, and the use and capacity of the Trans-Siberian Railroad. Stalin replied that the Red Army would have to increase its strength in the Far East from 30 to 60 divisions, and that the transfer of troops would require three months after the defeat of Germany. Stalin advanced two conditions, however, as prerequisites for his entry into the war against Japan: first, the assistance of the United States in creating stock piles of supplies in Siberia, and, second, political agreement among the Allies as to territorial and other gains for Russia after the war, the agreement to concern both Japan and China. Such an agreement was reached later, at the Yalta Conference in February, 1945. Until then all Soviet promises and measures concerning warfare in the Far East were of a preliminary nature and could at any moment be reversed.

At the same time Stalin agreed to grant bases to the American Air Force in the Maritime Province, and to grant one naval base to the United States Navy at Petropavlovsk. Discussion revealed that he did not expect the Far Eastern campaign to last more than two and a half to three months. American supplies—food, fuel, transportation, equipment, tanks, motor vehicles, and 5,000 airplanes—were therefore to be provided on the basis of two months' requirements for a force of 1,500,000 men. Now the strategy of the future Russo-Japanese war was laid down—and, indeed, carried out some ten months later.

For a few months, again, negotiations between Russian and American officers concerning the Far East proceeded at a snail's pace; no noticeable progress was made. Tension between them was

heightened when on December 16—a mere two months after Stalin's pledge—the inevitable occurred: the Soviet Chief of Staff informed the Anglo-Saxons that "American Air and Naval Forces would be unable to operate from the Maritime Province." The reason advanced was the need of all available bases for the Soviet armed forces. The American Mission considered this a blunt retraction of a firm agreement, especially at a time when the American program of supplying the Far East had already gained momentum. Ambassador Harriman protested to Stalin, but the decision remained unaltered. For a while there was discussion of a plan to construct American air bases in the north, at the mouth of the Amur River. Such bases would, however, not be of sufficient strategic importance to affect the general strategy of the United States offensive against Japan; besides, there was now considerable doubt whether complete Soviet cooperation could be obtained in a task involving the transfer of 50,000 American officers and soldiers to Russian soil. In the end the United States declined the new Soviet offer.

In effect, military collaboration between the United States and Russia at this stage was already nonexistent. Joint preparations were limited to shipment of supplies to the Far East; by the summer of 1945, when the Soviet Union declared war on Japan, the lend-lease program set up in October, 1944, had been 80 per cent fulfilled.

Three Conferences and the Soviet-Japanese War

Only the strategic aspects of the contemplated war on Japan had been cleared in the negotiations between October, 1944, and January, 1945. Thus when Stalin went to Yalta to meet with President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, he carried with him a set of political demands whose acceptance by the Allies was an absolute prerequisite for Soviet entry into the Far Eastern war.

To Stalin, the prospect of victory in the Far East opened a tremendous vista. In territories, in peoples, in accretion of power, no victory in Europe could compare with this one over the Orient. The most ambitious of all dreams was that of becoming the only Great Power in the Far East, of being able to expand into China, Korea, and Japan, and thence, as a future naval power, farther into the Pacific.

All the elements of this great vision had accumulated during the two decades of Stalin's rule. Time and again victory seemed certain in this or that sector of the immense Far East—but every time Moscow's hopes had been thwarted. Momentarily Michael Borodin appeared to be leading China into the Soviet fold—only to be compelled to leave the country. Two war lords seemed to be bringing Inner Mongolia and southern Manchuria into the Soviet sphere—but they succumbed to their rivals. In Korea a revolutionary uprising was expected from year to year—yet it did not come off. At the congresses of the Comintern, Chinese, Korean, Mongol, and Japanese delegates pledged allegiance to Stalin's cause and claimed to represent the general will of their peoples—and still they were unable to make good their promises without strong, overt assistance from the Soviet side.

Now at last the time had come for this help. Never in history had such a golden opportunity been at hand. Not even in the years of Russia's most vigorous activity in the Far East, between 1896 and 1903, did the most imaginative and adventurous among the minis-

ters and the Tsar's advisers go so far in their designs. There had been Japan, and behind Japan, England, with her naval power; their might, though often minimized in St. Petersburg, had sufficed to act as a brake on the political daydreams of the Russian empire builders. Now, however, the defeat of Japan was becoming a certainty; and with the elimination of the greatest power in the Far East, all the dreams of the Tsar's ministers before 1917 and of the People's Commissars after 1917 suddenly seemed possible of realization: there was the hope of seeing a new kind of "Russo-Chinese Empire" emerge as the decisive factor in Far Eastern politics, with Korea and Indo-China soon falling into its sphere; a Japan rendered impotent as an opponent and eventually transformed into a Soviet satellite through the endeavors of its Communist party; and then—Stalin's pet idea—the construction of a great navy in the shipyards of Japan, northern China, Manchuria and Russia herself. It was almost impossible to stop in this flight of fantasy.

Peace or the offensive—such appeared to be the Russian dilemma in the Far East. To Stalin there was no such dilemma. To him the execution of a series of bold moves the moment Japan surrendered was a foregone conclusion. His own problem was of a different sort: whether to proceed in agreement and with the blessings of his allies or to act unilaterally, defying the United States and China. The first method involved preliminary agreements with the Generalissimo and with Washington, by which Moscow would have been compelled to accept certain limitations; pledge itself to maintain the integrity of China and Korea, not to interfere in the Chinese civil war, and not to assist the Chinese Communists. The second possible course of action (which might be labeled a Trotskyite policy) would involve a Soviet invasion of Manchuria and possibly northern China, the arming of Chinese Communist troops, and the occupation of Korea without inter-allied agreement. For obvious reasons Stalin preferred the first line of conduct—a policy which at first glance might seem narrow, nationalist, and marked by the sacrifice of the Chinese Communists to the convenience of the Soviet Government, but which was in effect the best way open to international Communism at the time. And this policy required Moscow's outward adherence to its alliance with the Western Powers.

The fact, however, that Stalin had the choice of two roads en-

abled him to strike a hard bargain with the United States at Yalta and Potsdam, and with China at Moscow. Had his partners refused his demands, he was still able to shift to the other track.

The demands Stalin was to submit to his allies as conditions of Russia's entry into the war had to be draped in the cloak of historical justification. Whatever Russia had possessed in the East at any time must be returned to the Soviet Union. Even objectives previously labeled in the Soviet press as predatory conquest and imperialism now had to be made a part of this program. The artificially generated picture of Russia reversing her course and embracing nationalism instead of Communism facilitated Stalin's line of argument. Russia's defeat in the war against Japan in 1905—all but hailed by Lenin and his followers, including Stalin, at the time—was now being depicted as a severe humiliation for Russia which had to be redressed.

The political methods to be applied in the Far East were three-fold. First, there was the announced part of the program. From Japan Stalin expected to recover the southern half of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands, which had been peacefully ceded to Japan in a businesslike transaction in 1875. In China Stalin sought to take over Japan's rights in the strategic Liaotung Peninsula and, in effect, restore Russian influence over Manchuria through control of the railroads which had been constructed by Russia before the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5. Mongolia was to become independent of China, that is, further tied to the Soviet Union. These points of the Soviet program could be set down in a signed agreement among the Allies.

Second, new prospects would open up upon the Japanese surrender to the Soviet armies on the Far Eastern mainland. There was a method of political expansion which had just proved effective in Europe and could be applied in the Far East on a far larger scale. To supervise the Japanese surrender in Korea meant that first the Red Army and then the pro-Soviet elements in Korea would be made the masters of that country. The same could be true of Manchuria. If Russia should occupy even one of Japan's islands, a part of Japan could become a "new democracy" within a divided Japan—a "new democracy" like that to be established in the Soviet zone in eastern Germany. This part of the program was of course not discussed

with the Allies. Stalin kept it very much in abeyance, preparing to present it later as a *fait accompli*.

Third, the glory of Soviet arms would radiate far beyond Soviet-held areas into the vast spaces and among the masses of central and southern Asia. New Soviet prestige, more important in the Orient even than in Europe, would develop into a force stimulating pro-Communist and other pro-Soviet movements and thus preparing the ground for the realization of a Soviet empire in the East.

YALTA

The chief negotiators on Far Eastern matters at the Yalta Conference were Stalin and President Roosevelt. China was neither informed nor represented, and Britain played a secondary role. President Roosevelt was hardly prepared for his difficult role.¹ His attitude toward the war in the Pacific was essentially the same as toward the war in Europe: he concentrated his attention on the defeat of the enemy and did not concern himself too much with the political phases of the postwar program. Whatever could be done to accelerate Japan's defeat had to be agreed to, even if in practice it went against the proclaimed principles of national self-determination, the Atlantic Charter, and similar pronouncements. His personal attitude toward Stalin's policies as well as the prevalent American wartime attitude toward Russia led him to minimize the reality of Soviet expansion in the Far East, to accede to Stalin's demands, and furthermore to assume the task of inducing China to agree. China was clearly being made to pay the heavy price of Soviet participation in the war.

American information concerning the strength of both Russia and Japan in Manchuria was inaccurate. Gen. William J. Donovan, wartime head of the United States Office of Strategic Services, later reported that "The bargain struck at Yalta with the Soviet Union in return for her entry [into the war] against Japan was based upon

1. James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly* (Harper & Bros., 1947), p. 23. "So far as I could see, the President had made little preparation for the Yalta Conference. . . . On the cruiser, the President, Admiral Leahy and I, on four or five occasions, usually after dinner, discussed some of the questions to be considered . . . I asked the President if the [State] Department had given him any material and he advised me it was all in the custody of Lieutenant William M. Rigdon. Later, when I saw some of these splendid studies I greatly regretted they had not been considered on board ship."

the estimate of the Kwantung Army in the absence of intelligence reports." American forces in China had been forbidden to send intelligence agents into Manchuria either openly or clandestinely.² President Roosevelt as well as the State Department stood "under the influence of military advisers who habitually overestimated, first, Japan's power of resistance early in 1945, and second, the strength of the so-called Kwantung Army . . ." ³

Such were the inter-Allied relations when Stalin, on February 11, 1945, signed a pledge at Yalta to join in the Far Eastern war. The document, kept secret in order not to provoke an immediate Japanese attack on the Soviet Maritime Province, stipulated that Russia would enter the war against Japan "in two or three months after Germany has surrendered." The conditions of the agreement were enumerated as follows:

1. The status quo in Outer Mongolia (the Mongolian People's Republic) shall be preserved;
2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz.:
 - (a) The southern part of Sakhalin as well as the islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union;
 - (b) The commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized, the pre-eminent interest of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded, and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the USSR restored;
 - (c) The Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South Manchurian Railroad, which provide an outlet to Dairen, shall be jointly operated by the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese company, it being understood that the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain full sovereignty in Manchuria;
3. The Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union.⁴

Those parts of the agreement which related to Manchuria and Mongolia required the concurrence of Chiang Kai-shek, and the

2. *New York Times*, March 1, 1946.

3. Ellis M. Zacharias, *Secret Missions* (G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1946), pp. 368-369.

4. As far as the Kurile Islands were concerned, Secretary Byrnes stated, in September, 1945, after the end of the war, that the agreement had been unknown to him, since the document embodying this part of the bargain had been kept in a separate file. Yet in the complete set of Yalta resolutions, published by the State Department on March 24, 1947, the paragraph about the Kurile Islands constitutes a regular part of the text. The very fact, however, that the Secretary of State was unaware of this undertaking is indicative of the deterioration that had occurred in American foreign policy.

Yalta agreement therefore included the following provision: "It is understood that the agreement concerning Outer Mongolia and the ports and railroads referred to above will require concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The President will take measures in order to obtain this concurrence on advice from Marshal Stalin." "On advice" meant that Washington would advise China of its fate, but not until Stalin considered the moment appropriate.

Roosevelt and Churchill, in turn, pledged that "these claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated," even if Japan were to capitulate before Russia's entry into the war and also in case China refused to yield to the demands.

As a reward, Stalin promised in this agreement to conclude "a pact of friendship and alliance" with China.

In fulfillment of the Yalta agreement, the Soviet Government prepared to renounce the Russo-Japanese neutrality pact of 1941. This treaty, which was to be in effect for a period of five years, was to expire in April, 1946, but only if notice of termination were given by either of its signatories one year in advance. On April 5, 1945, one month after Yalta, Molotov handed the Japanese envoy a note renouncing the pact. Pointing out the fact that the pact had been concluded before the German attack on Russia and before the Japanese attack on the United States and Britain, the note stated that in the meanwhile

. . . the situation is entirely altered. Germany attacked the Soviet Union, and Japan, an ally of Germany, helps the latter in her war against the USSR. Besides Japan is fighting against the United States and Britain, who are allies of the Soviet Union.

Under these circumstances the neutrality pact between the Soviet Union and Japan has lost its sense and a prolongation of this pact is impossible.

In accordance with the aforesaid and with Article III of the pact, which provides for renunciation of the pact in the year before the expiration of the pact's five-year period of effectiveness, the Soviet Government declares to the Japanese Government its wish to renounce the pact of April 13, 1941.

The text of this note led Japan and the world in general to surmise that the pact would remain operative until April, 1946, and

that the Soviet Union did not intend to enter the war until that time.

In the ensuing six months, from Yalta to the defeat of Japan, the foreign policy of the United States was at its weakest. President Roosevelt died soon after Yalta, and the new President's knowledge was limited to national politics. One secretary of state succeeded another. Edward Stettinius, Jr., had just replaced Cordell Hull; before he could acquaint himself with his new position, he was replaced by James F. Byrnes, who at first similarly lacked background and experience in international politics.

This situation within the United States made it easy for the Soviet Government to obtain approval of its program in all negotiations following Yalta. Moscow maintained an embassy in Tokyo and a network of informants and was superior to the United States and Britain in evaluating Japan's capacity to resist. In 1944 Stalin was certain that he would have to wage war for two or three months at the most.⁵

In February, 1945, Japan made an attempt to come to peace terms with the Allies through Russian mediation. The Emperor's idea was to use Russian mediation in order to forestall a Soviet attack, since the Manchurian Army had been considerably weakened by the transfer of a part for the defense of the Japanese home islands. Adm. Keisuke Okada, a former premier, reported after the war that in February, 1945, Foreign Minister Koki Hirota approached the Soviet Ambassador, Yakov Malik, and had four "peace conversations" with him; the talks were conducted at a resort hotel at Lake Hakone, 60 miles from Tokyo. The first two conversations showed some promise, and reports about them were transmitted to Moscow. But the later talks yielded no results, and the endeavor was dropped as a failure.⁶ At the same time, Ambassador Sato in Moscow informed his government that Soviet Russia was reserved concerning the arranging of peace by negotiation. The Soviet Government did not inform its allies of these Japanese feelers.

According to the Yalta agreement, the President of the United

5. Deane, *The Strange Alliance*, p. 264.

6. Associated Press, August 7, 1946. Okada's account was confirmed by members of the Japanese Cabinet. Cf. B. Fellers in *Foreign Service*, July, 1947.

States was to "take measures to obtain the concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek" on the decisions that concerned China. It was Stalin's desire that negotiations with China on matters covered by the Yalta pact be delayed; he was afraid that information would leak from Chungking to Tokyo, thus provoking a Japanese attack on the Russian Far East. It was considered that there was enough time to arrive at an accord during the three months between the defeat of Germany and Russia's promised entry into the Far Eastern conflict.

Finally in June, 1945, President Truman sent a message to Chiang Kai-shek telling him that it would be "in China's best interest" to start negotiations and conclude a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union. Now the real negotiations began. Since the fate of Outer Mongolia was to be decided during these negotiations, Marshal Choibalsan came to Moscow from Ulan Bator. The guests from Outer Mongolia were received with great pomp and gala receptions were tendered them in the Kremlin.

This coming and going of Chinese and Mongolians, and the numerous conferences in which Stalin personally took part, convinced the Japanese that Russia had made up her mind to join the Allies in the Far East. This was the reason for the new Japanese effort to seek Soviet mediation. In Tokyo it seemed certain that Moscow would advance certain demands for itself at the peace table; the Japanese proposal would give Russia a chance to present these demands without fighting a war, and Tokyo guessed that Soviet Russia wished to avoid a war if her desires could be satisfied without one.

In this respect Tokyo was wrong. Some Soviet demands on Japan could of course be satisfied without going to war. But the hegemony which Stalin sought to acquire in the East could be assured only in the wake of a military or semimilitary operation—war was necessary to fulfill this program. From now on the Soviet Government avoided any move that might put a premature end to the conflict.

The new Japanese move was made on July 7 when the Emperor ordered Premier Suzuki to send Prince Konoye to Moscow. Five days later Stalin and Molotov left for Potsdam; Tokyo received no reply to its offer of a visit by Konoye. On July 22 when the Soviet leaders were in conference with the Allies Moscow asked the Japanese Government "to elucidate more clearly the objectives of the

Konoye mission." Tokyo replied that Japan sought Russian mediation for the conclusion of peace. But Japan's offer was in vain. Unconditional surrender as a prerequisite of peace remained the demand of the Allies.

Ambassador Sato, in Moscow, urged his government to accept the formula of unconditional surrender in order to put an end to the war, but this Tokyo was still unwilling to do.

THE SINO-SOVIET CONFERENCE

China had not been a party to the Yalta Conference and accordingly was not bound by its decisions concerning her own future. Despite her humiliation at the hands of the Big Three, China had, of course, to accept the Yalta agreements as a basis for negotiations with the Soviet Government. Yet Chungking's interpretation of the agreements, presented considerable difficulties and became the subject of prolonged disputes.

The Moscow Conference began on July 1 and continued until July 13, when Stalin and Molotov left for the Potsdam Conference. Premier Soong then returned to China. On August 7, following the return of the negotiators, the parleys, with the new Chinese Foreign Minister, Dr. Wang Shih-chieh, present, were resumed. Each night around midnight the meetings began in Stalin's office in the Kremlin and they lasted until 4 or 5 A.M. During the day parleys would continue with Molotov. The Chinese maintained close contact with Averell Harriman, the United States Ambassador. The Sino-Soviet protocols were signed on August 14, the day of Japan's surrender, but were not published until after their ratification. On August 27 the world press carried the important news and published the seven documents embodying the new advances of Soviet Russia in the Far East.

The general principle underlying the contemplated changes as agreed upon at Yalta was the restoration to Russia of all rights and territories which she had possessed before the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5. The most important among these were the strategic area of Port Arthur and the railways across Manchuria. With certain alterations, the new treaties restored in these areas the status quo existing 40 years earlier.


The southern part of the Liaotung Peninsula, with the military

base of Port Arthur and the commercial port of Dairen, has played a unique role in Far Eastern history during the last half century. It first attracted attention in 1895, when Japan acquired it after her war with China. Three great European powers, headed by Russia, had protested vigorously against this Japanese conquest, and Japan saw herself compelled to relinquish the strategic territory and restore it to China. Russia thus appeared as the savior of China. But a mere two years later the Russian Government acquired from China the same territory for itself for a period of 25 years. Seven years later a war with Japan ended in a Russian defeat, and now Japan again acquired rights to the small but highly important peninsula. China could not but consent to the lease of Kwantung and the term of the lease was later extended to 99 years.


Now this peninsula became the center of all Japanese operations against China. It was the base of the famous Kwantung Army which menaced Russia during the decade before the war and which conquered Manchuria and set up the Manchukuo state. During the Pacific war it had been expected that after the defeat of Japan the Kwantung Peninsula would be restored to China, it being a part of China and inhabited by Chinese, and would cease to play the role of a breeding ground of wars. At Yalta, however, Stalin obtained the pledge that the Kwantung area would be restored to Russia. China did not dare to oppose the Soviet request, and at the Moscow Conference only minor changes were made in the demarcation of the territory, which comprised 1,338 square miles under Russian and Japanese control and contained a population of 1,370,000 of whom over 80 per cent were Chinese. The area was now renamed Naval Base of Port Arthur. (Cf. maps on pp. 200-201).

The Sino-Soviet agreement provided for the establishment of a military commission in Port Arthur for the "joint use of the naval base"; the commission consists of three Soviet and only two Chinese members, with a Soviet representative as chairman. The civil administration of the area is in China's hands, but must "take into account the interests of the USSR" in making appointments to responsible positions. Exactly as had been the case with Japan, "the Government of the USSR has a right to maintain in the area [of Port Arthur] its Army, Naval, and Air Forces and determine their location."

A special problem arose as to Dairen, the huge commercial port



THE PORT



ARTHUR BASE

which had mushroomed into a city of 600,000. The Yalta agreement provided for the "internationalization" of Dairen. This was a kind of compromise between the Russian demands for complete control over the port—which is located inside Kwantung Peninsula and is surrounded by Soviet-controlled territories—and American insistence on freedom of trade and open doors. President Roosevelt hardly foresaw what internationalization would mean when a strong Russia and a weak China administer an area in common. It took considerable effort on the part of the Chinese delegation in Moscow to obtain an agreement by which Dairen was made a "free port" open to the trade of all nations, with the USSR possessing her own piers and warehouses; yet the head of the port was to be a Soviet citizen appointed by the Soviet manager of the Manchurian railroads by agreement with the Chinese mayor of the city of Darien. A special clause provided for complete Soviet domination of Dairen in the event of war with Japan. It is on the basis of these provisions that the Soviet Union has refused to open up Dairen to international shipping after the war, as no peace treaty with Japan has been signed.

At Yalta it had been decided that the two main Manchurian railways would be jointly operated by Russia and China. Here again Stalin was in a position to quote to the Chinese delegates another carelessly injected phrase of the Yalta agreements recognizing "the pre-eminent interests" of the Soviet Union. What was the meaning of these words? Could Russia keep a police force in Manchuria to guard the railroads, as the Russians and Japanese had done before 1917? Could Soviet troops and Soviet weapons be transported over the railways? By adamant negotiating the Chinese succeeded in obtaining certain clarifications of the clause. The two main Manchurian rail lines (the former Chinese Eastern and South Manchurian, now joined into a single system under the name of the Chinese-Changchun Railway) were to come under the joint management of the two parties. The guarding of the railways was to remain China's responsibility.

The railroads, built by Russia between 1896 and 1901, according to the basic agreement were to become Chinese property in 80 years, i.e., in 1981. In its first treaty with China in 1924, the Soviet Government agreed to reduce this term by 20 years and turn over

the Chinese Eastern to China in 1961. The 1945 agreement provided for a postponement until 1975: the Chinese-Changchun Railway was to revert to the exclusive possession of China after a period of 30 years. Actual Soviet control over the rail system was to be effected by the restoration of the regime of the old Chinese Eastern Railroad with but small modifications. The main provision is that the general manager of the railroads shall be appointed by the Soviet side.

The next agreement concerned Outer Mongolia. At Yalta it had been decided that "the status quo in Outer Mongolia (the Mongolian People's Republic) shall be preserved." The Chinese were inclined to treat this as a mere confirmation of the then existing situation: a formal recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Outer Mongolia and the maintenance of its factual status of a Soviet dependency. Stalin, however, insisted that this paragraph of the agreement called for the final and complete severance of legal ties between China and Mongolia. He pointed to the few words in parentheses, "the Mongolian People's Republic," which had been shrewdly inserted in the Yalta text. President Roosevelt hardly suspected that this phrase would serve as the basis of a change in the legal status quo.

The Mongolian issue was decided according to the Soviet view, but a plebiscite was to be held in Outer Mongolia to decide its fate. This was only a face-saving maneuver for the Chinese, since there could be no doubt as to the outcome of a Soviet-conducted plebiscite. The Chinese, on the other hand, considered it a success that Mongolia was not to be formally incorporated into the Soviet Union, but would remain an independent state.

The Chinese delegates next brought up the issue of Sinkiang, where intervention by Soviet authorities and diplomats had been resumed. Stalin agreed to confirm that the Soviet Union had "no intention to interfere with China's internal affairs." At the insistence of China, he further confirmed that the "Soviet Government regards the Three Eastern Provinces [Manchuria] as a part of China" and reiterated his "respect for China's full sovereignty over them." Not without some hesitation and after some debate did Stalin promise to withdraw Soviet troops from Manchuria no later than three months after Japan's capitulation. This agreement,

which was not made public, constituted a part of the official minutes of the conference, signed by Molotov and Wang Shih-chieh on August 14, 1945. The relevant section ran as follows:

During their fifth conversation, held on July 11th, 1945, Marshal Stalin and Premier T. V. Soong had discussed the problem of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Chinese territory after the participation of the Soviet Union in the war against Japan.

Marshal Stalin did not want to include in the agreement regarding the entry of Soviet troops into the three eastern provinces (Manchuria) any reference regarding the withdrawal of Soviet troops within three months of the defeat of Japan. Marshal Stalin, however, declared that Soviet troops would begin to withdraw within three weeks after the Japanese surrender.

Premier Soong asked about the length of time required to complete the withdrawal. Marshal Stalin said that in his opinion the troops could be completely withdrawn within a period not exceeding two months.

Premier Soong continued to ask whether complete withdrawal could be completed within three months.

Marshal Stalin said three months would be the maximum time required to complete the withdrawal.

For the three months of Soviet occupation a special agreement provided for normal forms of cooperation between the Soviet command and Chinese Military Mission and civil authorities throughout Manchuria.

The Chinese delegates believed they had won another point, still more important to them in that Stalin seemingly repudiated the Chinese Communists when he agreed to declare that

In accordance with the spirit of the above treaty and for the implementation of its general ideas and purposes, the Soviet Government is ready to render China moral support and assistance with military equipment and other material resources, this support and assistance to be given fully to the National Government as the Central Government of China.

This pledge of Stalin's seemed of such importance that it influenced the negotiators to sign the agreement. In Chungking the possibility of the Soviet Army entering Manchuria, joining hands with the Chinese Communists, and spreading far to the south, was deemed to be a real danger. The representatives of China considered that the great concessions made to Russia in this series of documents would be well worth while if the Soviet Government would really

adhere to the agreement and desist from aiding the Chinese Communists.

All these accords and pledges were incorporated in the treaty of friendship and alliance; the alliance was directed against Japan, and the treaty more than once referred to the "prevention of further aggression on the part of Japan" as the basis of the understanding. Separate negotiations with Japan during a future war and separate armistice agreements were barred. It was not the first time that Russian assistance to China against Japanese encroachment provided a means of extracting considerable gains from China. There was an ominous parallel to be drawn between this treaty of 1945 and that of 1896, which had provided for the construction of Russian railroads in Manchuria, was soon supplemented by the lease of Kwantung, and led to the military conflict with Japan in 1904:

TREATY OF ALLIANCE OF
JUNE 3, 1896

. . . Desiring to consolidate the peace happily re-established in the Far East and to preserve the Asiatic Continent from a new foreign invasion, [Russia and China] have decided to conclude between them a defensive alliance. . . .

Every aggression directed by Japan, whether against Russian territory in eastern Asia or against the territory of China or that of Korea shall be regarded as necessarily bringing about the application of this treaty. In this case the two high contracting parties engage to support each other reciprocally. . . .

The Chinese Government consents to the construction of a railway line across the Chinese provinces . . . The junction of this railway with the Russian railway shall not serve as a pretext for any encroachment on Chinese territory. . . .

The Moscow agreements were hailed in China and especially in the United States and Britain as restoring friendly relations between

TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND
ALLIANCE OF AUGUST 14,

1945

. . . Having decided to render each other assistance . . . in the war against Japan until its unconditional surrender, [the USSR and China agree] . . .

to act according to the principles of mutual respect for their sovereignty and territorial entity. . . .

The main trunk lines of the Chinese Eastern Railway and the South Manchuria Railway . . . will become the joint property of the Soviet Union and the Chinese Republic and will be jointly exploited by them. . . .

The defense of the [Port Arthur] naval base is given the Government of the USSR. The Government of the USSR, with the aim of the defense of the naval base, is to establish the necessary equipment, and the cost is to be borne by the Government of the USSR.

China and Russia and, in particular, as a repudiation of the Chinese Communists by Moscow. It was expected that the pacts would lead to an early agreement between the two parties in China and that Moscow would assist the Chinese Government in compelling the Communists to come to terms with Chiang Kai-shek. Civil war will be avoided in China and Stalin will be the main force in preventing a Communist victory: such was the gist of official and unofficial comments in August, 1945.

Any agreement, however, whether between private or public parties, can be carried out in two ways: either by compliance with the spirit, or by adherence to the letter only. Any contract can be interpreted in different ways. It was optimistic, it was even naïve, to expect that Stalin would become the gravedigger of Chinese Communism, but such was the outlook which prevailed. Not for long, however, for it was only a few weeks before events proved the shallowness of these expectations.

To the Soviet Government the agreements with China meant the acquisition of strategic points on the Pacific and effective control of Manchuria. With the aid of Chinese Communists if possible, without them if necessary, the rights and privileges acquired in the seven protocols signed in Moscow on August 14, 1945, would lead to the encirclement of Manchuria by Soviet and Soviet-controlled territories, to the potential emergence of the Soviet Union as a major naval power in the Pacific, and to her eventual leadership over hundreds of millions of human beings in the Orient.

THE POTSDAM CONFERENCE

The most important phase of the negotiations concerning Japan opened at Potsdam on July 17, 1945. Stalin informed President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill that one of his two conditions for Russia's entry into the Pacific war—agreement with China—had not yet been fulfilled, that Premier Soong would again be in Moscow upon Stalin's return from the conference, and that Russia would not be able to join the Allies before the latter half of August. The implication was that the United States would have to prod China to comply with the Soviet demands. The military situation in the Pacific had changed so markedly that Japan's inability to continue the war had become manifest, and just one day before the

opening of the Conference at Potsdam the final successful test of the atomic bomb had occurred.

A certain amount of confusion still reigned in Washington in the evaluation of Japan's strength. At the top level of the War Department it was estimated as late as the summer of 1945 that major fighting might not end "until the latter part of 1946 at the earliest" if the atomic bomb were not used. Moreover, it was expected that the "fight to a finish" would not begin until November 1, 1945. It was pointed out that Japan's land armies were virtually intact and that a force of five million men could be expected to resist the invading American forces for a considerable time. After the war Dr. Karl Compton, chief of the Office of Scientific Research and Development Field Service, sought to demonstrate the good judgment of Secretary of War Stimson and Chief of Staff General Marshall in using the atomic bomb to bring about Japan's surrender. In his comment on Dr. Compton's article President Truman subscribed to the author's views. "I imagine," Mr. Truman wrote, "the bomb caused [the Japanese] to accept the terms."

This notion of Japan's strength was rather exaggerated and was not universally held by military and political experts. In his authoritative account Captain Zacharias shows that Japan would have surrendered even before the atomic bomb was used if Washington had pursued a more flexible policy. In his memoirs Admiral Halsey writes:

Japan capitulated so soon after the atomic bomb and Russia's declaration of war that the public may overvalue these two factors. My own estimate of their importance—that they merely gave the Nips an excuse, and helped them save face—received authoritative support from Admiral Soemu Toyoda, Chief of the Japanese Naval General Staff, in a statement recently published by the Naval Analysis Division of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey:

"I do not think it would be accurate to look upon use of the atomic bomb and entry and participation of Soviet Russia into the war as direct cause of the termination of the war, but I think that [they] did enable us to bring the war to a termination without creating too great chaos in Japan."⁷

7. E. Zacharias, *op. cit.*, pp. 367 ff.; Karl Compton, "If the Atomic Bomb Had Not Been Used," *Atlantic Monthly*, December, 1946, and President Truman's note to Dr. Compton, *Atlantic Monthly*, February, 1947; Henry L. Stimson, "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb," *Harper's Magazine*, February, 1947; W. F. Halsey, *Admiral Halsey's Story*, p. 271.

Thus the American problem at the Potsdam Conference centered on the question: Was Soviet participation in the war still essential to the United States? Were not the disagreements which would result from Soviet expansion auguring more trouble than the advantages of active Soviet intervention in the war were worth? There were doubts in the minds of some of the American delegates at Potsdam. "I would have been satisfied had the Russians determined not to enter the war," wrote Secretary Byrnes. "The President [Truman] was disturbed."⁸

The lack of effective American leadership, foresight, and orientation in world affairs made itself abundantly felt. Now, at the time of the Potsdam Conference, American interest would seem to have demanded Soviet abstention. The cession of Japanese territories promised at Yalta and even grants of billions of dollars to Russia would have been preferable, from the American viewpoint, to penetration by Soviet forces deep into Korea and China; and yet no one had the courage to attempt to turn the tide, seize the initiative, and prevent what was soon to become a long, deep, and dangerous conflict. "President Roosevelt and our military leaders wanted the Soviet Union in the war"—this was reason enough to continue the old policy under completely different circumstances.

Stalin's diplomacy was superior to the American. He certainly was aware of the Americans' doubts and uncertainty and he surely foresaw acrimonious reproaches when his goals in the Far East became manifest. To secure his position he suggested, on July 29, that the United States, Britain, and the other Allies address a formal request to the Soviet Government to enter the war. He also needed such an invitation because of the legal aspects of his relations with Japan. From a purely legalistic point of view the Soviet war on Japan constituted a breach of the neutrality pact, which had been renounced in April but was still operative for another year. If the pact was to be broken, Stalin preferred to have the support of the other powers for this violation of international law. Stalin's request could have provided the United States diplomats with another opportunity to forestall ominous developments in the Far East. Again inertia won out. Despite all the doubts that existed, President Truman wrote a letter to Stalin invoking the Charter of the United

8. Byrnes, *op. cit.*, p. 208.

Nations—which had not even been ratified—concluding as follows:

“It seems to me that under the terms of the Moscow Declaration and the provisions of the Charter, above referred to, it would be proper for the Soviet Union to indicate its willingness to consult and co-operate with other great powers now at war with Japan with a view to joint action on behalf of the community of nations to maintain peace and security.”⁹

Stalin expressed great appreciation of this message. In subsequent statements of Molotov and the Soviet press, the Russian entry into the war was always pictured as a compliance with Soviet obligations toward its allies.

At Potsdam Truman and Churchill—with Chinese consent—signed the declaration in which Japan was asked to surrender unconditionally. The declaration pointed out that “the might converging on Japan is immeasurably greater” than that which defeated Germany; here was a hint of both the atomic bomb and of Russia’s forthcoming entry into the war. The declaration contained seven paragraphs explaining the meaning of “unconditional surrender.”

Stalin was not consulted on this declaration; he was still a neutral in the war against Japan. For him, events were moving too fast, however. Should Japan accept the demands of the Allies, the war would be ended before the Soviet Union had formally joined it. Molotov asked that the declaration be held up for two or three days and was aroused when he learned that it had already been sent off. Stalin too was indignant. It was fortunate for the Soviet Government that Japan turned down the offer of the Allies, thus giving Stalin the opportunity of entering the conflict. The Potsdam Conference ended on August 2. The Soviet delegates promptly returned to Moscow to declare war.

Japan was now indeed at the end of her rope. A small clique of militarists, trying to prevent a surrender, menaced the government and the Emperor. Fantastic ideas of mass *hara-kiri* of millions of Japanese were being spread. However, resistance was no longer possible. On August 6 the first atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. In the Soviet press the first atom bomb explosion in Hiroshima received little attention; President Truman’s announcement of it ap-

9. *Ibid.*, p. 209.

peared in small type in an inconspicuous spot. While *Izvestiya* printed the item on the 7th, *Pravda* postponed its publication until the 8th; and a few hours after the newspaper went on sale the news was overshadowed by Molotov's declaration of war on Japan.¹⁰

From the Soviet embassy in Tokyo Moscow received reports of the utter confusion reigning in Japan and of the struggle among the various factions in and around the government. A few more days and it would be too late for Stalin to join the kill. Now he reversed his stand, despite the fact that no agreement with China had as yet been signed. On August 8 Molotov summoned the Japanese Ambassador and handed him a declaration of war, effective as of August 9. This was exactly three months after the surrender of Germany, which had occurred on May 8. It was a fortunate coincidence that the promise given at Yalta was kept to the day: Stalin had prepared his allies for some delay, and General Antonov, the Russian Chief of Staff, had likewise informed the American Military Mission that Russia could not enter the war until the latter part of August.¹¹

The declaration of war stated that "the Allies have addressed the Government of the Soviet Union asking it to join in the war against the Japanese aggressors and in this way to shorten the duration . . . True to its duty toward the Allies, the Soviet Government has accepted the proposal of the Allies."

THE WAR ON JAPAN

On the afternoon of August 8 loud-speakers in Moscow and radios throughout the country carried the message that Russia was again at war. For the people it came rather unexpectedly; nor were the Russians aware that the conflict was to be short and relatively painless. There was no enthusiasm and no wholehearted response to the government's appeal. The difference between this reaction and the reaction of the Russian masses toward the war against Germany was striking. Apathy and indifference was the mood throughout the country. The army was obedient and fulfilled every order,

10. When President Truman informed Stalin at Potsdam that the atomic bomb was to be used against Japan, Stalin pretended not to be impressed and not to attach excessive importance to the new weapon.

11. Deane, *op. cit.*, p. 271.

but there was no real understanding of why new sacrifices were needed in the Far East after four years of exhausting fighting in Europe. Neither the reminder that Japan had been Russia's traditional adversary nor the argument of "fulfillment of obligations" toward the Allies was sufficient to arouse the nation. The ensuing offensive against Japanese-occupied territories was, to the Russian people—as similar operations in the Orient had been for decades—little more than a colonial expedition, a *Kabinettskrieg*, a warlike operation conducted by the government for reasons which the people could not fathom and with which they were not in sympathy.

"The Russians received the announcement in complete silence," the *New York Times* reported on August 9. "At war again!" General Deane, then stationed in Moscow, reported popular apathy and silence along with obedience and discipline:

It seemed apparent that if Russia had needed the spirit of her people in a war against Japan as she had needed it in her fight with Germany, it would not have been forthcoming, at least not to the same degree. . . . It was impossible to arouse any great hatred against a nation as remote as Japan, and perhaps that is why even in the last few weeks the party propaganda machine made no effort to do so.¹²

It was a sound popular feeling—an emotion rather than a concept—that this new war was unnecessary, perhaps even harmful, and that it signified the beginning of a costly and dangerous venture which one day might end in a terrible catastrophe.

The press, however, gave a picture of enthusiastic popular support. "The Allies turned to the Government of the Soviet Union [*Izvestiya* wrote editorially] asking that it join the war against the Japanese aggressor." "The Soviet people unanimously support the decision of its government," *Pravda* wrote. Workers' rallies were convoked in factories and city halls. Again the press spoke of "a mighty wave of meetings" and "a powerful expression of will." All the provinces, even Lithuania, hailed the government's decision to go to war. From the first day the newspapers reported striking victories, glorious offensives, and the capture of city after city.

On August 10 the Soviet Ambassador, Malik, informed Togo, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, that Russia had joined in the Allied demand of unconditional surrender. Togo notified

12. *Ibid.*, p. 277.

him of Japan's readiness to surrender, upon the understanding that the prerogatives of the Emperor would not be prejudiced. The same message went from Tokyo to Washington through Sweden and Switzerland.

Washington and London did not intend to make the abolition of the monarchy or the abdication of the Emperor a precondition of the cessation of hostilities. Stalin had left the monarchy and the monarch in Rumania, and Hirohito, who in the last phase of the war had repeatedly tried to feel out the Allies as to the possibility of peace, was in a not dissimilar category. It might have been logical immediately to accept the Japanese offer. In Washington, however, the opinion prevailed that Japan should not be allowed to make any conditions whatever. Secretary Byrnes's reply was negative, although it contained a phrase which in effect satisfied the Japanese request: "The ultimate form of government of Japan shall, in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration, be established by the freely-expressed will of the people"; i.e., the victors did not intend to impose on Japan a new form of government. There was some haste and confusion in this exchange of notes.

When the message reached Moscow, Molotov was concerned about the speed of the negotiations. He asked for two days' delay. Prompted by the American Ambassador, however, he gave his consent to the Byrnes draft the same night, and on the 11th it reached Tokyo. It took the Japanese Cabinet three days to make up its mind; during these days numerous meetings of the Crown Council and of the Cabinet were held, until finally Hirohito demanded unanimous agreement—even among those who opposed surrender. A brief military uprising ensued, during which the Emperor and several Cabinet ministers were obliged to hide from the armed bands which roamed the imperial palace. Finally the Emperor announced his decision to surrender Japan. Japan surrendered on August 14, 1945.

Everything was moving too fast. Soviet participation was not sufficiently impressed upon the world-wide public. Only during the first three days of the war were there real battles; the most important were at Hailar and at Mutankiang. The Japanese Army in Manchuria, which had been stripped of its aviation for the defense of the home islands (the air force had been cut from 1925 planes

in 1942 to 415 in 1943), offered sporadic and weak resistance. Japan's final surrender came on the sixth day after the Soviet declaration of war.

The Soviet radio and press nonetheless continued to describe in detail the hard fighting in the Far East, telling the people that there was elation in the United States over Russia's entry into the war. War communiqués were issued almost every day until the end of August. *Pravda*, in an editorial on August 15—after Japan's surrender—declared that "Japan's position became hopeless when the Soviet Union joined its sword to the arms of its allies and, striving to shorten the war and bring nearer universal peace, declared war on Japan." "The sensation of the atomic bomb," *Izvestiya* said on August 16, "blinded some people; they are willing to regard science as a wizard's incantation." No, wrote *Red Star*, rather "the fact of the Soviet Union's joining the war against Japan was the major political event abruptly changing the relative strength of the parties in the war in the Pacific." This line of propaganda—Russia's decisive contribution to victory in the Far East and the negligible role of the atomic bomb—was to be the tenor of Russian press releases for years to come.

Soviet headquarters reported that the Japanese armies facing Russia had received no order to lay down their arms. The Red Army ordered the Japanese to surrender on August 20. The Japanese command in Manchuria did not believe that the order to surrender was genuine; not until the Mikado's brother arrived did the army capitulate. During all this time war correspondents continued to play up the "heroic deeds of our brave Far Eastern warriors," the "fanatic resistance of the Japanese," "the stubborn fighting." On the 12th Soviet forces landed in Korea. On the 23d an airborne landing was made at Port Arthur and Dairen, at the southern tip of Manchuria. The same day Stalin, in an order of the day, concluded the campaign by giving public thanks to four Soviet commanders: Commander in Chief Vasilevsky; the commanders of the First and Second Fronts, Generals Meretskov and Purkayev; and Admiral Yumashev, commander of the Pacific Navy.

The war was over, and surrender ceremonies were held aboard the U.S.S. *Missouri* on September 2, 1945. The protocol was signed on behalf of the Soviet Union by Lt. Gen. Kuzma Nikolayevich

Derevyanko—a man destined to play a primary role in future politics in and around Japan. Russia's losses in the Far East were officially placed at 8,219 dead and 22,264 wounded. This appears a rather modest figure in view of the scale of the second World War, yet numerous experts have considered even this highly exaggerated. Of Japanese 594,000 were taken prisoner, among them 148 generals. The number of Japanese killed in this campaign was estimated by Soviet sources at 80,000.

On the day when the second World War ended and the armistice with Japan was signed aboard the *Missouri*, Stalin, in an address to the Soviet people, hailed the historic moment. He recalled Russia's defeat at the hands of Japan in 1904-5, Japanese intervention in the Far East during the first years of the Revolution, the border incidents of 1938-39. In the peculiar style of Soviet wartime pronouncements, splicing old-style Russian nationalism with Soviet patriotism, he said: "For forty years we, the men of the older generation, have waited for this day. And now this day has come." He proceeded to give an intimation of future plans for the expansion of Soviet power in the Pacific:

From now on, Southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands will serve as a means of direct communication of the Soviet Union with the ocean and as a base for the defense of our country against Japanese aggression . . .

We have won. From now on we can consider our country saved from the threat of German invasion in the West and of Japanese invasion in the East. The long-awaited peace for the nations of the whole world has come.

As far as gains from Japan were concerned, Soviet aspirations were not entirely satisfied. Stalin had proposed to his allies that Soviet troops be dispatched to Japan proper to take part in the acceptance of Japanese surrender. As early as August 10 Molotov suggested to Ambassador Harriman that General Vasilevsky be appointed Commander in Chief in Tokyo with equal rank with General MacArthur. Harriman turned down these suggestions and later expressed his indignation that they had been made since Russia had been only two days in the war which the other powers had waged since the end of 1941. Thereupon Molotov withdrew his demand, and a few days later Stalin acceded to Truman's designation of General MacArthur as Supreme Allied Commander.

This retreat of the Soviet Government, hailed by the Americans in Moscow as a singular success, was actually hardly a retreat at all. Stalin had clearly decided to proceed with his schemes in the territories occupied by the Red Army. In fact, the Supreme Commander in Tokyo was not to become Marshal Vasilevsky's superior; not only could he issue no orders to him, but he was unable even to collect information about developments in the Soviet-held areas of China and Korea formerly occupied by the Japanese. Soon this paradoxical situation gave rise to confusion in Washington. On March 5, 1946, Secretary of State Byrnes declared at a press conference that the jurisdiction of General MacArthur extended over Manchuria; then he consulted the War Department and the next day had to retract his statement: MacArthur's authority was limited to Japan, Southern Korea, and certain islands in the Pacific. Manchuria, including the Kwantung Peninsula, and Northern Korea, was directly or indirectly outside the range of his responsibility.

Marshal Vasilevsky became *de facto* Second Commander in Chief with powers no less than those of MacArthur.

China and Russia in Wartime (1941-1945)

Sino-Soviet relations, which had begun to deteriorate in 1940, became even cooler after the outbreak of the Russo-German war and particularly after Pearl Harbor.

Russian assistance to China in her war against Japan ceased when Russian resources had to be marshaled for use against Germany. The flow of Russian goods through Sinkiang and Mongolia ended in 1941. The neutrality pact between Moscow and Tokyo, concluded two months before the beginning of the war with Germany, did not mention China, but the Japanese press incessantly emphasized that Soviet-Chinese collaboration was an indication of Moscow's hostile attitude toward Japan and at that time Moscow was anxious not to give Tokyo the slightest cause for hostility.

Pearl Harbor closed a five-year period of relatively normal, at times even friendly, relations between the regimes of Russia and China which for over a decade had been kept apart by a deep gulf of hostility. The Japanese menace had been at the root of their rapprochement; Chiang Kai-shek's resistance to Japan was a means of safeguarding the integrity of eastern Siberia. Now, after December 7, 1941, the problem of Japan was removed to another field; Japan's fate would be decided independently of China and of Russo-Japanese relations. If the United States and Britain should win the war, the Japanese danger to Russia would be eliminated; if they should lose, no amount of Soviet aid to China would rescue the Russian Far East. Moscow no longer had any interest in Chiang Kai-shek and his government, and immediately the differences between the Central Government and the Communists returned to the foreground of Soviet attention. The domestic affairs of China were again a matter of supreme Soviet concern. From 1942 on, the situation grew continuously worse.

At the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in October, 1943, Cordell Hull exerted considerable pressure on Molotov to

have China sign the agreements concerning the future United Nations Organization. A joint conference of the Big Four could not be arranged when President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill traveled to Teheran; instead they had to meet Chiang Kai-shek in Cairo, and then Stalin in the capital of Iran. At the preparatory conference for the creation of the United Nations organization at Dumbarton Oaks, the Soviet Government refused to sit together with China; as a result two conferences had to be held—one, among the Big Three, and then another, between the Western Powers and China. Late in 1944 Molotov told the American expert on China, Donald Nelson, that relations had deteriorated completely and that the Soviet Government did not intend to make overtures for their improvement. The flow of goods to China had ceased, trade had stopped almost entirely, no cooperation between the two in grand strategy of the World War was contemplated or even possible.

It was not until the spring of 1943, when the Russo-German war reached its turning point at Stalingrad, that the situation eased sufficiently to permit attention to be paid to China. By the middle of 1943 Soviet policy toward China began to stress the Communist issue, while the struggle between the Communist forces and those of Chiang Kai-shek mounted in ferocity. The United Communist-Kuomintang front, a pious promise at the outset of the war, had now become a dead letter. A "coalition government" had been the principal demand of the Communists since the winter of 1939-40—and now the Soviet press began to support and play up the same demands.

In Moscow China's reverses in the war were now pictured as a consequence of the Central Government's "reactionary policy," of the activity of "fascists" inside the Kuomintang, and of the unwillingness of the Kuomintang to unite with "representatives of the people," i.e., with the Communists. In an increasing number of articles and statements the Kuomintang was portrayed as a party considerable elements of which had gone over to the enemy and were collaborating with him in the occupied territories. The Kuomintang's "lenient attitude" toward "pro-Japanese" party members was considered a cause of China's retreats. Communist firmness was juxtaposed to Kuomintang weakness. This new line of reasoning was to last until the very end of the war.

The matter of the sharing of authority between Yen-an and Chungking—basically a domestic problem of China—was raised by Moscow to the level of international discussion. "To carry out national unity [i.e., to include Communists in the government]," *Red Star* later summed up the issue, "is not only in the interest of China but also in the interest of the Allied countries who are now fighting the Japanese."¹ This was the gist of the new policy: Chiang Kai-shek does not know how to fight and is incapable of leading his country to victory over Japan! Chiang Kai-shek is surrounded by fascists, landlords, and pro-Japanese men! Chiang cannot kindle the people's enthusiasm for the struggle ahead! Despite the vast resources of China and Allied aid, his forces are retreating before the Japanese as a consequence of this one-party regime of the Kuomintang! The Chinese Communists are the real people's party. If China wants to defeat Japan and if the Western Allies are interested in China's victory, they must insist on a reorganization of the Chinese Government!

The first shot in the campaign was fired in the summer of 1943, when the official *War and the Working Class* wrote:

The [Communist] Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies consist of the most progressive, steadfast, and self-sacrificing people of China. They are led by the Chinese Communist party which enjoys merited prestige among the broad masses of the working people. Today, by direct military pressure, new attempts are being made to bring about the dissolution of the Chinese Communist party and liquidation of the armies . . .

. . . With large strategic raw material resources and tremendous manpower reserves at her disposal, China has every possibility for victory over the enemy.

In order to win, however, "national unity" is necessary.²

Later the same publication exclaimed:

The army is burdened with vestiges of feudalism . . . The reactionary generals and officers of the Kuomintang armies often provoke conflicts on the borders of the Special Border Region of Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia. The blockade of the Special Border Region, established by the Kuomintang authorities, draws off a very considerable number of Chinese troops.³

1. *Red Star*, March 13, 1945.

2. Vladimir Rogov, in *War and the Working Class* (Russian ed.), August 6, 1943.

3. *Ibid.*, June 1, 1944, p. 31.

And again: "The position of China is today such that only a decisive break with the reactionary elements can produce a positive effect." ⁴ "The reactionary elements" to be expelled were those leaders who were apprehensive of collaboration with the Communists. In August it was said: "The Chinese High Command has been unable to organize the repulse of the Japanese offensive." ⁵

Now Moscow tried to accuse the Kuomintang of harboring "Chinese Mikhailovichs"—these were the officers of the Chinese Army who had resisted the Communists by force of arms. They were termed traitors, and the "traitors'" role in the Chiang government was made a part of the indictment against the Chinese Generalissimo. Why, for instance, the Soviet press asked, had the Chinese Government during the war built a railway from Kwangsi to Kweichow which soon fell into Japanese hands and served them well? Had not the line been constructed with the aim of letting the Japanese get it? Was this not treason on the part of high members of the government? "Was it the result of strategical miscalculations or of the activities of Japanese agents in Chungking? The railway was practically a gift to the Japanese General Staff, for which they had been longing for years!" the journal exclaimed. ⁶

Therefore Moscow backed the Communist insubordination. The Central Government, not the Communists, it was charged, was guilty:

According to the data of American and English newspapers, the number of troops chained down to blockade the Special Border Region by will of the Chinese High Command is as high as 400,000 men, including the attached reserves. An army of almost half a million men, well armed and trained, is not taking part in the war against the Japanese! ⁷

The real cause of China's weakness was of course the fact that before the converging of the world-wide coalition against Japan, China had been ravaged and devastated and her industrial areas occupied by the Japanese so that at least 90 per cent of her industrial capacity was in enemy hands. When coalition warfare finally did begin, there were no roads to bring in weapons and ammunition in large numbers—in contrast to the situation in Russia's war in Eu-

4. *Ibid.*, July 15, 1944, p. 13.

5. *Ibid.*, August 15, 1944, p. 23.

6. *New Times*, September 15, 1945.

7. *War and the Working Class* (1944), No. 14, p. 12.

rope. No "united front," no Kuomintang-Communist coalition could alter this situation. Yet the general Soviet program for both Europe and Asia called for the establishment of coalition governments. In these very years (1943-45) such coalition governments were initiated in Yugoslavia, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. At first they included various "patriotic" and "democratic" elements; they enabled the Communists to occupy key positions and to begin the disintegration of their partners from within; removing them one by one from the government, the Communists finally obtained complete control. In China this meant a coalition between Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung, the expulsion of the "fascist" CC clique (the Chen Brothers) from the Kuomintang, and the subsequent weakening of the Kuomintang until the Communists could dominate the government.

Soviet insistence on such a reorganization of the Chinese regime was not confined to the press. In diplomatic negotiations, at the Conferences in Teheran and Yalta, the Soviet Government followed the same line. It soon found receptive ears in the West, and the Soviet press could with considerable satisfaction quote American publications which seemed to have swallowed the Moscow line.⁸

All during the war Moscow held its protecting hand over Yen-an. When the Russian retreat in Europe ended and military successes began to multiply, the hand became firmer and its protection more effective.

The old ideology had seemingly been put aside. Neither in Moscow nor in China, nor in the international discussions of Chinese affairs, was there any mention of the former ideology of the Comintern. Social revolution was never talked about; even "the struggle against imperialism" seemed forgotten. Social upheaval, even in the Communist areas, was not on the agenda. The demand for the overthrow of Chiang Kai-shek's regime was replaced by a demand for national unity through a coalition of Communism and Kuomintang. Everything seemed to be decided in terms of the war against

8. The ones most frequently quoted were *Amerasia* and *The Far Eastern Survey* of the Institute of Pacific Relations; also Owen Lattimore's *Solution in Asia* and Edgar Snow's writings.

Japan; opposition to Japan was the sole permissible criterion of judgment. In Chungking, Washington, and London the Soviet Government did everything it could to help the Chinese Communists, but every one of its moves had to be pictured as a component of the over-all war effort.

In reality, however, the philosophy behind the Soviet policy continued in the old furrows.

"The destruction of the machine of the state" (a legacy of Lenin) as the first step in a successful revolution has long been an undisputed principle of Communist theory and practice. No reforms would suffice, no constitutional methods of change would work. "The destruction of the machine of the state" was what the Russian Bolsheviks sought to achieve in 1917-18 by seizing power. The destruction of the old state has been the aim of each and every Communist movement.

Now it appeared that the war had created a unique situation in which the parties of revolution were relieved of this hard and dangerous task. The Germans in Europe and the Japanese in Asia had achieved at tremendous cost what the Communists had been supposed to do: they had destroyed a number of old states, supplanting them with their own administrative machinery, and now that they were forced to leave, there was no state left to be destroyed. There was a *tabula rasa* in eastern and central Europe and eastern Asia which must quickly be taken hold of and made use of for the ends of the revolutionary party. Popular uprisings in the formerly occupied areas were therefore considered unnecessary, even harmful. Wherever the Communists attained power after the war, they did so without rebellions—they came to power merely by taking over what had been left by the enemy.

The peculiar situation in China was that the Japanese had occupied only one part of the country, while the Nationalist Government remained at the head of free China. In preparation for the moment of liberation, the Communist party extended its organizations into the occupied territory. Behind the Japanese lines it established political cells and semimilitary formations to take over large areas—not so much for the fight against Japan as for the future fight against its Chinese rivals after Japan's defeat. "Our fixed policy," Mao Tse-tung had declared, "should be 70 per cent

expansion, 20 per cent dealing with the Kuomintang, and 10 per cent resisting Japan." ⁹ The larger the Communist Army, the better the outlook for victory; the better their arms, the greater their chances. In all negotiations with the Communists, Chiang Kai-shek's first demand was the actual incorporation of the Communist armed forces into his Nationalist Army. With the same consistency the Communists, prepared to make concessions in many other fields, refused to yield in respect to their armed forces. Characteristically, their program for postwar China emphasized far-reaching "local autonomy," with the Communist areas—in General Chu Teh's phrase—remaining "constituted as they are today." ¹⁰ In this stand they were effectively backed by Moscow.

Often the Chinese Communists even succeeded in misleading their opponents abroad. When they asked for weapons from the United States they usually received a negative reply, since the United States recognized only the Chungking government. But early in 1945 the Communists proposed to Ambassador Hurley that a vast amount of Japanese weapons captured by the United States be turned over to them. Without realizing the intent of the Communist leadership, Washington was ready to go through with this plan, but when Chiang Kai-shek's consent was asked, he flatly refused to give it. The indignation of both Yenan and Moscow was great.

THE COMMUNIST TIDE

During the war the Chinese Communist party went through a period of rapid growth. Its membership of about 300,000 in 1937, on the eve of the Japanese attack, grew to over a million in 1944; by the summer of 1945, just before Japan's surrender, the party officially claimed 1,200,000 members. Along with the general trend "to the left" which occurred in China as it did in Europe, the recruitment of new Communist partisans was fostered by the expansion of the Communist-controlled regions, where new administrative organs were set up and no other parties were permitted to engage in political activity. Only a minority of the party's membership worked in "free China"; the great majority were in the so-

9. *Documents on the Problem of the Chinese Communist Party* (Chungking, 1944), quoted in Udey, *Last Chance for China*, p. 194.

10. Harrison Forman, *Report from Red China* (Henry Holt, 1945), p. 174.

called Border Region and other areas ruled by the Communists.

The Seventh Congress of the Chinese Communist Party convened in April, 1945, when the war was nearing its end. This was its first congress since 1928; the contrast was striking. The Sixth Congress had gathered on Soviet soil to avoid persecution of the shattered party. Now Chinese Communism could celebrate its return as a major force in China and even in world affairs. The Soviet areas of China, which in 1937 embraced only 30,000 square miles, now comprised (according to Communist sources) over 300,000 square miles. The population under the Communists had risen from about two millions in 1937 to 63 millions in 1941; at the end of the war, the Communists claimed control over 95 million people. Besides the area of Yen-an, 15 to 20 "liberated regions" were now under their dominance. According to their own (often greatly exaggerated) reports, the Communist armed forces had grown to 470,000 in 1944. Now, in 1945, Mao claimed an army of 910,000 men in addition to large numbers of "militiamen."¹¹

In his triumphant report Mao Tse-tung gave the congress these figures and developed his program. "Many people know that there was one Mikhailovich in Yugoslavia," he said, "but they do not know that there are tens of Mikhailoviches in China." The Chinese Communist party must represent not only the Chinese workers but also "the numerous peasant class, the petty bourgeoisie, the intellectuals, and other democratic elements." This was in line with the classical concepts of Leninist Communism, which until the Russian Revolution considered its group essentially a workers' party but one that fought for the genuine interests of certain other progressive elements of society. Mao Tse-tung explained—and this was not new either—that because of China's backwardness, a purely Communist regime was not yet feasible; instead, a "regime of a union of the democratic classes" must be produced. This was the very system which was beginning to take shape in Poland, Yugoslavia, and other Soviet-dominated countries. Finally, Mao demanded an "immediate improvement in Sino-Soviet relations"; he eulogized Soviet policy in regard to China:

The Soviet Union was the first nation to abrogate the unequal treaties . . . the Soviet Union was the only nation that assisted China in her

11. Its real strength probably amounted to from 300,000 to 350,000.

fight for emancipation. . . . The Soviet Union was again the first to come to the aid of China in her fight against the Japanese aggressors. . . . We maintain that the final, thorough solution of Pacific problems is impossible without the participation of the Soviet Union.¹²

In the Communist areas of China, Soviet methods of economy were being adapted to Chinese conditions. Programs of small-scale industrialization were carried out, but these were hampered because the large cities and industrial areas remained outside of Communist control. A few workshops were set up, others were enlarged; private industry, theoretically tolerated by the Communist leadership as a necessary evil in backward China, did not develop in the Communist regions—instead “cooperatives” were vigorously encouraged. The Soviet idea of “Saturday brigades”—a form of overtime work—found wide application. Land rents had been lowered by decree. Communist officials and Red Army men were allotted land for cultivation. Certain landlords’ estates which had fallen to the Communist Government were, after the model of the Soviet *soukhoz*, made to produce food for the armed forces.

“Democracy,” which formally succeeded the abolished soviets, was as dictatorial as had been the regime under the old terminology. Elections were ordered held. The “three-in-one” hoax described above in Chapter VIII continued. This system purported to achieve a “people’s government” with a democratic majority. Important as it was for propaganda purposes and for confusing public opinion abroad, it never gave any power to any group other than the Communists. There were no party organizations in the Communist areas other than those of the Communists. The Communists controlled the entire press, and no rallies could be held except under Communist sponsorship. Notwithstanding rumors to the contrary, freedom of religion was not guaranteed. A considerable number of missionaries were jailed in the Soviet areas of China and many churches were occupied by the local authorities.

Communist rule remained a dictatorship, severe and cruel, devoid of any shred of democracy. Prof. O. Brière, a keen and intelligent observer, writes as follows of conditions in the Chinese Communist areas during the war:

12. Mao Tse-tung, *The Fight for a New China* (English trans., New Century Publishers, 1945), p. 67.

One of the first impressions to strike a foreign observer who arrives at Yen-an is the atmosphere of suspicion which surrounds him: he cannot take a step without being followed by a spy attached to him and who follows all his movements. Mutual surveillance [among the Chinese] is even more surprising; they too are often accompanied by a companion . . . Many suffer from this perpetual surveillance and try to rid themselves of it, but in vain.

The system of public or secret confessions, the *tan-pu-hui*, is a means of police investigation to establish the past errors of enemies, the doubtful and traitors and to determine the attitude of the accused. But besides, there exists the *te-cheng-hui*, the "struggle against the capitalists with the aim of ruining them."

As to the tripartite composition of the government, there is no greater hoax than this one. The so-called Communist third commands the levers and holds exclusive power. It would do no good for the other two thirds to try any opposition whatever, particularly in the town of Yen-an; if at times a modicum of leeway is accorded the non-Communists, it is only on secondary issues . . . Freedom of religion! When the church hierarchy, bishops and priests, no longer have the right of residence nor even the right of making regular visits to the Christian citizens! If by chance a priest passes through a locality, he may be permitted to hold mass—a favor that is not always accorded.

Alongside the executive organs we find other bodies, hierarchically organized and at times more powerful than the government itself. It is the party agencies that give the key and the general direction to policy; they make themselves councillors. The councillor of the mandarin had more authority than his chief. Thus each department is supervised by a party member and has no possibility of acting independently.

In a word, there is complete dualism in the system of government. The head of every single administrative agency, whether high or low, has his councillor or, more properly speaking, his controller, who effectively directs his policy from the wings. It is the same with the army. The party officials, councillors, and subordinate personnel form the *kan-pu*, i.e., the motor—the central or executive committee.

The army of Red officials probably exceeds in size that of any other regime: it is one of the mainstays of the state. Never before has any people known such a formidable army of parasites: army soldiers, popular militia, officials—they are legion. It is the peasant who pays for this gigantic array of officialdom, and the exactions disgust him: in certain regions the taxes are literally heavier than the total harvest. But in return, what does this flock of parasites produce?¹³

13. O. Brière, *Le Mouvement Communiste en Chine* (to be published), Chap. 2.

A consequence of Communist rule was the widespread migration from the Soviet regions into the cities and into Nationalist China. While small groups of young Communist militants were making their way to Yenan, hundreds of local inhabitants tried to leave, and the neighboring cities were often swelled by an influx of immigrants and refugees. In Tsingtao the population in this way grew from 300,000 to 800,000. Tens of thousands of refugees arrived in Shanghai.

Communism was strong not so much in popular support as in the relentless activity of its adherents. In activity it has been superior to all other political movements in China. It is estimated, O. Brière says, that only 10 per cent of China's population would vote for the Communists in a free and secret election.

"It is a totalitarian dictatorship," the prominent Chinese philosopher, Lin Yutang, wrote in 1945,

and its methods and techniques are definitely copied from the Russian model. . . . It calls any critics "Trotskyites" and sends them to colonize uninhabited, primitive regions, the Chinese equivalent of Russian Siberia. It has the same check and countercheck spy system, it has the same "purges" and "liquidations" carried out by the same refined and to us tortuous technique. It holds the same "small group" conferences at night, even obtains "confessions" and self-condemnations. . . .¹⁴

This picture of Communism in China would be incomplete if we were to overlook its profound emotional and ethical aspects. More than once it has been stressed in this book—and it must be repeated again—that genuine faith and devotion to an idea lie at the root of Chinese Communism; and that out of it spring comradeship, brotherly love of the companion-in-arms, and self-sacrifice in the service of the cause. If these are the features that constitute what we are used to calling "idealism," then indeed idealism is inherent in the Communist movement in China. However, was there not a good deal of sincere religious fanaticism behind the medieval witch hunts and inquisitions? Were not, after all, the "human torpedoes" and the Japanese kamikaze fliers also men willing to sacrifice their lives for a cause which to them appeared to be the greatest in the world? No, devotion to an ideal is not enough for a movement to be labeled progressive.

One more remark is necessary to avoid misunderstandings. The

14. Lin Yutang, *The Vigil of a Nation* (John Day, 1945), p. 230.

absence of criticism of Kuomintang China in this book is by no means to be taken as an endorsement of the conditions prevailing under the Central Government. There is a wealth of incontrovertible evidence pointing to widespread corruption, inefficiency, misery, and political degradation in Kuomintang China, and the widespread criticism of conditions there is often well justified. The subject of this book, however, is not China or the Far East in general, but Soviet policies in the Far East. Communism in China has its place in Moscow's political concepts; it is an important instrument of Soviet activity in Asia. The Kuomintang is not. This is the reason why internal conditions of Kuomintang China have not been treated in this book.

The role of the Chinese Communists in the struggle against Japan has been grossly exaggerated. The same reasons that had prevailed before Pearl Harbor continued to make large-scale fighting impossible for the Chinese Communists: shortage of ammunition and supplies, among other things, made them a guerrilla force and not an established army capable of facing the Japanese in open battle. Since 1940, when the Communists had refused to obey the orders of the High Command in Chungking, they received neither pay nor arms from the Central Government except for some machine guns produced in the Soviet Union. What was more, the hearts and brains of the Chinese Communists were by now more absorbed in the conflict with Chiang Kai-shek than in the war against Japan. After Pearl Harbor, when the Great Powers began to fight Japan in the Pacific, it was obvious that the outcome of the war depended to only a small extent on China's own war effort, and this was particularly true of the Chinese Communists. *Tua res agitur*—this was the prevalent feeling in Chungking, and even more so in Yen-an: "in fighting for their own reasons, the Great Powers are also fighting for us"—and it therefore seemed that there was more elbow-room for home affairs and domestic squabbles and that the "united front" with the Kuomintang, still officially in force, was in fact already a matter of the past.

Toward the end of the war the Communist armies claimed to have suffered 400,000 casualties and to have killed and wounded 1,100,000 "Japanese and puppets." As far as the Japanese alone were concerned, their Commander in Chief in China, General

Okamura, stated, after V-J Day, that only 50,000 Japanese had been lost to the guerrillas.¹⁵ The rest of the men killed and wounded by the Communist armies were Chinese, and the troops of the Nationalist armies made up a considerable number of them.¹⁶

Armed clashes with government forces, which sometimes turned into full-scale battles, recurred repeatedly. In the summer of 1943, for example, serious fighting took place in Shantung Province; the Communists attacked the Nationalist armies in July and again in August; while the Japanese launched an attack from the north, the Communists fought the same army from the south. The struggle of course ended in a complete defeat of the government forces. Though usually on a smaller scale, similar conflicts continued throughout the war years.

The entire attention of the Communists was directed toward the day when the Japanese would withdraw from China and the problems dividing the Kuomintang and the Communists would have to be resolved one way or the other. To maintain a strong and efficient army was the first commandment of the Communists. On this issue compromise has never been possible for them, and Moscow has shared and supported their determination.

The attitude of the United States Government, more influential in China than any other, began to veer in the direction prompted by Moscow. President Roosevelt subscribed to the idea of a united front in China; he did it not so much out of sympathy for the Communist elements as in an effort to appease the Soviet Union during the war. He sought to fulfill as many of Stalin's demands as he could afford to. When he sent Vice-President Wallace on a tour of Siberia and China, in 1944, he had two objectives in mind: to improve Russo-Chinese relations and, to this end, to bring about a rapprochement between the Central Government and the Communists in China. Thus, Wallace's conferences in Chungking in June, 1944, helped to create illusions as to future relations between Russia and China. He

15. Forman, *op. cit.*, pp. 125-126; White and Jacoby, *Thunder Out of China*, p. 210. How unreliable all these claims were is indicated by the fact that another Communist source, likewise official, placed the number of Japanese and puppets killed, wounded, and captured at 429, 636. *New York Times*, October 21, 1945.

16. "For every Japanese they claim to have killed, they have killed at least five Chinese. . . . Of the hundreds of 'clashes' per year they claim to their credit, a fair percentage must include those with the Chinese 'enemy.'" Lin Yutang, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

predicted that the common boundary between Russia and China would in the future be like the border between the United States and Canada. The American Vice President's remark received wide attention in Chungking, where the general supposition was that he would not have voiced such a view unless he had good reason to believe that China's territorial integrity, particularly in Manchuria, would be scrupulously respected after the war.¹⁷

Stalin could chalk up a success when in 1944, at the behest of President Roosevelt, a group of American correspondents went to visit the Communist region. An official American Mission was established in Yen-an. Ambassador Hurley took the initiative in bringing together Communist and Kuomintang leaders to achieve "national unity"—a coalition government, which was uppermost in the Soviet program for China and among the demands of the Chinese Communists themselves. Sensing the new trend in Soviet-American relations, a number of writers, individual specialists, and institutions began a campaign in favor of the Chinese Communists and against Chiang Kai-shek in the United States. The American correspondents who visited the Communist areas stayed there for 43 days; most of them had no command of Chinese nor any background of knowledge of Chinese Communism and its relations with Russia. In their reports these visitors displayed an appalling credulity. Some of them had plainly been fooled, others wanted to be deceived. Their reports were inexcusably biased in favor of Communist policy in China.

" . . . the most positive step yet taken in China by any party away from dictatorship and toward democracy," Owen Lattimore reported, was the operation of the "one-in-three" election system of the Communists [see p. 134]. "During the ten years of civil war the Communists . . . had become a peasant party. . . ." Among the peoples of Asia the Soviet Union has "a great power of attraction. . . . It stands for democracy."¹⁸

This was an important point in the pro-Soviet and pro-Communist propaganda campaign of the time: "Chinese Communism is neither a workers' nor a revolutionary movement—it is agrarian in composition and program."

"The Soviet Union cannot have any expansionist tendencies,"

17. *New York Times*, June 21, 1944.

18. Owen Lattimore: *Solution in Asia* (Little, Brown, 1945), pp. 108, 109, 139.

Edgar Snow had repeatedly asserted.¹⁹ Two other correspondents told their readers: "from Pearl Harbor on, the United States became more and more important to the Chinese Communists, the Soviet Union ever more remote. . . . The furious American campaign in the summer of 1944 for Kuomintang reform convinced the Communists that the word 'democracy' meant roughly the same things to the Americans as it meant in northern China."²⁰

Another reporter stated that in their local government "Communist members must submit to majority rule." He went on to say: "In the five months I spent with the Chinese Communists I saw not the slightest tangible connection with Russia. . . . Today the Chinese Communists are no more Communistic than we Americans are."²¹

And American analysts anxiously added: "Soviet postwar objectives in Asia are likely to coincide fully with those of the United States."²² "The policies of China's Communists . . . point toward a progressive China with which this country could work in harmony, while the Chungking Government has tended to move in an unsatisfactory direction."²³

The political consequences of the avalanche of propaganda in favor of the Chinese Communists in Yen-an and Moscow, innocently taken up in Washington and carried out in China, made themselves felt during the last period of the war and for at least a year after its conclusion. Long after the military alliance of the United States and Russia had ended and all the motives for the appeasement of the Soviet Union had ceased to operate, the policy of the United States in China continued to labor under the impact of the propaganda campaign of 1944-45.

Seldom has the Soviet Government been more successful than in this case in attaining its goals by a really brilliant maneuver.

AMERICAN MISCONCEPTIONS

Considerable American pressure was exerted on Chungking to make various offers and concessions to the Communists. In the first

19. For example, *Battle for Asia*, p. 300.

20. White and Jacoby, *op. cit.*, pp. 237, 240-241.

21. Forman, *op. cit.*, pp. 56, 176-177.

22. *Amerasia*, December 15, 1944.

23. Lawrence K. Rosinger, *China's Crisis* (Alfred A. Knopf, 1945), p. 254.

stages of these negotiations the American Ambassador, Patrick J. Hurley, played an important part; he visited Moscow, Chungking, and Yenan, attempting to bring together all the partners of the proposed agreement. He was later succeeded by Gen. George C. Marshall, whose efforts lasted for another year. After almost three years of futile effort the upshot was the only one possible—a complete fiasco. The parleys, in broad outline, reflected the course of American-Soviet relations and depended on the general trends of Soviet policy. From the vantage point of the Soviet power position in Asia, collaboration between Moscow and Washington in the Far East became, with the end of the war, superfluous and even undesirable. The removal of American forces and influence from China, Japan, and Korea became the immediate Soviet concern in 1946. Accordingly the government of Chiang Kai-shek again became an enemy and the Chinese Communists the sole force to be relied upon in China.

It was in May, 1944, that the negotiations, under American sponsorship, started in China. In Sian, at the border of the Communist region, Liu Tsu-han, chairman of the Special Border Region, met with Dr. Wang Shih-chieh, of Chungking. Together they departed for the wartime capital. Chou En-lai, the actual Foreign Minister of the Communists, then joined in the talks, which lasted until October. The Communist negotiators demanded a coalition government with Communist participation; the maintenance of their area's autonomy; the perpetuation of their own army, which was to be loosely attached to the Nationalist forces and was to receive pay and equipment from the Central Government; the legalization of the Communist party throughout China; and the freeing of Communist prisoners.

Chiang Kai-shek was prepared to agree to the maintenance of 10 to 12 Communist divisions, i.e., from 100,000 to 150,000 men (Chou En-lai claimed to have an army of 470,000 men in addition to some two million guerrillas), on the condition that this army would confine its activities to the area assigned to it. All the military forces of China, including the Communists, were to be subordinated to the Chungking High Command. Chiang was ready to appoint a number of Communists to ministerial posts but was not prepared to share supreme authority with them or to grant the Communists influence equal to that of the Kuomintang. He was

obviously intent on keeping the decisive role within the Cabinet.

The future organization of the armed forces was the main stumbling block. In order to reach an agreement, Chiang proposed that three generals (one Communist, one from Chungking, and one American) to be placed in charge of the incorporation of the Communist forces into the Chinese Army. This, as well as similar proposals, was turned down by the Communist party which, while prepared to yield important ground in respect to other issues, would not yield on the question of military control. Chou En-lai shuttled back and forth between Yenan and Chungking during the winter of 1944-45 while the negotiations marked time.

The negotiations broke down early in 1945 after the Communists had refused both to yield a part of their army and to accept an American as a member of the Supreme Military Commission. On March 9 a Communist headquarters statement referred to Chiang Kai-shek as a "despot" and "dictator" and declared that he should be removed and punished; "he spoke like a lunatic," the statement read, "when he suggested that an American officer be placed in command." The statement demanded the immediate termination of the "dictatorship" of the Generalissimo, who had indulged in "gangster talk." Despite the failure of the negotiations—which were officially considered only temporarily suspended—the attitude in the world's capitals remained favorable to the Communists. The latter demanded inclusion in the Chinese delegation to the United Nations Conference at San Francisco; the United States intervened in Chungking, and one Communist delegate, Tung Pi-wu, was named to the Chinese delegation.

Ambassador Hurley tried to discuss the issue of Chinese Communism when he visited the Kremlin in April, 1945. Both Stalin and Molotov adopted the same tactics which had proved so successful in world affairs: having always been in close relations with Chinese Communism and having extolled its achievements so often, elated over the immediate prospects of its growth, they now displayed cool aloofness, almost indifference, in their talks with American diplomats. The American conception that Chinese Communism was "merely an agrarian movement" and that the followers of Mao Tse-tung were "no Communists at all" appears to have pleased Stalin and Molotov greatly. When Ambassador Hurley tried to

find out their attitude toward Chinese Communism, Molotov shrugged his shoulders: "Chinese Communists? They are simple agrarian reformers!" Two months later, at the Potsdam Conference, Stalin again declared that "the Chinese Communists were not real Communists at all."²⁴ On Stalin's part this meant both contempt for his American partners and reliance on their ignorance of Sino-Soviet relations. About the same time that Ambassador Hurley was in Moscow, the official Soviet *War and the Working Class* heartily condemned the Kuomintang, approvingly enumerated all the demands of the Chinese Communist party, and urged their acceptance by Chungking.²⁵ Soon, too, *Izvestiya* repeated in detail all the demands of the Chinese Communists.²⁶

The Soviet declaration of war on Japan and the Japanese surrender offer on August 10 had an electrifying effect on Chinese Communism. With Soviet armies in Manchuria and Japanese armies surrendering all over China, here was the long-awaited moment for which the Communists had groomed themselves all these years. The time had arrived for bold and ambitious action. The future of Communism in China, its future realm, its chances for a telling victory over the Kuomintang—all were to be decided within a matter of weeks—or so it seemed in Yenan.

The same day, August 10, General Chu Teh, the Communist Commander in Chief, issued an order to his officers to "accept the surrender" of the Japanese armies, and the following day he instructed four of his commanders to move into Manchuria to meet and cooperate with the Soviet armies. "To accept the surrender of the Japanese" was the cloak under which a move of tremendous importance was being staged. It involved the automatic shift of cities and provinces from Japanese to Communist control without conflicts with Chiang Kai-shek's forces. A most important region of China, of which Shanghai and Nanking are the capitals, was surrounded by Communist-dominated rural areas, and the possibility of Communist seizure of central China seemed strong. In the north the Communists were strong in Shantung and were prepared to occupy Peiping and Tientsin, while in adjacent Manchuria the occupation was to be effected through Communist collaboration with

24. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, p. 228.

25. *War and the Working Class* (1945), No. 8.

26. *Izvestiya*, June 3, 1945. *

the Soviet Army. Besides the impending creation of a huge Communist Army, the surrender of the Japanese also meant the acquisition by the Communist forces of huge quantities of modern weapons and planes. This would transform the Communist guerrillas into a strong and well-equipped fighting force capable of outdistancing the Nationalist armies.

To the order of Chu Teh concerning the acceptance of surrender, Chiang Kai-shek immediately retorted with an order addressed to the Communist armies to "remain at their posts and wait for orders." But this demand made no impression in Yenan, which was ready to act on its own.

The Chinese people [Yenan replied on August 13] ask that anti-Japanese troops in liberated China under Commander in Chief Chu Teh have the right to send their representatives directly to participate in accepting a Japanese surrender by the Allies, in military control of Japan, and in the coming peace conference. If this demand is not granted, the Chinese people will consider it very inappropriate.

Now Chu Teh was asking for the privilege of sitting in on the surrender ceremonies; he sent a memo to the Big Three envoys in Chungking on this point. He called on the United States "to stop lend-lease to the Kuomintang Government immediately." Chu Teh further demanded that the Communists be given a voice at the peace table and in the future conferences of the United Nations. He went on to tell Chiang Kai-shek that "the Chinese people are dissatisfied with you and your government which cannot represent the broad masses."

Neither Chu Teh nor the Communist leadership in general was aware that the treaty just then being negotiated in Moscow between China and Soviet Russia contained a paragraph under which the Soviet Government pledged itself to render "moral support and assistance" only to the Nationalist Government "as the Central Government of China." This was the condition which China had raised in return for her extensive concessions to Russia. Preparing for war with Japan in alliance with the United States and China, Stalin could not defy Chiang. The forces of the United States converging on Japan were so overwhelming that unilateral action of the Soviet Government against China was out of the question.

Consequently collaboration between the Red Army and the

Chinese Communists could not be overt; the surrender of the Japanese forces to the Chinese Communists could not be officially demanded by Moscow; Chu Teh, in his capacity of military leader of the Communist armies, could not be supported by Russia in his demands for a voice in the armistice and peace negotiations. Mao and Chu had based their grandiose plans on faulty premises, without considering the international situation and the attitude of Moscow, which at that moment was of necessity a circumspect one.

When the real state of affairs became known in Yen-an, the Communist leaders immediately made the best of it and revamped their plans. They no longer insisted on recognition as a sovereign power at international conferences. "We entirely approve of the Sino-Soviet pact," Mao Tse-tung declared, "and hope it can be thoroughly realized."²⁷ They shifted their forces northward from central China and concentrated on the areas—in and around Manchuria—where they were sure to win control under the tacit protection of the Red Army. For the Soviet Government this was a delicate situation, one in which it tried to do as much as it could for the Chinese Communists without openly violating the agreements signed in Moscow only a few weeks earlier.

Washington now advised Chiang Kai-shek to start a new round of negotiations in order at least to gain time. Chiang, who had twice invited Mao Tse-tung to make a personal visit to Chungking in August, now repeated his invitation. This time Mao sent a reply, signed in oriental manner "your younger brother," which said: "My humble self is most willing to come to Chungking to discuss peace and national reconstruction with you." Soon Mao arrived in Chungking and, for the first time in 18 years, since the dramatic break between the Kuomintang and the Communists, he met face to face the man whom he hated more than anyone else.

Chiang and Mao conferred until the middle of October. Their negotiations were as fruitless as the prior efforts.

27. Reuter from Chungking, September 22, 1945.

Part IV./The Spoils of Victory

XIII

The War Is Over

The war ended in September, 1945, and now the change in the position of Russia was so rapid as to be fantastic. Only a few weeks before it had been Japan that confronted Soviet policy and Soviet forces everywhere in the Far East. A few miles from Vladivostok, at the Korean border, stood a Japanese Army; on the island of Sakhalin a border line divided Soviet from Japanese guns; the long frontier between Manchuria and Siberia was manned by a Japanese force. North China, Shanghai, Nanking—all were in Japanese hands. And now, within a matter of weeks, Soviet policy and Soviet forces were everywhere confronting—the United States. Within a matter of weeks the Soviet Union and the United States had filled, with their armies and navies, the vacuum created by Japan's defeat. Korea was divided, and Soviet soldiers faced the Americans at the demarcation line. At the southern tip of Sakhalin Soviet troops were within a few miles of the main Japanese islands occupied by the United States. In China American support was thrown on the scales of the Central Government, while Soviet forces expanded in Manchuria, removing a huge amount of war booty and prolonging their stay beyond the agreed period.

The fact that Russia and the United States had now become close neighbors would not in itself have been a reason for conflict and antagonism. Soviet aspirations had not been satisfied, however. Only the points enumerated in the Yalta and subsequent agreements had been fulfilled. Stalin's great designs for the Far East were still far from realization, and it was the United States that barred the roads to their achievement. The American Commander in Chief in control of Japan tolerated no interference from any quarter; no Soviet zone was established in Japan; in Korea, where the Soviet forces arrived a month ahead of the Americans, the Soviet supporters engaged in feverish activity and sought to establish all over the country a network of committees that were poten-

tial Korean sovicts. But the Americans undid their work, disbanding all of the committees in their area.

In contrast with her situation in Europe, Britain was out as far as the Far East was concerned. The contraction of the Empire had set in, and it had started in the Orient. From a stronghold radiating British power over lands and seas, Hongkong had shrunk to a lonely outpost. In the affairs of the Near East, Iran, Greece, and the Soviet satellites in the Balkans, Britain was still active—at times deploying more energy than did the United States. In the Far East, however, she yielded almost immediately, leaving the political field divided between only two contenders: Russia and America. Antagonism between them flared up and continued to grow in the subsequent years.

The war was over, but the official ideology of Soviet nationalism and patriotism had not yet been relegated to the past. During the war years the slogans of revolution, class struggle, and abolition of capitalism, as well as the Communist International, had been discarded, at least as far as the press and public propaganda were concerned; democracy was praised, and the praise was not qualified by the use of the derogatory adjective "formal." The end of the war did not bring an immediate reversal of ideology or an immediate return to the old slogans. Wartime policy had proved that the presentation of "national interests" and "security" as the ostensible essence of Soviet policy had been capable of securing great successes and gains. Now, with the war won, a reservoir of good will toward Russia and an understanding of her needs had accumulated in the West, making possible, for a certain time, further Soviet advances along the same lines as during the war. A frank return to old-style Communist slogans and terms would have jeopardized Soviet policy at the moment. Diplomatic possibilities had not yet been exhausted; with the use of a little shrewdness and canniness they were susceptible of yielding significant results. Soviet policy still moved along the wartime lines for almost two years before it became obvious that further advances along this road were impossible and that the old methods of the Comintern must be resurrected.

This is why Soviet foreign policy in general, and particularly in the East, had to be expressed in peaceful and democratic terms—

never in those of revolutionary Communism. Aims and ends of course remained the same as before, but everything had to be re-dressed and rephrased. The maintenance of peace and the prevention of future aggression were the only aims avowed. Roots of aggression in the occupied countries must be eradicated. Wars of aggression, according to the Soviet contention, were engendered by specific groups interested in territorial acquisitions and expansion, i.e., "capitalists and landlords." The capitalist class—the industrialists, bankers, trusts, monopolies—had, according to this view, been the mainstay of aggressive governments in Japan, Germany, Italy. To eliminate the danger of war in the future, it was necessary and sufficient to eliminate the great mass of these "war criminals"—actually remove and liquidate the propertied classes of society. Social transformations, termed "social revolution" in pre-war days, were now pictured as the only means of achieving universal lasting peace.

This theory, widely accepted also outside the Soviet frontiers, was, however, in contradiction to the facts. Aggressive wars had occurred in history long before the emergence of a capitalist economy; strong expansionist tendencies are present in Soviet policy despite the abolition of all vestiges of capitalism there, as has been true of Communist Yugoslavia since the end of the war. Imperialist aggression has not been and is not the monopoly of any distinct economic system. Land reforms, the abolition of *zaibatsu* and of German cartels may well be sensible and useful, but after all the solution of social and economic problems, as of so many other problems, could be left up to the peoples concerned. In Communist thinking, on the other hand, the economic transformation of Japan, Germany, and Italy was raised to an issue of *international* concern; the defeated countries had to accept the Soviet concept of imperative social change. The lack of force of Communist minorities in the ex-enemy nations had to be compensated by pressure from an outside power. Wherever the Soviet Union was in control of a nation or a part of a nation, such transformations were carried out; where others were in control—Great Britain or the United States—this remained the Soviet program. Yet the partial or complete abolition of capitalism in Japan, or elsewhere, is in no way tantamount to the eradication of militarism in those countries.

The *political* system of a great nation is more closely related to

problems of war and peace than is its *economic* condition. Highly developed industrial countries like Great Britain, France, and the United States under democratic regimes remained peaceful in recent decades, whereas the dictatorships strove for war. The Soviet Union, a dictatorship, has emerged from the war as the greatest expansionist nation of our time.

Applied to the Far East, the principles of the Soviet postwar program called for the eradication of Japanese capitalism by pressure from outside, regardless of the attitude of the Japanese people itself.

OUSTED FROM JAPAN?

A few days after the signing of the armistice with Japan the Soviet press made the first allusions to disagreements concerning Japan. "The American policy," *Pravda* wrote, "jeopardizes peace in Asia and the relations among the Allies."¹ General MacArthur was in full control of Japanese affairs, and there was no inclination on the part of the United States to share responsibility with other powers. This was precisely the source of the intense irritation which prevailed from September to December, 1945. The Soviet Government wanted a voice in the control of Japan and the right to have her armed forces occupy a certain part of the islands. On September 24 a Soviet memorandum was submitted to the Conference of Foreign Ministers, then meeting in London, demanding that a "control council for Japan," on the model of the Control Council for Germany, be established, on which the four Far Eastern Powers—the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain and China—would be represented.

At this unhappy conference, which broke up in disagreement, the Japanese issue played a considerable role in spite of the fact that it had not been placed on the agenda. Molotov was anxious, before the pattern of the occupation of Japan had hardened and become final, to discuss it and press for acceptance of Soviet demands. Several sessions were devoted to the Japanese question; outside the conference room Molotov conferred with Secretary of State Byrnes, again urging acceptance of the Soviet program. Molotov was generally dissatisfied with the way in which American occupa-

1. *Pravda*, September 17, 1945.

tion authorities were operating in Japan. It was not enough, he argued, to disarm the Japanese; the Allies should compel the former Japanese Army to work for them, as Russia had done with the Japanese in Manchuria, who were being deported to Siberia. Molotov further asked the Secretary of State "whether or not the one or two billion dollars of gold which the Americans had found in Japan, according to the newspapers,"² had anything to do with the American intention to establish unilateral United States rule over Japan. The American reply to the Soviet demands was negative. As far as Japan was concerned, the Allies had pledged at Potsdam that all prisoners of war would be returned to Japan. The proposal of a control council for Japan was rejected; it was known that General MacArthur had strong feelings on this question, and that similar councils in Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria had been rendered impotent by their Soviet chairmen. Mr. Byrnes proposed instead the creation of a Far Eastern Advisory Commission of the ten nations that had fought Japan, the commission to function in Washington. (India had not yet been included.)

The London Conference led to no agreements whatever, and tension rose higher in October: now the Balkan question was the center of contention. Assuming that Stalin would be more inclined toward compromise than Molotov, it was decided in Washington to send Ambassador Harriman, armed with a letter from President Truman, to visit the Premier, then vacationing in the Black Sea resort of Gagry. Stalin read the Truman letter about the Balkans, but his first comment was: "The Japanese question is not touched upon." In his discussions with Harriman on various European problems Stalin again and again returned to the Far Eastern issue. He refused to dispatch a Soviet representative to the Far Eastern Advisory Commission and manifested his protest against American policy in Japan by telling Harriman that he was recalling General Derevyanko from Tokyo. Derevyanko, he said, had been ignored by the Americans and "made a piece of furniture"; all of MacArthur's activities were unsatisfactory, and the Soviet Government was not prepared to play the part of a Far Eastern satellite of the United States. Stalin reiterated that during the war the Soviet Union had kept an army of some 40 divisions on the borders of Manchuria and had entered the conflict with 70 divisions. Re-

2. The reports were soon categorically denied.

turning to the main point of his demands, he insisted that the Soviet Union "had been ready to assist in the occupation of Japan if its offer had been accepted."³

Stalin and Harriman did not succeed in reaching an agreement. Molotov, on November 6, the twenty-eighth anniversary of the Revolution, publicly made known his opposition to United States policy in the Far East when he declared: "The Soviet Union attributed great importance to the negotiations among the Allies concerning the establishment of due control by the major Allied Powers over conditions of capitulation of Japan. On this question the difficulties that have arisen have not yet been overcome."

By the end of November the American Government decided to try to reach a new agreement with Moscow on the Far East as well as on other outstanding questions. Mr. Byrnes suggested another Conference of Foreign Ministers; Moscow accepted, and in the latter part of December, 1945, the foreign ministers again gathered in Moscow. Proposals and attempts at compromise were widely discussed. Again the occupation of Hokkaido by Russian troops was brought up; under the plan for this occupation 20,000 Red Army men were to go to Japan. A full-fledged control commission of the Allies was to be set up in Tokyo. Again General MacArthur refused to acquiesce in these proposals.⁴

Everything remained in abeyance.

LONG-RANGE PLANS FOR MANCHURIA

Soviet-Chinese friendship was at its highest point when the Far Eastern war ended—or so it appeared. A week before the signing of the Japanese surrender aboard the *Missouri* the new treaties between Russia and China that had just been drawn up were ratified in Moscow and Chungking, and the newspapers of both countries enthusiastically hailed the event. Stalin's statement that the new agreement would serve as a "firm basis for the further development of friendly relations between the USSR and China for the benefit and prosperity of our peoples" was reiterated in all sections of the

3. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, pp. 213-217.

4. General MacArthur had threatened to resign if the Soviet proposal were adopted. MacArthur denied this when the report appeared in the press, yet it is known to have been true.

press. The Moscow *New Times* made the diplomatic comment that if there had been disagreements between the two nations in the past, these had been "a result of the machinations of the Japanese militarists and of the intrigues of other imperialist forces."

Soviet troops by this time were deep in Manchuria, but who dared to doubt that in accordance with the Moscow agreements the activity of these troops would be limited to disarming the Japanese and restoring occupied regions to the sovereignty of the Central Government, and that they would evacuate Chinese territory within the agreed period of three months?

The internal situation in China seemed to have undergone a sudden improvement, and the prospects for peace and the establishment of order were better than ever. The day after the surrender Mao Tse-tung, the Communist leader, called on the Generalissimo to begin negotiations, which were soon widely reported to be developing most promisingly. Cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist party was in the offing; a coalition government appeared imminent. Peace and prosperity for China were virtually assured: so it seemed to a multitude of observers in Chungking.

When it became clear a few weeks later that despite all the upheavals in Far Eastern relations a grave Manchurian problem still existed, the world was startled. Manchukuo was dead; Japan had capitulated; Stalin's solemn declaration on Manchuria had been unequivocal. Was there any reason to expect trouble over Manchuria?

For the Soviet Government the Manchurian problem remained far from solved.

Forty years almost to the day had gone by since Russia had been defeated in Manchuria. When Russia withdrew Manchuria was a backward and thinly populated country of no significance in world affairs. Its population amounted to about ten million; industry was almost nonexistent; the country was known to the outside world for its "boxers" and "khunghuzs," who were viewed by superficial observers as mere bandits. Now the Russian Army returned to find a great country with a population equal to that of France, a highly developed economy, a network of railroads, and an industry of the most modern type. Agriculture had made great strides and

foreign trade had flourished, with the Japanese reaping the better part of the harvest. Southern Manchuria in particular had made great progress. No other country in the world had developed at so rapid a pace during these 40 years as had Manchuria. Unlike France, with its static population, Manchuria held promise for the future; it possessed free land and undeveloped mineral resources and was well on the way toward further development. Within a few decades its population might grow to 60, 80, perhaps even 100 million. Even as a separate state Manchuria was a potential great power in the Far East. Already its population was ten times that of the Soviet Far East. True, Manchuria had no forces or reserves to enable her to develop without outside help; Japan was down, and China was poor. It was anticipated that American interest in Manchuria would be manifested by both economic and political penetration. Moscow looked forward to a growing antagonism with the United States; it considered Manchuria a potential ally of the United States and China—if, and so long as, Manchuria remained free of Soviet influence.

Moscow had two policies in store for Manchuria. The immediate Soviet program was simple and narrow, hence insufficient: it called for the neutralization of Manchuria's military and economic potential by the destruction of her war and other industries. This would vouchsafe the security of the Soviet Far East, but for a short time only. After a few years industrial plants could be rebuilt, mines reopened, and railroads put back into operation. The second set of policies, therefore, aimed at an effective and lasting settlement of the Manchurian problem by means of establishing a "friendly government" in Manchuria and, in one way or another, placing it under the control of the Soviet Union. This was one of those cases in which the Soviet Government, pursuing its peculiar brand of security, reverted to the moldy blueprints of prerevolutionary Russia. The dangers implicit in such a policy were well known to Moscow. But now there was one very important factor—it was said—which had been absent during tsarist times: a large and popular pro-Soviet movement inside China—the Communist party and its armies.

Reduced to its simplest terms, the Moscow policy aimed at the acquisition of Manchuria. In making his solemn pledge of "respect

for China's full sovereignty over Manchuria," Stalin had the same mental reservations that he had had in other similar cases: a nation is sovereign even when under Soviet control; a "friendly" Chinese government means a sovereign China; so long as any other kind of government rules over the Chinese people, the formula is something less than 100 per cent applicable.

At the very time that the Chinese Premier and Russian Foreign Minister were negotiating the new treaties in the Kremlin, Soviet agencies were hard at work preparing for the large-scale removal of Manchuria's industry. The work began immediately upon the Soviet troops' taking possession of Manchuria's industrial centers. Soviet engineers arrived in considerable numbers; the NKVD was on the job; Japanese prisoners were put to work. Heavy machinery, tools, grinders, huge dynamos, hundreds of turbines and generators and rolling stock were removed. Attention was focused on aluminum, iron and steel plants, and on magnesium, lead, and zinc factories. The equipment was removed in part by railroad directly to Russia, in part to the southern ports of Manchuria to be shipped to Vladivostok by sea. In the course of a few months the job was nearly completed. The aggregate value of the "evacuated" installations and machinery was huge, impossible of measurement by any standards. The American Reparations Commission, which visited Manchuria in June, 1946, estimated the direct damage at \$858,000,000, while the total damage, including deterioration and cost of replacement, was put at over \$2,000,000,000. The Soviet side set the value of the removed equipment at \$97,000,000.⁵

The legal basis for this wholesale removal, as advanced by Moscow to the Allies, was the right of acquisition of war booty. Of course this explanation was not taken seriously by the Soviet authorities themselves; the term "booty" in international law and practice has never been extended to include industrial installations. While the Soviet press did not report the occurrence of these events in Manchuria, the international press has referred to it as looting unique in the history of war. When similar action was applied in Germany there was at least the justification of acting against a formidable enemy. But China was an ally, presumably entitled to the

5. United States, Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1946, p. 1154, and *Izvestiya*, January 29, 1947.

riches created under Japanese rule by the work of Chinese, on Chinese soil, at least as partial reparations for eight years of wartime devastation at the hands of the Japanese.

As early as September, 1945, the Chinese Government dispatched a note to the USSR and to the United States stating that it claimed all Japanese property in China (including Manchuria) should revert to China.⁶ Publicly, however, the Chinese Government maintained silence on this subject for a long time. Nevertheless, public opinion in China was beginning to throw off the naïve illusions about the new golden age in Sino-Soviet relations. The attitude of the Chinese Communists was most significant. They had long dreamed of becoming a great labor party; they hoped that after Manchuria's reincorporation into China they would attain the level reached by European mass workers' movements. To the Communists in China, more than to any other party, industrialization has been the measure of progress. In the eyes of the primitive Marxists of the backward Orient, just as in the eyes of Russian Communists, The Machine is endowed with almost magical power. Now, at one stroke, all these hopes and dreams were shattered as the industrial population of southern Manchuria began to starve and to return to the villages. If the Chinese Communists had possessed a shred of the independence so many "experts" used to allege they had, they would have joined in the general indignation against the Soviet action in Manchuria. As a matter of fact, not one word of protest, not even the slightest criticism of the Soviet operation, was voiced by the Chinese Communists. "I feel that the movement of the machinery," Li Li-san, the newly arrived leader of the Communists in Manchuria, declared in a speech in Harbin, "is not an important problem at all. Of course the Soviet Union moved some machinery but not a large amount compared with its war losses."⁷ The loyalty of the Chinese Communists to the Soviet Union was put to a severe test and proved unswerving. In mentality and attitude they were now ripe for the role of glorified puppets in the great designs of the Soviet Union.

Along with the Red Army, two other Soviet agencies—the Commissariats of Foreign Trade and of Transportation—immediately

6. *New York Times*, March 15, 1946.

7. *Daily Worker* (New York), July 26, 1946.

began to operate in Manchuria. These two agencies were often rivals. The latter was assigned the task of taking over the railways in accordance with the Moscow treaties, while the Foreign Trade agency had the task of acquiring for the Soviet Union the "commanding heights" of the Manchurian economy. If there is such a thing as economic imperialism, the Commissariat of Foreign Trade was its executive and standard-bearer for the Soviet Union.

The railway people were inclined to cooperate with the Chinese in a friendly manner; they had nothing to do with the Chinese Communists. There was even a case of an arrest of a group of Chinese officials by Communist troops in Szepingkai, in which the Soviet railway men dispatched a special train, freed the prisoners, and returned them to Changchun. The Foreign Trade agents, on the other hand, tried to act like empire builders—Soviet Rhodeses in the Far East. Enjoying the particular favor of the Commander in Chief, Marshal Malinovsky, they soon began negotiations with representatives of the Central Government for the reorganization of Manchuria's economy. In November, 1945, Malinovsky handed the Chinese negotiators a list enumerating 26 points of a Soviet economic program for Manchuria. In their initial form the demands were rather far reaching. They included Soviet-Chinese development of the giant Anshan iron and coal mines, Soviet navigation rights on the Sungari River, joint ownership and operation of all Japanese and puppet electric enterprises, of the Kirin-Heilungkiang gold mines, and of the arsenals in Manchuria.⁸

A number of Sino-Soviet "mixed companies" were to be established for the control of industry. These companies were to embrace 90 per cent of all metallurgical works, 85 per cent of the coal output, 95 per cent of electric power, and a large part of chemical and machine-building installations. It was also proposed that a certain group of industries be made the property of the joint Chinese-Changchun Railway, which was already half Soviet, half Chinese. In most cases the general manager—according to the Soviet proposals—was to be appointed by the Soviet side. Later in the process of negotiation, however, the demands were scaled down.

In addition, the Soviet Mission in Changchun claimed the property rights to all Japanese enterprises acquired by Russia during the period when the Red Army was issuing its own occupation cur-

8. Associated Press, November 25, 1945.

rency; there were 41 such enterprises in Manchuria. This currency, which was circulated primarily for the needs of the Red Army, was not recognized by the Central Government; the Soviet negotiators insisted that it be redeemed by the Chinese Government agencies.⁹

For China there was little prospect of benefit from such arrangements. Future investments—large amounts of which were badly needed—would be unlikely to come from Russia; China also feared that Soviet management of all industry, along with the Soviet controlling positions in Port Arthur and Darien, would actually lead to a political separation of Manchuria from China.

The Red Army, whose presence in Manchuria was the principal means of Soviet pressure, was to withdraw not later than December 2—three months after the signing of the armistice with Japan. Yet the negotiations were more protracted than was anticipated. Moscow therefore decided to prolong the military occupation. At the end of November, 1945, the Soviet command informed the Chinese that Moscow was “prepared” to postpone the evacuation of its armies “in order to assist the Chinese Government in the difficult task of establishing its authority in Manchuria” against Chinese-Communist resistance. Tass, the official Soviet news agency, then published a dispatch to the effect that the Soviet Army had been ready to leave by December 3 but that the Chinese Commander in Manchuria, Gen. Hsiung Shih-hui, had told Marshal Malinovsky repeatedly that “nongovernmental troops have made it difficult to introduce Chinese troops and administration into Manchuria.” Therefore, Tass continued, the Soviet Government “has given its consent to postponing the removal of Soviet troops from Manchuria for one month, and this has been acknowledged by the Chinese Government with great satisfaction.” The wording of the Soviet statement was diplomatic, in the old sense of the term.

There was a further delay in the evacuation of Soviet troops. The real reason for this was the obstinacy of the Chinese in the negotiations concerning the future of Manchuria's economy. Had the Chinese given in to the demands of the Foreign Trade Commissariat, the Soviet troops could have left promptly. Marshal Malinovsky was sometimes quite frank: “I know that you are fed up with me,” he would tell the Chinese negotiators, “but I have to fulfill my duty.”

9. *New York Times*, March 24, 1946.

The great design of keeping Manchuria under Soviet protection as a friendly power seemed a difficult and complex undertaking, hardly realizable within a short time. There were no Communist armed forces in Manchuria when the Red Army began its occupation; the few illegal party groups were small and scattered; resistance of the Central Government to Soviet control of Manchuria under any form had to be expected; finally, there was no doubt that the United States would vigorously oppose the sovietization of Manchuria.

In actuality, the task was performed far more easily and within a much shorter time than had been anticipated.

There were a number of foreign consuls and missionaries in Manchuria when the Red Army started its march; soon newspapermen arrived too. They were now asked to leave. A small group of Americans was allowed to complete the rescue of General Wainwright and 1,700 American prisoners of war; but the Red Army rushed the evacuation of all Americans and was glad to see them finally depart on September 19.¹⁰

At first the people of Manchuria, nonpolitical and unorganized, were enthusiastic in their support of the Chinese Central Government. The officers and men of the former Manchukuo Army, who constituted an active element, now looked to Chungking. The officers, on Soviet orders, were arrested, questioned by the NKVD, and confined to concentration camps. All Chinese able to speak Russian and who assisted the Soviet command in the negotiations with the Manchurian units were incorporated into the Soviet service as interpreters; some of them were later sent to the Soviet Union.

Communist groups were anything but inconspicuous. When Soviet troops began to move into Manchuria, on August 11, Gen. Chu Teh issued his famous order to four Chinese Communist Army groups to proceed to the northeast, into the Provinces of Chahar, Jehol, Mukden, and Kirin. Their movement, Chu Teh said, was "to coordinate with the operations of the Soviet Army which is now fighting on Chinese territory."

Contact between the Chinese Communists and the Red armies in Manchuria was precisely what the Chinese Government feared most and what the Soviet Government had solemnly promised not

10. George Moorad, *Behind the Iron Curtain* (Fireside Press, 1946), p. 291; Associated Press, October 6, 1945.

to promote. Indeed, this promise was considered as the most valuable payment received by the Central Government in return for the substantial concessions made to Russia under the August treaties. To fulfill its pledge the Soviet Government, promptly after Chu Teh's order, informed the Chinese Communist leadership that no Communist Army would be permitted in Manchuria. A high-ranking Soviet officer flew to Communist headquarters to announce this decision; what other negotiations he conducted there have not become known, but his instructions as to Communist armies in Manchuria were complied with to the letter: no Chinese Communist Army units, i.e., groups of armed and uniformed men, tried to penetrate into Soviet-occupied Manchuria. What did occur, however, was a tremendous movement of unarmed Communist "civilians" into Manchuria from the west and south. There were instances also of organized army units, flying Kuomintang banners, which got as far as the cities of southern Manchuria, and the Soviet radio at Khabarovsk announced the arrival of Chinese armies to take over limited areas: soon the Kuomintang banners were furled and the Red Star insignia reappeared.¹¹

Uniforms and weapons were actually unnecessary for the Communist penetration of Manchuria. The country the Communists were entering was one huge arsenal accumulated during 14 years by a Japanese Army in preparation for a great war against the Soviet Union or even against China and Russia simultaneously. Only a part of these weapons was used by the Soviet forces—for example, by the new police force and army being set up in Northern Korea. When the Communists arrived, unarmed, they were not issued weapons by the Soviet authorities. The Chinese Communists, however, knew what they were doing: they entered warehouses and opened arsenals, and quickly rearmed from Japanese stocks. Within a few weeks they had become a formidable force. They then proceeded toward the south, to the new "frontier," where the forces of the Central Government were expected to arrive shortly on their march to reoccupy the "liberated provinces" of Manchuria.

The Chinese Communist armies that had moved into Manchuria were of sundry composition. Three armies were considered Manchurian: they consisted of remnants of Manchurian forces that had been obliged to leave their homeland early in the 'thirties after the

11. *New York Times*, November 30, 1945.

Japanese attack on the Northeastern Provinces. They had formerly been led by Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, who was interned in the Province of Kweichow because of his attempt to kidnap Chiang Kai-shek in 1936. But two brothers of the Marshal carried on the tradition of the Chang family and headed the drive into Manchuria. One of them, Chang Hsu-shih, was appointed Governor of the rich industrial Province of Mukden. At first the "popular," non-Communist, character of this movement was stressed, and the armies were given various names: People's Democratic Army, United Democratic Army, etc. The Communist press in the West emphatically denied the Communist character of these forces, and the Soviet press referred to them ambiguously as "nongovernmental." In this case a shrewd maneuver had been pushed too far; a few months later the Manchurian armies were tacitly acknowledged to be a part of the Communist forces.¹²

Another section of the Communists' forces that moved into Manchuria was parts of the former Communist Fourth and Eighth Armies.

A third and most important component of the Communist forces was Chinese regulars and civilians with military rank who had arrived from the Soviet Union (and were usually called "Union Communist"). These troops had been organized on Soviet soil out of different Chinese detachments which had left Manchuria in the 1930's. A considerable number of Chinese Communists who had spent years in Russia came with them. This force, which at first fanned out over the northern, traditionally Russian, part of Manchuria, brought with it technical and administrative skill, discipline, and loyalty to Russia; it was to play a primary role in the future of Manchuria.

A peculiar development affected the Russian émigrés in Manchuria as well as in the rest of China. There were more than 50,000 Russians in Manchuria who had fled during the Russian Revolution; many of them expected punishment from the Soviet authorities. Their most important center was Harbin, capital of northern Manchuria, where from 30,000 to 40,000 of these people resided. A considerable number of arrests had been made among them soon after the arrival of Soviet troops; the fate of the arrested remains

12. As early as July, 1946, *Pravda* spoke of "people's armies under Communist leadership."

largely unknown. One group, consisting of Gen. Grigori Semionov and seven other former military and political leaders of the anti-Bolshevik "White" movement during the Russian Revolution, was brought to Moscow and tried in August, 1946; six men were executed, and the two others sentenced to 15 and 20 years of hard labor.

The Russians remaining in Harbin were offered Soviet citizenship, although only a minority were permitted to return to Russia. The impression that the Soviet Government had changed its inner orientation and espoused a more liberal policy during the war prevailed not only in Manchuria but also among Russian émigrés elsewhere. About 7,000 Russians in Harbin, 3,000 in Manchouli, and 1,000 in Dairen—still only a minority—filed applications for Soviet citizenship. In Shanghai, where there was a large Russian colony, a few thousand émigrés obtained Soviet passports, and some of them departed for Russia.¹³

The Communist entrance into Manchuria was synchronized with diplomatic measures and the policies of Soviet authorities in Manchuria and was swiftly executed. Chungking was confused; it could not believe that within the short period of a month or two Manchuria had been lost. Mao Tse-tung, the "Chinese Stalin," was quietly negotiating, in Chungking, for the new constitution, a coalition government, and peaceful cooperation in China. The Nationalist forces, with American aid, were being equipped to go to Manchuria.

But a series of "misunderstandings" occurred—a comedy of errors unequalled in the history of diplomacy. There were various ways for the Nationalist armies to reach Manchuria from northern China. There was the overland route from Peiping-Tientsin to Mukden-Changchun; there was the sea lane to the five ports of southern Manchuria; and, finally, there was the possibility of transferring troops by American planes to the numerous Japanese-built airfields in southern Manchuria.

It was suddenly discovered that the overland roads were blocked by well-armed Communist detachments. On November 9 the Communist command issued a blunt "stay out" warning to the Nationalist troops waiting at the Great Wall on Manchuria's border. Al-

13. *Pravda*, January 6 and February 14, 1946.

ready the government forces had proved inadequate; the Communists had announced an armed force of 200,000; besides, Chungking was anxious to avoid a civil war at the gates of Manchuria.

Now negotiations began concerning the landing of Nationalist armies in Manchurian ports. Soviet consent was necessary since the Red Army occupied the areas in question. A Chinese Military Mission arrived in Changchun, capital of Manchuria, to negotiate with Marshal Malinovsky. But strange obstacles arose. Port Arthur seemed to be the desirable place for the debarkation of an army, but the Soviet negotiators declared that this would not be in accordance with the treaty providing for the lease of Port Arthur to the Soviet Union. The next best base was the huge port of Dairen, but Dairen—the Soviet side replied—was classified as a commercial, not a military, port. Hulutao was then demanded by the Chinese; the Soviet command retorted that Soviet troops had just left this port and it therefore could not guarantee the safety of the Chinese troops to be landed there (the two cities were occupied by the Chinese Communists).¹⁴ When the American convoy carrying Central Government troops to Manchuria approached the port of Hulutao, the Chinese Communists opened fire; there were no casualties, but the ships turned back. There remained only the port of Yingkow. On October 29 Marshal Malinovsky agreed that Chinese Nationalist troops could start landing at Yingkow and that Soviet troops would leave the port by November 10. Soviet troops were evacuated, however, before that date, and now the Communists, who were in control, threatened to open fire on the American convoy. Adm. Daniel Barbey, commander of the convoy, decided to leave. Some Chinese troops did land, along with United States Marines, at Chinwangtao, only to learn that the locomotives and railway cars had been removed elsewhere.

Now the only access to Manchuria was by air. Again negotiations commenced in Changchun; again the Soviet command was most friendly and professed loyalty to the agreements. It agreed to the daily arrival of Chinese at the airfield of Changchun; it insisted, however, that no more than 1,500 soldiers a day could be handled there, and these only during the last few days before the evacuation of the Red Army. Actually Communist troops deployed on the outskirts of the city were strong enough to attack and destroy any such small units of government forces which should arrive. Some

14. *Ibid.*, November 30, 1945.

use was made of air transports, but this never reached decisive proportions and represented no substantial aid to the Central Government.

By this time—the middle of November, 1945—the Western world was already full of reports that “Manchuria was lost for the Nationalists.” About 500 members of the Chinese administration, dispatched to Changchun by the Central Government to take over Manchuria and head the various branches of the local government, returned to Chungking since there was no prospect of their being able to carry out their contemplated duties. Only a small liaison group remained to negotiate.

Most reluctant to acknowledge defeat was the Chinese Government itself. It sounded no alarming note, raised no loud protests, and even sought to silence the Chinese press. This peculiar behavior of China in dealing with a powerful and ruthless neighbor had already become traditional. During the “incidents” with Japan, weak China tried hard not to “irritate” the attacker by vigorous protestations or public demonstrations of antagonism. Rather she invoked words of friendship and agreements and treaties long since broken by her adversary. Now, in its attitude toward Soviet policy, the Chinese Government tried to employ the same methods. It appeased Chinese public opinion and failed to publish reports on the Changchun negotiations or the real state of affairs in Manchuria. It clung to the Moscow treaties and stressed the existence of Sino-Soviet friendship. It pretended to believe that there was real antagonism between the Soviet forces in Manchuria and Chinese Communists in and around the northern provinces. It repeatedly appealed for Soviet help against the rebels as if it did not understand the aims of Malinovsky's tactics. When the Soviet “dismantling” of Manchurian industry and the Soviet-protected Communist drive into Manchuria were at their height, Chiang Kai-shek made a friendly gesture toward Russia, stating, on October 15, that he “felt sure that Soviet forces in Manchuria would be withdrawn in accordance with the Sino-Soviet pact.”

One month later Chiang yielded to the postponement of Soviet evacuation from Manchuria on condition that the Soviet forces help the Nationalist armies take over the Mukden area. After the deal was concluded Nationalist troops arriving from northern China suddenly discovered that the Chinese Communists were

putting up no resistance. Early in December the Nationalist forces entered the Mukden area. The obedience of the Chinese Communists to Soviet instructions was startling. But before leaving Mukden somewhat later, the Soviet Army had erected fortifications on the road to Changchun. When the Nationalist troops started their northward movement they encountered the Communists at these fortifications. It took them six weeks to overcome the resistance.

By the middle of December, when the Chinese issue emerged as a major point on the agenda of the Moscow Foreign Ministers' Conference, Chinese Communist armies were entrenched all over rural Manchuria. At the same time the Soviet press was denouncing the United States for intervening in Chinese affairs and helping the Chungking government in the civil strife. Removal of all American forces from China became the most important demand of both the Soviet Government and the Chinese Communists.

KOREA REAPPEARS

For a period of 35 years Korea had been an internal problem of the Japanese Empire. With the defeat of Japan, in 1945, Korea re-emerged as a subject of international relations. It was widely assumed that at the end of the war political independence and sovereignty would be granted the Koreans. In no other country was this prospect stressed as emphatically as in the Soviet Union. The political leadership, the general press, special studies and university courses expounded the certainty that, once Japanese imperialism should cease to oppress the backward nations of the Far East, Korea would be the first to regain genuine independence.

There were sizable groups of Koreans living in Russia, particularly in the Far East. In 1926, 172,000 Koreans resided in the Soviet Union; at the time of the 1939 census their number was 180,000. The Maritime Province, bordering directly on Korea, contained areas in which Koreans constituted compact communities. With an eye on Japan, the Soviet Government had devoted much attention to these Koreans of the Russian Far East. In 1922 a special "Korean Section" was established in the Far Eastern offices of the Communist party; about 1,000 Koreans joined. By 1925-26, after

the initial purges, 500 to 600 Koreans remained in the party, and a further increase in membership was soon noted. One hundred and sixty-three Korean Youth League cells were established, with a membership of over 5,000. What was more important, certain areas were designated as Korean territories, and here the local soviets conducted their affairs in the Korean language. On September 29, 1927, the Presidium of the Executive Committee in Moscow decreed a program of training Korean teachers and physicians, encouragement and support of Korean literature, and construction of Korean hospitals. During the 'thirties, when relations with Japan had become strained, numbers of Korean Communists had fled to Russia, while the Comintern had militantly supported various illegal organizations which had been active under Japanese domination. The ties binding Korea's Communist groups to the Soviet Far East were manifold and close, and there were hardly any among the Communist leaders in Korea who had not visited Russia, or been educated in Soviet schools.

A mass migration of Koreans into adjacent Manchuria had taken place; nearly one million Koreans were registered there before the war; certain Korean groups resided in China proper. While the Koreans in the Soviet Union represented the nucleus of a future Communist Korea, those in China had as their goal Korean independence without Soviet or Communist orientation. A "Provisional Korean Government" had existed in China for many years under the leadership of Kim Koo, the terrorist hero of Korean anti-Japanese movements. Syngman Rhee was the representative of this movement in the United States. These geographically dispersed groups of Koreans gave birth to the parties and armies of the post-war period—when Korea was to have regained her right to international sovereignty: Koreans from Soviet Russia became the leaders of the Northern Korea Government and of the Communist party in Southern Korea; Syngman Rhee and Kim Koo headed the Korean democratic groups. The Manchurian Koreans served as a source of man power for the armies operating in Communist China as well as in Soviet-occupied Northern Korea.

In no other country, apparently, have political émigrés played as important a role as they did in Korea after the end of the war. Japan's policy in Korea had aimed at the "denationalization" of the people; the leading positions in government and economy had been

in Japanese hands for over three decades;⁶ no political parties or organizations were permitted; use of the Korean language was systematically discouraged; even in public schools teaching of the Korean language had ceased. An organized Korean nationalist movement was impossible under Japan. In political, economic, and cultural respects the population remained backward. This is why, after the defeat of Japan, it was the old political émigrés, often septuagenarians and octogenarians, who assumed leading positions in Korea's political life.

The Communist émigrés belonged to a younger generation; most of them had fled Korea after the first World War; some had returned to Korea from Russia for work in the underground—often to be jailed by the Japanese. Communist groups, although small and illegal, were almost the only political organizations active in Korea during the last decade. They were in contact with Soviet agencies in Tokyo and even more so with Korean Communists inside the Soviet Union.

During the war Korean Communist activity on Russian soil was a cause of embarrassment to the Soviet Government, as had been the activity of Japanese émigrés in Russia. Their work could jeopardize Soviet-Japanese relations at a time when Moscow needed Japanese neutrality. Therefore, in the early 'forties, Yenan, capital of Communist China, became the headquarters of a miniature Communist International of the Far East. Along with the leaders of Chinese Communism, the so-called Japanese Emancipation League, under Okano, was organizing the cadres of the future legal Japanese Communist party. A Korean Emancipation League with a membership of nearly 2,000, and headed by Moo Chung, Kim Tupang, and Professor Kim Tai-choon, was likewise founded near Yenan. Russian Communism, officially inconspicuous in Yenan, was of course very much alive in the background. The two Chinese cities of Chungking and Yenan during the last years of the war thus harbored two Korean groups—the so-called Provisional Government under Kim Koo, supported by Nationalist China, and the Emancipation League, supported by Moscow. In China, the fight between the two great political parties assumed the forms of territorial division. Soon this pattern of geographic partition between the major contending forces was to be reapplied in renascent Korea.

For the first time during the war the future of Korea was discussed between President Roosevelt and British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden in March, 1943. It was Roosevelt's idea to place Korea under trusteeship, with China as the logical chief trustee. In a sense, the President's ideas ran toward a restoration of the entire Far East to its status early in this century, before the ascendancy of Japan.

At the Cairo Conference in November, 1943, where President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill met with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, with Soviet representatives absent, a Declaration concerning Far Eastern affairs was signed which for the first time officially mentioned the future of Korea: ". . . The aforesaid three Great Powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent." The words "in due course" became a source of concern to Korean nationalists in both China and the United States.

Soviet plans for Korea had to be laid down in 1945—between the Yalta Conference in February and the Soviet entry into the war early in August. Strategically, the importance of Korea lies in the fact that the port of Vladivostok is situated 70 miles from the Korean border and any Great Power in control of Korea would be in a position to attack this key base. In a sense, the geographic position of Vladivostok is analogous in importance to that of Leningrad, 15 miles from the Finnish border prior to the Russo-Finnish war of 1939-40. To the Soviet Government the simple solution of annexing neighboring territory has appeared as the most desirable and expedient means of securing its borders. International complications arising out of such a course are usually minimized by the Kremlin.

But Korea, from Moscow's point of view, seemed to be a more fertile field of activity than Finland had ever been. Korea had known no real political activity for many years. Oppressed, to a large extent illiterate, politically inarticulate, Korea seemed to represent as rich a soil for large-scale political and social transformation as did the peasant regions of China.

On August 9, 1945, the Soviet Union entered the Far Eastern war, and on the 12th the first Soviet troops arrived in Korea. On the 14th Japan announced her surrender, and General MacArthur issued instructions for the Japanese armies in Korea north of the

38th parallel to surrender to the Red Army; the surrender south of the 38th parallel was to be accepted by American forces. Now a formidable Soviet Army, comprising also thousands of Korean troops, entered Korea from the north and east. These Korean émigrés, and sons of émigrés, were to perform an operation of crucial importance to the Soviet Government. For a short time Kanko [Hamhung], a city of 120,000 population, became the capital of Northern Korea. Wherever the Red Army came, the enthusiasm of the population was great and genuine. An arch of triumph was erected at the city gates which bore the inscriptions, "The Soviet Union—Hurrah!" and "Hurrah the Red Army!" Civilians returning to Korea from Russia and Communist China were joined by Korean Communists liberated from prisons; wherever they arrived they found excited and enthusiastic crowds—with no understanding of current events except the evidence of Japanese defeat.

The Japanese administration was to be swiftly replaced by the new custodians of power, the rapidly spreading "People's Committees." Some of these local committees "to preserve law and order" had been created by Japanese Governor Nobuyuki Abe during the very last stage of the war, when it became clear that the Japanese would be forced out of Korea. The Koreans invited into these committees were on the whole men without political affiliation but who were animated by the prospect of national liberation. A few Korean "liberals" also joined; the most prominent of these was Lyuh Woon Heung, a well-known anti-Japanese leader. As soon as the Korean Communists were released from prison, they hastened to join these committees or to create new ones¹⁵ and to make their weight felt before any other party established itself on Korean soil. Soon trade-unions began to grow. Although at first outwardly only another nonparty organization, they were clearly under control of the Communist party. The first Council of Trade-Unions, claiming to represent 1,194 unions in 15 different trades, met in Seoul on November 5, 1945.

The Americans were slow in arriving. Not until September 8—almost a month after the Soviet Army had entered Korea—did the first American ship, carrying Gen. John R. Hodge, approach the shores of Korea. Two days before its arrival a Congress of Korean "People's Committees," with more than 1,000 delegates at-

15. *Novyi mir* (1946), No. 4.

tending, convened in Seoul. The congress, under the strong influence of a small but active Communist minority, proclaimed the "Korean People's Republic" and appointed a "Provisional Commission," designed to evolve into a provisional government; at its head was Dr. Lyuh Woon Heung himself. Popular elections were decreed to take place on March 31, 1946. The commission now claimed to speak on behalf of the people of Korea and sought to present the arriving Americans with an accomplished fact.

The heads of the "People's Republic" boarded General Hodge's ship and transmitted to the general a letter in which the American Military Government was informed of the formation of the "Provisional Commission" and of the forthcoming elections. The local People's Committees, the American Government was informed, were to become the administrative agencies of the new Korean Government.

General Hodge refused to recognize the "People's Republic" as a government, and the People's Committees as the local administration. Instead, he proceeded gradually to reorganize the old administrative machinery without immediately removing all the Japanese government employees; he deemed their experience and knowledge of local conditions valuable enough to warrant their retention and saw no danger in their continued employment so long as it proceeded under strict American control. Thus the first friction arose between the American Military Government in Korea and the Communist agencies, the latter strongly backed by the Soviet Military Command in the north. The Soviet press as well as the pro-Communist publications in Korea accused the Americans of "disregarding the popular will" and of showing a conciliatory attitude toward the Japanese. "Self-appointed officials," General Hodge announced, "political groups, big or little conferences 'representing all the people,' and the self-styled Government of the Republic of Korea are entirely without any authority, power or reality." The promise of elections to be held in March, 1946, was "a fraud on the Korean people." Whereas in Northern Korea, under Soviet occupation, the People's Committees were formally made the constitutional basis of the new structure, in the south they soon went out of existence.

This somewhat primitive attempt to extend Soviet control over all of Korea through the medium of the People's Committees (ac-

tually Korean soviets) proved to be a failure. Obviously, the task was difficult and needed time. A circuitous course, involving a series of political maneuvers, was necessary if the Soviet goal was to be attained. Northern Korea had to be built up into a spring-board for a future Korean nationalist movement whose purpose would be the unification of the whole country under Soviet guidance. Considerable time—several years at least—would be required to accomplish this. In miniature, the program raised the same problems as those presented by Germany in Europe.

The division of Korea into two separate states was the inevitable consequence of these policies. During the Yalta Conference an "informal" agreement to the division of Korea for purposes of military operations was reached between Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill. Later, at Potsdam, prior to Russia's entry into the war, the military staffs agreed on the 38th parallel as the demarcation line between the Russians advancing from the north and the Americans coming from the south.¹⁶ It was then considered a line for short-range military convenience. Now the Soviet authorities made it a solid political and economic border. Movement of goods across this line ceased in October-November, 1945; inhabitants of Southern Korea were generally not admitted into the north; railway connections between the two zones were severed; with some temporary exceptions even postal service between north and south virtually ceased to function.

The development of Northern Korea took its own course, which was profoundly different from that in the south. The gulf between the two Korean states deepened with the passing of each month. Whatever the future of Korea may bring, the traces of this separation will probably have a lasting effect on the course of the country's life.

A division of Korea at the 38th parallel at first seemed unbelievable to the Korean people and provoked opposition in all parts of the country. Popular demonstrations took place, excitement and violence were widespread. At this first stage of the division even the Communist party protested against the "parallel"; without understanding the underlying motives of Soviet policy, the Korean Communists in the south joined in the general nationalist move-

16. This is according to George M. McCune, chief of the Korean Division in the State Department in 1945. *Far Eastern Survey* (1946), No. 3.

ment. Pak Heung Yung, at the time top Korean Communist, demanded, in October, 1945, that "the United States and Russia should withdraw immediately from Korea."¹⁷ In November a purge was effected among the Communists in the south, who were brought into line with the general Communist policy.

When Secretary Byrnes came to Moscow in December, 1945, the United States State Department was still inclined to consider the division of Korea as a temporary expedient, almost a misunderstanding. It could not yet fathom the plans of Soviet policy for "liberated" Korea.

THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE

Secretary Byrnes was certainly aware of the unfavorable position in which he would find himself at the Conference of Foreign Ministers in Moscow, which had been convened on his initiative. The last previous meeting of foreign ministers, in London in September, 1945, had ended in a complete deadlock, mainly over the Balkan and Far Eastern issues. Molotov's desires were incompatible with the policies of the United States and Britain. The prospect for a new conference would be no brighter unless one side was prepared to yield, and since it was Washington that had proposed a new parley, it was logical for Moscow to assume that Secretary Byrnes would be more willing to accede to the Soviet views than he had been heretofore. Always weighing politics on the scale of power relations, the Kremlin considered the American move an acknowledgment of United States failure to achieve its aims independently.

In this respect Moscow was correct. In the two months following the stillborn London Conference, the Soviet position in the Balkans had been consolidated, while in Manchuria and Korea Soviet agencies wielded unlimited power and the growth of the local Communist parties had been even greater than anticipated. The wavering policy of the United States in Chinese affairs was considered a further symptom of a deterioration of the American position. It was known that General Wedemeyer, American Commander in Chief in China, was going the whole way in supporting the Central Government; that other military leaders opposed this policy; that within the State Department itself opinion was divided,

17. *Daily Worker*, October 8, 1945.

with influential spokesmen wishing to condition American aid upon the creation of a joint Kuomintang-Communist government and demanding the evacuation of American forces from China—which coincided with Soviet and Communist views. Ambassador Hurley had just resigned his post after exhaustive attempts to reconcile the two factions; it was known, however, that Hurley's pessimistic conclusions were not shared by his superiors. There was no American policy for China and Korea. It was a sad picture of United States statesmanship—a picture well known to Moscow in all its details.

No sooner had the Moscow Conference opened, on December 15, 1945, than Molotov launched an attack on Secretary Byrnes. The Chinese problem was the first object of his offensive. For what purpose were American forces still stationed in China, Molotov inquired. Mr. Byrnes was put in the defendant's dock. He replied without counterattacking. He did not refer to the unprecedented dismantling of Manchurian industry which was going on despite Chinese opposition; nor to the factual partition, contrary to all previous pronouncements, of Korea; nor to the deportation, in violation of signed agreements, of Japanese prisoners of war to Russia. He only defended himself, saying that American forces were in China merely to help disarm and evacuate the Japanese troops.

Molotov was not satisfied with Byrnes's explanation. There was no doubt that "disarming the Japanese" was only one, and probably not the most important, among the objectives of American policy in China, and that, after all, the United States would have been happy to see the Central Government's rule extended to all of China, including Manchuria. Molotov considered the defeat of the Communists as one of the aims of Sino-American collaboration. The process of "disarming the Japanese" was a convenient alibi for defendant Byrnes.

The next day Molotov again raised the question of American aims in China. Again Byrnes reiterated the "disarming-of-the-Japanese" formula and was able to quote from President Truman's statement, just released by Washington, that the United States Marines were in north China only for the purpose of "assisting the National Government of the Republic of China in effecting the disarmament and evacuation of the Japanese troops." When Molotov returned to the same question once again Byrnes retorted:

“Mr. Molotov, you must be asking these questions because you like the sound of my voice. I can only give you the answer I have given you every time you have asked the question. For your advance information, when you ask the same question tomorrow, you will get the same answer.”¹⁸

Molotov's reply also constituted a reply to the American press campaign in favor of immediate Soviet withdrawal from Manchuria. If the American forces had to disarm the Japanese in China proper, Soviet forces had a similar task in Manchuria. Hence, *Pravda* said, “the maintenance of Soviet troops for some length of time in Manchuria would be far more justified than the maintenance of any foreign troops whatever in northern China.”

Failing to reach any agreement with Molotov, Secretary Byrnes proceeded to raise the Chinese issue during his interview with Stalin. The latter replied that although he did not object to the presence of American troops in China as such, he wished “to be informed about it.”

Essentially there was no reason to discuss China's internal or external problems at this international conference. Soviet troops had extended their stay in Manchuria after a halfhearted agreement by Chungking but were due to leave early in January. The American forces were there with the distinct approval of the Central Government; there were no deadlines limiting their sojourn in China. What Stalin wanted was to obtain Soviet-American accord on mutual obligations to withdraw armed forces from China. This he did obtain in a statement published at the conclusion of the conference. The statement constituted an important concession on the part of the United States, one which was to play a substantial role in subsequent developments. It also represented a grave humiliation for China. Not only was her international position discussed in her absence but her internal problems and interparty relationships were presumably being settled; more than one ironical remark and anti-Chinese joke was passed during the discussions. Humiliation of Chiang Kai-shek, now again at war with his own Communists, was once more a part of Soviet policy.

The conference's statement on China was satisfactory to Moscow. Drafted by the Soviet side, it stated in part that there exists in China “a need . . . for broad participation by democratic [mean-

18. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, p. 227.

ing Communist] elements in all branches of the national government." The Great Powers again pledged "noninterference in the internal affairs of China"; this was considered by Moscow an American pledge not to assist the Central Government against the Communists. The most important paragraph of the agreement read: "The two Foreign Secretaries were in complete accord as to the desirability of withdrawal of Soviet and American forces from China at the earliest practical moment consistent with the discharge of their obligations and responsibilities."

At the end of his conference with Byrnes, Stalin gave one of those little performances which he enjoys so thoroughly. Byrnes volunteered to inform him of the location and strength of the Communist, Nationalist, and Japanese forces in northern China. Byrnes did so by using matches on the table; he also quoted some (exaggerated) figures of Communist strength. Actually Stalin, who had been an attentive student of Chinese affairs for two decades, had war maps and reports indicating current changes on the Chinese civil war fronts; his sources of information were more numerous than and far superior to those of his American visitor. As always in his dealings with foreign guests, Stalin gladly assumed the role of a humble and uninformed man always anxious to learn. He pretended to be "deeply interested" in Mr. Byrnes's exposition and laughed heartily at the exaggerations indulged in by all factions in China. "All Chinese are boasters," he told Secretary Byrnes.

With regard to Japan, the concessions made to the Soviet demands by the United States were limited in scope. It was now definite that no Russian troops would be sent to Japan; the powers of the American Commander in Chief would essentially remain unlimited in practice. Two commissions were set up with what amounted to merely advisory functions: the Allied Council for Japan (an effort to apply the name "Control Council" was unsuccessful) and the 11-man Far Eastern Commission in Washington or Tokyo.

It was intended that the Far Eastern Commission, consisting of the 11 Far Eastern Powers, would give general instructions concerning Allied policy in Japan. Its decisions, along the pattern of the United Nations Security Council, required a majority vote plus "big power unanimity," i.e., they had to be backed by the four major powers of the Far East. The Far Eastern Commission began

to hold meetings in Washington in February, 1946; its activities never acquired importance.

The Allied Council for Japan was organized with the view of "consulting with the Commander in Chief and advising him." It was made clear, however, that all orders would be issued by the American Supreme Command, which held the chairmanship of the council. Although it yielded no practical results, the Allied Council evoked considerable attention and publicity because of the sharp clashes between the Soviet and American representatives on almost all issues of policy for Japan.

On the Korean situation, Secretary Byrnes submitted to the conference a draft proposal looking toward the unification of the two zones; a joint Soviet-American military government, with two commanders in chief; the gradual transfer of administrative functions to Koreans; a five-year trusteeship, which could be prolonged for another five years if necessary; and a Council of the Far Eastern Big Four. The American plan was for the immediate abolition of the "parallel," except as a demarcation line between the occupying troops. On the other hand, the American plan did not provide for the immediate establishment of a Korean government but promised the abolition of the four-power trusteeship as soon as "the Koreans would be able to form an independent, representative and effective government." No popular elections were mentioned in the Byrnes proposal; this omission was evidently a concession to Soviet wishes, since the State Department was aware that, as in Europe, the Soviet Government looked askance at the establishment of governments in occupied and liberated areas on the basis of free popular elections.

Molotov introduced his counterplan, which was accepted with a few amendments. It provided for the creation of a Korean government not by popular elections but by a union of "democratic parties." This method was being universally applied by Soviet authorities in Europe; in the Soviet view it had worked well in Yugoslavia and Poland. A joint Soviet-American Commission in Korea was given the task of consulting "with the democratic parties" with a view to establishing a provisional government. The trusteeship of the foreign powers was to last five years. Abolition of the "parallel" was not provided for; it was merely promised that in the future a "Provisional Korean Government will take all the necessary steps for the development of industry, transport, and agriculture." Only

an indefinite "coordination in administrative-economic matters" between the two zones was to be effected through a Soviet-American Commission, to convene in Korea within two weeks.¹⁹

Mr. Byrnes and his advisers did not realize how profound was the difference between the American and the Russian proposals. "We were pleased to find," John Carter Vincent, a high spokesman for the State Department, declared, "that the Russian viewpoint and ours were easily reconciled, because there was a common objective."²⁰ The American delegates failed to see that in sacrificing the immediate reunification of Korea they gained little in its place.

For Moscow there was now no longer reason for haste. The Soviet Government needed considerable time to build up Northern Korea, and the "Joint Commission" could serve well as an instrument for delays and postponements.

19. *Pravda*, January 25, 1946; Byrnes, *op. cit.*, pp. 221-222.

20. *Voice of Korea*, January 28, 1946.

New Antagonism Toward Japan

The Moscow Conference marked a setback for Soviet policy toward Japan. The Soviet Union was actually excluded from any decisive part in ruling the Japanese islands; its participation in the Allied Council was little more than a face-saving maneuver. From now on, direct Soviet policy in Japan was limited to opposition and propaganda; the Japanese Communist party assumed greater importance in the fulfillment of Moscow's purposes. The setback was not considered final, however; it was expected in Moscow that a day would come—before the signing of peace treaties—when all the problems of the Far East would have to be re-examined—and then the Soviet Government might be in a position to claim what it had been denied after the armistice.

After the war the Soviet Government had succeeded in surrounding Russia with satellites on its entire perimeter, from the Baltic to the Pacific; whatever gaps remained in this "security belt" consisted of small powers, such as Turkey and Iran, and were to be closed at an early date, one way or another. Nowhere was Russia now bordering on another Great Power. But to the Kremlin Japan was becoming a serious menace. Defeated, it was rapidly moving away, out of Soviet reach, into a foreign sphere. Under General MacArthur's Military Government Japan was becoming potentially hostile. Already a military base for American forces, it would be free to ally itself, after the American withdrawal, with other powers to challenge the Soviet acquisitions in the Far East and the achievements of the civil war in China. To Moscow MacArthur symbolized Japanese cooperation in opposing and resisting the Soviet Union. Now the United States became the great culprit, and all Communist activity in Japan turned against the United States.

During these years—1945-47—Gen. Kuzma Derevyanko was in effect Soviet ambassador in Japan with the title of representative to the Allied Council (succeeded by Gen. Alexei Kislenko in the

autumn of 1947). Derevyanko, with a staff of about 500 men, opened large offices in Tokyo; his staff was paid from the Japanese treasury upon orders from the American Military Government. The Soviet monthly bill ran to several million yen, while the British, for instance, asked for 250,000 yen a month for a staff of 150. In July, 1946, when the Soviet demand reached 9,000,000 yen, Derevyanko was asked to account for the sum, and since he refused, payment was "deferred." A reduction in Soviet personnel took place, but in the early months of 1947, he still had 312 persons on his staff—as against 334 in the other 16 foreign missions combined.

Soviet expenses had to be considerable. In May, 1946, for example, the newly established Soviet Culture Society began to issue a publication entitled *Soviet Culture*. There also emerged the Socialistic Scientific Research Society, the Soviet Research Association, and the Japanese-Soviet Cultural Liaison Association. The Communist party was in a position to spend great sums, especially during elections. Publishing houses connected with the party went on with their work despite huge losses.¹

At the same time pamphlets and newspapers printed in the Soviet Far East began to reach Japan, by-passing the American occupation authorities. In December, 1946, General MacArthur forbade the unauthorized importation of printed material. Moscow countered by increasing the broadcasts from Soviet territory beamed to Japan, which the Americans were unable to impede. Four transmitters in the Russian Far East—Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, Komsomolsk, and Petropavlovsk—were sending Japanese programs after 1946, systematically attacking MacArthur in particular and United States policy in general.

Every issue became a source of friction. In January, 1947, Moscow appointed a bishop for the Greek Orthodox communities in Japan after the death of the previous bishop. In view of the obvious political functions the envoy of the Moscow patriarchate would perform, MacArthur refused to admit him; instead a bishop was invited from the independent Greek Orthodox Church in the United States. While there were no "Voice of America" broadcasts in Japanese, the Soviet radio sent five programs daily, furnishing the Japanese Communists with all the necessary material for

1. Harold J. Noble, "The Russians Are Very Busy in Japan," *Saturday Evening Post*, November 23, 1946.

political and personal attacks on the Americans. In May, 1948, Tass also reported that General MacArthur had been buying up Japanese objects of art for 300 million yen; that he had purchased a substantial number of shares in a Japanese shipping company; that he was accepting valuable "gifts" from Japanese businessmen; and that other generals on MacArthur's staff were similarly enriching themselves.

The main battlefield was the Allied Council for Japan. Here General Derevyanko accused the occupying power of leniency toward war criminals, tolerance of militarism and fascism, freedom of the press for reactionary groups, insufficient and halfhearted reforms. In these and other respects his activity was along lines strictly parallel to those of the revived Communist party of Japan; the same demands and arguments made by Nosaka and Toyoda in the Diet in the name of their party were proffered by General Derevyanko in the small body of the Allied Council.

The coordination and synchronization of their activities were remarkable. Derevyanko insisted, for example, that the elections to the Japanese Diet, scheduled for April, 1946, were premature and must be postponed because "democratic forces were not yet consolidated"; the Japanese Communists raised the same demand. When the elections brought only five Communists into the Diet, *Pravda* in Moscow wrote that "the elections to the Japanese Diet have not justified the hopes of the democratic strata of the population."² A wave of strikes—economic and political, and often the result of Communist inspiration—engulfed Japan in 1946. General Derevyanko proposed to the Allied Council, on July 10, a labor code for Japan which, along with the usual regulation of working hours, wages, etc., provided, in one article: "Striking workers are entitled to take over and operate enterprises." This was a manifest propaganda move, and George Atcheson, representing General MacArthur, sharply attacked the Soviet general for spreading "Communist propaganda" through the Allied Council. Soon Derevyanko demanded measures against "militarist and fascist literature"; Atcheson, arguing for freedom of expression, turned down the demand. In September the Russian delegate submitted a draft resolution calling for the nationalization of all Japanese coal mines; the resolution, of course, was not passed. In November,

2. April 29, 1946.

1946, Derevyanko insisted on a large-scale purge directed especially against the industrialists in Japan. By this time, the Soviet press reported, Acheson was making it clear that no proposal which had the support of General Derevyanko would be acceptable.³

The tone of the Soviet press was becoming violent. Now *New Times* was demanding that the Emperor be declared a war criminal and brought to trial, and that the list of other war criminals be considerably widened. It accused the American authorities of having given some of the war criminals "the opportunity to commit suicide and thus avoid a trial." The Americans, *Pravda* reported on the basis of American and Japanese news dispatches, were removing various precious metals and submarines from Japan: "from the bottom of Tokyo Bay they have begun to salvage platinum, gold, and silver bullion, whose value is estimated at two billion dollars." The Americans, the Moscow press reiterated, were confiscating and exporting stocks of opium, rubber, tin, and antimony. All these accusations were intended to neutralize American dispatches concerning Soviet booty exported from Manchuria, and were to serve later as a basis for demanding reparations payments from Japan.

As far as the democratization and demilitarization of Japan were concerned, the United States—Moscow stated—had failed completely. This failure was due to the fact that American capitalists were hastening to establish new business connections and revive Japanese industry. "Reactionary circles in America," *New Times* editorialized, for example, "do not hide their calculations, which can be reduced to the maintenance of Japanese militarism, to the transformation of Japan into a springboard for all kinds of adventure."⁴ The Soviet press followed with an equal degree of attention the American plans for acquiring bases in the Pacific, and manifested concern over this expansion of American might. The fundamental opposition to the acquisition of bases by the United States was obvious even though for various reasons of practical politics it was recognized that Moscow might fare better if it gave its consent to some of the American trusteeship proposals.

A new dispute emerged when the reparations demands of the Far Eastern nations were made known. The Soviet Government claimed 14 per cent of all reparations, declaring: "one must note

3. *Pravda*, October 20, 1946.

4. *New Times*, September 1, 1946, p. 1.

that despite the outstanding role of the Soviet Union in the crushing of imperialist Japan and thereby the significant shortening of the second World War, the Soviet Union has demanded extremely modest reparations." ⁵

The British Empire (including Australia, Singapore, and Hong-kong) demanded 75 per cent, China 40 per cent, and the United States and the Philippines together 50 per cent. Moscow was concerned, however, about the tendency of the United States to reduce the over-all amount of reparations and attributed this leniency to the interest of American capitalists in the Japanese economy. The greatest difficulty was, however, the Manchurian industry that had been removed to Russia. Moscow contended that this was legitimate war booty and could not be charged against reparations payments; the other powers argued to the contrary, that the Soviet reparations bill might already have been overpaid. In December, 1947, after a ten-month deadlock, the Soviet delegation served notice on the Far Eastern Commission that the American proposals on Japanese reparations were unacceptable to the Soviet Union. ⁶

The long-cherished plan to take over the Japanese island of Hokkaido was not abandoned. In 1947 an artificially engineered movement emerged there, with "autonomy" of Hokkaido as its program. The plot was suppressed by the Japanese police.

REPATRIATION FROM RUSSIA

The problem of repatriating Japanese nationals and prisoners of war from Soviet-occupied areas was a cause of much irritation. The Potsdam Declaration, to which the Soviet Government had adhered in declaring war on Japan, had stated plainly that all members of the Japanese armed forces would be repatriated: "Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives." As soon as the war ended, however, the Soviet Government tried to obtain consent from its allies to use Japanese prison labor within the Soviet Union. The United States refused, but Moscow decided to go ahead with its industrial projects based on the utilization of Japanese labor. The Japanese troops which surrendered in Manchuria and Korea were deported across the border

5. *Pravda*, September 13, 1947.

6. Associated Press, December 11, 1947.

and since early in 1946 have been distributed among Soviet industrial installations in the Far East, central Siberia, and European Russia.

Japanese civilians were allowed—and often forced—to return home from Manchuria and Northern Korea; they were evacuated to Japan. During 1945–46, 5,500,000 Japanese were transported back to the home islands from China and various Japanese possessions in the Far East. By the summer of 1947 the repatriation from American- and Chinese-occupied areas was nearly complete and from British-held areas 65 per cent complete. Among the repatriates were civilians returned from Soviet-occupied Manchuria and Korea, but no Japanese civilians residing in the southern half of Sakhalin Island.

To keep the economy of Southern Sakhalin going, Moscow decided not to evacuate the Japanese; there was no way of immediately shipping peasants and workers from Russia in adequate numbers to replace the potential évacués. On the contrary, the Soviet authorities demanded that the families of the Japanese living on Sakhalin be transferred there from Japan. A bitter controversy arose over this issue as well as over the general Soviet policy of keeping Japanese prisoners in the Soviet Union.

To the Soviet Government, Japanese prisoners of war constituted both an economic and a political asset. Economically they were of importance in the rehabilitation of Soviet industry, which during the war had lost millions of workers and thousands of engineers. At Yalta Stalin had obtained the consent of the other two powers to employ German prisoners of war in the Russian economy; Britain and France were making use of German manpower for a period of two to three years.

There were also political reasons behind the long detention of Japanese prisoners in Russia. At first "Democratic Leagues" were organized in the Japanese prisoners' camps. Membership was voluntary, and propaganda still ran along the wartime line—liberation of the Japanese people by the democratic coalition, of which both the Soviet Union and the United States were members. After about a year, however, new instructions were issued prescribing a new direction of the propaganda effort, this time against the United States, which was "saving the Japanese reactionaries and militarists."

The Democratic Leagues were reorganized and renamed Tomo

No Kai—"Associations of Friends." Their leaders were selected from among the prisoners; the Japanese hoped to achieve speedier repatriation as a reward for joining. There were some former Communists among the thousands of prisoners, and they soon rose to the fore: the ablest among them were sent to school in Khabarovsk, some even to Moscow. Two Japanese-language newspapers, *Nippon Shimbun* (Japan Newspaper) published in Khabarovsk, and *Shin Seimei* (New Life) published on Sakhalin, were distributed in the camps. Generally the newspapers underscored the gulf between East and West, the successful postwar reconstruction in the Soviet Union, and the obstacles to the reconstruction of Japan caused by the policy of the imperialists, i.e., the United States.⁷ Only a minority of the prisoners adhered to the new trend, but this minority were expected to be of great help, after their repatriation, to the Communist party of Japan.

In June, 1946, the American representative on the Allied Council in Tokyo asked General Derevyanko about Soviet repatriation schedules. Derevyanko refused to divulge any information or to make any promises, considering the repatriation as "outside the purview" of the Allied Council. The other members of the council backed the American position but the situation remained unchanged. A few weeks later, on September 6, the Soviet press attacked in Tokyo accused the American authorities of creating difficulties in the matter of repatriation of Japanese civilians from Manchuria, north China, and Korea. Mr. Atcheson replied that no agreement could be reached, and disposed of the Russian proposal to permit Japanese families to join their husbands and fathers on Sakhalin:

"It would not be right to send them to Sakhalin under restrictive circumstances without full assurances that they would be permitted to return with their husbands and fathers [to Japan], if they wish. Such assurance has not as yet been given this headquarters by the Soviet. Until such assurance is forthcoming, to send families to Sakhalin would amount to deportation. We do not believe in deporting women and children from their homes."⁸

A month later General Derevyanko accused General MacArthur's staff of slowness in the demilitarization of Japan, pointing

7. *New York Times*, December 14, 1947, and *New York Herald Tribune*, June 18, 1947.

8. *New York Times*, September 7, 1946.

to the so-called demobilization boards still operating two years after the end of the war. These boards, he said, were in effect independent agencies employing several thousand members of the former Japanese armed forces. "The benevolent attitude toward such persons is dangerous and fraught with serious consequences for the Allies." Atcheson reported that the demobilization boards must remain in existence merely because the repatriation from the Soviet Union had not yet gotten under way.

"The statement that we are supporting a camouflaged General Staff is surprising. In fact, it is a fantastic statement. It would be just as fantastic if some misguided and propaganda-minded person were to allege that the 400 members of the staff of the Soviet member in Japan constituted an army corps headquarters.

"It would be just as fantastic if a misguided and propaganda-minded person alleged that the 800,000 Japanese soldiers in Soviet hands had been held for the development of a secret army."⁹

In December the Irkutsk *Pravda* for the first time carried a report mentioning Japanese prisoners of war at work in Russia. With pride it recalled the shattered German and Japanese schemes of conquest: "Nazi and Japanese dreams of meeting in central Asia are being realized as Japanese and German prisoners of war in Siberia work on railway and highway construction." About 800,000 Japanese, the Soviet paper continued, were at work on the new Siberian Railway and two highways under construction north and south of the railway; a new opera house in the capital of the Buryat-Mongol Republic, was being built by Japanese; 50,000 Japanese were engaged in mining gold near Bodaibo, north of Lake Baikal.¹⁰ Finally, in December, 1946, an agreement was reached concerning the forthcoming return home of former Japanese prisoners of war. The monthly quota was set at about 50,000. On this basis it would take over two years to complete the repatriation project; yet the agreement was not kept and in 1947 the monthly average was considerably less than had been agreed upon.

Early in 1947 the first considerable numbers of prisoners of war were repatriated to Japan from the Soviet Union. According to the information furnished by the repatriates themselves, Japanese prisoners in Russia were distributed among 754 camps, the princi-

9. *Ibid.*, October 3, 1946.

10. *New York Herald Tribune*, December 17, 1946.

pal establishment being near Khabarovsk at the Manchurian border; the former Emperor of Manchukuo, Henry Pu-yi, was among the officers living there. About 2,000 Japanese officers had been sent to Leningrad to work in tank, automobile, and electric equipment factories and in electric power plants, and these enjoyed the best treatment.¹¹ In July, 1947, the Japanese Government announced that a total of 997,000 persons were still in Soviet hands. By May, 1948, their number had decreased to 700,000; of these 3,000 were located in Dairen; 198,000 on Sakhalin and the Kuriles; and over 400,000 in Siberia. From January to June, 1948, only 91,344 returned instead of the scheduled 300,000.

The repatriation issue was again raised by the American representative on the Allied Council in October, 1947. William Sebald reported that General MacArthur had received petitions bearing 960,000 signatures of Japanese who asked for the return of their relatives; the December agreement providing for the repatriation of 50,000 a month was not being fulfilled, he stated, and proposed that all the remaining Japanese be shipped home from Russia within five months. General Kislenko, the Soviet representative, again denied the right of the council to deal with the repatriation problem. "In this attempt," he declared, "I see a tendency to incite unfriendly feelings toward the Soviet Union among the Japanese . . . I insist that measures be taken to discontinue this propaganda." He maintained that 50,000 Japanese were in effect being sent home every month. Apparently his figures included both civilians and prisoners of war.

In its attitude toward Japanese prisoners the Soviet Government differed considerably from its allies, and this circumstance did much to antagonize the population in Japan and to add to the difficulties of the pro-Soviet groups in Japanese politics.

PEACE TREATY WITH JAPAN?

In April, 1946, Secretary James Byrnes proposed to the three other Far Eastern Powers the conclusion of a treaty mutually guaranteeing the demilitarization of Japan; he had hoped thereby to allay Soviet fears. Britain and China agreed, but Moscow failed to reply. By the summer of 1947 the United States began to urge the conclusion of a peace treaty, and new diplomatic conflicts

11. *New York Times*, October 18, 1947, and May 15, 1948.

arose on this ground. On July 11 the Soviet Government received an American proposal to convene a conference of the 11 Far Eastern nations on August 19 to draft a peace treaty with Japan. On July 22 Moscow rejected this suggestion, demanding a conference of the Big Four. It reiterated its stand in a later note in August.

After 1946 the United States had striven to widen the base of the international conferences in which the Soviet Union would participate—for the same reasons that the Soviet Union had tried to limit these conferences to the smallest possible number. The smaller the membership of the conference, the greater the weight of any of its members and the greater the possibility of pressing for concessions. A numerous gathering could even go ahead against and without the Soviet delegates, under circumstances in which a small conference would break down. This is why the United States has sought refuge in the General Assembly of the United Nations, while the Soviet Union has preferred to operate through the Security Council. The Paris Conference for the drafting of European peace treaties met at the initiative of the United States and over the initial opposition of the Soviet Union. For similar reasons, Moscow insisted on two-power conferences for Korea, while Washington proposed a meeting of the Big Four. As far as Japan is concerned, a large-size conference seemed dangerous to Moscow, since its ten members could easily proceed if Russia chose to ignore its decisions.

The stalemate in the peace treaty negotiations prompted China to offer a compromise solution. China's position here differed from both the American and the Soviet viewpoints. To China the rehabilitation of Japan appeared more dangerous than it did to the United States; in a sense, her attitude was analogous to that of France in regard to the resurrection of Germany's economy. On November 18, 1947, Vyacheslav Molotov received a Chinese note proposing a peace conference of the 11 Far Eastern nations, with the provision, however, that no decision could be made over the opposition of any one of the Big Four. Thus the Soviet Union would hold the right of veto, similar to the one it wields in the Security Council of the United Nations. Molotov rejected this compromise, too. On November 27, 1947, he reiterated the Soviet demand to convene a special conference of the Big Four to consider the peace treaty with Japan in January, 1948.

The exchange of notes continued, especially between Moscow and Nanking. On December 5 a Chinese note detailed at greater length the special position assumed by the Nanking government; on December 30 Molotov again rejected any compromise, insisting on the holding of a four-power conference to discuss the Japanese peace treaty.¹²

On this issue the deadlock was now complete. Actually the Soviet Government felt that it stood to gain little from an early conclusion of peace with Japan. It could expect neither significant reparations nor territorial gains. On the other hand, it would then be compelled to open the port of Dairen to international—and Chinese—navigation. Furthermore, the stabilization of Far Eastern relations might lead to a new strengthening of Japan and thereby call in question the Soviet successes of 1945-46.

COMMUNISM IN POSTWAR JAPAN

In the Soviet activities in and about Japan a leading place was occupied by the Japanese Communist party.

During the eight years of war the Communist movement in Japan had been virtually nonexistent; certainly it had not been a popular movement with public manifestations of its existence. A considerable number of its party members, including its leaders, had been in jail; its press had been suppressed, and also in the underground Communist activity was at a minimum. The ties between Communist émigrés living in Russia and China and their followers in Japan were loose and contact was sporadic, while the Japanese police continued severely to persecute "dangerous thoughts," pro-Soviet leanings, and pro-Russian sympathizers. After 1941 Soviet diplomatic relations with Japan became so delicate that Moscow preferred to remove the émigré center of Japanese activity from Moscow to China.

In Yenan, wartime capital of Communist China, a Japanese People's Emancipation League was founded by a group of Communists. The Chinese Communists captured about 2,000 Japanese prisoners, but, in accordance with their policy, permitted those prisoners who so desired to return to their homes or armies. Only 300 to 400 remained to join the league. They not only enjoyed full

12. *Pravda*, January 4, 1948.

freedom of movement within the Communist region but were occasionally even elected to local governments, and one, Ken Mori, became councilor of the Chinese Communist Border Region Government. The Japanese, accustomed to living conditions better than those of the average Chinese, were granted various privileges by the Chinese Communists; they received soap, tobacco, tooth-brushes, towels; they had their own school for political education.¹³

From 1943 on this organization was headed by Susumo Okano, well-known member of the Comintern's highest body and long a resident of Moscow. Its main aim was to prepare cadres for postwar activity in Japan. At the Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in May, 1945, when the defeat of Japan was already a foregone conclusion, Okano delivered a long address in which he outlined the Communist program for Japan in considerable detail. This program included, among other things, all the issues that were soon to become the burning problems of postwar Japan: punishment of war criminals and confiscation of their property; purge of government employees; liquidation of industrial trusts; agrarian revolution; political liberty for the Communists. With regard to the abolition of the monarchy, Okano did not demand it as an armistice condition to be insisted upon by the foreign powers. While stressing the republican convictions of the Communists, he declared that "we propose to decide by a people's referendum the problem of dethroning or retaining the Emperor."

After the surrender the Japanese Communists resumed their activities at home. On October 10, 1945, the leaders of the Communist party were liberated after having spent up to 18 years in jail. They were met at the prison gates by a crowd carrying streamers reading "Democracy!" and "Down with the Emperor!" Okano returned from Yenan and resumed his real name, Sanzo Nosaka. Along with Kyuichi Tokuda and Yoshio Shiga, two Communist leaders released from prison, he formed a triumvirate to govern the Japanese Communist party, with Tokuda as Secretary General of the Central Committee. The party publication, *Sekki* (*Akahata*)—The Red Flag—reappeared after a suspension of 11 years. Its circulation was soon boosted to 260,000. The party held its first postwar congress—officially its fourth—in December, 1945, with some 500 delegates attending; two months later, the

13. Forman, *Report from Red China*, p. 115.

Fifth Congress was called, which was attended by 1,200 delegates. A Communist Youth League was established. Party membership grew at a rapid pace: from 1,000 in December, 1945, it rose to 20,000 in April, 1946. In the spring of 1947 the party claimed 70,000 members and in November, 1947, 100,000.¹⁴ The Communists claimed considerable influence over Japan's trade-unions, which were growing rapidly. There had been about 400,000 union members before the war; by the end of 1946 union membership had risen to about 4,500,000, by the end of 1947, to 5,700,000. Numerically strongest among them was the Japanese Congress of Industrial Organizations (known for brief as Sambetsu), with 1,200,000 members; second was the Japanese Federation of Labor (Sodomei), with 800,000 men. The biggest independent unions were those of railway workers (600,000) and the communications workers (400,000).¹⁵

The first 18 months after the war were a period of growth and popular success for the Japanese Communist party. The old political groups were disorganized, their leaders disoriented; quite a few expected to be purged, and a good many others lived in uncertainty whether they would be permitted to remain active in politics. As in Europe, the pendulum swung to the extreme left. The activity of the Communists attracted widespread attention. Street demonstrations and well-attended mass rallies were organized in rapid succession; for a period of eight months the Japanese radio was a stronghold of Communist commentators.¹⁶ The demands of the Japanese Communists during this period fully coincided with the program of General Derevyanko, the Soviet delegate to the Allied Council for Japan. The list of war criminals drawn up by the Communists included the Emperor and the Empress and all members of their family; 23 persons connected with the court; 130 military commanders; 135 former Cabinet members; 19 diplomats; 16 governors; considerable numbers of industrialists—altogether many hundreds. The confiscation of their property and the partition of their estates were to complete what the Com-

14. *China Weekly Review*, June 18, 1947, and *Partiinaya zhizn*, November, 1947.

15. Manabu Sano, "Politics and Personalities in Japan," Tokyo, 1947; *Mirovoye khozyaistvo i mirovaya politika* (1946), No. 3, p. 29; *New Times* (1947), No. 16.

16. "The file of four days of June broadcasts shows that nearly all comments were tirades against the Government, many favoring workers' control of production. Not one supported democracy as Americans know it." *New York Times*, July 27, 1946.

munists called the "bourgeois-democratic revolution" which in turn was to be a stepping stone to a transformation of Japan into a "socialist state." These demands of the Communist party found warm support in Moscow. Reversing the Potsdam decision, *New Times* wrote, in April, 1946:

"World public opinion insists that Hirohito be brought to trial. As the Democratic Senator Russell rightly pointed out in the United States Senate when he spoke in defense of a resolution demanding the arrest of the Mikado as a war criminal, Hirohito is the heart of Japanese imperialism and one of the greatest aggressors in history."¹⁷

Moscow repeated the contention that the occupation authorities were displaying "carelessness" in respect to war criminals, who had been given extra days of liberty to wind up personal affairs and destroy compromising documents and had been permitted to give interviews to correspondents of various newspapers.

The political activity of the Communist party was, however, out of proportion to its popularity. In energy the Communists outdid all other political groups, but not in numbers. Therefore plebiscites and elections which might injure their position were undesirable for them. The party sought to put off the day of parliamentary elections as long as possible. Despite the party opposition and Derevyanko's protests, General MacArthur approved the holding of the first postwar elections in April, 1946. The Communists polled 2,129,000 votes out of a total of about 27,000,000, i.e., about 8 per cent, and only five deputies of the 464 elected to the Lower House were Communists. Moscow supported the Communists' protests against the election results:

The Japanese Communist party [wrote the *New Times* in Moscow] points out that the conditions in which the elections were held prevented a large number of voters from expressing their will, and is demanding the dissolution of this parliament and the holding of new elections, or, at least, the purging of this parliament of fascist and militarist elements. There can be no doubt that this demand is quite justified and legitimate.¹⁸

Nosaka-Okano became the head of the small Communist parliamentary faction. He tried to establish a popular front with the

17. *New Times* (1946), No. 8, p. 8.

18. *Ibid.*, No. 9, p. 17.

leftist elements of the Socialist party, but his efforts were unsuccessful; the majority of the Japanese Socialists were disinclined to cooperate with the Communists. And the Moscow *Pravda* bitterly censured the Socialists for their refusal to join in a leftist coalition.

The overthrow of the Yoshida government, not by parliamentary action but as a result of popular demonstrations and general strikes, became the immediate goal of the Communist party. Demonstrations in front of the Imperial Palace and the Diet demanded Yoshida's resignation, while inside the parliament Nosaka reiterated this very demand. "What does a people's democratic government mean?" he asked. "It means a government which carries out the demands of the popular gathering in Tokyo." In January, 1947, a general strike of government employees was expected; among the 1,500,000 prospective strikers there were about 500,000 railway workers and 300,000 employees of postal and telegraph services. In this way a political general strike was to begin under Communist leadership which would obviously paralyze the economic life of Japan, especially since the Japanese CIO appealed to its members to join in a solidarity strike. At this point General MacArthur challenged the Communist leadership by simply forbidding the strike. The walkout was called off, and this failure marked at least the temporary end of the Communists' ascendancy in postwar Japan.

The Communists began to lose ground. In the new parliamentary elections in April, 1947, the Communist party had expected to obtain 5,000,000 votes and to elect 13 deputies. Instead, it polled only 873,000 votes, and only four Communist deputies were elected; Shiga, one of the "Big Three," was not re-elected. In the trade-union movement, Communist influence likewise began to decrease. The Japanese Congress of Industrial Organizations began a "re-examination of its leadership"; the powerful Miners' Union, Communist-led until early 1947, embarked upon a change in leadership and political orientation. Workers in general were obviously becoming weary of frequent and futile strikes and demonstrations. The Communist party took cognizance of this situation and drew the proper conclusions for its program of political action when, in September, 1947, it reformulated its plans:

"We need not always resort to strikes" [Sanzo Nosaka now proclaimed]. "Numberless problems are before our eyes which we should take up. Lenin agitated over such a trifle as the question of boiling water

in a factory. We should take up such matters as factory toilets and dressing rooms.

"If the party succeeds in solving the people's problems it will certainly succeed in grasping the support of the masses and infusing at the same time the revolutionary idea into the people."¹⁹

Soon after, in December, 1947, the Sixth Congress of the Japanese Communist Party was held in Tokyo. The 800 delegates approved the policies of the leadership, adopted some changes in the party statutes, and proclaimed a new agrarian program.²⁰ On the one hand, the party moved to the "left," resuming at it did its attacks on monarchical institutions; on the other hand, Secretary-General Tokuda stated that "the Communist Party must discourage strikes for the moment," thus acknowledging the failure of the previous political line.²¹

Writing at the same time about the situation within the Communist party, a former Communist leader, Manabu Sano, stated that "the Communist party has only second-rate leaders. Dictatorship is complete within the party itself . . . Secretary-General Tokuda wields dictatorial power so absolute that it is ridiculous. One comedian-commentator has dubbed him *Tokuda Tenno* (Emperor Tokuda)."²²

The first three years following the war proved that, under the circumstances, the Japanese Communists would not realize the high hopes which International Communism and Moscow in particular had placed in them. Despite all the propaganda and political support lent by the Soviet Union, a transformation of Japan into a "new democracy" appeared more utopian in 1948 than it had in 1945. Moscow was constrained to realize that neither the military force of the Soviet Union nor the cognate political forces inside Japan would be able to overcome and remove this obstacle on the road of future Soviet expansion in the Far East.

19. *New York Times*, October 5, 1947.

20. Tass, December 24 and 25, 1947.

21. *New York Herald Tribune*, December 2, 1947.

22. M. Sano, *Politics and Personalities in Japan*, p. 10.

Trusteeship over Korea

The decisions of the Conference of Foreign Ministers of December, 1945, provoked violent protests in Korea. As soon as the first news arrived, street demonstrations broke out in Seoul and other cities; within a few days the word "trusteeship" became the most hated label throughout the country. To a nation just emerging from subordination to Japan, and to a people to whom the Allies had talked of "liberation," the new trusteeship was a hard blow. In content as well as in form the Moscow decisions were anything but a success.

Pro-Soviet groups were at first among the most vociferous protestants. Soon they were told that the trusteeship was necessary to fulfill Soviet plans for Korea, to create a government controlled by the Communist party. In a few days the acceptance of the Moscow decisions in general, and those concerning trusteeship in particular, became a distinguishing mark in differentiating "progressives" from "reactionaries."

The division of the country was now permanent. Each of the two Korean states began a separate development.

SOVIET NORTH KOREA

North Korea down to the 38th parallel occupies about half of the country's territory (57 per cent, to be exact); as far as the population is concerned, however, only 7 to 8 millions lived in the Soviet zone, as against 17 to 18 millions in the south. This disproportion was widened even further in 1946 and 1947, when about a million Koreans fled from the northern to the southern zone; large numbers were also repatriated from Japan and Manchuria to the southern zone.¹ Figures of population ratios soon acquired great

1. The census in the winter of 1946-47 showed that the population of South Korea had jumped to 19,369,270—70 per cent of the total population of the country.

political significance; in all the ensuing negotiations concerning the unification of Korea and a future government and parliament, great stress was placed upon the fact that the representatives of only about one third of the population lived in the Soviet zone.

In the Soviet zone of Korea industry and mining are more developed than in the predominantly agrarian south. Under the Japanese, coal mines, iron and steel mills, the chemical industry, and electric power stations had been developed to supply both the southern part of the country and Japan proper. The food produced in the north, on the other hand, has, since the end of the war, been insufficient and has had to be supplemented from outside. The difference in the degree of economic development of the two areas became a source of hardship as soon as the division of Korea went into effect. Coal and fertilizers for the south, for example, ceased arriving from the North Korean mines, and the Americans were obliged to ship fuel in from the outside; Soviet Korea lacked agricultural products and turned to Manchuria, where Communist forces were then rapidly expanding. Detaching itself from South Korea, the northern half became increasingly connected with and organically dependent upon its neighbors—the Soviet Maritime Province and Communist Manchuria.

The first few months of Soviet occupation brought little satisfaction to either the Korean people or Soviet prestige. When Gen. Ivan Chistyakov, one of the defenders of Stalingrad, entered Korea with his army of a quarter of a million men, the behavior of this tremendous military force provoked fear and resentment.² The army demanded from the population a regular supply of food; the discipline and moral standards of the troops had fallen to the same low point as they had in Germany after the end of the war. Looting was widespread and it was known that Soviet soldiers reported for plundering went unpunished if they denied the offense. New money was printed, while the old, declared void, returned to the banks, which were ordered to deliver their currency reserves to the occupation forces. Now the old currency became a fund for financing Soviet operations in the south. The evacuation of industrial equipment from a "friendly" country such as Korea (estimated at from 30 to 40 per cent of the North Korean industrial potential)

2. Richard E. Lauterbach, *Danger from the East* (Harper & Brothers, 1947), pp. 211-213; Henry Chung, *The Russians Came to Korea*, pp. 43-47.

led to rising discontent. When the United States Reparations Commission arrived (in June, 1946) to inspect five areas of North Korea, it was denied access to two districts—Chongjin and Hungnam—from which most of the reports had come concerning removal of industrial equipment.

These developments in Korea were not reported in the Soviet press or over the Soviet radio, and even today the Russian people remain ignorant of the real situation in that country. Soviet policy in Korea is still represented as only an endeavor to assist the Korean people in re-establishing their national independence. Congresses assembling in North Korea are given wide publicity; the Soviet Government's activity in promoting reforms and the specific growth of a loyal labor movement are often commented on and registered as positive accomplishments of the Korean people itself. Institutions and personalities which are only figureheads, fronting for and manipulated by the occupation command, in this picture acquire an autonomous existence and freedom of action—as if shadows could exercise free will.

The People's Committees, banned in the south, were made legitimate agencies of the government in the Soviet zone; they are controlled by the Communist (Labor) party and by the Soviet occupation authorities.

Kanko Province was the first to be occupied by Soviet troops. Here 10,000 political prisoners of the Japanese were freed, among them a sizable group of Communists. A "Provisional Committee for the Creation of a People's Government of the Province of Kanko" was formed, with the Communists the most active and best organized group in it. In the other Soviet-occupied Province of Heijo, on the other hand, political differences between Communists and non-Communists prevented the immediate establishment of a similar agency, and here it was the Russian officers who actually set up the Korean People's Committee. The Soviet press has described how a handful of Communists, after years in jail, and with only 200 supporters in the large city of Pyuongyang, became, through collaboration with the Soviet military authorities, the heads of the local Korean regime.³ The Soviet authorities and local

3. B. Runin, in *Novyi mir* (1946), No. 4.

Communists enjoyed the support of many Korean intellectuals in their zone. Especially at the beginning, the Soviet Union seemed to them to be the incarnation of national freedom and social justice. A special "Section for the Intelligentsia," led by the Korean writer Han Sel-ya, was affiliated with the Central Committee of the Communist Party.⁴

The capital of Soviet-occupied North Korea was at first set up at Kanko and then moved to Pyuongyang, where it has remained since.

The establishment of North Korea as a separate semi-Soviet state began immediately after the Moscow Conference, in January, 1946. Kim Il-sung was sent to Korea to supplant the inadequate leadership of Ho Yen-ho, and on February 8 and 9 a Conference of People's Committees of North Korea convened in Pyuongyang, where a government of 25 was appointed, headed by Kim Il-sung. Moscow preferred a coalition government to a purely Communist regime. Two non-Communist parties were assigned to represent groups other than the Communists, but they first had to reaffirm their allegiance to a policy of close cooperation with the Soviet Union; they were, however, unable to exert any political influence. The three parties making up the government were the Communists (later renamed Labor party), the Democrats, and the "Chen To Giyo" (the Heavenly Way).

The Communist party had no more than 10,000 members throughout Korea at the end of 1945. This number grew rapidly, and by the summer of 1947 the party claimed a membership of 700,000 in North Korea. Its program is similar to that of other Communist parties in an analogous position: all power to the People's Committees; universal adult suffrage for both sexes; "freedom of the press" (but no expression of opposition to the regime); redistribution of land among the peasants; nationalization of industry, railroads, and banks; labor legislation. Loyalty to the Soviet Union is one of its foremost and unquestioned tenets. During the first few months of the party's postwar growth some Communist leaders demanded outright incorporation of Korea into the Soviet Union. This line was soon dropped in order not to make difficult the more immediate task of reunion with South Korea. However, on

4. *Literaturnaya gazeta*, February 1, 1947.

all major occasions the Soviet flag is displayed along with the Korean flag; Stalin's name and picture always appear along with those of Kim Il-sung.

"All our conquests [Kim declared], all our successes in economic, political, and cultural life were to an overwhelming measure dependent on the sincere, disinterested assistance given to us by the Soviet Union. . . . To the Soviet Union, to the Soviet Army and Generalissimo Stalin, hearty thanks for their aid and support!"⁵ On Moranbon Hill, near the North Korean capital, where, according to an ancient legend, Korean history began 4,000 years ago, a new monument has been erected which is topped by a shining five-cornered red star. The inscription on the monument, appearing in both Russian and Korean, expresses gratitude to the Soviet Union and Generalissimo Stalin "for the liberation of the Korean people from the Japanese yoke, for the return of freedom and independence to Korea."

Kim Il-sung is depicted as "a man with an energetic, simple face . . . the hero of the national-liberation movement, former commander of the partisan detachments who fought against the Japanese, one of the popular leaders of the Korean people." He was born Kim Sing-choo, but later adopted the name of a revolutionary hero, Kim Il-sung. In the early 'thirties he was Secretary of the Communist Youth League in Manchuria and later belonged to the guerrillas. Today his official position is that of Secretary-General of the Communist party—the post held by Stalin in Russia for a quarter of a century.

The Democratic party, the second partner in the government coalition, officially represents 300,000 members and is assigned to speak on behalf of the petty bourgeoisie, merchants, peasants, and non-Communist intellectuals. It often reiterates that "the most important achievement has been the creation of the People's Committees as organs of truly popular government."

The third party, the Chen To Giyo, emerged several decades ago and, as a religious movement, participated in the anti-Japanese insurrection in 1919. It too has stressed its loyalty to the Soviet Union and approval of the "democratic reforms" effected in North Korea. These two non-Communist movements never fail to support the Communist leadership in internal, and especially in "for-

5. *New Times* (Russian ed. 1947), No. 23, p. 24.

eign," policy—in regard to South Korea: the reunion of the two Koreas, according to them, must proceed on the basis of a "people's republic" with Kim Il-sung as the head of the all-Korean regime.⁶

The internal political system of North Korea is a dictatorship backed by the occupying force. None but the government press is permitted to operate, and no opposition is tolerated. In the process of purging the non-Communist groups, opposition has been silenced. The most prominent critic of the regime, Cho Man-sik—the "Korean Gandhi"—founder and head of the Korean Democratic party, has been held incommunicado since January, 1946, because he refused to join the puppet regime. The North Korean press and radio have repeatedly denounced him as a traitor.

In March, 1946, Kim Il-sung's government decreed a land reform. All estates, Japanese as well as Korean, were broken up, and the land was divided among the peasantry. The new agrarian law provided for the confiscation of (a) all lands that had belonged to the state of Japan as well as to Japanese citizens (in accordance with this provision, about 100,000 chos⁷—5 per cent of the land property of North Korea—were confiscated); (b) all lands belonging to churches, monasteries, and religious congregations, totaling 14,400 chos; (c) all lands belonging to "traitors" and to Koreans who had fled (mostly to the southern zone), totaling 21,700 chos; (d) all lands that had regularly been leased to peasants.

Along with the land, all cattle, farm inventory, and buildings were confiscated. The dispossessed owners were entitled to peasant allotments elsewhere; out of 6,933 dispossessed landlords, 3,911 availed themselves of the benefits provided by this article. The land allotted to them may remain in their possession, however, only so long as they themselves engage in farm labor.

The law further provided for the transfer of land to the peasants free of mortgages or other debts. All peasant debts to the landlords were declared cancelled. The cultivated orchards of the former owners were transferred to the local People's Committees. A special Instruction published somewhat later explained that the agrarian reform did not prohibit the use of hired farm hands. According to official reports, by the middle of 1947, when the reform was nearly

6. *Ibid.*, No. 32, pp. 15-19.

7. A cho is 2.451 acres.

completed, about 725,000 peasants had received a total of about three million acres of land. A normal allotment of 12.5 acres per peasant family was prescribed; priority of allotment was given to "anti-Japanese fighters," many of whom were Communists. The 725,000 peasants who acquired land represented about three quarters of the entire peasantry of North Korea.⁸

In order to understand the significance of the agrarian reform in Korea one must keep in mind that there had been no large-scale farm economy. Large landowners had rented out their land to tenant-peasants. "Therefore the confiscation of the big estates," a Soviet magazine reported, "did not create land reserves for free distribution." What the land reform did achieve was a change in the legal status of the peasant. In essence the reform aimed at leaving in peasant hands those lands which they had previously rented. However, an attempt was made to repartition these rented allotments according to the size and number of working members in a family. All land above the given norm was to be separated and pooled for use by poorer peasants. There is no information to indicate whether this part of the program was actually carried out; there are indications that this provision was one that remained on paper only.⁹

At first the reform made a deep and favorable impression in both North and South Korea; in the south it exerted an appeal in favor of Soviet policies among the sizable rural population. Gradually, however, some features—characteristically Soviet—became evident which dampened the enthusiasm somewhat. The peasants acquired no property title to the land but were given it in "possession"; they could not sell it or use it as security for loans; they could not rent it, and, if for some reason they ceased to work it, the People's Committee or another local agency was empowered to re-allocate their holding to another family. This uncertainty of possession and lack of property rights was contrary to the prevalent interests and desires of the peasantry.

A real improvement of the peasants' lot came through an early order to the effect that no more than 25 per cent of the crop was to be taken as taxes; under the old system landlords usually obtained 50 per cent of the crop as rent. Soon, however, the economic needs of the new state and the feeding of the armies made it necessary to

8. *Pravda*, August 15, 1947.

9. *Mirovoye khozyaystvo i mirovaya politika* (1946) No. 12.

introduce supplementary levies. Taxes were now calculated on the basis of theoretical production quotas, often impossible to fulfill; frequently levies were as high as 50 to 55 per cent of the production, with the state now substituted for the expelled landlord. Soviet influence was making the state as omnipotent in politics as in economics.

Industry in North Korea was nationalized. Officially only the industrial and banking property of Japanese and pro-Japanese Koreans was expropriated. In fact, this amounted to complete nationalization of large and medium-sized holdings and enterprises. Only retail trade and minor plants remained in private hands.

These reforms were practically completed by the end of 1946. The new regime was consolidated, and local as well as national elections were held throughout North Korea from November, 1946, to March, 1947. The November elections to the local committees repeated the pattern so well known in other countries in the Soviet orbit, with almost the entire population voting and nearly all ballots being cast for the government candidate. In the November elections 4,356,000 voters were registered; 4,341,000 (99.6 per cent of those eligible) went to the polls; the "United Front" candidates obtained 4,208,959 votes, i.e., 96.9 per cent of the votes cast. "For the first time in Korea," commented *Pravda*, "truly democratic universal elections have taken place."

Then, in February, 1947, a Congress of People's Committees assembled in Pyuonyang. In its three-day session it managed to confirm retroactively the agrarian legislation, approve the activity of the Kim Il-sung government, and send Stalin a letter of "warm gratitude." It then proceeded to elect a "legislative body" for North Korea, called the People's Assembly, consisting of 237 members. This method of constituting a government and a quasi-parliament was similar to the Soviet Russian procedure during the first two decades of the USSR, when the Central Executive Committee, the Soviet parliament, was elected not by direct popular vote but by a Congress of Soviets. Eighty-nine of the 237 deputies were Communists, 29 each belonged to the other two government coalition parties, and 90 members were "nonpartisan." Since 118 was a majority in the People's Assembly, the Communists plus any one of the other groups could dominate the Assembly. The real power of the Korean People's Assembly was nil, however, and its sessions

were short; no opposition was tolerated. The government, on the other hand, was firmly entrenched and proceeded to legislate without the People's Assembly.

In December, 1947, about the time when the currency reform was carried out in the Soviet Union, a similar financial reform was engineered in North Korea. The currency in circulation—the former Japanese yen (ven) and the Soviet-issued emergency currency—had to be deposited in the banks. While heads of families were to receive up to 500, and members of their families 200, new yen in exchange for the surrendered currency, members of the Russian occupation forces were entitled to draw 5,000 and officers up to 10,000 yen. Great dissatisfaction was further caused by rumors about special privileges accorded Korean Communists in the exchange of old for new currency. The North Korean radio station announced, however, that “farmers are dancing in the streets with joy over the government policy.”

Not until February, 1948, was the money reform completed after the Soviet pattern. Depositors with balances up to 2,000 yen were to be reimbursed in full, while those with deposits over 2,000 yen were to receive only a certain percentage of their assets.

One of the most important measures adopted by the new government was the creation of a large Korean Army. Conscription was introduced, military training schools were established, and the schooling of Korean cadets and officers assumed considerable proportions. In 1948 the North Korean Army had attained a strength of about 200,000 men.¹⁰ It was commanded by Kim Mu-chung, a long-time member of the Chinese Communist party. There were 250 students in the military academy at Pyuonyang and 500 students at the aviation training center near by. Two hundred-odd planes were put at the disposal of the new army at an airfield near Pyuonyang. The Soviet command turned over large quantities of weapons taken from the Japanese to the North Korean forces. About 15 new airfields were built by the Soviet forces and the Korean Army command. Stationed at the borders of Manchuria, this army was a potential strategic reserve for the Chinese Communists fighting there.

10. In a hearing of a congressional committee, General Hodge estimated the Korean Army at from 120,000 to 150,000 in March, 1947. In his report to the “Little Assembly” of the United Nations on February 19, 1948, Dr. Manon, on the basis of estimates by General Hodge, gave its strength as 200,000 men.

Its main orientation, however, was southward. It had to fulfill one of the most important tasks entrusted by Moscow to Korean Communism. By the end of 1947 the organization, in the rough, of the new army was completed.

THE SOVIET UNION AND SOUTH KOREA

Both the United States and the Soviet Union were to suffer severely from their "trusteeship" policies. A coy term—"guardianship"—was introduced to avoid the use of the compromised "trusteeship"; but it meant the same thing.

Both occupying powers repeatedly stated that their policies aimed precisely at the restoration of Korean independence, yet there was considerable difference between them. While the American Government as well as its military in Korea simply promised independence in the near future, Soviet pronouncements emphasized both independence and the establishment of a "friendly government." This was the official formula from the very beginning. "The Soviet Union has a keen interest in Korea being a true democratic and independent country, friendly to the Soviet Union," General Shtykov stated at one of the first meetings of the Joint Commission on Korea. The American formula, stated by Secretary Marshall, read: ". . . a self-governing sovereign Korea, independent of foreign control." In two respects the American formula deviated from General Shtykov's: it mentioned sovereignty, and it omitted mention of Korea's obligation to be friendly to any one power.

There was some contradiction in these two Soviet aims. A government independent in its decisions need not necessarily and at all times be "friendly" to the Soviet Union; if, on the other hand, it is compelled to be "friendly," it cannot be truly independent. This contradiction was becoming a heavy burden, almost a curse, on Soviet policy both in Europe and Asia. In Korea, as in Poland, Rumania, or Hungary, it was obvious that, after the experience of Soviet occupation, an independent government representing the majority of the people might easily turn against Russia. To keep the small nations in line with Soviet policy, independence had to be forfeited, and all that was left was a vague and meaningless promise. Thus the call for a "friendly government" became the foremost demand of Soviet policy, even if only a small part of the

population was prepared to support it. More than once Moscow tried to base its policy in neighboring countries on more than the frankly pro-Soviet parties; it has never been able to succeed, and the local Communists everywhere remained the only political force prepared and assigned to constitute the core of the friendly, though not independent, regime.

In Korea, where after decades of Japanese overlordship, the nationalist tide rose higher than anywhere else, this policy made the Soviet position extremely difficult. The Soviet press in Russia and the pro-Soviet press in Korea tried to convince the people that the Americans were the one and only real threat to their independence. This was the prevailing tenor of the propaganda throughout 1946-48. The Americans, it was said, are not acting in the interests of the Korean people; they are an imperialist power striving to turn Korea into a colony and to enslave its people anew; their abundant use of Japanese advisers, especially at the beginning, is proof of their real attitude; unlike the system in the north, no elected local or Central Government was permitted in the American zone—this was proof of American mistrust of and apprehension concerning Korean public opinion; no land reform was immediately enacted. Korean leaders who returned from the United States were depicted as agents and forerunners of American trusts and cartels striving to conquer and exploit the unfortunate people.

At the beginning, these contentions and accusations had some success. Certain political groups in the south were opposed to the American policy; the coalition called the "People's Republic" remained in existence for some time. The situation began to change slowly in 1946, resulting in a decrease of Soviet prestige and isolation of the Communists. Both Moscow and Washington were guilty of "trusteeship"; but the Russian command was determined to prevent a merger of the two zones, even under foreign guardianship. It was becoming difficult for the Communists to gain new adherents at a time when the ineffectualness of the Joint Soviet-American Commission in Seoul was known to be due to the uncompromising Soviet attitude. In June the leader of the liberals and of the People's Republic, Lyuh Woon Heung, broke with the Communists, with whom he had worked since the Japanese surrender, and started negotiations with other moderate groups. In the summer of 1947 he was killed by an unidentified assassin.

The membership of the Communist party of South Korea numbered several thousand at the end of 1945. It increased rapidly to about 20,000 by the summer of 1946, but then its growth stopped. Pak Heung Yung, the Communist leader of South Korea, belonged to the group of émigrés who had returned from Russia through Yenan at the end of the war; he had spent ten years in prison under the Japanese. His party made abundant use of the political freedom existing in South Korea, where Communist newspapers were permitted to appear and Communist meetings were tolerated. During the outbursts of violence and the street fighting with other political groups a number of Communists were arrested; the Communist press as well as the Soviet representatives were now accusing the American authorities of persecuting the Communist party. Ultimately Pak Heung Yung was charged with instigating military resistance to the occupying power and declared a fugitive from justice.

In July, 1946, the Communist party merged with a few small groups and was renamed the Labor party; no change occurred in either its leadership or its tactics. During the initial months of "trusteeship" it also succeeded in gaining a foothold in the controlling posts in the new labor movement. The Communist-controlled Trade-Union Confederation claimed 266,500 members in South Korea, while in the Soviet zone, where membership in labor unions was practically obligatory, the unions counted 390,000 members in the summer of 1947.¹¹ In the south there also emerged, however, a non-Communist Federation of Labor.

Considerable assistance to the Communist movement in South Korea has come from Pyuonyang; the contact has been constant and close. Instructions, ideas, and slogans have been supplied by the north; financial help, especially in the first stage, has been extensive. Later a ring of 19 Communist counterfeiters, headed by Song Un Pil, financial director of the Communist party, was caught in the southern zone. It had printed a few million yens' worth of paper money; the plates had been stolen from the Korean Bank Company.¹²

The Communist party of South Korea was a highly important tool of Soviet policy in 1946-48. A Soviet consulate general con-

11. *New Times* (1947), No. 22, pp. 21, 24.

12. *New York Times*, May 14, 1946.

tinued to function in Seoul until 1946; the Consul General, Andrei Polyansky, had served in the same capacity under the Japanese and had continued in office even during the brief Soviet-Japanese war; he was not disturbed when Seoul became the capital of the American Military Government. He maintained contact with Communist leaders, many of whom visited him, and served as an intermediary between Pyuongyang and the southern Communists. In April, 1946, an American ultimatum was handed to the Soviet authorities demanding that they either permit the opening of an American consulate in the northern zone or close the Soviet office in Seoul; a reply was requested within one month. The Soviet Government did not reply, and in June, 1946, Polyansky and his staff were ordered by the Americans to close down the consulate. They left for Pyuongyang.

The main interest of the Soviet authorities was naturally in the state of American forces in the south, and both the consulate and the Communists served as important media for gathering intelligence. Various members of the Soviet delegations who came to the Joint Commission sessions in Seoul were also assigned to this job. Anatol Shabshin, before the war Vice-Consul in Seoul, was in charge of these activities; during the sessions in 1946-47 he came to Seoul to get in touch with various Koreans in the capital. In October, 1947, when the Seoul police charged Shabshin with directing the Communist underground in South Korea, an acrimonious exchange of communications ensued between Generals Hodge and Shtykov, with the American authorities insisting that the charges were well founded. Col. Vladimir Podgoronov was less circumspect in his operations, and at the demand of the United States returned to the northern zone after repeated attempts to enter off-limits areas. Colonel Kornyshev tried to learn the location of United States troops and the condition of their weapons. Caretakers of the Soviet consulate building in Seoul were "admonished" by the American authorities to confine their activities to the consulate. When United States officials tried to have breaches in the walls surrounding the Soviet consulate repaired, they encountered strong Soviet opposition. In addition one Greek Orthodox church served as a meeting place and clearing house for Soviet and Korean Communist agents.¹³

In their task of winning the support of the workers of South

13. *Ibid.*, September 27, 1947.

Korea the Communists were, however, less successful. In September-October, 1946—at the same time that a similar situation arose in Japan—a wave of political strikes was scheduled to begin to engulf the industrial establishments in the south. On September 23 railway and other workers went out on a political strike. The “Farmers’ Union,” a small pro-Communist organization, claiming the support of the Korean peasantry, came out in support of the walkouts. However, General Hodge forbade the strikes, and the workers returned. Now widespread rioting broke out in the provinces, and in the suppression of the riots there were many casualties. By the latter part of 1946 this insurrectionist movement had reached its peak, and by 1947—as had also been the case in Japan—the Communist tide began to recede.

For the great majority of the Korean people the American policy was a cause of deep resentment. In no other country was the American military force after the war as poorly prepared as it was in Korea. While the Russian Army brought with it a staff of Koreans and Korean-speaking Russians, the Americans lacked the minimum number of experts and translators necessary to carry out their tasks. Korea was even less well known to the American High Command than were China and Japan. There also developed among the United States troops a critical attitude toward the Korean people, and manifestations of American “superiority” led to numerous conflicts with the population.

What was even more important, the policy of the American command wavered as between the Soviet program and that of the Korean nationalists. In the Soviet view, a Korean government had to be established at the conference table, after conversations and consultations among a small group. The Korean nationalists preferred the normal path of popular elections. Since it was obvious that such elections would result in a defeat of the Communist party, it was natural that they should be rejected by Moscow; they were also turned down by the American authorities, who wished to keep in accord with the Moscow agreement of 1945 and avoid friction with the Soviet staff in the north. In this way the American Military Government increasingly isolated itself from the mass of the Korean people without attaining any rapprochement or collaboration with Moscow.

The strongest political group in Southern Korea is a federation

under Dr. Syngman Rhee, with which 71 associations are affiliated. Its official name is National Association for the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence. Next to it in influence is the Korean Independence party of the veteran fighter for Korean independence, Kim Koo. Syngman Rhee's movement is violently anti-Soviet and has therefore been considered rightist, even "reactionary," by the Soviet press and leadership. Its program, however, would be considered, in both America and Europe, as rather leftist. The program announced by Syngman Rhee and adopted by the Democratic Council in March, 1946, contains a demand

to nationalize all heavy industry, mines, forests, public utilities, banks, railways, water power, fisheries, communication and transportation systems; to inaugurate state supervision of all commercial and industrial enterprises . . . ; to redistribute all confiscated agricultural lands to small farmers; to break up and redistribute large private estates; . . . to control terms and interest rates charged by private loan agencies and to abolish private pawnshops . . .¹⁴

This program goes farther than that of the British Labour party. But it also demands popular elections, representative government, and an independent Korean state. *Pravda* accused Syngman Rhee of being a "tool" of the Americans, charging that he sought control over Korea's economy in behalf of American trusts.¹⁵ In all the ensuing negotiations concerning the formation of the Korean Provisional Government, the Soviet representatives have refused even to consult with Syngman Rhee despite the fact that he is by far the best-known popular leader in South Korea.

After the failure of the many attempts to create an all-Korean government, General Hodge, on August 24, 1946, issued an ordinance providing for the establishment of an Interim Legislative Assembly as a counterpart to the People's Assembly in the Russian zone. The assembly was to consist of 90 members; of these, 45 were to be popularly elected and the other 45 were to be appointed by the Military Government. This was a rather timid step. In the elections, in which the Communists refused to participate, 40 seats went to

14. Chung, *op. cit.*, p. 208.

15. "The Korean émigrés, Kim Koo, Syngman Rhee, and others were 'imported' from the United States . . . Some of these individuals have already managed to assure themselves of the support of some American companies interested in Korean concessions." *Pravda*, June 3, 1946.

the so-called rightists, while only 5 seats went to the moderates; the American command appointed "moderates" and built up Kimm Kiu-sic, representing the Korean political center. Most of the administrative posts in South Korea had meanwhile been transferred to Koreans, but even this measure failed to win more prestige for the United States.

The Legislative Assembly was not a success, and the opposition of Syngman Rhee and his party mounted. Beginning with the summer of 1947 relations between the old Korean leader and the American Military Government became increasingly strained and almost hostile. Rhee's program called for immediate elections in the south and the proclamation of the government thus elected as the government for the whole of Korea, including the Soviet zone. Fearing complications with the Soviet Union, General Hodge did not give his approval to this procedure; no new elections were held until May, 1948.

"Nearly six months ago," Syngman Rhee now declared in a statement issued on November 26, 1947, "General Hodge coaxed and threatened us to hold off our election on the ground that the USA and USSR Joint Commission would solve the problem satisfactorily. Now he tries to put up the same arguments in connection with the UN Committee. If this effort fails again, he will find some other reason for postponement. Are we supposed to sit still and wait indefinitely?" A few days later in a new statement he declared: "We are now ready for self-rule. We have the inherent ability for and the inalienable right to it. If we only have our own government we can do better for ourselves than any of our friends can do for us."

Syngman Rhee's statements deserved more attention than they received from the United States authorities. Rhee is actually the most representative of the leaders of the Korean people and can claim more support than most other political leaders of today. "Everywhere I went in South Korea," Dr. Robert Oliver wrote upon his return from the Far East,

the faces would light up when I mentioned the magic words, "Yi Baksa!" [Dr. Rhee] and the reply would instantly come, "Number One Man!" The American Military Government, which at first supported him, has cooled considerably, to the extent that I was assured Dr. Rhee could have no part in an American-sponsored government.

Why? "Because his attacks on Communism have rendered him persona non grata to Russia."¹⁶ •

On the whole, the policies of the American occupation failed to win the sympathies of the people. Despite the expenditure of huge sums by the United States, the standard of living in Southern Korea is lower than it was when American troops first landed. A police force of 50,000 men has been equipped and armed by the Americans, but is widely held to be quite inadequate to preserve law and order. Prices of food, clothing, fuel, and rent have increased eight to ten times between 1945 and 1948. An opinion poll showed that in the city of Seoul about half the population considered the former Japanese rule preferable to the present American.¹⁷ The failure of Soviet policy was even greater. It was weighted down by its espousal of trusteeship, the maintenance of the 38th parallel, encroachments on the independence of Korea, and the program of transforming all of Korea into a Soviet satellite.

RUSSIAN-AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS

The negotiations provided for in the decisions of the Moscow Conference began in January, 1946, and continued, not without prolonged interruptions, for about 20 months. The complete story of these diplomatic exchanges, proposals and counterproposals, published and unpublished speeches and statements would fill a sizable volume. It is a unique record of old-style diplomacy revived in the twentieth century, a diplomacy in which words and phrases often signify the opposite of their accepted meaning, in which proposed plans are unrealistic and presented for propaganda purposes only. Despite the great excitement which some of these diplomatic documents provoked in Korea and elsewhere when they appeared one after another, the long record is a monotonous tale of futile attempts to reconcile the irreconcilable, to solve insoluble problems.

The futility of the negotiations was obvious to Moscow from the very start. There was a maximum and a minimum Soviet program for Korea—but neither would be able to obtain the consent of the American Government. The maximum program meant the formation of a government for the whole of Korea under Communist

16. *Korean Open Letter*, November 30, 1946, p. 5.

17. Lauterbach, *op. cit.*, p. 247.

control; an army supervised by Russian officers; the tying of Korea's economy to that of its neighbors—the Soviet Union and Communist Manchuria; and the achievement of a Korean "independence" essentially limited to the free use of the Korean language in schools, governmental agencies, and literature. The free use of the native language was to be the main distinction between Korea's colonial status under Japan and the brand of independence accorded her by the Soviet Government.

Whether this maximum of expectations could actually be realized in the whole of Korea was more than doubtful. This was 1946, and Washington was no longer inclined to repeat in Korea, in all its details, the Churchill experiment in Yugoslavia; the Rumanian and Bulgarian regimes were in the forefront of international discussion; and General MacArthur was known to be uncompromisingly opposed to Moscow's plans in the Far East. A lesser program was therefore resorted to; more modest, it appeared realistic and possible of fulfillment. Limited, for the time being, to North Korea, it provided for the transformation of North Korea into a pro-Soviet state, creation of a sizable army, assistance to Communists in the south, and postponement of Korean unification until a propitious moment in the future. Under these conditions, negotiations made little sense. Moscow was marking time.

When the first session of the Soviet-American Conference opened in Seoul on January 16, 1946, a multitude of immediate problems were presented but not one of them was really solved. The Americans proposed that the boundary line, which now cut across counties, sometimes across fields, be rectified—a geographic "parallel" is not a natural administrative boundary. They further wished to include in the agenda the questions of removal of machinery from North Korea, the right of free travel between zones, free circulation of newspapers, and the resumption of postal and telegraphic communications. General Shtykov, who headed the Soviet delegation during the entire period of negotiations, declared, however, that most of these problems could not be discussed since the main topic of the conference was the creation of a Korean government. The American delegation asked for economic unification of Korea and free flow of goods between the two zones, which had complemented each other economically before the partition; the Soviet delegates had to turn this down too, and *Pravda* accused

the Americans of "complicating the negotiations" by making such proposals. General Shtykov considered exchange of goods possible only on the basis of barter agreements of "equal value," such as exist in trade arrangements between two different nations. On February 5 the Soviet delegation left Seoul for the Soviet zone, promising to return early in March.

General Hodge was obviously unaware of Soviet intentions toward Korea. He still expected that the Joint Commission, when it met again, "will be able soon to remove the restrictions of the 38th parallel in so far as the Koreans are concerned." The Soviet representatives did not return until March 20—and then they came 100 men strong; not all their assignments were directly connected with the work of the Joint Commission. They remained in Seoul until May 8. Now General Shtykov, always holding the initiative, proposed a procedure for the formation of a Korean government: in order to learn the political sympathies and orientation of the Korean people as a prerequisite for the formation of a government, there shall be consultation with political and social organizations in Korea—with the exception of parties opposed to the Moscow decisions regarding Allied trusteeship over Korea. The latter groups were reactionary, Shtykov declared, whereas the intention of the Allies was to install a democratic government.

The intent behind this decisive step of the Soviet Government was the same as in similar instances throughout the Soviet sphere in Europe, namely, to eliminate in advance from the government coalition such parties and groups as were opposed to Soviet practices. In Korea, however, the plan of making the acceptance of foreign trusteeship the dividing line between "democrats" and "reactionaries" was not a fortunate one. "Trusteeship" had been the Japanese term for its domination over Korea; for a nation just emerging out of one "trusteeship" only to plunge into another, this Soviet demand that the people hail and support the new trusteeship was maladroit and clumsy. The Minindel (Soviet Foreign Office) had shown that it was capable of devising more palatable schemes.

After four weeks of negotiations the Americans gave in. A formula was agreed upon, to be signed by Korean political groups: "We will abide by the decisions of the Joint Commission in its fulfillment of Paragraph 2 of the Moscow Decisions in the for-

mation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government.”¹⁸

The acceptance of this formula was at the time a Soviet victory. But now General Hodge managed to convince the Korean parties—especially the violently anti-Soviet ones—that if they accepted and signed the formula, this would not imply wholehearted adherence to the trusteeship proposals; it would be, rather, a business-like acceptance of a decision in order to make possible the creation of a Korean government. Once that government was established, Hodge argued, it would be free to devise its own policies. General Shtykov was aroused. He did not wish to “consult with reactionaries”; he accused the Americans of violating the Moscow decisions. The Soviet delegates again departed for Pyuongyang. No sooner had they arrived there than new letters came from General Hodge inviting them to resume the conversations. Receiving no reply, Hodge wrote again in June; still no answer was forthcoming. Indeed there was no point in resuming the conferences.

Now anti-American propaganda mounted in both North and South Korea; the tenor of the propaganda was that it was the fault of the Americans that Korea could not be reunited. The United States State Department countered with a long statement of its aims in Korea. These aims were not imperialistic, they said, and “the United States gains no economic advantages in Korea from our occupation.” Correspondence, along the previous lines, between the two zonal commanders was renewed in the last months of 1946. No progress was made.

When the new Secretary of State, General Marshall, was in Moscow in April, 1947, he tried to take the initiative in resuming negotiations. On April 8 he dispatched a letter to Molotov proposing a new session of the Joint Commission for Korea. Molotov could not but agree, although he surely realized the complete futility of the experiment. He answered on the 19th, accepting Marshall’s proposals but insisting, as before, on consultation with Korean groups which subscribed completely to trusteeship. Marshall, in a note to Molotov of May 2, gave the American point of view, adding, significantly, that the “United States Government has under consideration a constructive program for the rehabilitation of the economy of Korea and for its educational and political development.”

18. United States, Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1947, p. 173.

This plan of rehabilitating Korea with American help—a forerunner of the greater Marshall Plan for Europe—did not fail to make an impression in Moscow; in Korea, as in Europe, it meant, in the Soviet view, not so much an economic as a military strengthening of a hitherto weak country.

Molotov agreed to the new session of the commission but asked that implementation of the American plans be suspended: first, he informed Secretary Marshall on May 7, there must be a single government for Korea; then this new government could consider American and Soviet offers of economic assistance. Molotov was successful in preventing large-scale American aid for the rehabilitation of Korea.

On May 21 the Joint Commission reassembled in Seoul, and the unending discussions as to which parties should be “consulted” began all over again. Twenty-four organizations in South Korea were barred by General Shtykov; among them were the representative parties that had had majority support in the elections. The American delegation could not fairly deny them participation.

At the end of June the commission went to North Korea to “consult” with the parties in the Russian zone. When the American train reached Pyuongyang on the morning of June 30 there was not a single Korean civilian in the vicinity of the station; only Russian soldiers and Korean police were in sight. The Americans drove through the empty streets of the big city, although it was marketing and shopping time.

All that day, stores, shops, homes in Pyuongyang were closed tight. No one came out. The streets were silent. Then suddenly at four o'clock in the afternoon, the Russian and North Korean authorities gave a strict order for a parade. For three long hours, the worried citizens of Pyuongyang tramped in procession carrying heavy banners which said that Mr. Stalin of Russia is a great man. After this procession, which was managed very carefully by the North Korean police and other Home Affairs control men, Pyuongyang again became a city of closed doors and silence.¹⁹

The Joint Commission needed no more than three days to complete its business in the north. All parties were miraculously unanimous in their suggestions. The American representatives were not curious and did not seek to establish how democratic these organiza-

19. *Seke Shinbo*, quoted by *Korean Open Letter* (July, 1947), No. 63, p. 9.

tions were nor what political climate prevailed in North Korea. This attitude of the Americans in Pyuongyang gave rise to great concern, even resentment, in the south. "This process has convinced many Koreans," a correspondent reported,

that the American participation in the Joint Commission is neither sincere nor honest. Reports of the utmost reliability reaching here give validity to these opinions.

Soviet-sponsored political groups in North Korea have had exclusive consultation privileges. Representatives of groups opposed to the Communists have been unable to reach either the Joint Commission or the American delegation. . . . Most Koreans here . . . express the fear that they are facing a sell-out and that the United States will refuse to accept the challenge of the Soviet Union's bid for the control of Korea.²⁰

These fears were exaggerated. General Shtykov was unyielding to such a point that even those among the Americans who had been inclined toward a compromise solution saw no way of reaching agreement. Meanwhile in the south the Communist party began great demonstrations in favor of the Soviet plan for a Korean government, and all groups affiliated with it and its newspapers were frank in demanding that "the future provisional government must introduce the same reforms as in Northern Korea." The labor unions were used to voice the same cry. They rejected the Democratic party and the party of Independence as reactionary and pro-Japanese.

By the end of July the negotiations in the Joint Commission were beginning to become ridiculous. The Americans made it understood that they would not agree to the setting up of a government if the Communists and their groups claimed more than 40 per cent of the posts in it—40 per cent would still have been far in excess of their popular strength. General Shtykov of course rejected this ratio, and with equal cynicism presented a list of parties in South Korea with which he was disposed to "consult." The list contained 119 unimportant groups, in addition to 28 groups of North Korea; 20 parties—including the Democrats and the Independents—were still excluded. The deadlock was complete. General Brown, chief American negotiator, told the press that if the Soviet proposal were accepted, at least 15 million Koreans would be "voiceless in the

20. Richard J. H. Johnson, in the *New York Times*, July 3, 1947.

government." He added that although 49 meetings of the Joint Commission had already been held, the entire effort had been in vain.²¹

The internal situation in South Korea was changing rapidly. Pressure from the Democratic and Independence parties grew; the riots and violence that occurred during the stay of the Soviet delegation in Seoul led to numerous arrests of Communists and a considerable curtailment of their political activity. The big parties' demand was for relieving the stalemate through popular elections. The American command, which had tried for a year and a half to compromise with the Soviet position by opposing elections, reversed its stand; now the United States delegates on the Joint Commission asked for the holding of popular elections as the method of creating a Korean government. This was of course unacceptable to the Soviet delegates. On August 12 Secretary Marshall, in a note to the Soviet Government, proposed that the Joint Commission submit a report of its achievements. Molotov replied on the 23d; while he accepted the Marshall suggestion, he took the opportunity to protest vehemently against the persecution of Communists in South Korea:

The offices of such parties and organizations [Molotov complained] are being seized by police forces; their leaders and members are being arrested; their press organs are being closed down. The Soviet Government considers such a situation abnormal and inadmissible, as the possibility of a proper fulfillment of the decisions of the Moscow Conference of the three ministers on Korea is barred if these persecutions of democratic organizations and leaders in Southern Korea are not immediately and fully abolished.²²

Molotov soon found support in the "United Front" of North Korea, which appealed to the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union in connection with the arrests of "democrats" in South Korea. It mentioned 27,135 men and women who had allegedly escaped from the south into the northern zone in order to avoid police repressions. In the meantime the number of people who had escaped in the other direction reached two millions.

The meetings of the Joint Commission continued. On August 26 General Shtykov asked that the commission proceed to the appoint-

21. *New York Times*, August 1, 1947.

22. *Pravda*, August 24, 1947.

ment of members to the future Korean government "out of the democratic parties and social organizations." He rejected the idea of electing the members of a people's assembly, and proposed that the Soviet-American Commission appoint the members of the contemplated legislative body, emphasizing that North Korea (with its population of seven-odd millions) must have equal representation with South Korea (with a population of about 19 millions). Shtykov's proposals were rejected.

On the second anniversary of Japan's surrender—August 15, 1947—General Shtykov appeared before a mass meeting in Seoul. Addressing an audience of 60,000, he stressed the service rendered to the Korean people by the Soviet Union and insisted that it was the Soviet Union that had "defeated Japan's Army and forced the capitulation of the Japanese Empire." But he received no applause; by this time the attitude toward the Soviet Union had changed markedly. At times Shtykov was booed by thousands of Koreans.

A new exchange of diplomatic notes between Washington and Moscow took place. On August 29 the State Department made seven proposals for the settlement of the Korean question, among them that there be early elections to a provisional legislature, with secret multiparty balloting for each zone separately; that the two zonal legislatures then choose representatives to a national legislature, but in numbers reflecting the proportions of the population; that this central legislature, in turn, establish a provisional government for a United Korea; that during all stages the United Nations have observers on the spot; finally, that the Provisional Korean Government and the powers concerned agree on a date by which the occupation forces would be withdrawn. Anticipating a refusal of the Soviet Government to follow this procedure, the State Department proposed that a conference be held of the four Far Eastern Powers to discuss the Korean problems, and proceeded to send invitations to China, Britain, and the Soviet Union to attend such a conference on September 8.

In his reply of September 4 Molotov rejected the entire list of United States proposals. As far as elections were concerned, he said, they would result in an aggravation of the division within Korea. He also rejected the proposal for the four-power conference. General Shtykov notified the press that "the Soviet delegation is sorry to note that the American delegation has not recently been inclined to continue the work of the Joint Commission to solve the

problems of the Korean government." For their part, the Soviet Government in Moscow and General Shtykov in Korea simultaneously proposed a radical measure—the complete withdrawal of both American and Soviet troops from Korea early in 1948. The Soviet note of October 9 to General Marshall emphasized that "providing the Government of the United States of America agrees to the withdrawal of troops at the beginning of 1948, Soviet troops will be ready to leave Korea at the same time as the American troops."

TWO KOREAS

More than two years had passed since Soviet troops had entered North Korea. Reorganization of that area during the period had advanced to such a point that the military superiority of the north over the south was beyond any doubt. In the south there was no Korean army whatever, and certain political groups acted there as agencies of the northern zone. If the two occupying powers were to withdraw their armed forces, unification of Korea would indeed be achieved—the Soviet way.

General Marshall responded by turning the Korean question over to the General Assembly of the United Nations, then in session. The United States proposed that the United Nations send a commission to Korea to supervise national elections to be held before the end of March, 1948, and to assist in creating a national government. The Soviet delegation at first insisted that the General Assembly had no authority to deal with Korean matters; when it was voted down, it reiterated Molotov's proposal that both foreign armies withdraw from the country. Finally, in a purely propagandistic and time-consuming move, its chief spokesmen, Gromyko and Manuilsky, insisted that Korean representatives be invited to take part in the deliberations of the United Nations. Since the selection of such representatives had been the main stumbling block in the negotiations concerning Korea for almost two years, the Soviet motion in fact meant an indefinite postponement of any United Nations action.

In the voting (with the Soviet bloc abstaining), the main proposition, providing for the dispatch of a special commission to Korea, was carried by 43 votes, but not before Manuilsky had warned of "grave consequences" which would result from the United Na-

tions' action, and Gromyko had announced, on behalf of the Soviet Union, that "if the General Assembly should decide to send a commission to Korea, the USSR will not be able to participate in the work of such a commission."

In January, 1948, the United Nations Special Commission arrived in Seoul. The Soviet (Ukrainian) member of the commission did not accompany it to Korea and, in general, did not take part in its work.

The commission appealed to the American and Soviet commanders in chief in Korea for cooperation, but Gen. G. P. Kotikov, in Pyoungyang, did not even respond. The commission was informed that its members would not be permitted to inspect the northern zone. Despite this affront the members of the United Nations body tried hard to maintain a sort of impartiality; the majority was reluctant to draw any definitive conclusions from the attitude of the Soviet representatives in the United Nations and of the Soviet command; they still doubted whether elections should be held in Southern Korea only; and they still hoped that in some miraculous way balloting by democratic methods could be made possible in both parts of Korea.

While the United Nations Commission was deliberating in Seoul, the Soviet authorities in the north, with the help of the "National Front" in their zone and the Labor party in the south, launched a vigorous campaign against the very idea of elections in the south. From February 7 to 9 demonstrations were staged against the United Nations Commission; strikes were proclaimed; sabotage was widespread; railway traffic was cut. A sizable number of Koreans were killed and wounded in the disorders, yet the strikes never attained large proportions. General Hodge was handed an ultimatum, which, among other demands, asked for the immediate establishment of a "People's Republic" in the south.

Meantime radio broadcasts beamed from the northern zone to Southern Korea reported the creation of "a great popular movement" against the United Nations decision. A mass demonstration was arranged in Pyoungyang: for the first time a formidable Korean army of 200,000 men in uniform, with tanks and airplanes, publicly paraded before the Government of Northern Korea.²³

What was more important, it was announced in Pyoungyang

23. *New York Times*, February 11, 1948.

that the draft of a new constitution was being submitted "to the people" for discussion; as soon as it was adopted, the government in the north would declare itself the government of all of Korea. In its manifesto of February 21 the National Front proclaimed itself spokesman for the "overwhelming majority of the population in both Northern and Southern Korea."

Do not tolerate the realization of the insidious schemes of reaction [the manifesto read], which upon instructions from its foreign bosses insists on the holding of separate elections in Southern Korea and on the creation of a separate government of Southern Korea . . . Fight against such an invasion of the rights of the people! Demand the holding of general election all over Korea after the evacuation of foreign troops! ²⁴

New disorders followed on February 26-27 in Southern Korea; from the north instructions came immediately to set up local "People's Committees." The obvious aim of the movement was to impress the United Nations Commission, to create the illusion that the population was violently opposed to the holding of separate elections in the south.

Meanwhile the commission had arrived at the conclusion that elections could not be held under its auspices in the north, and it directed two of its members to return to Lake Success to receive new instructions from the "Little Assembly" of the United Nations. With a few exceptions, Korean leaders in the southern zone demanded immediate elections in that part of Korea where they could be held; but they demanded also that the government set up as the result of the balloting be proclaimed the government for the entire country. On February 26, 1948, the Little Assembly, by 31 votes to 2, instructed the Special Commission in Korea to go ahead with the organization of elections "in such parts of Korea as are accessible to the Commission." Soon elections were scheduled for May 9; the date was later shifted to May 10.

Now a vigorous campaign was launched against separate elections in Southern Korea, lasting down to election day. One congress after another was convened in Pyuonyang in rapid succession; all the gatherings were well organized and prepared; not one dissenting voice was heard. All the rallies denounced Ameri-

24. *Pravda*, February 23, 1948.

can imperialism, expressed their gratitude to the Soviet Government, demanded the immediate removal of foreign troops and promised to hold elections after the withdrawal of United States and Soviet forces.

At first a thousand delegates met for a Congress of the Communist party. Then the most important of all conferences took place—the so-called Joint Congress of [550] Delegates of North and South Korea. The Communist leadership scored a tremendous success in persuading a number of non-Communist leaders from the south to participate in the congress and sign its resolutions. So strong has been the urge toward unification of the nation and so tired the people of Korea of foreign occupation that the Communist slogans have attracted certain elements opposed to Communist and Soviet policies. The “liberal” Kimm Kiu-sic and even the conservative Kim Koo arrived from Seoul. The participation of the delegates from the south was considerably played up in Pyuonyang; the Presidium of the Congress consisted of 28 persons: 14 from the north and 14 from the south; the real leadership, however, remained in the hands of “General” Kim Il-sung and the northern Communists. Here for the first time an aged man was introduced to the gathering as the “original Kim Il-sung,” allegedly the legendary hero of the anti-Japanese resistance movement from whom the present “Stalin of Korea” derives his name. All sorts of promises were made to the southerners to win them over; many of them were broken as soon as the conference ended. It was pledged, for instance, that Cho Man-sik, the venerated father of Korean liberalism, would be set free, and that the threat of the northern government to cut off electric power to the southern zone would not be carried out.

“Everything went off like clockwork,” the southern delegates reported after their return: “. . . no one was allowed to talk . . . There was no discussion.” Kimm Kiu-sic’s speech was twisted and an entirely different version broadcast.²⁵ The principal resolution of the conference asked for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea and for the creation of a united, independent, democratic state.

Then followed a conference of political leaders of both parts

25. *New York Times*, May 2, 1948.

of Korea, representing 41 organizations. Among the signatories of its resolutions again were Kimm Kiu-sic and Kim Koo, who pledged themselves "not to recognize the outcome of the elections" and not to support a separate government which might be set up in the south. Late in April a new session of the People's Assembly of North Korea was held in Pyuongyang. It adopted a constitution tailored for the whole of Korea; the capital was stated to be Seoul, and Pyuongyang was only temporarily designated as the center of government activity.

In South Korea meanwhile the Communist campaign against the elections was stepped up. Riots, sabotage, and derailing of trains were widespread. Over 400 people were killed and thousands injured. Frequent attempts were made to destroy the lists of registered voters and to render elections impossible. But for the fact that the Communists in the south were a rather ineffective group supplied and supported from the outside, these incidents would surely have led to the outbreak of civil war.

At the same time the Soviet-controlled Pyuongyang radio appealed to the people in the south not to participate in the balloting. It took sharp issue with General Hodge and proclaimed: "Give up your attempt to carry out a separate election! You had better get out of Korea with your clothes packed. . . . Why do you make such a valuable effort at the expense of your nervous system?"²⁶

The elections were held as scheduled on May 10 and on the whole were conducted in an orderly fashion. Participation was unusually high in comparison with free elections in other countries: nearly 90 per cent of those qualified appeared to cast their ballots. Out of the 200 elected candidates, 56 registered with Syngman Rhee's party; another 60 "nonparty" men also supported him. Thus, backed by a clear majority, Rhee became Korea's outstanding national leader.

The outcome of the election represented a telling defeat for the Communist party and Soviet policy. Its first consequence was the cutting off of electric power from the north to South Korea, contrary to all previous promises.

By the middle of 1948 South Korea was obviously on its way to becoming a separate state. An independent government representing the majority of the Korean people was due to be created.

26. *New York Times*, May 10, 1948.

The fact remained, however, that the Soviet Union had been able to propose the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops, while the United States had to insist on the continuation of occupation. This was due to an appalling shortsightedness of American policy between 1945 and 1947, when a strong Korean Army was created in the Soviet zone while the American authorities in the south indulged in petty maneuvers, considerable gesticulation, and manifested a rare lack of perspicacity and resoluteness. The first task of the new Government of South Korea would obviously be the establishment of an armed force, and the United States would be bound to supply it with modern equipment. The outlook in Korea cannot improve until the superiority in power shifts to the freely elected government in Seoul. Korea's unification has ceased to be a problem that can be solved by the Koreans themselves. It remains a major issue on the roster of unsolved international problems.

No Peace for China

The five months that intervened between the Moscow Conference and the Soviet withdrawal from Manchuria marked a crucial period in Sino-Soviet relations. Still friendly at the beginning of the period, relations rapidly deteriorated, and after the last Soviet soldier had left Manchurian soil the two governments were divided by a wide abyss.

The postponement of the withdrawal was essential to the fulfillment of Moscow's policy during those months: it was a means of pressure in the economic negotiations being carried on concerning the future of Manchuria's industry; it was instrumental in permitting the Communist-led "armies of liberation" to spread all over Manchuria; it was, further, a lever applied against the United States in order to have her withdraw her armed forces from China.

China still clung to her old idea of an orderly transfer of authority in Manchuria from the Red Army to the Nationalist Government. The Chinese proposed that their troops be permitted to enter the Manchurian cities before the Soviet forces withdrew. This proposal was rejected on the ground that the simultaneous presence in the same city of Soviet and Chinese forces might cause friction and incidents. The Chinese then asked for the Soviet schedule of withdrawal so that they might be able to synchronize the troop movements, and asked the Soviet command to leave behind in the evacuated localities a token Soviet force in order to prevent a swift occupation by detachments of Chinese Communists. This General Trotsenko, Soviet Chief of Staff in Manchuria, refused to do. The natural consequence was that when the Soviet troops finally did begin to pull out from the populated centers of Manchuria, Communist forces deployed in the vicinity wasted no time in advancing to occupy the towns, while the Nationalists, farther away, were handicapped in their movements.

After the evacuation was delayed for the second time, the

Chinese Government inquired in Moscow as to Soviet intentions with regard to the promised withdrawal from Manchuria. No reply was forthcoming. General Trotsenko formally announced that "the Soviet command intends to withdraw the Soviet troops not later than the date on which the American command evacuates American troops from China, and possibly earlier."¹ At the end of February the Chinese Government again inquired in Moscow as to the causes of the Soviet delay and asked for a definitive deadline.

Official relations became seriously exacerbated. Despite the reluctance of Chinese official agencies to make public statements, sufficient facts concerning the situation in Manchuria became known; the details of Soviet plans for Manchuria and the transfer of industrial equipment to Russia could not be kept secret; the behavior of Soviet troops in Manchuria was widely reported to be unsatisfactory. Resentment had arisen after a well-known mining engineer, Chang Sin-fu, and his seven companions were killed at a railroad station at Lishuchan. Chang was traveling under a Soviet guard commanded by a Major Zotov, when "unknown persons"—a band of armed men belonging to one of the Manchurian "armies of liberation"—broke into his compartment and led him and his companions to the platform, where they were bayoneted to death. Zotov committed suicide. In China there was no doubt that the Chinese Communists were responsible for the murders. *Pravda*, on the other hand, in order to clear the Communist guerrillas, alleged that although investigation had not yielded any conclusive evidence, yet "there are reasons to presume that the killing is the result of a carefully prepared provocative act, committed by one of the bands operating in Manchuria with the aim of worsening Sino-Soviet relations."²

As a consequence of all these events and of Soviet policy toward China, public opinion became exceedingly hostile to the Soviet Union. Large-scale demonstrations took place in a number of cities all over China. Twenty-five thousand students and professors paraded the streets of Chungking demanding immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from Manchuria; similar demonstrations took place in Hankow, Peiping, Chengtu, Nanking, Tsingtao. Marchers carried cartoons of Stalin with the caption "Snake"

1. *Pravda*, February 27, 1946, and *New York Times*, March 4, 1946.

2. *Pravda*, March 10, 1946.

others depicted Russia as a bear, tiger, snake, or alligator. In front of the Soviet embassy building in Chungking the marchers shouted, "Down with the aggressors." In Hankow as many as 100,000 workers, merchants, women, and students took part in the march. Chengtu students staged a one-day protest strike. Faculty members of five universities asked the government to take a strong stand on China's "sovereignty in the northeast." In Nanking 30,000 men marched through a steady rain to protest in front of the Soviet embassy against the "spiritual atomic bomb"—the Yalta agreements.³ A few days later fresh demonstrations broke out. Twenty-seven public organizations sent a telegram to the United Nations demanding sanctions against Russia. A Formosan conference of public organizations appealed to Generalissimo Chiang to take a firmer stand against the Soviet Union's "insatiable demands." At Tsinan, capital of Shantung Province, 20,000 students staged a "Quit Manchuria" parade.⁴

The Soviet Government reacted nervously to this mounting antagonism, which was especially strong among students and the intelligentsia, whom Moscow had considered as the elements most favorably inclined toward the Soviet Union. The Soviet Ambassador launched a formal protest against such "demonstrations by Chinese reactionaries," while the Soviet Army publication, *Red Star*, attacked China in the same vein.

Not content with malicious libel in the press [*Red Star* wrote of "Chinese reactionaries"], they staged obviously hostile demonstrations against the Soviet Union, particularly in Chungking. Despite the numerous protests of broad democratic circles, the Chinese authorities failed to take proper measures against this campaign hostile to a friendly power.⁵

The British joined in the protests against the delayed evacuation. While the United States made no public *démarches*, there was no doubt as to the attitude of official circles and the American public. Meanwhile the Communist forces in Manchuria had made great strides, and Moscow now decided to put an end to the prolonged and dangerous Manchurian venture. Toward the latter part of

3. United Press, February 26, 1946.

4. Associated Press, March 1, 1946.

5. *Information Bulletin of the Soviet Embassy* (Washington), March 28, 1946, p. 258.

April it was announced that Soviet troops would be evacuated from Manchuria by the end of that month.⁶ The date was not adhered to, however, and the evacuation, as Molotov later admitted, was not completed until May 31.

Six months after the original deadline, the Soviet forces withdrew from Manchuria. Some went to the Soviet Far East, some to North Korea, and some to Port Arthur and Dairen. Manchuria continued to be flanked on all sides by Soviet armed might.

In addition to the presence of Russian troops at the peripheries, three elements within Manchuria continued to operate as instruments of Soviet policy: (1) colonies of Soviet Russians had been established on the Chinese-Changchun Railway, particularly in Harbin, where the Central Administration of the railroad resumed its activity; (2) the sizable group of Chinese reimported from Russia occupied high posts in the administration of Manchuria, serving as the most vital link between Soviet Russia and Chinese Communism; (3) thousands among the Russian émigrés in Manchuria and China became Soviet citizens, and a number promptly turned into informants and agents of the Soviet police.

The repatriation of émigrés to Russia attracted widespread attention in the Far East. Along with Berlin and Paris, Shanghai and Harbin had been the great centers of Russian émigré activity since the early 'twenties. After the second World War Moscow deemed the situation propitious to effect a disintegration among the old Russian groups, and the Soviet ambassadors, especially in China and France, went out of their way to court the former "counter-revolutionaries" and convince them that the Soviet fatherland had pardoned all their sins and that living conditions in Russia had improved considerably even for political opponents. The envoys and consuls actually did persuade a number of refugees to acquire Soviet passports; from as far as Sinkiang thousands traveled to Shanghai to go through the formalities preliminary to returning to Russia. While in Harbin many were removed by force during the Soviet occupation, in Shanghai thousands of émigrés decided to return of their own will. They sold their property and bought what they could of clothes, household goods, automobiles, even refrigerators; they were permitted to take everything with them.

Soon different reports began to reach Shanghai from Russia. The

6. Tass, March 24, 1946.

Soviet authorities could not possibly permit the former enemies of the state to parade as well-to-do homecomers who had enjoyed a standard of living much higher than that of the bulk of the Soviet population; even their outward appearance would look like propaganda on behalf of the non-Soviet world, allegedly so much poorer than Russia. All the arrivals were stripped to the bone; some of them were sent into outlying provinces to work. In veiled language their letters told their friends about their return home. One repatriate wrote: "We long for our friends who remained behind in Shanghai, especially the Chow family." Chow is the Chinese term for cooking. Another reported: "Everyone is well dressed and follows the latest fashions. The suits are made à la *pi-seb* [the Chinese word for beggar]." ⁷ Soon the flow of returnees abated. By 1947 repatriation stopped, both in Europe and in the Far East.

Not all Soviet objectives had been attained during the nine months of occupation in Manchuria. Moscow had been less successful in its economic goals than in its political program. Manchuria was to all intents and purposes detached from China and placed under control of "friendly forces." The Americans were prevented from getting into Manchuria, and were withdrawing their troops from China. A powerful pro-Soviet Army had been established in Manchuria during these nine months. The economic picture in Manchuria, on the other hand, continued to be unsatisfactory to Moscow.

Soviet-Chinese negotiations in regard to "war booty" and the future of Manchuria's industry had not led to an agreement. On January 21, 1946, the Soviet Government presented a note to China, which was soon to be supplemented by a further memorandum handed to the Chinese negotiators in Changchun. Although never published in complete form, the gist of the Soviet demands became known. They offered a bold and novel interpretation of war booty which upset the previously accepted concept of the term as recognized under international law. All Japanese enterprises in Manchuria which had worked for the Japanese Army, the note said, were to be regarded as war booty by the Soviet authorities. (The Soviet Government would therefore be entitled, if it so desired, to

7. *Novoye russkoye slovo*, March 17, 1948; New York *World-Telegram*, December 30, 1947; Associated Press, July 1, 1947.

remove all these properties to Russia, with or without the consent of the Chinese or any other Allied government.) Now the Soviet Government made a friendly gesture toward China by offering to avail itself only partially of this prerogative and proposing to China a joint arrangement for the development of Manchuria as far as the remnants of Japanese-built industry in Manchuria were concerned. At the time, the Soviet Army was still on the spot and there was an implied threat that if China declined, the Soviet authorities would export from Manchuria what remained of the "war booty."

The Chinese Government agreed to hold conversations; it was circumspect in its relations with the Soviet Union. The Soviet note, however, contained a point aimed at the United States and the other Allies in the Far East. Japanese property abroad constituted valuable assets for payment of reparations to be exacted from Japan, and it was in Manchuria that the greatest part of such property was located. In the American view, it would be up to the future Reparations Commission to determine the rights to these assets. The Soviet position would call for the extraction of great sums from the reparations pool—in favor of the Soviet Union and perhaps China. The Soviet note had made it explicitly clear that Moscow did not believe that war booty should be included among the sources of reparations funds.

On February 9 the American Secretary of State dispatched a note to the Chinese and Soviet Governments concerning this network of questions:

It is disturbing to this Government [he said] to receive reports that discussions are under way which might result in the establishment of exclusive Sino-Soviet control over industrial enterprises in Manchuria . . . This Government considers that the ultimate disposition of Japanese external assets, such as the industries in Manchuria, is a matter of common interest and concern to those allies who bore the major burden in defeating Japan . . .

It would seem, therefore, most inappropriate at this juncture for any final disposition to be made of Japanese external assets in Manchuria either by removal from Manchuria of such industrial assets as "war booty" or by agreement between the Russian and Chinese Governments for the control or ownership of these assets.⁸

8. State Department release, March 5, 1946.

In his reply (which was never published in full, obviously in order to conceal some of the demands of the Soviet Government), Foreign Minister Wang accepted the American concept for the Chinese Government:

The claim of the Soviet Government [he declared] is far exceeding the scope of war booty as generally recognized by international law and international usage and, for this reason, the two Governments have not been able to reach a unanimity of views of fundamental principles involved . . .

The Chinese Government has found it impossible to agree to this Soviet proposal because it goes beyond provisions of the Sino-Soviet agreements of August 14, 1945 . . .

In the negotiations in Changchun, which nonetheless continued, the Soviet negotiators now offered a more modest set of demands to China. While the initial Soviet proposal had called for the creation of "joint Soviet-Chinese companies" with 50 per cent of the votes on each of the boards going to the Soviet Union, the new proposals in some instances provided for 51 per cent of the property to go to China and agreed to the appointment of some Chinese managers. China, however, assured of the backing of Washington, decided to reject the new Soviet plan too, and at the end of February Chiang Kai-shek issued instructions to this effect to his representatives in Changchun. His stand was that negotiations in regard to the Manchurian economy could not be fruitfully continued so long as Soviet troops remained on Chinese soil. This meant the end of the negotiations.

During May and June the United States dispatched a Reparations Mission, under Edwin Pauley, to investigate the situation in Manchuria and Korea. Its report, which was subsequently released by the State Department, stressed the damage caused by the removal of industrial equipment from Manchuria. In September, however, the Soviet Government reiterated its view that war booty could not be credited to reparations and that, therefore, whatever the Pauley mission might have reported had no relevance to the apportionment of reparations from Japan. For the benefit of the Soviet reader, *Izvestiya* for the first time referred to the booty issue. Not without resorting to some distortion did it tell the Russian public that the issue at stake was the removal of a part of "military

property which had belonged to the Japanese Kwantung Army." "Pauley raises accusations against the Soviet Army," it continued indignantly, protesting against the intention of the United States to proceed with the apportionment of reparations without the consent of the Soviet Union. Finally it claimed—and this was the most important part of its statement—that the Soviet concept of war booty had been incorporated in the armistices concluded by the Allies with Rumania and Bulgaria in 1944 and with Hungary in 1945.⁹

Since then the deadlock on reparations and war booty has been complete. The Soviet Union has not altered its stand; the only concession the Allies have been prepared to make is one whereby they would acquiesce in the actual state of affairs and not demand restoration by the Soviet Union of the removed industrial equipment (since such a restoration would be impracticable), but would consider the removed property as a payment toward the reparations account. In such case the Soviet Union stood to receive little if anything from an eventual reparations allotment among the Allies.

The reparations issue was not among the insoluble Far Eastern issues. A compromise solution was possible. But the stalemate on over-all Far Eastern negotiations between the USSR and the United States blocked the settlement of the reparation accounts.

Almost all of the territory of Manchuria was under Communist control at the time the Soviet forces left. The real government was the "Northeast Bureau" of the Chinese Communist party. It enjoyed wide autonomy in Manchurian affairs, especially in the north and east; it appointed civilian officials; eight of the nine provincial governors of Manchuria were put into office by the Northeast Bureau. Its most important instrument was of course its military

9. *Izvestiya*, January 29, 1947. The reference to the Balkan armistices was a spurious argument. The three agreements provided for the delivery as "booty" by the former German satellites of "all war material belonging to Germany and her satellites, including vessels of the fleet of Germany." No industrial installations or material could possibly be considered to be included in such a definition. Furthermore, the armistice with Bulgaria had provided a precise and proper definition of "war booty"—one directly contradicting the concept now advanced by the Minindel. "War material" as used in the armistice agreement was to "include all material or equipment belonging to, used by, or intended for use by enemy military or para-military formations or members thereof." Paragraph 2 of the protocol annexed to the Bulgarian Armistice, October 29, 1944.

arm. While General Chu Teh, the Communist Commander in Chief, remained in northern China, Gen. Lin Piao arrived from Shansi to take command of all Communist forces in Manchuria.

Thanks to recruitment and new arrivals from adjoining provinces, the armed forces continued to grow. It was estimated—all estimates, including official Communist estimates, were vague and unreliable—that there were from 200,000 to 300,000 men in the various Communist military formations in Manchuria at the time the Russian troops left, i.e., in May, 1946. The Communist armies continued to grow, although at a slower pace; by the end of 1946 they had nearly 400,000 men. Extensive military training had been instituted; a staff college and infantry, artillery, engineering, signal, aviation, and mechanics' schools had been established, and thousands of the graduates were being transferred to combat units.

The composition of this amalgam of Communist forces—referred to as the Joint Democratic Army, or People's Emancipation Forces—was rather heterogeneous. About half the army consisted of Chinese Communist troops; an Eastern Mongolian Army counted some 30,000 men; a numerically small force of about 15,000 men was made up of Japanese. A few Japanese "corps" (the Matsuda, Tagahani, and Akane Corps) had hidden out in the mountains after the surrender and during the period of Soviet occupation; along with regular Japanese troops, there were many Japanese colonists reared on the mainland, many of them born in China, who were now hiding out with their families, not wishing to be returned to Japan. There were also among them native Manchurians educated by the Japanese and later conscripted into the Kwantung Army. The total of Japanese still in China is unknown. While a considerable number of them are still violently anti-Communist, a few thousand have been recruited into the Communist armies. Because of their technical skill and good training they are not a negligible element of the Communist forces in Manchuria. Finally, Korean troops constitute a most important contingent: since November, 1946, Koreans had repeatedly been in action against the Nationalists and thus rendered valuable services to the Communists.

While the Communist armies in Manchuria swelled to almost 400,000, those in China proper were estimated to number about 500,000 around the middle of 1946, and 600,000 in the winter of 1947-48.

SOVIET ASSISTANCE TO THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS

A heated debate has been raging in the United States and elsewhere: has the Soviet Government been giving assistance to the Communists in the Chinese civil war and, in particular, has it supplied the Communist armies with weapons? The two queries relate to two entirely distinct questions.

Since the end of the war Moscow's support of the Communist party of China and its armies has been continual, consistent, and considerable. Assuming a variety of forms, it has been instrumental to such a degree that, in Manchuria at least, it has made all the difference between success and failure.

For those who comprehend the impulses behind Moscow's foreign policy, who feel its tremendous dynamism and are aware of its resourcefulness, there can be no doubt whatever that Moscow had to extend all possible consideration and help to a party which stood at the head of a mighty army and whose victory spelled the fulfillment of both the ideological and "security" aims of the Soviet Government—a party so disciplined and so obedient that its success was tantamount to the success of the Soviet Union itself. There was never any doubt in the minds of the Soviet leadership that the Chinese Communists must be accorded systematic support. The only problem was the best form in which they could be helped.

One crucial limitation has been imposed upon Soviet assistance: it must not be pushed to such lengths as to entangle the Soviet Union in dangerous conflicts with other Great Powers before it is prepared for them, and it must be maneuvered in such a manner as not to provoke a flow of military assistance from a third power to the Nationalist Government of China. Communist Foreign Minister Chou En-lai explained the strategy succinctly: "If Russia came in to support the Communists, the United States would only increase its support of the Kuomintang." ¹⁰ Under the circumstances much shrewd political maneuvering was required.

It is a serious error to assume that the supplying of weapons to the Communist armies in China is the most important or most effective means by which Moscow can help the Chinese Communists in their civil war. China's war is being waged on such a level and under

10. *New York Times*, September 9, 1946.

such conditions that foreign assistance in forms other than arms can be—and, in fact, is—decisive. It is a mistake to measure the Chinese conflict with the customary yardsticks of European military requirements. In their two wars with Germany in the twentieth century France, Russia, and Britain possessed, in varying degrees, the essential prerequisites for modern warfare except for a sufficient quantity and quality of armament; this deficiency often had to be made up by the United States. For centuries these countries had been acquiring military skill, developing military science, training military commanders of great ability, continually adjusting their military machines to the latest innovations and requirements of warfare, learning and copying from one another.

In Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries Frederick the Great was revolutionizing his army, Napoleon organizing mass legions and evolving a new strategy, and Suvorov revamping the Russian military machine. The new Prussian Army rose to strength under Schlieffen and the elder Moltke. The new ideas were promptly absorbed by the military leadership of Germany's western and eastern neighbors. Even poor Russia, backward in many ways, maintained an army not inferior to that of the other Great Powers. In these respects America had nothing to teach the Great Powers of Europe.

In China, however, the situation is vastly different. China reached the summit of her greatness in the eighteenth century and in many aspects of her national life she has failed to progress farther since then. China's military techniques remained virtually unchanged. China's civil war, in both technique and strategy, is being waged on a primitive level. In training, leadership, ability of military commanders, weapons, ability to employ heavy artillery, and aviation, China is so far behind that the most vital aid needed by both Chinese factions is advice and guidance, teaching and training, rather than vast amounts of equipment. The general staff of an army—an army's brains—consists of a few hundred officers of high educational and intellectual stature, superior to the thousands of field officers who are hurriedly trained in a few months. Such a general staff cannot be created overnight; it requires a background of experience, tradition, military academies, long years of study and learning. This is why "advisers" were of such importance to Chiang Kai-shek in the 'thirties (they were often Germans, some sent from

Berlin and in part refugees from the Nazi regime). And this is why Russian and American advisers were so badly heeded by China after 1937.

This is why, also, education and advisers are among the most important forms of assistance which the Soviet Government can give to the Chinese Communists. Battalions and regiments of Chinese who were driven out of Manchuria during the Japanese attack were reorganized, trained, and armed in the Soviet Union; after Malinovsky's armies went into Manchuria in August, 1945, these Chinese contingents returned. Hundreds of the most capable Chinese commanders visited the Russian Far East and studied in various schools in Russia. The Chinese Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow and various military schools in the Soviet Union trained a large number of Chinese leaders, both military and civilian, who now went back to China to take charge of Communist armies and government activities. During their stay in Russia they had acquired more than military knowledge. A better understanding of the political aspects of the civil war, of diplomatic tactics and maneuvering, and of international relations was gained by these sons of Chinese merchants and peasants whose main weapons had heretofore been the sword and the knife. As they streamed back into China behind the Soviet advance, it was as if the twentieth century were breaking into and superimposing itself upon the eighteenth century. This in itself may have been of decisive moment in the civil war.

The most prominent among the group of Russian-trained Chinese was Li Li-san. He had been approved by the Comintern as the supreme leader of Chinese Communism late in the 1920's, after the removal of the "rightist" Chen Tu-hsiu. Soon the fiery Li, inclined as he was toward direct action, revolutionary uprisings, and military operations even under unfavorable conditions, was decried as a "half-Trotskyite"; his main guilt, however, was the derogatory remarks he had made about the Comintern. Moscow removed him from leadership in China and appointed Mao Tse-tung in his stead. Li Li-san was taken to Russia. There he spent 15 years as a Chinese émigré; he attended Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow, and married a Russian girl. When he returned to Yen-an in the fall of 1945, he was no longer the impetuous, inflammatory, and independent Li: he had become a loyal graduate of Stalin's school, a circum-

spect and prudent politician embodying the combination of Russian and Chinese Communism. Now Li Li-san changed his name to Li Min-jen, that is, Li Man-of-the-people. His first act on his return from Russia was to fly to Yen-an for a visit with his erstwhile enemy and successor, Mao Tse-tung. Their friendship was promptly resumed, and Li proceeded to Manchuria as de facto Foreign Minister in Harbin, the Russo-Chinese capital of Manchuria. Like so many other Communist leaders, he was now made a "general"; his official title was that of Political Adviser to the Communist Commander in Chief in Manchuria, Gen. Lin Piao. Li's actual assignment, however, was more important than his title would indicate: it was to coordinate Communist activities throughout their vast new fields of action. Li conducted negotiations with the Chinese UNRRA Mission in Mukden; he went to North Korea to coordinate the exchange of goods, and made himself useful in a variety of ways.

The Korean Army was another example of how the Soviet Government was able to give valuable aid to the Chinese Communists short of supplying arms. This army was founded in Soviet-occupied North Korea and equipped largely with Japanese matériel and weapons. It took part in a number of serious encounters in southern Manchuria and often proved to be superior in fighting ability to the Chinese Communists. Its intervention was decisive in gaining critical areas for the latter.

Sometimes Soviet assistance assumed unexpected forms. In November, 1946, for example, a Communist formation in southern Manchuria, several thousand men strong, was forced to retreat before the Nationalists and cross the border into North Korea. Complying with the regulations of international law, the Soviet border guard promptly disarmed the Communists. The latter were then transported on the Soviet-operated Korean Railroad 150 miles to the northeast and released to enter Manchuria near Linkiang; before being turned loose they received their weapons from the Soviet officials.¹¹

On another occasion (reported by the Supreme Nationalist Commander in Manchuria, Gen. Hsiung Shih-hui), when fighting developed in Shantung, Soviet gunboats transported Korean troops, technicians, and artillery experts from Dairen to Chefoo;

11. *Ibid.*, November 20, 1946.

there Soviet officers directed Communist artillery signal units and Soviet engineers ran all locomotives used by the Communists during the operation. The Chinese Chief of Staff stated that at Szepeing-kai 31 Russian advisers were working with the Communist armies.¹²

In the fall of 1946 two Communist regiments had taken refuge from Nationalist attack at Port Arthur, remaining there until the spring of 1947, when they re-emerged to join in the general Communist attack in Manchuria. In September, 1947, the Chinese War Minister, Pai Chung-hsi, stated that Chinese Communists were receiving help from Korea, Outer Mongolia, and Japanese prisoners of war, as well as unspecified supplies "from a certain power."¹³

Moscow's propaganda assistance to the Chinese Communists was as consistent as it was effective. The Soviet press systematically backed the Communist cause in China, the valor of its armies, and its solidarity of purpose. In its relations with the United States, the Moscow Foreign Ministry successfully strove to reduce American aid to the Chiang Kai-shek government to a minimum and to have UNRRA's field of operations extended to the Communist areas. Animosity toward the Government of China was kindled by Moscow by all possible means; this policy yielded valuable results in the United States by producing confusion in regard to China which, again, was of benefit to the Communists there.

In the framework of this multilateral aid given by Moscow the supplying of arms and armaments plays a subordinate role indeed. Yet it is not entirely a negligible role. Not all the facts concerning it can be ascertained and verified. The Nanking authorities have listed 105 cases of alleged direct aid given by Russia to the Chinese Communists in the two and a half years between December, 1944, and June, 1947. Among them, it is charged, are the supplying of firearms, motor cars, and trucks, light and heavy machine guns, mortars, field guns, small ammunition, shells, grenades, a few tanks, transfer of Japanese planes, training of cadets and officers, delivery of gasoline and radio sets. According to the same Nationalist sources, in February, 1947, for example, Soviet ammunition was furnished to the Communists in exchange for 109 carloads of corn.

The most important step in arming the Chinese Communists was

12. United Press, July 4, 1947, and Associated Press, June 24, 1947.

13. *New York Times*, September 10, 1947.

of course the disposal of Japanese arms and arsenals in favor of the Communists, when "Soviet troops overran Manchuria."¹⁴ It is charged in Nanking, however, that additional arms are being produced in the Russian Far East for the Chinese Communists from captured Japanese models. Gen. Chao Chia-hsiang, then acting commander of the government forces in Manchuria, charged in July, 1947, that "the former Japanese arsenal at Mukden, removed after the war, has been set up at the Soviet-Manchurian border, where it is now producing arms and ammunition for Chinese Communists." From Shantung it was reported that Communist soldiers were carrying a new type of rifle that bore no identification marks.¹⁵ There is no way of ascertaining at the present time to what extent all these allegations and rumors are based on facts.

However much certain details may be obscured, there remains no doubt that the multifarious and systematic aid of the Soviet Union has been instrumental in the Communist conquest of Manchuria and highly important in the Communist advance in northern China.

There was one cardinal difference between American aid to the Central Government and that of the Soviet Union to the Chinese Communists. The supply of arms to a recognized government—scant as it was in the American case—is permissible under international law, and no legal objections have been, or could be, raised against it by the Soviet Government. In the other instance, Soviet policy was in manifest conflict with the recently concluded Sino-Soviet treaty, by which Moscow had pledged its "moral and material assistance" exclusively to the Central Government of China. Any form of assistance given the internal foe of the central regime was an obvious and undisputed violation of the treaty of 1945.

The Soviet press and propaganda campaign against the United States in connection with Chinese affairs has been mounting in intensity since the end of 1945, but not until the end of 1946 did it reach its full pitch. American troops in China were the first target of attack; later, when the size of the American forces in China was reduced, the Soviet campaign turned against American policy in

14. Cf. pp. 249-250.

15. United Press, July 3, 1947, and *New York Times*, October 19, 1947.

China in general, with the over-all accusation that Washington was intent on making China its great Asiatic dependency. While the Soviet Union, it was asserted, was fighting for the integrity and independence of China, the United States was plotting to make China a component of the future American empire.

On Red Army Day (February 23, 1946) Marshal Malinovsky addressed a mass meeting in Changchun. "At last the friendship and solidarity of the Soviet and Chinese peoples have been realized. This friendship is unbreakable, for it has been cemented with blood. But look! A beautiful lady has appeared on the horizon, stretching out her hand in a kidskin glove, aiming to tear China away from the Soviet Union." "We shall cut off that hand!" Malinovsky declared. Fearing, however, that some of his listeners might have missed the allusion, he returned to the subject toward the end of his speech, adding: ". . . and dollars tinkle in the lady's purse." He was repeating almost word for word what the first Soviet Ambassador, Lev Karakhan, had declared in Manchuria 23 years earlier. Then the arrows had been directed chiefly against a Great Britain that was intensely antagonistic toward the Soviet Government. In 1946 Malinovsky was aiming his shots at a recent ally.

When Malinovsky's armies left Manchuria in May the propaganda campaign, with the demand that the Americans leave China altogether, increased in vigor. *Pravda* and *Izvestiya* systematically carried dispatches under such spirited headlines as "Get Out of China!" and "Americans Kindling Civil War in China." In August Chiang Kai-shek's aviation bombed Yenan, then the Communist capital. The Moscow *New Times* commented: "Chinese reactionaries would not have had the daring to commit a provocative act fraught with such consequences as the bombing of Yenan if they had not felt behind them the ever-increasing support of the United States."¹⁶ And *Pravda* added: "The bombs were of American make." Again and again Soviet newspapers quoted from various American publications to demonstrate that "the American soldiers don't want to stay in China." The commercial treaty concluded between the United States and China in November, 1946, received detailed treatment in the Soviet press. *Pravda* slanted its comment to make the treaty appear symptomatic of a "return to the system of unequal treaties": "The conclusion of the American-Chinese trade

16. *Novoye vremya* (1946), No. 16, p. 17.

treaty represents a new example of the retreat of the Kuomintang Government before the onslaught of American monopolies. In order to safeguard its anti-democratic regime, the Kuomintang Government sacrifices the vital interests of the Chinese people."¹⁷

At the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in March-April, 1947, where the principal issue was the preparation of a peace treaty with Germany, Molotov again raised the Chinese issue and asked for its discussion. He wanted to know how the agreement of December, 1945, had been implemented by the individual powers. George Marshall and Ernest Bevin refused to discuss China in the absence of a Chinese representative. The Chinese Government, amid excited protests against the proceedings in Moscow, declared its refusal to take part in the conversations. Molotov then declared that China's presence was not necessary; to his mind, her absence was probably the first step on the road toward a "trusteeship" over China, not dissimilar to that imposed on Korea. The Chinese Communist radio obediently attacked the United States for opposing the discussion of Chinese affairs in Moscow. In an attempt to find a compromise solution Secretary Marshall now suggested a mere "exchange of information" between the three powers; copies were to be submitted to the Government of China. Molotov accepted. It was a matter of principle for him to keep the decisions of 1945 alive and to make China and Chiang Kai-shek the objects of international deliberations.

In the "information" presented by the United States General Marshall asserted that the American forces in China had repatriated about three million Japanese to their homeland; "as for the disposition of the estimated 700,000 Japanese taken in Manchuria by the Soviets, I have no information," he added. The over-all number of American troops in China would be reduced, he concluded, to 6,180 military and naval personnel after a few months.

Molotov's statement emphasized that the number of Japanese taken prisoner in Manchuria by the Soviet armies was approximately 600,000, and that their repatriation was proceeding according to plan.

Soon *Pravda* came out with a violent blast against American policy in China. Quoting Congressman Hugh DeLacy and the American author, Owen Lattimore, it accused the United States of

17. *Pravda*, December 19, 1946.

supplying China with "huge quantities of weapons"; of having trained 40 Chinese divisions; of supplying lend-lease goods; and of selling war surplus to China to the amount of \$500,000,000.¹⁸

At the end of October, 1947, the United States granted non-military aid to China. The first installment of \$30,000,000 went to China in the form of 120,000 tons of wheat, 80,000 tons of rice, other foods, and various consumer goods. For this, V. Avarin, of the Moscow Foreign Office, bitterly attacked the American Government. The new Sino-American agreement, he claimed, "is directly contrary to the agreement signed in December, 1945."¹⁹

DE FACTO RECOGNITION

Moscow's position in regard to the Chinese Communist regime in Manchuria was one of de facto recognition.

The Communist regime in northern Manchuria, headed by Li Li-san, refused to admit Edmund Cobb, who had been appointed United States Consul General at Harbin; it expelled the Danish consul, Gunnar Buck; the Soviet Consul General, however, was able freely to perform his duties.

At the headquarters of the Chinese-Changchun Railway a Soviet Russian administration was at work, with Gen. Alexander Zhuravliov at its head. It smoothly collaborated with the local Chinese Communist agencies.

The Sino-Soviet treaty of August, 1945, had provided for the joint administration of the railway, at the headquarters as well as all along the line. The Chinese Government had appointed its personnel in October, 1945, which proceeded to Manchuria; some even got as far as Harbin; but none was allowed to perform his duties. The Nationalist appointees returned to Changchun in 1946. The railroad was administered, on the one hand, by Zhuravliov's staff, and on the other, by a Communist-controlled Railroad Board. All station masters in the Communist-occupied areas were appointed from among Soviet railroad men.

In order to avoid too evident a violation of the Sino-Soviet treaty, the Soviet agencies have run their own trains, and no Chinese Communists are being employed at Zhuravliov's headquarters. On the

18. *Ibid.*, April 21, 1947.

19. *Novoye vremya* (1947), No. 46, p. 11.

other hand, the Chinese Communists run their own (Chinese) trains and have their offices in Harbin too. Railroad repair shops are being used by Chinese Communists and Soviet agencies jointly. The pretense of nonrecognition notwithstanding, actual collaboration between Soviet and Chinese Communist agencies continues.

On the other hand, in Mukden, which was occupied by the Nationalist Army, conflict between the railway administrators was quick to arise. As a result of this friction, Moscow, in November-December, 1946, recalled all Soviet railway officials from Mukden.²⁰

Trade between Manchuria and the Soviet Union got under way during the second half of 1946, and now Soviet trade agencies were established in Harbin and Manchouli (in Manchuria) as well as in Suiyuan (in Inner Mongolia) in which several hundred Soviet officials and workers were employed. Trade agreements were concluded with the Manchurian Communists, and a considerable exchange of goods in both directions began—between Manchuria-Mongolia and the Soviet Union; there was also some exchange of goods between Communist Manchuria and Soviet-occupied North Korea. Manchuria's agricultural production, which before the war had been a large item of her exports, had diminished considerably; yet a way was found to export large amounts of wheat, soy beans, meat, rice, and furs to the Soviet Union in exchange for badly needed coal, kerosene, matches, cigarettes, and various industrial products. A large number of freight trains left Harbin daily for the northwest border station of Manchouli, as well as in the direction of Vladivostok. So important were the Manchurian products to the Soviet Union that about 60 Japanese-built locomotives, which had been removed from Manchuria during the Soviet occupation, were now sent back there.²¹

An analogous situation obtained in the military base of Port Arthur and in Dairen, where the Soviet authorities gave de facto recognition to the local Communist authorities.

The Soviet de facto recognition of the Communist regimes was in obvious conflict with the treaty of 1945, which had stressed the sovereignty of the Nationalist Government over Manchuria. Moscow's excuse was always the same: it was allegedly ready to recog-

20. *Pravda*, November 20 and December 6, 1946.

21. *New York Times*, March 7, 1947.

nize Nanking as soon as it had established itself in control, hence, "Why don't you come and take over?" Stripped of excuses and niceties, however, the factual recognition involved the consolidation of a great new Soviet-controlled area embracing North Korea, most of Manchuria, and a part of Inner Mongolia.

ENTANGLEMENT OVER DAIREN

The diplomatic struggle over Dairen, principal port of Manchuria, was part of the Sino-Soviet-American entanglement over Manchuria. It was conducted in the same manner and often with the same Oriental methods as the larger conflict; but it occupies a separate place because of the distinct position which the city and port of Dairen hold in the agreements of 1945 between China and the USSR, as approved and recognized by the United States.

At the base of the conflict over Dairen lies the fact that this large city, whose population had grown to more than 600,000 under the Japanese, is situated inside the "Kwantung territory," renamed Port Arthur Military-Naval Base and leased to the Soviet Union for 30 years. While Port Arthur, an excellent military port, was claimed by and given to the Soviet Government for defense purposes, Dairen, as a purely commercial port, was to remain under Chinese administration in spite of the fact that it is surrounded by Soviet-leased territory. When the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1945 was being negotiated in Moscow, Stalin personally attempted to obtain for Soviet officials some part in the administration of Dairen; he met with determined protests on the part of the Chinese representatives and was obliged to yield. It was stipulated, however, that in time of war with Japan the Soviet military regime would be extended from Port Arthur to Dairen. The agreement was signed, but Stalin was scarcely prepared to tolerate an administration representing an independent Nanking regime inside his leasehold, which was rapidly being militarized, fortified, and converted into a strong Soviet bastion on the Pacific. Docile Chinese Communists, on the other hand, were acceptable and necessary; the reoccupation of Dairen by the Nationalists must be postponed as long as possible.

Improvement and expansion of the military base at Port Arthur was begun during the stay of Soviet troops in Manchuria. Thousands of Japanese prisoners—they were reported to number 60,-

ooo—built new airfields between Port Arthur and Dairen, improving defense positions, digging artillery installations. In the north the border line separating the Port Arthur area from Manchuria was likewise being fortified. Soviet forces in considerable numbers arrived in Port Arthur and Dairen.

In November, 1946, part of the Soviet troops were withdrawn to Port Arthur. When they left, all the facilities of Dairen remained in the hands of Communist groups who had entered the city; Communist administration and police were established, in defiance of the Nationalist forces stationed near by at the northern border of the leasehold. The Soviet command did not permit these forces to cross over into Dairen.

To show its adherence to signed compacts, the Soviet Government more than once invited Changchun and Nanking to dispatch their own administrators to take over Dairen. Nanking appointed representatives, but they failed to take over the city. Shen Yi, appointed to be mayor by the Nationalist Government went to Dairen in February, 1946, but returned soon after because he was unable to exercise his duties. In his place, the Communists appointed their own mayor.²² In order now for the Nationalist forces to gain control of the area, the local Communists either had to be eliminated—and for this Nationalist troops were needed—or the Soviet command had to order them to submit. The Chinese Government repeatedly asked that its troops be permitted to accompany the administrators to Dairen, but this request was consistently turned down. Nor did the Soviet command make any move against the Communist agencies operating in Dairen.

In December, 1946, a crisis was precipitated, and the United States openly entered the picture. During the entire period of Soviet occupation the American Consul General in Dairen had been compelled to reconcile himself to the abnormal conditions reigning there: he had no direct means of communication with either Washington or the American Ambassador to China; all dispatches were sent through Soviet channels to Vladivostok and on from there, and there was of course no certainty that the contents did not become known to "third persons." His attempts to get in touch with the Soviet commander at Port Arthur were usually

22. *Ibid.*, March 12, 1946.

vain; the Soviet commander himself was under orders from Moscow.²³ Only rarely—once every few months—did an American ship, bringing mail and sometimes a few American citizens, stop at Dairen for direct contact with the consul. On December 18, 1946, when an American Navy LCI docked at Dairen, the Soviet authorities ordered it to leave within 48 hours. An American correspondent who arrived on the ship was not allowed to remain. The ship left as ordered. Sixteen months after the end of the war neither foreign ships nor foreign correspondents were generally permitted in the city. On January 5, 1947, the State Department sent a note to Russia and China demanding the "implementation of the provisions of the Sino-Soviet Agreement" in regard to Dairen.

. . . This Government [the note read] perceives no reason why there should be further delay in reopening the port, under Chinese administration, to international commerce as contemplated in the aforementioned agreement . . . [It was hoped, said the State Department, that] . . . the abnormal conditions now prevailing at Dairen may be terminated at an early date and normal conditions may be established which will permit American citizens to visit and reside at Dairen in pursuit of their legitimate activities.

The Soviet reply consisted of a peculiar interpretation of the agreement of 1945: the port of Dairen was to be a free port—except in time of war with Japan; the end of war is marked by the conclusion of a peace treaty; no peace treaty has yet been concluded with Japan; Q.E.D., a legal state of war continues, and so do Soviet privileges in Dairen. Tass recalled the repeated invitations sent to the Chinese Government to "take over" the civil administration of Dairen. A note on this subject had been sent as recently as December 3, 1946, Tass reported, but the Chinese had not replied. Therefore a new Soviet note was dispatched to Nanking on March 7, 1947, which stated: ". . . The Soviet Government proposed a second time that the Chinese Government accelerate the installation of a Chinese administration in the entire Military-Naval Base zone of Port Arthur and the city of Dalnii [the Russian name for Dairen] in accordance with the Soviet-Chinese agreement of August 14, 1945." Nanking replied on March 31 asking that National-

23. Interview with Consul General Benninghoff, *New York World-Telegram*, December 6, 1947.

ist troops be permitted to accompany the administration to Dairen. Moscow refused even to consider this demand, and Tass, speaking for the Kremlin, considered the Chinese reply inadequate. It commented, with biting irony: "Evidently there is some sort of paralysis of power in China."²⁴ This "paralysis of power" was caused by the Soviet refusal to let Nationalist troops assure the installation of the Chinese administration in Dairen. Moscow was saying, in effect: "Come and take over but don't use any arms against those who are your sworn enemies and who will make sure that you cannot operate there."

Having repeatedly made this gesture of inviting Nanking in, Moscow deemed the situation ripe for a new move—the constitution of the Port Arthur area as a separate Chinese region—a little puppet state. On April 8, 1947, a "Kwantung Administration" was set up; it was headed by the Communist appointee, Chih Tse-hsiang. Without being given juridical status, it became the only Chinese agency that the Soviet authorities recognized in the area. This move was in obvious contradiction to the provisions of the 1945 treaty, but an excuse, in the form of the numerous Soviet notes to Nanking, had been prepared. When two months later Chiang Kai-shek sent a mission to Dairen to inspect and report back, it was admitted into the city but subjected to a humiliating procedure exacted by the Soviet command: the Nationalist representatives had to obtain a permit from the "Kwantung Administration" to perform their work.

The great port of Dairen had lain unused since the end of the war. Only a few Soviet ships, usually from Vladivostok, entered the harbor from time to time, and only infrequently did Soviet ships carry cargo to Communist-occupied ports in northern China. In August, 1947, the Chinese Government made the futile gesture of barring all foreign ships from the port of Dairen. Immediately the Soviet Government retorted by stating officially that

. . . The Port of Dalnii [Dairen], in accordance with Article IV of the Soviet-Chinese Agreement Concerning the Port Dalnii, *until the peace settlement with Japan* falls under the regime established in the region of the Military-Naval Base of Port Arthur. By virtue of this, Soviet steamers have the indisputable right to enter the port of Dalnii, even though this port, for reasons independent of the Soviet Union, has

24. *Pravda*, April 2, 1947.

not as yet been opened to trade and navigation of all countries, as had been provided for by the Soviet-Chinese Agreement of August 14, 1945.²⁵

In this statement the Sino-Soviet treaty was inaccurately quoted, however. The treaty gave the Soviet Union special privileges in Dairen not "until the peace settlement with Japan" but "in time of war against Japan." The legal issue whether the Soviet interpretation of the letter of the treaty was correct came to occupy an important place in official and unofficial reactions to the Soviet position. The State Department declared itself in disagreement with the Soviet version, and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Shih-chieh stated in May, 1947: "As a state of war in actuality does not exist between Japan and Russia, and as no immediate threat of aggression can come from Japan, Dairen can no longer be subject to the military control of the Port Arthur Area." ²⁶

Meanwhile the towns and villages of the Port Arthur Base, including Dairen, were developing along the Soviet pattern. An agrarian reform was carried out in 1946; landed estates of the Japanese and of "Chinese collaborators" were confiscated; new taxes were introduced for the peasants; in the cities, where many apartments had become vacant due to the departure of Japanese and of Chinese merchants, some groups of Chinese were moved into the fine structures, mainly members of the new and growing bureaucracy. In the schools some of the old teachers were dismissed and new ones appointed to teach in accordance with the new spirit. Politically, Dairen was following the usual Soviet model. Pictures of Communist statesmen, with Stalin's foremost, adorned the façades of public buildings; on holidays, a Soviet correspondent reported, "the streets are filled with demonstrations in which tens and hundreds of thousands of people take part. The national flags fly high, songs and slogans resound, columns of workers and employees, merchants and students are marching; 210,000 demonstrators gathered on the huge square in front of the building of the provincial government of Dairen to celebrate the Day of Victory over Japan." ²⁷ Such reports were of course slanted in favor of the new regime. The new way of life was a far cry from the promised

25. *Ibid.*, August 29, 1947. Italics are mine.

26. *New York Times*, May 23, 1947.

27. V. Golubkov, in *Novoye vremya* (1947), No. 10, p. 27.

plenty for all. Under conditions of civil war the standard of living had dropped, and the over-all economic situation of the bulk of the population continued to deteriorate.

The dispute over Dairen, which led into a channel of legalistic bickering and interpretations, was hopelessly deadlocked. Moscow was in control and was in no mood to retire from its position. It considered Dairen an asset in future peace negotiations over Japan, since the other powers were aware that Dairen could be opened to international trade only at the price of concessions to the Soviet Union.

CHINESE COMMUNISM AFTER THE WAR

The restrictions that the Chinese Communists had imposed upon themselves during the preceding seven years, and the conciliatory trend of their political maneuvers, became unnecessary, even harmful, to their cause as soon as the war ended. An all-out offensive was due. Yet it was a whole year before the definite shift in tactics was consummated.

In 1937, when Nanking concluded its treaty with Moscow, the Chinese Communists changed their attitude and proclaimed a "united front" against Japan. Its provisions were not always carried out; clashes with the government forces occurred more than once; yet this anti-Japanese orientation, along with a new and moderate agrarian policy in China, made a rapprochement with other powers, notably the United States, possible—so much so that in the later stage of the war hopes were high, both in China and outside, that the civil war was definitely over and the consolidation of China could be effected as soon as Japan surrendered. These expectations, incidentally, together with the wartime tendency toward making maximum concessions to Moscow, prompted the United States Government to seek to reconcile the two main forces of China.

For the Communists, the end of the war put an end to the necessity for a conciliatory "united front" policy. Basically they were set to revert to their earlier aggressive tactics. The danger from Japan had disappeared; Moscow was embarking on a series of serious controversies with China; the strength of the Chinese Communists had grown extensively and the areas under their control had expanded all over northern and central China. A new turn "to the

left," as logical for China as for world Communism, was due. Keeping in step with its elder brother, Chinese Communism went through a step-by-step evolution which after a little more than a year led to all-out civil war, armed uprisings, and violent agrarian revolution. The main reason for the hesitancy and slowness of the Chinese Communists in effecting this shift to the left immediately after the end of the war was the policy of the United States, which promised to make possible Communist successes and victories almost without bloodshed and resort to arms.

In the discussions between Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung (September, 1945) which had been arranged through the American envoy, the Communist chief made the demand that in four provinces of northern China (Hope, Shantung, Chahar, and Jehol), Communist governors be appointed, and that in two neighboring provinces (Suiyuan and Shansi) the vice-governors be appointed by the Communists. This would have meant that the entire administration of this northern Chinese region, with a population of about 71 millions, would have become either Communist or Communist controlled. Mao Tse-tung had every reason to expect that Manchuria, then occupied by the Soviet Army, would eventually become a part of the Communist realm; his plan was thus obvious: it aimed at the creation of a Chinese Communist state—with the consent of Chiang Kai-shek—covering the rich and valuable regions of northern China, forming a belt adjacent to the Soviet Union. (The configuration of such a state will be seen from the attached map.) The maintenance of the Communist Army in some form was a Communist prerequisite to agreement. Mao Tse-tung was not prepared to accept the principle of a united Chinese army—or, as Chiang Kai-shek put it, "a nationalization of the armed forces so that no private army should be within the country's boundaries."

The negotiations, in which the United States took an active part as mediator and conciliator, lasted for about six weeks. It was "almost" agreed that Communist armed forces—then claiming a strength of 1,200,000 (according to government claims, their strength was less than half this size)—would constitute one sixth of the future army of China, i.e., it would be reduced to 20 divisions; they would be stationed mainly in the northern provinces



THE COMMUNIST PLAN

along with Kuomintang forces; and the strength of the entire Chinese Army would then be sharply reduced to a total of 120 divisions, the size of a peacetime standing army.

No agreement was concluded, however. Chiang was not prepared to concede the northern territories to the Communists; nor were the Communists prepared to integrate their forces into a national army. On October 10, 1945, Mao Tse-tung left Chungking to return to Yen-an. He accused the "ruling cliques of the Kuomintang" of "preparing to launch a civil war . . . They hope that certain Allied officers will fill the same role that General Scobie, the British commander, filled in Greece." Meanwhile clashes between Nationalist and Communist detachments continued. The civil war was gaining momentum. Yen-an, the Communist capital, now found itself on the periphery of the Communist-controlled area and hence became unsuitable as a capital; in December, the evacuation of government agencies from Yen-an began. Most of the Communist officers moved to Kalgan, while Mao and most of his top advisers continued for some time to reside in Yen-an. Caravans of mules, ponies, and donkeys loaded with books, beds, office files, and food moved daily from Yen-an toward the Yellow River; the Resistance University, the Art Academy, the Military College, the Medical College, and a number of other institutions and party offices were already out of Yen-an when in a Nationalist air bombardment in the summer of 1946 much of what remained of the cave capital was destroyed.

Mao's departure from Chungking did not mark a definite rupture of negotiations. The parleys continued due to the efforts of the United States. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley, special American envoy, disillusioned and bitter after more than a year of effort and failure, announced his resignation and slammed the door behind him. He publicly charged "colonial imperialism and Communist imperialism" with impeding the conclusion of an agreement; he also accused certain officials in the State Department of double-crossing his own activity. Hurley's resignation did not, however, produce any essential shift in American policy. The conviction that a coalition government must and can be established in China was still widespread; there was as yet little understanding of Communist tactics. Now General Marshall was chosen to continue the work begun by Hurley alongside Ambassador J. Leighton Stuart. Mar-

shall's assignment to China was an obvious product of this utter incomprehension of the Chinese scene and could not but end in failure. This greatest failure in the life of the successful general was the logical consequence of the prevailing attitude toward China.

To the Chinese Communists, American policy was baffling. In China, as in Europe, people assumed that the Government of the United States pursued a consistent policy dictated by its national interests; they never appreciated to what extent chance factors, personal sympathies, and sentimentalities accounted for oscillation, uncertainty, and contradictions in the policy of the Department of State. They applied the standards of the military operations conducted with such skill and success by the armed forces of the United States. But the singleness of purpose characteristic of military operations had dissolved in the first rays of peace.

American lend-lease shipments to the Central Government, for example, were prolonged until June 30, 1946—beyond the deadline set for other countries. This meant a strengthening of Chiang Kai-shek in his operations against the Communists. But in his statement of December 15, 1945, President Truman advocated a coalition government for China: "The United States is cognizant that the present National government of China is a 'one-party government' and believes that peace, unity, and democratic reform in China will be furthered if the basis of this government is broadened to include other political elements in the country." To Chinese ears this naturally sounded like a vote of nonconfidence in the Generalissimo and a demand that power be shared with the Communists—all the more so since it was common knowledge how sharply critical of the Chinese Government Ambassador Stuart and his staff had been. Chou En-lai commented, with great surprise: "On the one hand, we see American munitions fired at Communist troops, while on the other hand the Americans are trying to bring about peace!"

So long as pressure was being exerted upon the Chinese Government by Washington, the Communists were shrewd enough to move slowly and not indulge in revolutionary gymnastics, but rather to stress their readiness to form a national coalition government in which power would be shared; they were willing to yield on constitutions, elections, press and public relations; they would not compromise on their hold over northern China and on the unification of the army. The Americans had to be appeased, yet the

great offensive had to be begun. More than anything else, the Communists stressed their respect for the United States and its institutions. Jefferson, Washington, and Lincoln were now referred to and venerated in every Communist public statement, while Marx and Lenin were apparently forgotten. Mao Tse-tung himself wrote about a "bourgeois-democratic" revolution in China; socialism, he said, could not be established "on the debris of a semicolonial and semifeudal China"; a dictatorship of the proletariat, as exemplified by the Soviet Union, would not work in China. "Chinese history will create a Chinese system—a new democratic state and government with a union of several democratic classes." Strangely enough, this exhibition did not fail to make the desired impression. The American observers were elated; they did not remember that Mao had employed precisely the same terms, in their specific Communist meaning, while he was engaged in a destructive civil war.

Another Communist leader, Liu Shao-chih, a member of the Chinese Politburo and known as a political thinker in his party, stated at the time in an interview for the benefit of foreign correspondents:

The Communist party's program for China at present is one of democratic capitalist development, based on state, private and cooperative enterprise. . . .

The program of the Chinese Communists is comparable to the political and economic concepts in the United States at the time of Jefferson and Lincoln. The Chinese Communist party maintains no liaison with the Russian Communist party or any other foreign Communist party.

Considering that true communism is not suited to China in the present stage of political and economic development, the Chinese Communist party would oppose any party that attempted to introduce communism of the classical or Russian pattern into China. . . .²⁸

He promised that under Communist control private industry and enterprise would be an essential part of the Chinese economy and that many formerly Japanese enterprises would be turned over to private owners.

It seemed worth while for the Communists to make pro-American gestures of this kind. Winston Churchill had acquiesced in a Subasić-Tito government for Yugoslavia, out of which a powerful Communist dictatorship emerged without much bloodshed. Why,

28. *New York Times*, December 5, 1945.

after all, could such a development not be duplicated in China—with a Chiang-Mao government as the first step on the road to a Communist regime? If the Americans were willing to let themselves be used in such an evolution, they must of course be given an opportunity to do so, the Communists reasoned.

General Marshall arrived in China on December 20, and on the very same day Communist Foreign Minister Chou En-lai announced an offer which was sweet to American ears: an immediate truce to end the civil war and negotiations for a coalition government. With General Marshall's assistance, a truce was actually concluded on January 10, 1946. All hostilities were to cease immediately; all troop movements were to be stopped; the destruction of railways was prohibited; truce commissions consisting of three officers—one Kuomintang, one Communist, and one American—were to visit the fronts and insure the execution of the truce provisions. Their headquarters was to be located in Peiping.

The one area exempted from the original truce was Manchuria. The Soviet Army was still in control there, and the Communists were moving sizable forces into the Northeastern Provinces. They now demanded a limitation on the number of Nationalist troops to be moved into Manchuria. They also advocated the recognition of a separate regime for that area in which the Communists would hold the key posts. Not until March 11, 1946, was the original truce agreement extended to Manchuria.

After a few weeks the truce became a fiction. Troop movements continued, and wherever an area could be occupied, the Communists rushed to make use of the favorable situation. Clashes were numerous; often they resulted in full-fledged battles. The civil war had not been stopped.

On the "highest level" negotiations continued. General Marshall conversed with Chiang Kai-shek and Chou En-lai concerning the future constitution of China, and it seemed that progress was being made. A single unified army of only 60 divisions was to remain in existence at the end of a reorganization period of 16 months; each division was to have no more than 14,000 men. From an alleged strength of over three millions, China's Army was to be reduced to 840,000.²⁹

29. The Kuomintang claims of 4,800,000 and the Communist claims of 1,200,000 men under arms were both greatly exaggerated.

The Communist negotiators turned sharply against the Americans for the first time in April in connection with Manchurian affairs. They reacted violently to the American activity in connection with transporting of government troops by sea to northern China. In a sharply worded letter Chon En-lai informed General Gillem, the American commander, that unless Americans ceased carrying Nationalist troops to Manchuria, the Communists "would have to give serious consideration to their own policies." The government plan for Manchuria was also unacceptable to the Communists. Nanking proposed that only three or four areas, constituting about one sixth of Manchuria, be assigned to the Communists. The rest, including the northern cities of Harbin and Tsitsihar, and, of course, the industrial Province of Mukden, would be occupied by government forces. This offer was unacceptable to the Communists; they still hoped—with good reason—that they could gain control of the whole of Manchuria.

In August the Nationalist Air Force bombed Yen-an, and now a rupture of the futile negotiations became imminent. General Marshall and Ambassador Stuart issued a pessimistic statement and appealed anew to the patriotism of both Chinese factions. But appeals were of no avail. The civil war was spreading, and early in October Chiang Kai-shek ordered his army to start an offensive against Kalgan, Communist stronghold in eastern Mongolia. The United States countered by a refusal to permit the export of \$75,000,000 worth of munitions to China. This marked the end of the ten months' efforts of General Marshall to unify China. But not until January 29, 1947, did Washington announce the official cessation of its endeavors to mediate between the two warring factions in China. Meanwhile General Marshall had returned to the United States to become Secretary of State.

Out of the negotiations and maneuvers which lasted through almost all of 1946, the Communist party and its army emerged as a major and mature power. "Last summer the government had nine armies here, totaling perhaps 200,000 regular troops and including some of the best American-trained and American-equipped units in China," Christopher Rand, a cautious and rather objective correspondent wrote in June, 1947, in the *Herald Tribune*. "The Communists were no match for them, as had been proved at the pitched battle of Szepingkai in the preceding spring."

"Most observers think they could easily have taken the Communists' Manchurian capital of Harbin. They were prevented from doing so by the truce imposed during General George C. Marshall's attempt to mediate the civil war."³⁰

By the end of 1946 the Communist armies had become a formidable force.

Now the civil war raged again with full force and fury. All the accumulated bitterness and passionate hatred burst into the open. For the Communists, terrorism was once again the order of the day. The Communist radio in 1947 called for the "arrest, trial, and punishment of Chiang Kai-shek," while the Generalissimo in his New Year's Message on the eve of 1948 attacked both the Chinese Communists and Soviet Russia. "The present Communist menace," [he declared,] "comes as much from without as from within. Unless it is checkmated it will cause the downfall of our nation, make unity impossible, and reduce our people to serfs."

The fortunes of war changed in the spring of 1947. The Kuomintang forces were weakening, while those of the Communists continued to gain both in quantity and in efficiency. Since the summer months of 1947 "the Democratic armies in Manchuria" and the Communists forces in northern China have scored remarkable successes. By early 1948 the territory held by the Communists was very much the same as that which Mao Tse-tung had demanded from Chiang Kai-shek on the day after the armistice with Japan.

By the spring of 1948 the territorial gains of the Communists had reached such proportions that their immediate objective became consolidation rather than swift expansion in the near future. Large cities located within their regions were still Nationalist controlled; local administration was unsatisfactory; trade was virtually paralyzed. Late in May, 1948, the Communist party announced that a huge territory, termed "North China Liberated Area," was being set up as a united "administrative region." Its population amounted to about 44 millions, and it stretched over seven provinces of northern China (Manchuria not included). All the Communist and pro-Communist armed forces were placed under a unified command; government agencies were strictly sub-

30. *New York Herald Tribune*, June 13, 1947.

ordinated to the Communist party machine. Here was another important step toward the division of China.

Meanwhile the Communist party of China had swelled numerically from about 600,000 members in 1942 to more than two million at the end of 1947. Along with the Italian party, it represented the largest Communist party outside of Russia. In its political methods the party had moved rapidly "to the left" since late in 1946, reverting to both political terrorism and violent agrarian revolution. Its agrarian policy has always been a good yardstick for its vacillating political stand as between left and right.

After the war the Chinese party stepped up its drive against large landlords and other well-to-do elements of the rural population. At first a limited redistribution of land was inaugurated; it involved only the territory of "Japanese puppets" and "traitors." Soon those landlords whose attitude toward the peasants was known to be particularly unjust or oppressive were also deprived of their lands. As the next step, the Communist party ordered the confiscation of virtually all estates of landlords—the only exception, which was rarely made, was in the case of Communist sympathizers. By the end of 1947 this agrarian reform was announced as almost completely achieved in the Communist area. Not without some exaggeration, the Communists now claimed that at least 60 million peasants had acquired land in northern China and Manchuria. The acquisition of land, more often than not, consisted in the acquisition of title to allotments previously rented by the peasants from the landlords. In Manchuria alone five million peasants thus obtained property rights to 26 million mou.³¹

But now the fourth stage of the agrarian revolution—the most difficult and ominous of all—got under way. In September, 1947, an Agrarian Conference of the Communist Party was held. It voted to "make the land reform thorough and complete." After the landlords had been eliminated in the previous operation, the new drive was aimed against the better-off peasants in favor of the pauperized rural strata. The Communist party, which had appealed to the *entire* peasantry for support in its fight against the "class enemies"—the landlords—now turned against one part of the peasants in an

31. *Pravda*, November 23, 1946. One acre = 6.6 mou.



CHINA,



1947-1948

effort to redistribute rural wealth more equitably. "The peasant unions shall expropriate surplus animals, agricultural implements, houses, grain, and other property of rich peasants. These shall be distributed to peasants lacking these properties and to other poor people and, furthermore, an equal share shall be distributed to landlords," the announcement read. The Communist radio announced that the party intended "to distribute land thoroughly and equally so that the landless and land-poor peasants will obtain land, farming implements, draft animals, seeds, food, clothing and dwelling."³²

The new phase in agrarian policy was likely to provoke deep dissent in the Chinese Communist ranks, and new dangers lurked for the party's unity of action. In a significant statement, the leadership turned against moderate Communist elements unprepared to wage a civil war against a part of the peasantry:

Many intellectuals in the revolutionary ranks have come from landlord or rich farmer families and are more or less connected with the feudal system. They may be firm in their standpoint against imperialism, big land-lord and big bourgeoisie classes, but because of their self-interest some of them often waver when the revolutionary movement goes further to eliminate feudalism altogether.³³

In his speech before the Central Committee of the Communist Party on December 25, 1947, Mao Tse-tung singled out the "poor peasantry" as the basic cadre of Communist activity and stressed the desirability of maintaining "a firm alliance with the middle stratum" of the peasantry; the "class enemies" were the "landlords and rich peasants of the old type, whose land and property must be divided among the peasant masses." According to Mao Tse-tung, these "class enemies" embrace only 8 per cent of the population yet call their own from 70 to 80 per cent of the land. Faithful to the general line of the Communist party of the Soviet Union and Communism in general, Mao warned against "ultra-leftist" (i.e., Trotskyite) trends in the party as well as against an erroneous policy in regard to the petty bourgeoisie.³⁴

A new land reform directive issued by the Communist party

32. Associated Press, August 31, 1947, and *New York Times*, October 19, 1947.

Lenin had bequeathed the Communists his formula: "At first, with the entire peasantry against the landlords, then with the poor peasants against the kulaks."

33. Broadcast of the Communist New China News Agency, Associated Press August 31, 1947.

34. *Pravda*, January 6, 1948.

early in 1948 stressed the need of "purifying" the party, and while opposing "absolute equalism" declared a policy of "equal distribution of land" fully applicable.³⁵

Indeed anti-Communist revolts broke out and autonomous peasant movements emerged, and anti-Communist plots fed on this peasant discontent. Hence the mounting radicalism in land reform had to be accompanied by greater extremism in political methods. Terror was again resorted to. "Settled accounts trials" before so-called People's Courts—the Chinese species of Russian "purge trials"—became standard procedure for the elimination of undesirable elements. Death sentences were imposed far more frequently than during the previous decade. There were mass executions. Reports of Communist terrorism were sometimes exaggerated, but even the most conservative estimates spoke of huge numbers of victims. "Fantastic figures given in Tsinan estimate the number of persons killed by the Communists as in the millions; all evidence indicates that the total is at least in the hundred thousands," Tillman Durdin reported from the Province of Shantung.³⁶ He also described an innovation in Chinese Communist methods consisting of the *Wang Chiang Kan*—the "Watching Chiang Pole":

The pole is erected in a flat open space in or near the villages and towns. At its foot jagged stones or iron spikes are placed. Those whom the Communists wish to eliminate are tied around the waist to the rope, one end of which is passed through a slip device at the top and is grasped by the executioner on the ground. As the citizenry whom the Reds have assembled to watch the show gather around, the victim is harangued and taunted, then hoisted a little way into the air.

"Do you see Chiang coming?" the victim is asked by the managers of the spectacle. "Do you see the Nationalist armies coming?"

If the answer is no, the person is pulled a little higher and the question is repeated, and so on until he dangles at the top of the pole. After he is allowed to hang for a bit, the rope is slackened and the victim drops to the bottom. If he is not killed in the first drop, he is swung and dropped again.

If the victim responds to the questions by saying that he can see Chiang, this is taken as a prompt confession of anti-Communist sentiments and the execution is carried out without more ado.

It is evident from the stories of witnesses that this writer has heard

35. *New York Times*, March 8, 1948.

36. *Ibid.*, October 14, 1947.

here, in Tsinan and in near-by points, directly or indirectly from scores of persons among the tens of thousands in this area who have fled to Nationalist-controlled places from the Communist districts that hundreds are being executed in Central Shantung each month by the "Wang Chiang Kan" method.

The natural reaction to such procedures was the re-emergence of the old Chinese peasant movements. From Shantung Province it was reported, for example, that the old Union of Red Spears, an organization which had been widespread before the war against Japan, was being revived. These movements, lacking real leadership and arms, were of course ineffective and doomed to failure. Anti-Communist conspiracies were reported from various cities in the north. According to testimony given in the court in Harbin, 30,000 members of an anti-Communist organization gathered in the vicinity of that city in an attempt to seize it for the Nationalist Government. They were led by Li Ming-sin, Chu Ta-king, and Gen. Chiang Peng-fei; all three were executed as "Japanese agents."³⁷

While the climate of Kuomintang China generated violent opposition, revolutionary tendencies, and Communist activity, Communist practices in the Communist areas engendered violent anti-Communist feeling among farmers and large segments of the urban population. The Chinese civil war was blazing unarrested, with the antagonism at new heights, and expectations of peace and unity in a hopeless impasse.

37. *New York Herald Tribune*, September 17, 1946.

Expansion in Mongolia and Sinkiang

The war greatly increased the Soviet sphere in central Asia. Some peripheral areas of China had previously fallen under direct or indirect Soviet control; now the earlier possessions were consolidated, lost territory was recovered, and new gains were scored in abundance. Parts of Sinkiang, Outer Mongolia, and Inner Mongolia were made components of the peculiar Soviet colonial empire.

Anticipating the account of events that follows here, one may say that the net result of this policy for the peoples concerned was twofold: on the one hand, there was the beneficent influence of an advanced nation upon backward peoples. Roads, schools, literacy, doctors, and medicine were brought to nations which had vegetated on the lowest levels of human civilization. These effects of Soviet rule will be lasting; a return to the old ways of life is out of the question. On the other hand, the experimenting with the local economy, the negative attitude and at times even suppression of private trade in lands of shepherds and small farmers, and the actual severance of commercial ties with China have had a negative influence on the national economies of the subject countries. These measures have engendered considerable resentment not only against the government but also against Russia herself.

MONGOLIA

The Mongolian People's Republic did not officially participate in the war against Germany. The mutual assistance pact of 1936 between the Soviet Union and Mongolia had in view the "maintenance of peace in the Far East" and was directed against Japan. Mongolia's actual contribution to the Russo-German war was chiefly confined to supplying horses for Soviet cavalry and food-stuffs for the Red Army from the cattle-breeding plains of Mon-

golia. Official reports speak of 60,000 Mongolian horses delivered to the Red Army, and of railroad trains loaded down with food, mainly meat, shipped to the Soviet Union as a "gift" of the Mongolian people; to aid in this process, the Soviet authorities during the war established a meat-packing plant in Ulan Bator, the capital of Mongolia. More than once during the war Mongol delegations visited Moscow; the Soviet press featured prominently the generous assistance of the Mongols, and the Mongol leaders were given gala receptions by Stalin in the Kremlin.

Two days after Moscow entered the war against Japan, the Mongolian People's Republic followed suit with a declaration of war, on August 11, 1945. Mongolian cavalry, under Soviet command, rushed from Outer into Japanese-held Inner Mongolia and thence past Kalgan into Manchuria, while the Soviet forces were occupying Manchuria from the north and east. The war ended within a few days. The Mongolian Government reported that its casualties in the conflict amounted to 2,039 men; its war costs, 322,000,000 *tugrik*.¹

The Sino-Soviet treaty of August, 1945, had meanwhile been made public. Regarding Mongolia, it contained a declaration of the Chinese Government that it was prepared to recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia if "a plebiscite of the people of Outer Mongolia confirms that they desire" independence. Preparation for the plebiscite became the main preoccupation as soon as the war ended. Six weeks after the armistice with Japan, on October 20, 1945, the plebiscite was held. There could be no doubt that under the circumstances the great majority of the population would vote for separation from China. But the methods employed, and their results, were unique even for Soviet satellite countries after the second World War.

Everywhere else a certain minority had dared to vote against the government candidate or program, however small the chances of making opposition effective. There is no doubt that among the half million voters in Mongolia some elements at least preferred political ties with China to those with the Soviet Union. The day after the plebiscite the results were made known. Of 494,960 eligible voters 98.4 per cent had cast votes. This participation, unusually high even for civilized countries, was achieved in this backward desert

1. *Pravda*, October 25, 1946. One *tugrik* equals 1.31 rubles.

and pasture land by strict orders from the authorities. "To appreciate the significance of the 98.4 per cent," the *Moscow New Times* stated quite frankly, "one must know the difficulties the nomads were obliged to overcome to reach the polling places. In the middle of October snow fell in the western regions . . ." But even more startling was the complete "unanimity": 100 per cent of the voters declared themselves in favor of separation from China. Not a single dissent was registered. The explanation for this phenomenal outcome lies in the peculiar method of voting: every voter was required to indicate his "yes" or "no" on the electoral lists and sign his name to it. The instructions for the plebiscite directed: "Put your 'yes' or 'no' on the electoral list next to your name and sign your name; in case of illiteracy, give the fingerprint of the thumb of your right hand."²

The returns, from all over Mongolia, were collected in an amazingly short time, *New Times* commented:

Along all the roads of Mongolia leading to the various district centers came horsemen, galloping at top speed, carrying the voting results in envelopes sewn in the white belts they wore around their waists. These horsemen had been previously chosen at specially organized racing competitions. Each of these precious envelopes had printed on it a falcon and the word "Fly!"—the ancient symbol of the special messenger. The riders changed horses at the post stations which had roused the admiration of the famous Marco Polo in the thirteenth century. For the purposes of the plebiscite 2,010 new post stations were set up, and 20,000 of the fleetest horses were employed.³

The Chinese Vice-Minister of the Interior, Lei Fa-cheng, was in Ulan Bator at the time of the plebiscite. He could do nothing else but report to his government the results of the voting, and Chungking had to accommodate itself to the long-expected formal separation of Mongolia. In January, 1946, the Chinese Government declared that it considered Outer Mongolia an independent state, and on February 13, 1946, it concluded an agreement concerning the establishment of diplomatic relations with Mongolia.

The next agreement concluded by the Mongolian People's Republic was with the Soviet Union. Their previous pact, signed in 1936 for ten years, was to expire in March, 1946. A new treaty was

2. *Ibid.*, November 22, 1945.

3. *New Times* (1946), No. 3, p. 29.

signed on February 27, 1946; essentially it was again a treaty of friendship and mutual assistance. What was new in it was its title. The pact of 1936 had been called a "protocol" allegedly embodying a "gentlemen's agreement" concluded two years earlier; this complicated procedure had been adopted because, in name, Moscow still recognized Chinese sovereignty over Mongolia. The new pact of 1946, on the other hand, could now safely be labeled "treaty." In June, 1946, Marshal Choibalsan cabled to Trygve Lie, Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mongolia's request for admission to the international community of nations. In October he requested the Council of Foreign Ministers to admit a Mongolian delegate to the Far Eastern Commission. Neither request was complied with. Mongolia was regarded as the most obedient of all Soviet satellites; this small nation was not expected to conduct an independent foreign policy. Moreover, Mongolia not only was unrecognized by all countries except Russia and China, but evidently sought to avoid diplomatic recognition which would entail the establishment of foreign legations and the arrival of observers in Ulan Bator. In the United Nations the Soviet Union blocked the admission of the states supported by the Western Powers (Austria, Finland, Italy, Eire, Portugal, Transjordan) until consent should be given to the admission of the countries sponsored by the Soviet Government; these, along with Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania, included the Mongolian People's Republic. China, which had previously been willing to support Mongolia's demand for membership in the United Nations, changed her attitude in the summer of 1947, as a result of the border incidents in Sinkiang. The other nations too opposed her admission. "How is it possible," the Australian delegate asked on July 28, 1947, "that a country of less than a million inhabitants, mostly nomads, is capable of organizing a tank brigade and an aviation force?" There were widespread doubts about the reality of Mongolia's "independence." Mongolia remained outside the United Nations.

In December, 1947, a new Congress of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary (Communist) Party was held. Like the Communist party of the Soviet Union and Communism in general, the Mongolian movement now marked a departure toward a more radical, "leftist" line of conduct. A Five-Year Plan for Mongolia was of-

ferred to the congress and, of course, adopted; it related to the period from 1948 to 1952. More important, the congress decided to intensify once more the drive for collective cattle-breeding farms, which had been experimented with in the early 'thirties and discarded as a catastrophic failure. Now, having no doubt received Moscow's blessing, the Mongolian party leaders again turned to this dangerous economic experiment. Choibalsan reported that the party membership, just as in the Soviet Communist party, had doubled since the last prewar congress.⁴

Despite the end of the war and the disappearance of military menace in the foreseeable future, Mongolia has maintained a standing army of considerable size; it has been estimated at 100,000. After the Soviet pattern, its troops are divided among the War Department and the Ministry of the Interior (MVD). Among the officers and generals a considerable number are Mongol Buryats from the adjacent Soviet region. There are a war college, an officers' academy, a military aviation school, and other similar institutions. Soviet advisers play a decisive part in all matters relating to the armed forces. Military supplies and, in particular, aviation come from Russia.

Two officers of the Mongol Army fled to Peiping in March, 1948. They pictured conditions in Mongolia as following the pattern in the Soviet Union. They confirmed that an army of about 100,000 men was being maintained after the end of the war; that Soviet advisers and army personnel were running the country; and that some 25,000 political prisoners worked on forced labor projects under Russian guards. The two officers had intended to flee to the United States, following the allegations of the Soviet radio that China had become "an American colony."⁵

In the meantime Ulan Bator, the capital, has grown from a large Mongolian village into a city with brick houses, a state theater, and electric lights. According to official sources there are 650 schools and other institutions of learning in Mongolia. Seven newspapers and magazines are being published. There are radio, telephonic, and telegraph services. Industrial enterprises have been set up. The Textile *Kombinat* is prominent in felt making, wool washing, and

4. *Pravda*, December 10-25, 1947.

5. *United Press*, March 10, 1948.

other fields. A meat-packing plant and a power station have been built. Running water, sewage, and even steam heating have been installed in some houses—although mostly for the highest officials and Russian advisers. Roads and airfields have been improved. The new Five-Year Plan provides for the construction of five railways in this area, totaling 2,800 miles; three of these will run to Manchurian territory under the Chinese Communists.

For Russia Mongolia has, for a quarter of a century now, been the source of considerable expenditures which have hardly been balanced by the advantages accruing to the Soviet Union from its colonial policy and economy. Investments in Mongolia's economy—as in other areas in the East—must be made at the expense of the standard of living of the Russian people. The arming of Mongolian troops, the establishment of military schools and of an air force after the war had to be financed, from this same source, by an impoverished and devastated nation itself suffering from a serious lack of clothing, housing, and adequate food. Colonialism has often been an expensive luxury. In the case of the Soviet Union and Mongolia it appears more grotesque and tragic than elsewhere.

TOWARD INNER MONGOLIA

In signing the Moscow agreement on Mongolia, the Chinese Government considered it a success on its part that from the plebiscite there was to emerge an independent Mongolia; and the annexation of the Mongolian People's Republic to the Soviet Union was prevented. It is dubious whether the maintenance of Mongolia's formal independence can be credited to the Chinese negotiators. In fact, it has been a consistent policy of Moscow during the postwar years to concede formal independence to a number of states which to all intents and purposes were controlled by Soviet civilian or military forces. The appearances of independence were in themselves considered an important device of Soviet foreign policy. Mongolia, as a sovereign state, was now to knock at the door of the United Nations; demand a seat on the Far Eastern Commission deciding occupation policies for Japan; and possibly expand eastward in the direction of Inner Mongolia, which was still under Chinese sovereignty, and westward into Chinese Sinciang.

Inner and Outer Mongolia had parted in 1912-14, since which time the political gulf between them has widened considerably. Outer Mongolia was subjected to Russian rule, while Inner Mongolia went through a period of strife among the opposed warlords, the Japanese occupation, and civil war between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists.

The vast territory of Inner Mongolia—about 400,000 square miles—has a population estimated at between eight and ten millions—ten times as great as that of Outer Mongolia. While Outer Mongolia was, both before and after the Russian Revolution, virtually free of Chinese immigrants, Inner Mongolia attracted millions of Chinese peasants from the overpopulated provinces. By the end of the 'twenties, Inner Mongolia had in effect become more Chinese than Mongol. Only two to two and a half million Mongols were estimated to be living among the predominantly Chinese population.

The eastern—the most important—part of Inner Mongolia was recognized by Russia in 1912 as a Japanese sphere of influence, and this is why the unification of all Mongols in one state found support neither in St. Petersburg nor in Tokyo. After 1917 Japan continued to adhere to its own sphere despite the fact that for Russia the secret treaties had become inoperative. The Soviet Government had to respect this Japanese interpretation; it opposed all tendencies aimed at the unification of the two parts of Mongolia.

In the 'twenties, when the Chinese generals were engaged in bitter internecine warfare, Inner Mongolia was partly under the control of Feng Yu-hsiang, the so-called Christian General. Fighting against Chang Tso-lin in Manchuria, Feng repeatedly received financial support and supplies from Moscow; during this period (1924-27) Inner Mongolia was open to the activities of its People's Revolutionary party, which tended to favor Moscow.

Under the Japanese in the 'thirties the loyalty of the Mongols of Inner Mongolia was questionable. When the Russo-Mongolian treaty of mutual assistance was announced, in April, 1936, Mongol leaders in the Hsingan territory were accused of conspiring against Japan in the interests of the Soviet Union. Their aim, the Japanese alleged, was the separation of Hsingan from Manchuria and merger with the Mongolian People's Republic. The highest officials of the province were involved; Lin Shen, the governor, was accused of

having met with a secret Soviet agent in March, 1936 (Moscow denied the meeting).⁶ All the accused, including the governor, the army's chief of staff, and the chief of police, were brought to trial, found guilty, and executed.

For another nine years Inner Mongolia remained under the control of Japan.

When the Russian Army drove into Manchuria on the eve of Japan's capitulation, one of its roads led through Inner Mongolia to the north of the ancient city of Kalgan. The Japanese puppet regime collapsed, and the Chinese Communists entered the provincial capital on August 23, to remain there for over a year. It was a rare thing for them to hold an important industrial, commercial, and communications center for any length of time.

On the other hand, a Communist "Republic of Eastern Mongolia" was set up at Wangycimiao, in January, 1946, and a new army was promptly established under its command. A People's Assembly convened; it adopted a red flag, resembling the Soviet emblem. Gen. Ur Tan, a graduate of the Soviet Military Academy, was elected President.⁷

In the meantime economic reforms had promptly been enacted in Kalgan. Employers were ordered to double all wages. Land rentals were prohibited from exceeding 37½ per cent of the crop. Low-cost apartments were frequently turned over to employees and factory workers. Many peasant debts and obligations were canceled. A progressive tax system was prepared.

Despite the promising reforms and the best intentions, life was becoming increasingly hard not only for the propertied classes but for the whole of Kalgan's population. The new authorities encouraged the people to denounce suspect elements of the population, and oral reports and letters poured forth by the thousands naming alleged "enemies of the people." Hundreds were arrested; many were tried and executed. "It is hardly surprising that the people of Kalgan are in a somewhat subdued mood," A. T. Steele reported from Eighth Route Army headquarters.

Passing through the streets yesterday, this correspondent saw this new democracy in action. A small mob of people stood in front of a man who had worked as a junior police official in the Japanese puppet gov-

6. *Izvestiya*, April 27, 1936.

7. United Press, February 7, 1946; Associated Press, February 11, 1946.

ernment. One of the group was reading a list of the crimes this official allegedly committed and the crowd joined him in shouting denunciation. The crowd was working itself into a spirit of hot excitement. Later I asked a young official what the outcome of this demonstration had been. He explained that the mob had finally seized the traitor and "beaten him black and blue." Then the police arrested and executed him.⁸

On October 22, 1946, as General Marshall's mediation efforts drew to a close, the Central Government troops were ordered to attack Kalgan. After 14 months under Communist rule, the city was recaptured by the Nationalists. Only in the spring of 1948 did the Communists renew the attempt to capture Kalgan. The effort was made by the Chinese Communists, not by the troops of the Mongolian People's Republic. Should this endeavor lead to a lasting occupation of Inner Mongolia, however, a readjustment of borders and populations between Manchuria, China, and Mongolia is certain to take place.

SINKIANG

After the outbreak of war with Germany the attention of Moscow (in 1941-42 of Kuibyshev) was entirely focused on affairs of far greater urgency than the venture into Chinese central Asia. Russian prestige suffered markedly during the first 18 months of the war, and this too had considerable effect on the Soviet Union's importance in the eyes of the peoples of the interior of Asia.

Governor Sheng Shih-tsai had been in power for seven years in Sinkiang when this war broke out. He was firmly established amid an array of Chinese and Soviet Communists, while the Russian consulate in Urumchi was in effect the strongest power in Sinkiang. Later in 1941 and early in 1942, however, a process of disintegration appeared to have affected the Soviet colony in Sinkiang. At a time when Russia was losing heavily in the west and prominent Soviet officers went over to the enemy, the formerly streamlined Soviet colony became a nest of intrigue. According to Sheng's reports, a group of Russian officials, including men directly connected with the consulate in Urumchi, favored a greater measure of Sinkiang independence from the Soviet Union. Others were labeled Trotskyites by their comrades although they

8. *New York Herald Tribune*, October 14, 1945.

probably never had shared any of Trotsky's concepts. As usual in these areas, the discussions and disputes soon assumed violent forms. Among those killed was Sheng Shih-tsai's brother, himself a Communist; so were Sheng's wife⁹ and a number of other persons.

Under these circumstances, Governor Sheng decided upon a major reorientation: a shift from Moscow to Chungking. In April, 1942, he disbanded the Anti-Imperialist League, which for several years had indulged in violent anti-British propaganda. A considerable number of officials, among them district governors, were arrested; Communists were persecuted. High government officials from Chungking arrived in Sinkiang. Madame Chiang Kai-shek came in August, 1942, to celebrate the reunification of Sinkiang with China. The conduct of Sinkiang's foreign affairs was turned over and subordinated to Chungking. The Kuomintang opened a branch headquarters at Urumchi, and Governor Sheng, who only a few years earlier had been ready to join the Communist party, became the chairman of the government party in Sinkiang. Chinese troops entered the area early in 1943, and soon a stream of Chinese refugees from the east began to flow into this far-off province.

The British and American consulates at Urumchi were reopened in 1943, at a time when the influence of the Soviet Consul General was waning. Now the Soviet Government decided to withdraw and remove from Sinkiang all the industrial equipment and transportation facilities which had been brought there over the preceding ten years: drilling and refining equipment, autos, spare tires, generators, household goods, even furniture. The Sovsintorg closed its minor agencies and turned its buildings over to the Chinese.¹⁰ The breach was well-nigh complete. The restoration of Chinese sovereignty over its westernmost province further contributed to the irritation of Sino-Soviet relations; Moscow no doubt was looking forward to a turn for the better at the end of the war.

For over two years Governor Sheng Shih-tsai collaborated with Chungking, but by the end of this period relations became strained. Always fearful of any encroachment on his power, tender toward his personal well-being, and accustomed to the application of terroristic methods, Sheng was suspicious of the new officialdom arriving from China. Under the charge of "Communism" he ar-

9. According to other reports she was executed.

10. *Time*, October 25, 1945, p. 28.

rested considerable numbers of innocent men; almost any intellectual was a potential danger in his eyes.

In Moscow Sheng was now considered Russia's Enemy Number One in Sinkiang. His personal fate was thus sealed. When United States Vice-President Wallace arrived in Chungking from Urumchi to urge upon Chiang Kai-shek an improvement of relations with Russia, he pointed to Sheng as an obstacle in the way of a Russo-Chinese *détente*.¹¹ Chiang Kai-shek thereupon removed Sheng from the governorship of Sinkiang, appointing him Minister of Agriculture in the Central Government. On the strength of Sheng's reports the Chinese Government protested to Russia against the pressure which had been exerted on his government during the preceding years. Thereupon the Soviet Government sent to Chungking a copy of its previous correspondence with Sheng to show how little loyalty to China he had really displayed.¹² In July, 1945, after Premier Soong's negotiations with Stalin in Moscow, Sheng was dismissed from his post and disappeared from the leadership of the Kuomintang.¹³

Moscow did not reconcile itself to the withdrawal from Sinkiang. As soon as the military tide turned, it decided to return; but now it concentrated on two areas within Sinkiang near the Soviet border: the Ili-Ining districts bordering on Russia in the northwest, and an area bordering on Outer Mongolia in the north.

Changing its policy of the preceding period, the Soviet Government now employed the local population in Sinkiang as a vehicle toward the achievement of its aims. In the 'thirties, the Soviet Government had feared popular movements in this Moslem region and had preferred to cooperate with the Chinese minority. Now it turned to the "tribes" of Kazakhs, Uigurs, and other ethnic groups, furnishing them with a few leaders, military commanders, and weapons, and was thus able, while remaining officially aloof, to protest its nonintervention in Sinkiang affairs. Moreover, its officials in Urumchi were soon called upon to play the role of "mediators" between the rebels and the official authorities.

The first of these areas was the same Ili district which had been

11. *New York Times*, August 30, 1944.

12. *Nineteenth Century and After*, August, 1944, p. 70.

13. *New York Herald Tribune*, July 31, 1945.

occupied by Russian troops 70 years earlier and from which Russia had withdrawn in 1881. The region is a fertile one and has a number of Russian inhabitants and settlers from Soviet central Asia. A number of Soviet agencies—commercial, consular, and others—had been established there in the towns of Taheheng (Chuguchak), Ining (Kuldja), and Ili, and at Turfan and Kashgar in the south; some of them remained even after the Soviet economic evacuation. The second area bordered on Outer Mongolia, stretching from Chenchwa to Kitai. The local troops of Outer Mongolia were in fact controlled by Red Army headquarters and Moscow, and when necessary received help from Soviet aviation. For the Chinese, fighting Mongolia was thus tantamount to fighting the Soviet Union.

In 1943, soon after the Russian withdrawal, groups of local tribes, armed with rifles, descended upon the towns (in their tribal fights the native warriors were usually equipped with knives and spears only); during their attacks they received repeated support from mysterious formations of airplanes, about whose origin there could be little doubt. Fighting began at the end of 1943; after an interruption, it was resumed in March, 1944; in November of that year the revolt proved successful after an Uzbek named Farkhad assumed leadership. Farkhad entered Sinkiang from Soviet territory and was able to procure some arms for his troops. Employing mortars and machine guns, the rebels came within 70 miles of Urumchi, the capital. The Ili and Ining areas set up what amounted to a quasi-independent state and actually a nonrecognized "East Turkestan Republic" emerged there. The "tribal leaders" held this area for a period of 13 months.

The propaganda campaign of these tribes was strictly in accordance with Soviet practice, and the numerous leaflets stressed the freedom of national minorities in Russia, as contrasted with the situation in Sinkiang. "Our nearest blood relations are the Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Uzbeks and Tartars," one leaflet said. "In the Soviet Union each of these races has organized its own government and its members are living free and joyful lives."¹⁴

In the other area, at the Mongolian border, fighting also broke out at the end of March, 1944. At the head of the rebels stood a

14. *New York Times*, June 3, 1946.

Kazakh leader, Usman. According to Chinese sources, Usman had met with a "Soviet geological mission" near the Soviet border in May, 1943, and received "generous gifts"; in September, 1943, an emissary from Outer Mongolia also visited Usman in Sinkiang, and in December of the same year a general of the Mongolian Army met him and promised assistance. From then on Usman was able to obtain arms and ammunition from Outer Mongolia. Border incidents between Chinese troops and those of the Mongolian People's Republic occurred repeatedly. The initiative was, of course, Soviet-Mongolian; China was in no position to start a fight. Moscow in its broadcasts defended the Mongols, accusing the Chinese troops of invading their territory. "The Soviet Government," Tass stated, "will be forced to give the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic every necessary help and support."¹⁵ China categorically denied that Chinese troops had invaded Mongolian soil. After a short period fighting ceased for a time.

In the meantime negotiations were in progress between China and Russia, and in August, 1945, the Moscow treaty was signed, in which the Soviet Government pledged: "As to the latest events in Sinkiang, the Soviet Government confirms that, as stated in Article V of the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, it has no intention to interfere with China's internal affairs."

When this agreement was signed, fighting between the "local national groups" and the government forces was in progress. Again "unidentified" planes appeared to protect the "Kazakh tribesmen." While the Chinese 58th Division had suffered heavy casualties, the rebels had begun to advance on Urumchi. Now the Chinese Government approached the Soviet authorities with the request, made in typical Oriental fashion, to "mediate" the conflict between the "rebels" and the Sinkiang Government. Conversations between the pro-Soviet Kazakhs and the Chinese delegates began in Urumchi, with the Soviet Consul General playing the ostensible part of impartial mediator.

On its face the agreement reached after three months of negotiations was favorable to China; in essence, however, it provided for the separation of certain areas of Sinkiang as autonomous

15. *New York Times*, April 3, 1944.

regions closely connected with the Soviet Union. The insurgents consented to relinquish the name of East Turkestan Republic, which would have implied the creation of a new state, and to recognize China's formal sovereignty; on the other hand, they were permitted to keep their own army of six regiments (11,000 to 12,000 men), while the Chinese armies were prohibited from entering their special areas, which were granted a considerable measure of autonomy. The most important achievement of the insurgents was the appointment of their leader, Ahmed Djan, as Deputy Governor of the Province of Sinkiang. Ahmed Djan came from Soviet Uzbekistan and bore the Russian name of Kasimov. Since the age of eight he had shuttled back and forth between the Soviet Union and Sinkiang. In 1935 he left Sinkiang and went to study in Russia; he returned to Ili as a teacher, was arrested in 1938, and was later released. In 1944 he made a brief trip to Russia and returned as the political leader of the rebel movement. All the time Ahmed Djan kept his Soviet citizenship.

A sort of condominium of the governor appointed by China and the deputy governor with pro-Soviet leanings was established. In this way the Soviet influence was extended far beyond the borders of the special autonomous regions. At the same time a provincial council for Sinkiang was created, consisting of ten Chinese and fifteen Turkis representing the local Moslem population. For the whole of Sinkiang the agreement promised freedom of religion, fair taxation, an amnesty for those arrested during the incidents.¹⁶

The agreement was concluded in January, 1946, and confirmed in June of that year. It appeared to put an end to the "Ining incident," after 13 months of occupation of the border area by the pro-Soviet "tribes." More than 300 political prisoners were freed in June, and 143 Communists, previously imprisoned by Governor Sheng, left for Yen-an under armed escort of Central Government forces.¹⁷

The Nanking government drew its own conclusions from the events in Sinkiang. In May, 1947, it appointed, for the first time, a non-Chinese as governor of the province: Mazud Sabri, a wealthy Turki. This was an important milestone and represented a con-

16. Two addenda, which remained secret, were attached to the agreement; whether or not they concern relations with the Soviet Union could not be ascertained.

17. Chinese News Service, January 8, March 13, June 12, 1946.

cession to the national feelings of this non-Chinese province of China. Actually the East Turkestan Republic continued in existence. Contrary to the agreement, a seventh regiment was recruited; the weapons (although obsolete) supplied by the Soviet side were not unimportant in determining the outcome of the fighting. Thousands of residents were persuaded to acquire Soviet citizenship, and the Soviet Consul General distributed Soviet passports, which provided additional protection.¹⁸ A "Sino-Soviet Cultural Association" was created and engaged in an outspoken anti-Chinese propaganda campaign. A Sino-Soviet airline operates between Alma-Ata, in Soviet territory, across Sinkiang, to Hami; it maintains its own airfields on Chinese soil.¹⁹

Soon new clashes occurred in Urumchi, in the provincial council, between the pro-Soviet faction from Ining and the other representatives. On August 26, 1947, the delegates from Ining, led by Ahmed Djan, boarded four Soviet planes and returned to their capital, taking with them several Turki delegates from other parts of Sinkiang. In this way they could claim to have the majority of the regional assembly in Ining.²⁰ Mazud Sabri, the Governor of Sinkiang, wrote asking them to return, but they demanded as a prerequisite the removal of the Nanking-appointed governor. The demand was rejected, and the rift became wider.

Now conflicts flared up near the Mongolian border. On June 5, 1947, a border incident took place near Peitashan, with Soviet planes participating in the fighting under the guise of Mongolian aviation. The Chinese Government lodged a formal protest in Moscow with the envoy of the Mongolian People's Republic (since no direct diplomatic relations had been established between Nanking and Ulan Bator). The official Soviet News Service reported that the Chinese were the aggressors and had crossed the Mongolian frontier. *Pravda* followed suit with a "rumor from Shanghai" according to which the United States had instigated the clash in Sinkiang; the American consul in Urumchi, it reported, had visited the border area upon instructions from General Eisenhower two months before the fighting began. The United States

18. *New York Herald Tribune*, October 3, 1947.

19. *New York Times*, February 1, 1948.

20. *New York Times*, September 23, 1947; *New York Herald Tribune*, October 2, 1947.

embassy in Nanking declared the dispatch to be without any foundation whatever.*

New fighting, although on a smaller scale, was resumed in July and lasted virtually all through the summer of 1947. Incidents occurred again in the latter part of January and on February 29, 1948. In February and April, 1948, Tass officially accused the Chinese cavalry of invading Mongolia. China denied the accusations and offered mediation by a third power, but the proposal went unanswered.

The development of Sinkiang during the postwar years has mirrored on a small scale the general trends in Sino-Soviet relations and in the Nationalist-Communist relations within China. In 1945-46, an attempt was made to reach a working agreement between Russia and China; meanwhile negotiations were being conducted aiming at an agreement between Nanking and Yenan, with General Marshall acting as the mediator. At that time a compromise was reached in Sinkiang. By the end of 1946 relations between Moscow and Nanking had deteriorated; civil war burst out again with new intensity. Now the Sinkiang accord of 1946 ceased to be effective; tribal rebellions and border clashes were resumed.

A factual partition of Sinkiang has taken place, although the border line between its two parts is vague and undetermined. The map on p. 362 shows those areas in the north and west which have switched from Chinese to Soviet control; other areas at the Mongolian border are in dispute. In the south Soviet attention is focused on a region still under Chinese jurisdiction. All these areas, constituting a sphere of effective or prospective Soviet influence, embrace geographically the smaller part of Sinkiang. Economically and politically they are of far greater importance than the Chinese-controlled desert regions in Sinkiang's south and east.

Facing the Pacific

As a strategic, political, and economic body, the Soviet Far East has assumed a new configuration as the result of the war with Japan and the developments of the first postwar years. The politico-strategic border line which, as before, begins at the Bering Strait in the north and runs to the southern tip of Kamchatka Peninsula continues through the 800-mile-long belt of Kurile Islands, embracing and enclosing the Sea of Okhotsk, which has now become an internal Soviet sea. The political frontier turns westward, to the southern extremity of Sakhalin, and continues through the Sea of Japan to the 38th parallel in Korea, thence through the Yellow Sea and Port Arthur into the southern confines of Manchuria; from there it runs in an undefined and shifting line along the front of the Chinese civil war to the southeastern border of the now formally independent Mongolian People's Republic. The galaxy of territories and seas, islands and deserts located on the map (see end papers) between the old and the new political limits of the Soviet Union indicates the extent to which its sphere of influence has been pushed forward in the Far East.

Of the lands and waters formally incorporated into the USSR, the Kurile and Sakhalin Islands are of importance. The technically independent components of the sphere are North Korea, Manchuria and a part of northern China, and Outer Mongolia. The two most significant trends of Soviet Far Eastern policy since the war have been the digesting of the annexed areas and the consolidation of the informal members of the Soviet sphere.

For the Japanese, the Kurile Islands were hard to digest. The chain of 36 large and 20 small islands, in addition to a myriad tiny and uninhabited ones, had a population of 2,000 at the turn of the century, which rose to a little more than 10,000 on the eve of the recent war. Since 1934 Japan had been violating the provision of the treaty of Washington of 1922, by which she undertook not to

erect military fortifications on these islands. Having acquired the Kurile Islands in 1945, the Soviet Government proceeded to strengthen the fortifications and erect submarine bases and airfields there. Lack of man power—the ever-present handicap of the Russian Far East in general—was particularly pronounced on the Kuriles. An attempt was made to overcome it by obligatory settlement of demobilized Red Army personnel. These were accorded various privileges, in particular with regard to taxation; those who were married could have their families moved to the islands. At the same time hundreds of young girls were imported into the Kuriles, and Soviet reporters noted with pride that one of the first agencies set up in the newly won area was the Bureau of Marriages. Ambitious economic projects were begun. A geological research expedition arrived in the summer of 1945 and reported the presence of silver, iron, and sulphur deposits. Extensive building of houses and workshops got under way. Fishing and canning plants, partly taken over from the Japanese, resumed operations, as did workshops for refining sulphur and potassium iodide.¹ The reluctance and hesitation which had marked Japan's policy in the Kurile Islands were overcome. Hardships and sacrifices are no longer obstacles.

While the Kuriles are of strategic rather than economic value to the Soviet Union, the newly acquired southern part of Sakhalin is an important economic acquisition. Under the Japanese Southern Sakhalin had developed far more rapidly than had the Russian-held northern half. Japan was close at hand and was able to pay more attention and to invest greater funds in its part of the island than was the Soviet Government. During the last decades the island, previously long neglected and considered of negligible economic importance, was found to be a rich source of valuable minerals. Its coal reserves are estimated at 3.5 billion tons; its oil deposits are estimated at 300 million tons in the north and are probably more extensive in the south. A considerable fisheries industry emerged under the Japanese; the rich forests yielded larger quantities of wood pulp. The population of the south was about four times that of the northern area.

Man power presented the most difficult problem to the new Soviet regime on Sakhalin. At the beginning of the twentieth century the whole of Sakhalin had a population of 33,000, but more

1. *Pravda*, July 27, 1946; *Sputnik agitatora* (1945), No. 19.

than half of it consisted of deported Russian criminals. In 1905, after the war with Japan, Sakhalin was divided between Japan and Russia. When the exiles were permitted to return, the population of the large island dropped to 7,000. Northern Sakhalin, the Russian part, continued to grow; its population reached 50,000 in the early 'thirties and was reported near 100,000 in the middle 'forties. Since in the southern half there had been virtually no inhabitants when the Japanese took over, the population of this area consisted of Japanese immigrants who arrived in considerable numbers. The rate of growth was higher than in the Russian part: in 1938 the Japanese-held part had a population of 340,000; when the second World War ended it was estimated at over 400,000.

Unlike other Asiatic areas conquered by Japan, in which the Japanese were only a dominant minority, Southern Sakhalin was ethnically Japanese. It constituted a prolongation of the Japanese islands to the north. After the defeat, Japanese from all over the possessions were repatriated to their home islands; most of the Japanese colonies of Manchuria, China proper, and Indonesia disappeared. But it was not so easy to bring this about on Sakhalin. The economy of the island was completely dependent on the Japanese. Industry, mining, and agriculture were operated by Japanese skilled and unskilled labor. To repatriate the Japanese laborers would have led to a collapse of the economy; and the Sakhalin economy, in the new designs of the Soviet Government, was to be of paramount importance for its entire Far East. On the other hand, to leave the Japanese on Sakhalin indefinitely would mean the creation of a danger spot in the very neighborhood of Japan. Hence the conflicts concerning the repatriation of the Sakhalin Japanese in the Allied Council for Japan and the uncertainty evidenced by the Soviet authorities. Immigration of Russians to Sakhalin was the only means of replacing the Japanese, who sooner or later had to be shipped out. But the transfer of Russians presented serious difficulties. After the war European Russia was short of man power; discharged Red Army personnel were rarely inclined to go to Sakhalin and had to be induced or compelled to do so. To establish normal conditions of family life, a wholesale migration of women had to be organized. And even with all these measures it would be years before the new immigrants—mostly peasants from Russia—could master the economy of Sakhalin.

"Immigration" was forcefully carried out. "Tens of thousands of Soviet people have made known their desire to go to Southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands," *Pravda* reported late in 1946; whether or not these were really volunteers has remained unknown. Engineers, technicians, and administrators were at first the most important groups needed to replace the Japanese captains of economy. Economic progress was reported in the fishery combines; over 400 canning plants were in operation; a fishing fleet and refrigeration plants were built; the manufacture of nets and cans was encouraged. To provide housing for the Russian administration the Japanese paper-box buildings were replaced by European-style solid structures.

The extent of Soviet immigration to Sakhalin has been kept secret, as have the details of the economic development of the island. The main source of information has been the Japanese repatriated to their homeland—mostly old men, women, and children. According to them, over 100,000 Russians arrived in Southern Sakhalin from Vladivostok, and about 40,000 entered from the former Soviet part in the north. Because of this economic and demographic revolution, the rehabilitation of the island's economy has been slow and unsatisfactory. Coal mines, for example, at the end of 1946 were operating at 30 per cent of the prewar level; paper output was at 20 per cent.²

It will take considerable time—far more than would be needed under other conditions—to raise the level of Sakhalin's economy to prewar standards. When this is achieved, Sakhalin will become an important source of oil for the Soviet navy in the Pacific, coal for the Far Eastern industry, and fishery products for the Soviet population. Old and new shipyards—their location and precise number remain a secret—are to carry out construction and repairs for the new Far Eastern Navy, the plans for which, although certainly extensive—in accordance with Stalin's traditional pet ideas—also remain a state secret.

The Soviet Far East of prewar boundaries has likewise developed at a rapid pace during the last two decades, and especially since 1939. Here too normal and natural growth was supplemented and furthered by state measures which were often rigorous. The two

2. *New York Times*, December 10, 1946.

Soviet provinces which constitute the Far East proper (the Maritime Province and Khabarovsk) grew from a population of 1,240,000 in 1926 to 2,338,000 at the time of the 1939 census—an increase of 88 per cent, as against a growth of 16 per cent for the whole of the Soviet Union. In a wider sense eastern Siberia, to the east of Lake Baikal, constitutes the Russian Orient. The population of this area during the same period grew from 2.6 millions to 4.4 millions.

The cities of this area have expanded at a tempo unknown even during the years of frantic industrialization in the Soviet Union. From 530,000 in 1926 the urban population rose to 1,856,000 in 1939. This striking growth of cities was a characteristic of the essentially political project directed from the Soviet capital. The new inhabitants of the Far East were only to a small degree voluntary settlers, and these were mainly women. To this group also belonged the new administrative staff and higher personnel in industry and transport.

A large part of the influx was due to the deportations carried out by the NKVD, whose "corrective labor camps" soon dotted the wide spaces of the Far East; the northern part of this network was united in the 1930's under the Dalstroy agency of the NKVD. The main economic assignment of the Dalstroy is gold mining in the Kolyma region; besides, there is extensive fishing and lumbering. At the head of this unique enterprise stands a man appointed from Moscow, occupying at the same time four different positions: he is the chief of the Dalstroy of the MVD (the successor of the NKVD); chief of the MVD garrison in the city of Magadan; highest representative of the Ministry of State Security in the region; and plenipotentiary of the Executive Committee of the Khabarovsk Soviet for the Kolyma region. Endowed with immense authority, this official—today Ivan Nikishov—is in fact the undisputed and arbitrary master of the huge area, which stretches from the estuary of the Indigirka River in the north across the Yakut and Khabarovsk regions and Anadyr in the east, and two hundred miles southwest of Magadan.

The mushrooming "cities" of the Far East consisted in part of these prison labor colonies. The population of the prison capital of Magadan, on the Sea of Okhotsk, had reached 50,000 by 1939. Other prison camps were smaller but were also listed as urban areas,

since the census classified all settlements as either villages or cities. The ratio between free and prison population in the Far East has of course remained a secret, as have birth and death rates.³

The trends of the last decade, since the census of January, 1939, have not been made public. There can be no doubt, however, although no reliable statistical evidence is available, that a further growth of the population has taken place. New industrial enterprises have been established; coal mining in the Bureya basin and gold mining in the Kolyma region have assumed considerable proportions. Prison labor is also used for the construction of railroads and highways, in industrial construction, and in various digging jobs. The industrial equipment removed from Manchuria and Korea has been of importance in this connection during the first postwar years; details of its specific location and utilization, however, have not been revealed. At the same time, the greater part of the more than 600,000 Japanese prisoners of war were put to work on industrial and transport construction in the Far East.

The new Five-Year Plan provides for large-scale investments and wide expansion of the Far Eastern economy in 1946-50. It calls for the development of iron and steel centers and the creation of supplies of iron ore in the Far East. Petroleum extraction and refining are to be increased to the "maximum" in the Far East, particularly on Sakhalin. Electric power supply is to be expanded. Timber felling and timber-transport roads are being increased, chiefly in areas where logs can be floated downstream. "Fishing shall be widely extended in the northern and Far Eastern waters, especially off South Sakhalin, the Kurile Islands, and Kamchatka."⁴ The fishing industry in South Sakhalin is to be improved by the adoption of new techniques and the reconstruction of processing plants. Construction of ports is to be completed in the Far East. The network of air lines connecting European Russia with the Far East is to be developed. "At the iron and steel plant in the Far East a coke-chemical department and a blast furnace shall be built and put into operation, and the open-hearth and rolling departments expanded." Coking-coal mining and processing is to be organized in

3. D. J. Dallin and B. I. Nicolaevsky, *Forced Labor in Soviet Russia* (Yale University Press, 1947).

4. Law on the Five-Year Plan, adopted March 16, 1946, *passim*.

the Far East. A liquid fuel industry is to be set up in eastern Siberia. New centers of the textile industry are to be established in the Far East. In general, "due attention" will be paid by the state and economic agencies to the new areas of the Soviet Union, in particular the southern part of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands.

The program is extensive and ambitious. Yet a sense of reality is needed to evaluate the economic progress being made in the Far East. The Russian Far East still remains an immense wilderness, with huge unexplored mountain ranges and impassable forests where man has never trodden, with settlements, large and small, dispersed all over the great area and often located at great distances from one another, but clustering primarily in the south. Even after the acquisition of new territories, the aggregate population of the Soviet Far East amounts to less than 2 per cent of the population of the whole of Russia.

THE BALANCE SHEET

The development of the Russian Far East was a costly enterprise to its mother country under both the Empire and the Soviets; it was costly both in lives and in expenditures, necessitating enormous investments on the part of the rest of the nation.

In the early decades, when the land was being opened up, it seemed natural that the state would have to spend millions. But when the expenditures continued to rise Russia began to ask herself whether she could get out of the Far East anything to equal what she had put in. A scientific work published in Moscow in 1909, which summed up the history of the first half century of the Russian Far East, arrived at the conclusion that "The Far East has been costly. Amur is a gigantic pump, which extracts enormous riches from the Russian center and carries them into China and America." ⁵

The authors made up a startling bill, arriving at the sum of 3.4 billion rubles as the total of Russian investments and war expenditures in the Far East from the middle of the nineteenth century to 1905. Instead of diminishing as the economy of the Far East expanded, expenditures continued to grow. The cost of the Far East

5. *Primurye* (Moscow, 1909), pp. 168-169.

to the Russian treasury amounted to about two million rubles for the year 1860, and rose to 15 millions for 1910. "There is no reason to expect that these deficits will diminish," the authors argued. "Every year the Far East demands new expenditures. A conscientious study of the material leads us to bitter doubts: Can we achieve anything at all on that vast historical stage on which a coincidence of events has suddenly placed us?" The authors could give no definitive answer; nor was any given by the events of pre-1914 Russian history.

In the years just before the first World War an economic boom was in progress in the Far East. Cities grew, new settlers arrived, industry developed. But the source of this apparent robustness was only the millions of rubles which streamed from Russia. And what would the situation have been had the flow of funds stopped and the Russian Far East been compelled to live on its own resources? On the eve of the first World War the great newspaper, *Russkiya Vedomosti*, summed up the situation in these words: "Little but gloomy news is heard from the Far East. It is a country of wars, pestilence, bandits, costly adventures. It is a country to which one may travel to make money, but it is better not to visit it at all . . . The belief prevails that we are not firmly established on the Pacific Coast and on the shores of the Amur. Everybody is convinced that the Amur region has no stable population."

And then the newspaper reiterated the ominous doubt that already existed concerning the Russian Far East—the question which lay at the core of all Russian Far Eastern problems: "The main source of existence of the Amur region is not to be found in its soil, nor in its gold output, its industrial plants or its fisheries, but in those millions which are spent here by the state every year."⁶

In 1924-25, when civil war and Japanese occupation had come to an end, the Russian Far East stood, so it seemed, at the threshold of a new life. Great hopes were cherished now. The doubts and pessimism which had formerly prevailed gave way to great expectations.

Russia possessed the Amur region for a period of over 60 years. The history of the colonization of the Western states of North America has shown that half this time would have been sufficient for the Americans to awaken this rich country. This failed to occur in the Russian Far

6. Y. Liguin, *Na dal'nem vostoke* (1913).

East because of the Tsarist policy which tended toward the seizure of ever new territories and not toward the development of regions already possessed . . . The colonization of the Amur regions had the character of a military colonization.⁷

It is assumed that under the Soviet system a period of peaceful development would begin in the Russian Far East; that the region would not reassume its former function of a military base for the conquest of Manchuria and Korea; that it would now be able to stand on its own feet.

Subsequent developments did not confirm these hopes. In the late 'twenties the deficits in the budgets of the Soviet Union chargeable to the Far East again amounted to between 13 and 16 million rubles a year, aside from the important subventions for industry and agriculture. The First Five-Year Plan, published in 1930, noted that "the Far Eastern region remains so far a country that shows a deficit."

And then the amounts appropriated for the Far East in the budgets and five-year plans rose rapidly: under the First Five-Year Plan 2.5 per cent; under the Second 4.1 per cent; and under the Third 10 per cent.

Again, as in prerevolutionary periods, the Far East drained enormous sums from the rest of the nation. Again a revival and increased industrial development were the result of investments from outside; again the Far East found itself a nexus of international tensions. Its rapid industrialization was a military development rather than a normal economic one.

It is not possible to calculate the cost of the Far East to Russia during recent decades. Most of the financial items are unknown; state budgets are not published in full detail; military expenses have remained a state secret. There is no doubt, however, that taken together, capital investments, administrative costs, and military expenses in the 20 years following the Revolution constituted a very large sum—many billions of rubles—which flowed from within Russia to the Pacific. Despite output of gold and coal, the sums spent during the last decades were far larger than the sums expended before the Revolution. The Far East has become more and more costly.

More painful, however, than the material costs have been the

7. Baransky, *Ekonomicheskaya geografiya* (1926), p. 238.

human losses resulting from the Far Eastern conflicts. For Russia the Far East has proved to be volcanic ground, with eruptions following one another periodically at short intervals. During the last four decades no less than six wars were fought by Russia in the Far East. The Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5 took a toll of 43,400 dead and 140,000 wounded, of whom 43,000 were permanently disabled. No information is available regarding the losses in other Far Eastern conflicts: in the fight against the 1918-22 intervention; in the military clash with China in 1929; in the short but bloody encounters with Japan in the summer of 1938 and again in the summer of 1939. The brief war against Japan in August, 1945, cost Russia 8,219 killed and 22,264 wounded.

It is futile to argue the point whether or not the acquisition, population, and defense of the Far East by Russia represented a necessary and reasonable undertaking. The fact remains that today the territories of the Far East constitute an organic province of Russia, peopled by millions of Russians, with their own agriculture and industry, with culture and customs inseparably bound to those of the rest of Russia. A separation of the Far East from Russia is now out of the question. Even in the case of military defeat the forcible separation of the Far East would be only temporary since national and cultural forces of striking magnitude would begin to work in favor of reunification.

The Russian Far East will remain Russian. But what is the Far East in the Russian scheme of things? Is it merely one of numerous provinces, or is it a springboard of Russian expansion? Is the population of the area entitled to a normal economic and cultural life, or is it to be considered the human material of a military base, exposed to all the implicit risks and losses? Is the Russian Far East the natural end of a century-long movement to the east, or is it the beginning of a new penetration into other lands and a jumping-off place into the great areas of the Orient?

The new situation that arose in the Far East in 1945 would make it possible to convert the Russian Far Eastern lands into peaceful provinces and to provide certain guarantees of normal life. The danger from Japan has disappeared. China will be no threat for generations to come. Further economic development and increased utilization of its resources would make it possible for the people of

the region at least to stand on their own feet and to become an organic element of the great organism of Russia.

The Moscow government has given its answer to the all-important problem of the Far East. In the pursuit of its policy of expansion, in its boundless dynamism, it is developing the area into a new fortress, subjected once again to all the vicissitudes of military operations. Its dynamism has increased far beyond the accomplishments of its imperial predecessor at the peak of its successes in the Far East, in the decade from 1895 to 1904. The contemplated Soviet sphere in eastern Asia is considerably bigger than was the "Kuropatkin sphere" 50 years ago. The inclusion of Mongolia, Manchuria, and North Korea into the Soviet orbit is almost completed, while the drive to the South continues in the process of the Chinese civil war.

The new Far Eastern Cominform is destined to be one of the principal channels of this policy. In November, 1947, the first post-war conference of the Eastern Communist parties took place in Harbin, the Russo-Chinese capital of northern Manchuria. In his Christmas report of 1947 to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Mao Tse-tung, the "Chinese Stalin," referred to the new Communist International which had been set up for nine European parties in Belgrade, and declared that a similar organization should be established "to coordinate the liberation movements of the billion people of the Far East." The reluctance to proceed with such an organization was understandable since the alleged independence of Chinese Communism for international Communism had been successfully played up as a political propaganda asset by the Chinese Communists. But now this propaganda had lost its persuasive power and could readily be discarded. The way was open for the creation of a Far Eastern Cominform.

For the vast Soviet sphere in Asia—in China, Korea, and Mongolia—the specific weight of the Russian Far East lies not in its numbers or size but in its backdrop: the Soviet Union in Europe. It is in Moscow that the currents are generated which build up the Russian Far East into a mighty fortress on the shores of the Pacific and which aim relentlessly at expanding to the south, penetrating into the island empire to the east, and erecting a Soviet "co-prosperity sphere" for the Chinese, Mongol, Korean, and Japanese peoples under Soviet Russian leadership.

By this drive into China, Korea, and the Pacific, the Soviet Union has upset the Far Eastern security pattern which the United States had been slowly setting up for itself in the Orient. The Far Eastern policy of the United States has never been a consistent and logical one. During the 50 years in which the United States could be thought of as a Far Eastern Power American policy has wavered and vacillated, a disappointment to the peoples of Asia because they found it impossible either to understand it or to rely upon it. Yet in spite of its amateurishness, inconsistency, and weakness, this unconscious and unplanned policy of the American people appears to derive from a principle capable of rational analysis.

Americans have seen the Far Eastern problem as one involving primarily the relationship of Russia and Japan to each other and to China. Korea, Indo-China, Siam, and Australia are only minor elements in this configuration. If either Japan or Russia were to gain mastery over the other, that victory would mean also the mastery of China as well and would be tantamount to eventual control over the entire Far East. But domination of the Far East by one power is as great a threat to American security as domination of Europe by a single power. It has become more and more the conscious function of American policy, therefore, to forestall or to destroy such a concentration of power in the hands of either Japan or Russia. The United States has felt itself secure when Russia and Japan were more or less in balance; it has consequently thrown its political weight to the side of the weaker against the stronger whenever the maintenance of that equilibrium made such action desirable. At such times the American Government could rely on the support of public opinion, which was resentful of the expansionist drives of the stronger power and sympathetic with the weaker.

The United States resented the acquisition of the Kwantung Peninsula by Japan in 1895. When, a few years later, the Russian Government proceeded to acquire that very area for itself and refused to withdraw its armies from Manchuria, public sentiment as well as government support shifted in Japan's favor. During the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5 American public opinion was vigorously pro-Japanese, and the United States let it be understood that it would go to war on Japan's side if any other power allied itself with Russia. After Russia's defeat in 1905 a certain balance be-

tween the two contestants became evident in the Far Eastern picture. The balance was again upset during the first World War and especially after the Russian Revolution. When Japan made use of her superiority to gain control of China and occupy the Russian Far East, American policy took a stand against Japan and forced her to retreat in the early 'twenties. Japan's renewed drive into the Asiatic mainland early in the 'thirties led to a rapprochement between Washington and Moscow that culminated in the military alliance between them in 1945.

Geography has always made China the first casualty in any conflict between Japan and Russia. Before either power could attack the other, it had to conquer parts of Manchuria and northern China. China was always too weak to offer any successful resistance to the aggression of either Japan or Russia. The first reaction of the United States at such times was to support the "independence and territorial integrity" of China, as the formula went, as an initial move in its efforts to keep the Far East from falling under the sway of either of the two Great Powers seeking domination.

The most important consequence of the second World War was to make Russia the dominant power in the Far East as well as in Europe. At both ends of the Eurasian continent Russia has made territorial acquisitions, direct and indirect, of unprecedented proportions. In both areas the United States has been somewhat slow to grasp the implications of the new situation and to define its policies accordingly. For more than two years it applied obsolete formulas to Korea, while in China it showed disorientation, impotence, and a curious lack of comprehension. Therefore its influence in China has been sporadic, controversial, and often futile. The cause of this disorientation was probably the feeling of security that prevailed in the United States after the war. There has not yet developed any general sentiment that the recent developments in Manchuria, Korea, and north China are of *vital* import to the United States. The presence of American forces in Japan has contributed to this inflated sense of security.

But the American occupation of Japan will have to end in the not-too-distant future. Japan will either be drawn into the great Soviet "coprosperity sphere of eastern Asia" or will try to oppose and resist the Russian advance, and this it will be able to do only as an ally of the United States. The first hazy contours of an

American-Japanese collaboration to oppose the expanding Soviet Union are already discernible. The pattern of realignment of the powers is to be seen: the Soviet Union, northern China, and North Korea against non-Communist China, South Korea, and Japan, backed by the United States.

To attain its goals the Soviet Government has often had to act contrary to treaties and agreements which it had itself signed and affirmed. Over a period of two decades Moscow tried hard to build up for itself a reputation for strict adherence to international law and international obligations. To establish such a reputation was not easy for a government that had emerged out of revolution and begun its existence by denouncing treaties and debts. By the end of the 'thirties it had almost succeeded. It contended that while it had repudiated prerevolutionary Russian commitments, it adhered strictly to obligations assumed subsequent to 1917. Yet hard as Moscow strove to maintain this element of Soviet prestige the newly acquired reputation had to be sacrificed if the newest Great Designs were to be realized. For the execution of its program a breach of pledges became inevitable.

The Soviet Government's formal promise to China in 1945 that it would evacuate Manchuria within three months after the armistice with Japan was broken, and its armies remained in Manchuria for six months after the expiration of the dead line. The Soviet Government violated the Moscow agreement of 1945 by preventing the economic unification of Korea, by setting up a North Korean Government, and by establishing a large army in North Korea. Moscow acted in violation of international law when it removed from Manchuria and Korea industrial equipment worth about one billion dollars, labeling it "war booty." It broke the Potsdam agreement, which provided for the immediate repatriation of Japanese prisoners of war; it transferred the Japanese to Siberia and put them to work on Soviet projects. At the conservative estimate of \$4 as the value of the daily production of an average worker, the six to seven hundred thousand Japanese thus utilized by Russia (up to the summer of 1948) have yielded, as reparations in the form of man power from Japan, the staggering sum of over two billion dollars. The Soviet Government violated its pledge to China to give "moral and material support" to the Central

Government only; actually in not a single instance was "moral support" given to the Central Government, while multilateral aid—moral, political, and material—was steadily accorded the internal enemies of the Central Government, and de facto recognition was extended to the Communists in Manchuria. In violation of the Moscow Declaration, the great port of Dairen remained closed to Chinese administration and trade. Moscow broke its formal pledge not to interfere in the affairs of the Province of Sinking; it supported and armed groups of separatists and helped, in effect, to set up a separate state. It made a farce of the plebiscite held in Outer Mongolia which was to decide whether or not the Mongols wanted to remain under Chinese sovereignty. It violated international law in holding elections to the Supreme Soviet in Southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands, in order to demonstrate the finality of the political changes introduced there, before these areas were definitely ceded to the Soviet Union by a treaty of peace . . .

This incomplete list of obligations violated, pledges broken, and rules of international law disregarded represents the necessary corollary of the "dynamic" policy of extending borders, widening "spheres," and creating puppet states under puppet governments. Once a power embarks upon a policy of forcible empire building, defiance of laws and treaties becomes a matter of course. This was true of Mussolini's drive into Ethiopia, of Hitler's conquest of Europe, and of the Japanese effort to erect the "Greater East Asia."

This was also true of the first Russian drive into China and Korea early in this century. Russia did not require these vast areas at the time; nor does she need them today for economic advantage or settlement or for reasons of security. They were acquired in order to enhance the power of the state and to invest its rulers with an aura of greatness and invincibility. The people of Russia, indifferent to these colonial expeditions, were consulted neither by the tsarist government 50 years ago nor by Stalin's government today. The indifference and aversion on the part of the Russian people to Far Eastern conquests spring from the sound realization that new exploits and adventures in the Far East can only lead to catastrophe for Russia.

A demilitarized Japan and a weakened China at the end of the

second World War should have provided sufficient assurance of Russia's security from any threat from the east. The rehabilitation of the Orient could have been begun—and continued for a long time to come—along purely economic and cultural lines. Now, however, the natural response to the Soviet acts will be the remilitarization of the neighboring nations. Once again history will show that conquest and acquisition of lands and goods and the requisitioning of man power on a mass scale are only of transitory, momentary benefit. Ultimately they are bound to exact a heavy cost in material and lives.

For the Far East the fighting is not yet over. The Far East stands on the threshold of a new series of hostilities which will exact a heavy toll in human lives before stability and progress return there.

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